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FOREWORD
When this research project was launched in the second half of 2012
the world economy faced an uncertain future after the crisis. The ﬁ-
nancial and economic crisis set back the growth of the world’s most
developed countries – among others those in the European Union –
and highlighted existing structural problems. At the same time
emerging markets such China, India and Brazil enjoyed the beneﬁts
of their economic growth. In a globally integrated world economy
where economies and societies are intensely shaped by transforma-
tive forces, including economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal
and technological seismic shifts, no country can decouple itself from
global processes, be that development or decline. Global issues are
determinative for Central European Visegrad countries Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. This means that the historical
and geographical background of these countries are of special im-
portance. The location of Central Europe, at the intersection of the
western and eastern interests, and the western orientation and
process of catching up to Europe’s developed core area, determine
the system of reference. Europe is facing new challenges not only
internally but externally as well. There are several old and new issues
which at the beginning of the research had not escalated, but which
will inﬂuence the future development of the EU. These include among
others the new chapter of transatlantic relations with the US, espe-
cially free trade issues, increasing economic and the rising political
inﬂuence of China and Russia, security policy issues of the Middle
East and North Africa, as well as the national policies regarding
refugees and emigrants. 
This book presents the results of research supported by the Inter-
national Visegrad Fund in an attempt to summarize those political,
social and economic challenges that can inﬂuence the future of
Visegrad cooperation. We focus on internal as well as external effects
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and issues. The research was implemented under the direction of the
Institute for World Economics of the Centre for Economic and Re-
gional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The other
three partners are the Warsaw School of Economics from Poland,
the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy from the Czech Re-
public and the Institute of Economic Research of the Slovak Academy
of Sciences from Slovakia. In the discussion of the topic we also in-
volved other researchers from the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs and the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
This summary edition of the research consists of the studies pre-
pared in the framework of the project “Prospects of the Visegrad co-
operation in changing economic, political and social Conditions”.
During the implementation of the project we kept in mind that one of
the added values of the project should be deeper knowledge relevant
to each country covered. Therefore, at ﬁrst, Krisztina Vida summa-
rized the actual challenges facing the European Union by highlighting
the latest governance trends and possible future scenarios of the EU.
She also discussed the positions of the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis
the latest governance developments and recommended some prin-
ciples to follow when jointly shaping the future structure of the Union.
In the following parts of the volume Polish, Czech and Slovak reﬂec-
tions and standpoints were expounded – by Elżbieta Kawecka-
Wyrzykowska, Vladimír Bartovic and Boris Hošoff respectively –
regarding EU governance and the future of the V4 cooperation. In-
creasing Russian inﬂuence in the Central European region was
analysed by András Rácz. We placed a special focus on the similar-
ities and differences among external policies of the V4 members. In
the economic section Krisztina Vida evaluated the main aspects of
real and nominal convergence of the V4 in the ﬁrst decade of EU
membership. Her SWOT analysis helps to identify the factors that
strengthen or weaken cooperation. Competitiveness and world eco-
nomic integration has a key role in the economic catching up
process. Gábor Túry analysed the main trends regarding international
competitiveness of the Visegrad countries with a special focus on
their export structure, especially integration into global value chains.
Last but not least social trends of the V4 members were analyzed by
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (Poland), Vladimír Bartovic (Czech
Foreword
Republic), Boris Hošoff (Slovakia) and Annamária Artner (Hungary).
Beside analysing the main trends, the authors focused on main chal-
lenges and possibilities in order to create successful social inclusion
in the V4 countries.
At the end of this book Judit Kiss formulated the main converging
and diverging forces that determine the future of Visegrad coopera-
tion, highlighting political, economic and social differences and sim-
ilarities. At the end of the summary recommendations to the decision
makers are formulated in order to deepen Visegrad cooperation and
draw attention to possible threats and challenges. 
Gábor Túry
editor
Budapest, July 2015
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EU GOVERNANCE TRENDS
– DILEMMAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
Krisztina Vida1
Introduction
The institutional structure of European integration has been going
through important changes since its inception. This process has been
accompanied by recurrent and competing proposals on its ideal
model. This study attempts to brieﬂy outline the past, recent and cur-
rent trends and challenges of EU governance, and – on the basis of
those developments – offers some scenarios that can be expected
in the near future. In the light of the governance trends and potential
scenarios, it ﬁnally formulates some modest recommendations for
the high-level policy-makers of the Visegrad countries. The aim of
those recommendations is to contribute to an eventual joint position
of the four countries while shaping the future of the European Union.
EU governance: 
past and recent trends and challenges
Governance issues have been on the agenda of European integration
from the outset. In 1949, when the Council of Europe was founded,
the battle between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists
ended with the victory of the latter group. Two years later, when the
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty was signed, the same
9
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dilemma was circumvented: not a top-down federation but a special
kind of supranational integration was launched. The new type of gov-
ernance – being more than intergovernmental but less than federal –
was however meant to lead in the longer run to a kind of a bottom-
up European federation. Ever since the 1950s (with the birth of all
three founding Treaties) we usually speak about a sui generis Com-
munity or now Union – meaning a special alliance of states where an
increasing part of national sovereignty is being transferred to the
supranational level where it is pooled and exercised in common via
the institutions. This sui generis system has been characterised by
an important evolution of the institutional balance among the Euro-
pean Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, accom-
panied by an equally spectacular evolution of Community law and
federal type competences of the European Court of Justice.2
In the integration process, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 repre-
sented a quantum leap as the EC/EU became responsible, in one way
or another, for many areas well beyond market integration and ac-
quired responsibilities similar to a federal state. These ambitious
changes (i.e. economic and monetary union, internal security issues,
foreign policy, etc.) however have not been accompanied by a thor-
ough institutional reform resembling a kind of a federal model. On the
contrary, from the point of view of governance, a certain fragmenta-
tion could be witnessed due to both the new pillar structure and the
opt-outs by some member states. While in the ﬁeld of monetary inte-
gration a truly federal structure was to be introduced, in the area of
economic and social integration the Community method was pre-
served, but in internal security and foreign policy issues an intergov-
ernmental approach prevailed. At the same time, from the Maastricht
Treaty onwards, the variable geometry of integration became a reality
with some member countries not participating in some policy areas.
From the early 1990s onwards – through the Amsterdam and Nice
Treaties – up until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,
governance modes became increasingly complex, going well beyond
the simple categorisation of Community versus intergovernmental
2 See among others: Josselin–Marciano (2006)
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methods.3 Beyond the lack of transparency another challenge was
the upcoming historical enlargement as well as the fact that not all
the member states were willing and/or able to participate in all proj-
ects of European integration. 
As a response to these challenges, since the ﬁrst half of the 1990s,
innovative ideas on a two-tier EU and the re-emergence of federalism
came to the fore. One of the best known ideas was the Schäuble-
Lahmers initiative in 1994 about the future structure of European in-
tegration. In this paper4 the authors – as representatives of the
German Christian Democratic party alliance (CDU/CSU) – argued for
the establishment of a so-called “hard core”, composed of (initially
ﬁve) countries introducing the single currency. The hard core should
however remain open towards those member countries which would
be able to join later. At the same time, the initiative also emphasised
the importance of subsidiarity including an eventual repatriation of
competences from European to national levels. Actually, they pro-
moted the idea of an EU organised into a federal model, based on a
constitution-like document. Another important milestone in the com-
mon thinking about the future of the EU was the rather similar model
presented by then foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer in
2000, in a speech at the Humboldt University.5 This concept urged
the willing and able member states to re-establish the EU on a federal
basis with new structures. This “avant-garde” group or “centre of
gravity” would be open to the rest of the member countries and
would exercise a pulling effect on them. These proposals paralleled
with European Commission President Jacques Delors’6 concept on
a federation of nation states. In his various speeches/interviews in
the 1990s, Mr. Delors referred to federalism as a method of organis-
ing competences between the EU and the member states and not
as an attempt to build up the United States of Europe. “A federal
structure is the only kind of structure that could boost our clout with
the rest of the world, yet without weakening either the nation state or
3 See on this topic among many others: Missiroli (2011)
4 Schäuble–Lahmers (1994) 
5 Fischer (2000) 
6 Mr. Delors was head of the European Commission between 1985-1995.
11
Krisztina Vida12
member countries’ domestic democracy. It clearly sets out who is re-
sponsible for doing what.”7 Delors also recognised the necessity of
differentiation within an ever widening Union and at one point he even
proposed the idea of a “Treaty in the Treaty”8 (to be concluded by
those committed to federalism). 
While the recurrent ideas on federalism as a method did inspire
the Lisbon Treaty, the two-tier model has been asserting itself in the
past few years in response to the crisis. The Lisbon Treaty (namely
the Treaty on the European Union, TEU, and the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, TFEU) actually preserved the initial
sui generis nature of the EU where different policy areas are being
governed with different intensity/methods at the EU level. In fact,
most of the policies were grouped into exclusive, shared or com-
plementary competences which can be carried out via the so-called
Community method. At the same time, some areas that did not ﬁt
into these categories, are being managed either via coordination
(economic and employment policies) or via intergovernmental deci-
sion-making (foreign affairs, security and defence policy). The Lisbon
Treaty did not bring substantial deepening about, and it also pre-
served the existing institutional structure with several innovations
however (e.g. permanent President of the European Council, High
Representative-Vice President, ordinary legislative procedure as a
rule, reforms in the size of the Commission and the voting mecha-
nism in the Council). 
While – along the lines of the Constitutional Treaty – the Lisbon
Treaty did not (want to) create a federal Europe, it reinforced its fed-
erative nature to some extent (e.g. delimitation of competences, the
“bicameral” system thanks to the ordinary legislative procedure, the
position of the “foreign minister”, or the declaration on the primacy
of EU law). On the other hand, it continues to guarantee the Treaty-
based framework for differentiation enacted by the Amsterdam
Treaty (Art. 20 of TEU on enhanced cooperation) while it also intro-
7 Jacques Delors is cited by Ricard-Nihoul (2012), p. 2. 
8 Joannin (2008) 
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duced the possibility of repatriation of competences (Art. 48 of TEU
on ordinary revision procedure) as well as that of leaving the Union
(Art. 50 of TEU) – features not typical for federations. Despite the
lack of a fully-ﬂedged federal structure (let alone transforming the
EU into a state), the Constitutional Treaty failed in two referenda and
the Lisbon Treaty in one – pointing to alarming legitimacy chal-
lenges. This fact combined with growing Euroscepticism (see Figure
1) must be an important lesson for those who would like to push for
“more Europe” in terms of both competences and institutional re-
structuring, even if in the name of more transparency, democracy
and efﬁciency. 
Figure 1. Trust in the EU average
Source: Eurobarometer (spring waves, 2010-2014)
At the time of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the most
serious ﬁnancial and economic crisis ever hit the European Union.
The crisis has actually been exercising two parallel impacts on Eu-
ropean integration: a centripetal one (pushing for deeper coopera-
tion in some key areas than ever before) and a centrifugal one (UK’s
reservations about membership, strengthening Euroscepticism
among EU citizens and the rise of Eurosceptic parties). The reason
is simple: as mentioned, since the Maastricht Treaty, but more in-
tensively since the crisis, the EU increasingly behaves like a state
while it still suffers from legitimacy gaps. Thus, even if the EU is not
and will never become a state, due to its mounting functions – re-
cently including the politically so sensitive area of national ﬁscal poli-
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cies – it has to close the legitimacy gap. As this tension is being felt
for a long time by analysts9 and recently also by EU leaders, the
issue of a more democratic political union is being discussed more
intensely than ever before. The debate is once again about the future
structures and governance of the Union which – beyond the usual
issues of legitimacy and efﬁciency – should also be able to respond
to both the mentioned centripetal and the centrifugal pressures.
The past few years in terms of governance:
stability by complexity?
Since the outbreak of the crisis, the EU has been using mixed meth-
ods and instruments to tackle it and there has been a boom of new
institutions, legislation and ﬁnancial tools proposed/created. Here
the centripetal and centrifugal forces became visible. On the one
hand, all the member states were united in some initiatives to tackle
the crisis and work together (e.g. European Semester, Europe 2020
Strategy, Six-pack, Two-pack, Deposit Guarantee Scheme), on the
other hand, there were initiatives not supported by all members (Euro
Plus Pact, Fiscal Compact) and again others not involving everybody
(e.g. European Stability Mechanism Treaty, Single Surveillance Mech-
anism). Table 1 shows the main building blocks of the EU’s response
to the crisis in terms of governance. It also shows the great variety
of instruments and implementation methods used. (Table 1)
As it can be seen, those measures are completing the incomplete
ediﬁce of EMU set by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact, and they also represent substantial guarantees to pre-
vent from similar (primarily ﬁnancial and ﬁscal) crises in the future.
There is however an obvious mixture of the Community method and
the so-called Union method – promoted by the leaders of Germany
and France – in terms of both preparation of proposals (see the rivalry
between the European Commission and the Van Rompuy Task
Force) and the end result.10 This mixed approach and the patchwork
9 For example by Hix (2008) or Sarduski (2013)
10 Highlighted among others by Chang (2013)
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nature of the above mentioned measures and instruments is however
very detrimental to transparency and accountability. It also makes
the whole machinery of economic and ﬁscal policy governance ex-
tremely complex and bureaucratic.12 Of course, the constant dialogue
between especially the euro area member governments and the EU
institutions can in the long run lead to enhanced stability of EMU, but
transparency, legitimacy and accountability still remain an issue in
the coming years. All the more, that there are no clear lines between
national policy discretion and the depth of EU-level inﬂuence on the
highly sensitive budgetary strategies of member states; which can
result in conﬂicts and spark a more vivid debate on national sover-
eignty.13 Another obvious consequence of these developments is the
unfolding model of an institutionalised two-tier EU strengthening the
dividing lines between euro-ins and euro-outs. Whether the inner cir-
cle will move towards more federalism, remains to be seen.
Scenarios of future EU structures based on
recent trends and proposed reforms 
Since autumn 2012, several important speeches and proposals must
be mentioned when scrutinising the ideas and initiatives on future
European structures and governance. In a chronological order the
ﬁrst one was the speech on the state of the Union by the then Com-
mission President Barroso in September 2012.14 In this speech Mr.
Barroso urged for an upgraded economic integration (based on the
single market), for a stronger economic and monetary union and ﬁ-
nally for a political union. In his view, while most aspects of the ﬁrst
two dimensions can be done in the present Treaty framework, for the
11 Van Rompuy–Barroso–Juncker–Draghi (2012) p. 5.
12 It is enough to mention the Annual Growth Surveys, the National Reform Programmes, the
Stability/Convergence Programmes, the Commission Staff Working Documents, the Country-
Speciﬁc Recommendations, the Alert Mechanism Reports, the In-Depth Reviews, etc.
13 Recently in an interview Jacques Delors criticised the European Commission for asking the
French government in its Country Speciﬁc Recommendation to reform the notary system: an
issue out of EU competence and irrelevant in ﬁghting the crisis. As he put it: “The high ofﬁcials
(of the Commission) should not come too often to give lessons to the governments.” Reconst-
ruire la grande Europe, Tribune, 19/06/2013, p. 5. http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/reconst-
ruiregrandeeurope-delors-ne-ijd-juin13.pdf?pdf=ok
14 José Manuel Barroso: State of the Union 2012 Address, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-rele-
ase_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm
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indispensible political union there is a need to create the European
federation of nation states. This however – as he underscored –
should not mean a superstate. It should rather be: “A democratic fed-
eration of nation states that can tackle our common problems,
through the sharing of sovereignty in a way that each country and
each citizen are better equipped to control their own destiny. This is
about the Union with the Member States, not against the Member
States. In the age of globalisation pooled sovereignty means more
power, not less.” To build the federation of nation states, Barroso
pleaded for a new Treaty – i.e. not an amended Lisbon Treaty but a
new one. He emphasised that we have to be careful about this, and
that such a process has to be well prepared. 
In fact, in this respect a key prerequisite would be a German-French
accord but – despite championing for “more Europe” – so far neither
of the two parties seems to favour explicitly a European Federation
of Nation States. On the German side it is important to highlight the
legal difﬁculties. In 2009, the German Constitutional Court has ruled
that the Lisbon Treaty should be seen as the upper limit of European
integration, and further deepening would not be compatible with the
German Basic Law. For a deeper integration, let alone a European
Federation, Germany would need a new constitution which can be
problematic.15 Moreover, in her speech in Bruges in 2010, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated the Union method (instead of
the Community or the federal approach)16. On the French side, there
are also reservations vis-à-vis the federal concept. France under
President Nicolas Sarkozy has been supportive of German ideas on
reinforcing cooperation at the European level to ﬁght the crisis. Be-
yond strengthened economic and ﬁscal policies and a banking union
President Hollande would also be in favour of more Europe in terms
of solidarity, employment and social policy, a bigger common
budget, stronger defence cooperation, etc. – but certainly not in the
form of a European federation. He would rather support a differenti-
ated Europe based on a kind of variable geometry involving different
15 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html
16 http://www.bruessel.diplo.de/contentblob/2959854/Daten
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willing and able countries into different policy areas. In his view,
greater democracy in the EU should be ensured via the strong role
of the European Parliament.17
Towards the end of 2012, further moves in the direction of substantial
deepening have been proposed by EU leaders; one by the European
Commission18 and the other one by the then European Council Presi-
dent Herman Van Rompuy.19 Taking an ambitious stance, both papers
called for substantial further deepening in the direction of ﬁnancial,
budgetary and economic integration accompanied by more political
accountability. A highly important common element in both papers
was the contractual arrangement to be concluded between euro area
member states and EU institutions about longer term structural re-
forms, and “in exchange” a certain ﬁnancial support (Convergence and
Competitiveness Instrument) would be available to back those reforms
in the given member states.20 The ﬁnancial background of this would
actually be a new budget, parallel to the existing one. In terms of po-
litical union implying more democracy and accountability, the Van
Rompuy proposal suggested to accompany “further integration of pol-
icy-making and a greater pooling of competences at the European
level” with a “commensurate involvement of the European Parliament
in the integrated frameworks for a genuine EMU.”21 The paper added
the importance of fostering cooperation between national parliaments
and the EP – without specifying its mechanisms. The Commission pro-
posal went much more into details. Among others it also foresaw a
stronger role of the EP in the whole process of ﬁscal and economic
policy coordination. Furthermore, it proposed that members of the
Commission take part in debates of national parliaments about the
Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, on their request. By looking more
thoroughly into those drafts, they point to a more explicit split between
euro area ins and outs within the Commission, the Council and the EP.
17 Video of François Hollande’s speech (in French) before the EP on 5 February 2013:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6vsOoAALRY
18 European Commission (2012) 
19 Van Rompuy–Barroso–Juncker–Draghi (2012)
20 A comprehensive critical comparison and analysis of these two instruments can be read in
Vanden Bosch (2013) 
21 European Commission (2012), p. 16. 
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The next milestone was the speech given by British Prime Minister
David Cameron in January 2013.22 In this speech, Mr. Cameron high-
lighted the need to reform the EU, namely by making it more ﬂexible,
more adaptable, more accountable while also less bureaucratic and
able to make decisions faster. In his view, the repatriation of certain
competences to national levels should be feasible as “we cannot har-
monise everything”. Since there is no European demos, the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the EU should be strengthened via the national
parliaments. With a view to achieving such changes Mr. Cameron
would prefer to have a new Treaty, or in the absence of overall nego-
tiations on a new Treaty framework, he would push for a bilateral ne-
gotiation process between the UK and the rest of the EU. In his view:
“At some stage in the next few years the EU will need to agree on
treaty change to make the changes needed for the long-term future
of the euro and to entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically
accountable Europe that we seek. I believe the best way to do this will
be in a new treaty so I add my voice to those who are already calling
for this. My strong preference is to enact these changes for the entire
EU, not just for Britain. But if there is no appetite for a new treaty for
us all then of course Britain should be ready to address the changes
we need in a negotiation with our European partners.” By autumn
2014, the British balance of competence review was done23 to serve
as the concrete basis for future British EU policy/negotiations, and in
January 2015, the Prime Minister reiterated his push for a revised EU-
UK relationship embedded in a new EU Treaty.24 In any case, the
British citizens will be asked about staying in or leaving the EU, which
would take place in the near future (before the end of 2017 the latest),
in case of an electoral victory of the Conservative Party in May 2015. 
While the Brits are keen on Treaty change or a new Treaty, the
Dutch seem to be against it. At the same time, the Dutch government
22 Video of David Cameron’s speech:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ls60Wbq_dk
Full text: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referen-
dum
23 Review of the balance of competences: https://www.gov.uk/review-of-the-balance-of-com-
petences
24 BBC: David Cameron: I can ﬁx EU 'problem' http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
30701604
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also carried out a so-called subsidiarity review, in which they actually
listed those concrete areas (54 points) where the EU should and
where it should not act.25 But according to the Netherlands, these
important corrections can be done without any Treaty change. Some
other countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Finland26) have also been ac-
tive in re-thinking the EU’s responsibilities recently, but these moves
are rather shedding light on the key importance of subsidiarity (and
its actual practice by the EU institutions, as well as by the national
parliaments) than insisting on lengthy and “risky” Treaty change. 
At the EU level – due among others to the lengthy negotiations on
the multiannual ﬁnancial framework, the stubbornly high youth un-
employment, severe external policy challenges, or the renewal of the
membership of main EU institutions – the building up of the missing
pillars of the genuine EMU (with special regard to the banking union)
slowed down in 2013-2014. At the same time, governance issues did
not disappear from the agenda. For example, ﬁnance minister of Ger-
many, Mr. Wolfgang Schäuble reinstated his idea of a necessary hard
core at a conference in Brussels in 2014, and openly proposed the
setting up of separate euro area institutions.27 In his turn, Mr. Joschka
Fischer published a book in which he urges for a United States of
Europe, modelled on the Swiss federal system.28
The new European Commission, taking ofﬁce in November 2014,
is using a less ambitious and more pragmatic language when treating
governance issues (avoiding any hints to federalism, two-tier struc-
ture, or Treaty change). The Commission’s work programme for
2015, entitled “A new start”,29 stresses in connection with EMU gov-
ernance the following. “The architecture of the Economic Monetary
Union needs further strengthening so that the euro can maintain cit-
25 Government of the Netherlands (2013)
26 Győri (2014), p. 48.
27 Conference report entitled “20 ans après le “noyau dur européen” – où en sommes-nous?
Où allons-nous?” (“20 years after the “hard core” – where are we now, where are we going?”),
Jacques Delors Institut, Berlin, 30/09/2014 – http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/noyaudur-ko-
enig-jdi-b-sept14.pdf?pdf=ok
28 Fischer (2014)
29 European Commission (2014)
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izens’ conﬁdence, continue to weather market turbulence and create
the conditions for sustainable jobs and growth. Following its review
of the economic governance rules and actions to simplify and stream-
line the European Semester process, the Commission is working on
deepening the Economic and Monetary Union, developing proposals
on further steps towards pooled sovereignty in economic gover-
nance. This effort will be accompanied by actions to reinvigorate so-
cial dialogue at all levels.”30 By the same token, the new Commission
seems to feel the decline of citizens’ conﬁdence in the EU. As a re-
sult, it is committed to tackle this challenge with a pragmatic ap-
proach, by enhancing better regulation, by focusing exclusively on
what matter to citizens (with emphasis on growth and jobs) and by
eliminating rules that are outdated, or withdrawing proposals that are
unnecessary or would only increase red tape.31
Based on the above mentioned ideas and proposals, and also
based on current realities and citizens’ attitudes, we can broadly proj-
ect the following scenarios for governance developments in the near
future. (Table 2)
Some recommendations to the high-level 
policy-makers of the Visegrad countries
It seems to be quite a challenge to formulate recommendations to
the Visegrad (V4) countries on EU strategy as, apart from some
shared positions (e.g. in the ﬁeld of cohesion policy ﬁnancing, inter-
connection of transport and energy networks, enlargement and East-
ern Partnership32) these countries have different attitudes and also
occupy different positions in the Union.33
Poland – which weathered the crisis well, without any recession –
has been supportive of all anti-crisis measures taken by the EU since
2010 while favouring a strengthened economic governance. Its main
preoccupation has been to avoid any “second-class” membership
30 Ibid. p. 8.
31 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
32 See more on this topic in Vida (2012)
33 See more on the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in this volume.
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status, therefore the country acceded to all new institutions and in-
struments. In parallel, Warsaw is committed to abide by the rules on
ﬁscal discipline and to show a sustainable nominal convergence. At
the same time – even if it would guarantee a “ﬁrst class” membership
– for internal political reasons it remains highly difﬁcult for Poland to
join the euro in the near future. 
In its turn, the Czech Republic has been more sceptical about the
methods and new instruments of crisis management, especially
under the centre-right government. This attitude, accompanied by
the outright eurosceptic approach of the former President of the
Czech Republic Mr. Václav Klaus, resulted in the country’s abstention
from both the TSCG and the Euro Plus Pact. The new coalition gov-
ernment however – led by the social democrats – changed this
course, and the current government is prepared to join the Fiscal
Compact. Once backed by the parliament, it will certainly be en-
dorsed by the new, pro-EU President, Mr. Miloš Zeman too. 
Hungary occupied a place between these two behaviours. The
Hungarian government was fully in favour of the Six-pack, whose ne-
gotiations (among the member states and then between the Council
and the EP) coincided with the Hungarian presidency which has been
very successful in bringing the process to an end soon after (under
the Polish presidency). Hungary has also been committed to all re-
forms taken in the framework of the existing Treaties and institutions.
At the same time, Budapest has been more cautious vis-à-vis initia-
tives taken by Germany and France (without prior consultations with
the other member states) leading to new structures outside the Treaty
framework. In fact, Hungary did not join the Euro Plus Pact as it did
not support its objective to harmonise the corporate tax bases of the
member countries. On a voluntary basis however, Budapest is willing
to cooperate on all other aspects of the Pact, including employment
issues, sustainability of public ﬁnances or reinforcing the stability of
the ﬁnancial sector. With a view to avoiding a reinforced outsider sta-
tus and also showing its commitment to sound public ﬁnances, Hun-
gary actually signed the TSCG (but most of its provisions will be
binding on Hungary only upon its accession to the euro area). 
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Finally, being a euro-member since 2009, Slovakia did not and will
not have any choice but to join all new structures and instruments of
a “genuine economic and monetary union”. At the same time, this
did not happen without conﬂicts: adhesion to the ESM Treaty, and
thereby accepting Slovakia’s contribution to the new monetary fund,
led to an internal political stalemate and the resignation of the cen-
tre-right government led by Ms. Yveta Radicová in 2011. 
Table 3. Membership in crisis management instruments by the V4
*Voluntary joining to the SSM and SRM is possible for non-euro member states too
Despite the mentioned different attitudes and non-homogenous
status of the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis those key institutions and
instruments, some proposals can still be formulated that could serve
as a basis for V4 cooperation in shaping the future of European in-
tegration. A common denominator could be the recognition of the
EU’s already mentioned legitimacy gap and the necessity to do
something about it. To close this gap, the EU should make efforts
in two dimensions in the near future: it should try to strengthen both
its input and output legitimacy.34 When considering the future
structures and functioning of the EU and formulating the position of
the V4 countries on it, these two dimensions should serve as a com-
pass for them.
34 The concept – widely used in EU studies – was introduced by Fritz Scharpf. Its importance
was recently emphasised among others by Schmidt (2013) or Karaman (2013). 
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Name of instrument Membership by V4
Europe 2020 Strategy V4
European Semester V4
Six-pack, Two-pack V4
Fiscal Compact (TSCG) HU, PL, SK
Euro Plus Pact PL, SK
European Stability Mechanism SK
ESRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA V4
Single Supervisory/Resolution Mechanism SK+*
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On the one hand, there is a need to reinforce the input legitimacy
of the Union by strengthening its democratic aspects. In concrete
terms it would primarily mean to foster the emergence of a Euro-
pean demos. This could be done, among others, via the creation of
a genuine European media supplying EU-related news and offering
platforms for debates without taboos and double standards in all
EU languages. Also, the EP-elections could and should have been
“Europeanized” further. In fact, establishing a clearer link between
EP elections and the would-be President of the European Commis-
sion by naming the top-candidates, as well as presenting the pro-
grammes (manifestos) of the given political group were positive
steps in this direction in 2014. The establishment of a European
electoral law and of trans-European party lists35 and the discussion
of relevant and topical EU-related issues as well as the confronta-
tion of the different party strategies thereof would be desirable dur-
ing the electoral campaigns. A clearer link between the elected
MEPs and their constituencies should be organised, so that the 751
MEPs could become more accountable to their electorate. To this
end new forms of regular personal and virtual encounters should
be arranged. Furthermore, the national parliaments should get more
intensively involved into European affairs especially via the sub-
sidiarity control mechanism (which was so far used only twice36
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty). Finally, the more fre-
quent use of the European Citizens’ Initiative would also belong to
the appropriate tools to bring the EU closer to its citizens in terms
of input legitimacy. 
On the other hand, it would be equally important to reinforce the
output legitimacy of the Union. This would primarily mean a rein-
forced use of subsidiarity, advocated recently also by the Commis-
sion’s First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, who is actually
responsible (among others) for subsidiarity and better regulation.
With the help of subsidiarity taken seriously, the EU should focus on
35 Idea promoted among others by Habermas (2014)
36 European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_
other/npo/subsidiarity_en.htm#procedure
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policy areas which really matter for citizens37 and/or where it can re-
ally be more efﬁcient and effective compared to the national, regional
or local levels by bringing about an obvious added value. To such is-
sues of a cross-border dimension belong for example the strict sur-
veillance of the ﬁnancial sector, establishing trans-European
infrastructure networks, deepening energy policy, ﬁghting climate
change, promoting student exchange programmes, or tackling im-
migration from outside the EU, etc.38 Actions by the EU should reﬂect
citizens’ expectations tested also via Eurobarometer surveys or
channelled in via the members of the European Parliament who
would base their suggestions on consultations with their electorates.
It would also be important to inform the public on a regular basis
about what the EU could achieve vis-à-vis the above mentioned and
other challenges that preoccupy the ordinary citizens.
Regarding the unsuccessful/problematic ratiﬁcation processes of
the recent past (Nice Treaty, Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty) and
also keeping citizens’ scepticism in mind, coupled with an ever low-
ering participation in European Parliament elections,39 it could prob-
ably be a good strategy for the V4 countries to push for more input
and output legitimacy before any Treaty change is put on the
agenda.40 The V4 group, together with other allies could perhaps
draw up concrete proposals in both dimensions, ﬁrst in the frame-
work of the current primary law. Any Treaty change – or eventually a
new Treaty – could then be supported with a view to reinforcing those
37 Among others Simon Hix (Hix, 2008) draws attention to the fact that, based on Eurobaro-
meter surveys, there is often a discrepancy between what the EU is doing at the supranational
level (e.g. agricultural policy, trade liberalisation) and what really matters for its citizens (e.g.
immigration, education, health care, taxation). 
38 On every day level a positive example would be the lowering of the prices of mobile phone
conversations across the Union, while a negative one would be the failed proposal on how to
serve olive oil in restaurants. In a more general dimension, of course a more successful crisis
management in Greece would have strengthened the EU’s output legitimacy while its deadlock
magniﬁes the lack of it. 
39 Turnout at EP elections has been steadily declining from nearly 62% in 1979 to 42.5% in 2014.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-
2009%29.html
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html
40 Treaty change may be triggered by pressure from the UK or by other events (e.g. potential
Greek exit from the euro area) which would also be a good opportunity for inserting into the
Treaty those instruments which are currently outside of it (with special regard to the TSCG).
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initiatives which seem to bring about a tangible improvement of the
EU’s performance. In case the Union’s input and output legitimacy
are not reinforced in the near future, a deeper Euroscepticism can
be expected among EU citizens. Therefore, when reshaping the Eu-
ropean Union to enhance its legitimacy, voices from Eurosceptic or
simply more critical countries/parties should also be heard and the
V4 leaders as well as EU leaders should be more open-minded to-
wards their arguments too. 
To sum up, the following aspects might serve as a basis for elab-
orating future recommendations to the leaders of Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, in case this group would be deter-
mined to shape the upcoming developments of European integra-
tion. 
• To stand against ad hoc intergovernmental solutions in strategic de-
cision-making and to be careful about the so-called Union method;
• To stick to the Lisbon Treaty framework;
• To stick to the integrity of the institutions and the acquis; 
• To support initiatives for increased input and output legitimacy
ﬁrst within the Treaty framework;
• To elaborate joint proposals for reinforcing the EU’s input and out-
put legitimacy;
• To build up a dialogue with those who are more sceptical/critical; 
• To support any Treaty change (or a new Treaty) only 
– after some improvements of input and output legitimacy are
tangible,
– if it does not deepen an institutionalised two-tier model;
• To discuss regularly and harmonise interests/strategies vis-à-vis
the potential scenarios of future EU structures;
• To play a catalyst role in these discussions by creating a wider al-
liance network. 
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POLAND’S POSITION ON EU
GOVERNANCE TRENDS
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska1
Introduction 
The ﬁnancial and economic crisis revealed weak enforcement of the
Maastricht convergence criteria.2 The original rules of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), as speciﬁed in the Maastricht Treaty of
1992 and later elaborated in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of
1997, were adopted under the assumption that governments would
conduct responsible economic policies. Surveillance and the risk of
ﬁnes were expected to be sufﬁcient to force countries to ensure ﬁscal
discipline. Practice has shown that this idealised approach has not
been working. The ﬁnancial crisis that started in Fall 2008, followed
by a sovereign debt crisis and deep recession in many countries in
subsequent years, has revealed major macroeconomic imbalances,
including huge budgetary deﬁcits and public debts in the EU
1 Professor of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw
2 The weak governance was admitted by the European Commission in one of its recent Com-
munications: “The SGP was insufﬁciently observed by the member states and lacked robust
mechanisms to ensure sustainable public ﬁnances. The enforcement of the preventive arm of
the SGP, which requires that member states maintain a strong underlying budgetary position,
was too weak and member states did not use periods of steady growth to pursue ambitious
ﬁscal policies. At the same time, the debt criterion of the treaty was not rendered operational in
practice in the corrective arm of the SGP” (Communication from the Commission 2012, p. 2).
The crisis also conﬁrmed that the monetary union of the EU was sub-optimal from the theore-
tical point of view and did not meet all criteria necessary to conduct a single monetary policy
properly addressing the needs of all parts (member states) of the single currency area. In par-
ticular, the conditions of ﬂexibility of the labour market (via reduction of real salaries in case of
worsened competitiveness or via increased outﬂow of unemployed workers) and use of ﬁscal
transfers to address problems have not been met (Mundell 1961, pp. 509-517.). Last but not
least, the crisis revealed that a number of member states conducted irresponsible economic
policy, spending much more money from their budgets than revenues allowed.
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economies. In response to the sharp deterioration of ﬁscal positions
and sovereign debt crisis in the majority of member states, EU lead-
ers have been strengthening the EU economic governance frame-
work, in particular for eurozone member states. They have
undertaken a number of steps to enhance economic governance.3
Among the most important institutional measures is the implemen-
tation of a concept of European Semesters and of the Euro-Plus
Pact, a reinforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) with the
so-called Six-Pack and Two-Pack, as well as the entering into force
of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union – TSCG (the ﬁscal part of the TSCG, or
sometimes even the whole Treaty is referred to as the “Fiscal Com-
pact”). The assumption was that the entry into force of all above-
mentioned laws would improve economic and budgetary discipline
and its surveillance and ensure longer-term ﬁscal sustainability. 
Since the very beginning, the Polish government has supported all
initiatives serving enforced ﬁscal stability. In general, the position has
been that there is “a need to deepen integration and complete the
EMU, with current changes in the institutional framework of the EU
being a step in this direction.”4 The assumption has been that the
prerequisite for exiting the crisis is credible, timely and growth-
friendly ﬁscal consolidation. 
The thesis of this paper is that Poland has contributed to overcom-
ing the crisis through responsive domestic economic policy and
through active support for the adoption of stronger measures of eco-
3 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2013b)
4 Speech of Mr. J. Dominik, Government Plenipotentiary for the Euro Adoption in Poland at
the Conference, see:
http://www.mf.gov.pl/en/ministry-of-ﬁnance/poland-in-eu/euro-in-poland/events/-/asset_pub-
lisher/5djV/content/conference%3A-economic-governance-in-the-eu-euro-area-
%E2%80%93-what-lessons-for-poland-warsaw-5-july-2012;jsessionid=C3D93FEE86330979
CCDA96B364B22AAF?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mf.gov.pl%2Fen%2Fministry-of-ﬁ-
nance%2Fpoland-in-eu%2Feuro-in-poland%2Fevents%3Bjsessionid%3D382C96641
E3FF3B8D1ED56C58CF2E4A7%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_5djV%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0
%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p_p_col
_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D2
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nomic governance at the EU level. This role was particularly visible
during the Polish Presidency in the Council of the EU in the second
half of 2011.
Implementation of
European Semesters in Poland
Basing on the European Council conclusions of June 17, 2010, a new
approach towards economic surveillance and a new policy-making
timetable were agreed and introduced.5 EU leaders realised that ﬁ-
nancial support offered earlier to countries in need (Greece, Portugal
and others) is important but not sufﬁcient. Also, macroeconomic ex-
ante policy adjustments were necessary to reduce public ﬁnance ten-
sions and ensure long-term stability. As a result, the different strands
of economic policy coordination have been integrated in a new sur-
veillance cycle, the so-called European Semesters.6
The European Semester represents a new approach toward eco-
nomic surveillance, including a new policy-making timetable. First
put into practice during the ﬁrst half of 2011, it ensures that EU-level
economic policies are analysed and assessed together and are suit-
ably covered by economic surveillance. It applies to all elements of
surveillance, including ﬁscal, macroeconomic and structural policies.
This new instrument has brought together the previous processes of
the Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Guidelines,
including the simultaneous submission of the Stability (or Conver-
gence) Programmes and the National Reform Programmes.7 The aim
is to ensure that all policies are analysed and assessed together and
that policy areas which previously were not systematically covered
by economic surveillance – such as macroeconomic imbalance and
ﬁnancial sector issues – are included. Since January 1, 2011, EU-
level discussions on ﬁscal policy, macroeconomic imbalances, ﬁnan-
cial sector issues, and growth-enhancing structural reforms have
5 COM(2010) 367
6 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/economic-gover-
nance/index_en.htm.
7 In the past EU institutions discussed economic policies in the spring and examined ﬁscal
policies and developments separately in the autumn.
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been taking place before governments draw up their draft national
budgets and submit them for national parliamentary debate in the
second half of the year (the “national semesters”). This “upstream”
policy coordination should make the implementation of policy guid-
ance more effective and help embed the EU dimension in national
policy-making. Thus, the intention is to agree upon coordinated ac-
tions by EU members before national decisions are taken. The most
important element of the whole process sees the Commission assess
the plans of the member states and make a series of country-speciﬁc
recommendations to each of them. These policy recommendations
are discussed between member states’ ministers in June, endorsed
by EU leaders in July, and incorporated by governments into their
national budgets and other reform plans during the National Semes-
ter. Then Commission monitors the implementation of policies which
member states have agreed.8
For every country, including Poland, the Semester provides a good
opportunity to revise the country’s economic policy. Altogether, the
process contributes to a more stable and pro-development policy.9
Polish experience has shown that implementation of the European
Semester is a method for fostering coordination of domestic policies
and speeding up actions to discipline budgetary balance. It is worth
adding, however, that the whole process has become extremely bu-
reaucratic and complex, involving the preparation of a huge number
of documents. Some of them overlap and are difﬁcult to coordinate.
Also, due to the lengthy preparation times of various documents, the
ﬁnal Recommendations are based on outdated information. At times
they do not properly address the sources of problems.10
Euro-Plus Pact
In March 2011 the Euro-Plus Pact was adopted to give further impe-
tus to the governance reforms. The pact commits signatories to even
stronger economic coordination for competitiveness and conver-
8 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/
index_en.htm
9 Toporowski (2013)
10 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014)
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gence, even in areas of national competence, with concrete goals
agreed on and reviewed on a yearly basis by heads of state or gov-
ernment.11
Originally it was advocated by the French and German governments
(and was called the Competitiveness Pact) with the aim of covering
only eurozone members. Poland and several other countries ex-
pressed fears of deepening two-speed European integration and re-
quested they be included in the initiative. As a result, the original
proposal was converted into the Euro-Plus Pact, open to all EU mem-
bers that endorse the objectives of the agreement. It was signed in
March of 2011 by 23 member states, including six that are outside the
eurozone (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania).
Later the Euro pact was integrated into the European Semesters.
Apart from measures to foster competitiveness and employment
and to enhance the sustainability of public ﬁnances, the Pact pro-
vides for the possibility of tax policy coordination. Fiscal statements
are the most controversial elements of the Euro-Plus Pact.12 The doc-
ument recognises that “…direct taxation remains a national compe-
tence”13 but “[p]ragmatic coordination of tax policies is a necessary
element of stronger economic policy coordination in the euro area to
support ﬁscal consolidation and economic growth. In this context,
member states commit to engage in structured discussions on tax
policy issues, notably to ensure the exchange of best practices,
avoidance of harmful practices and proposals to ﬁght against fraud
and tax evasion.” In particular, “…developing a common corporate
tax base could be a revenue neutral way forward to ensure consis-
tency among national tax systems while respecting national tax strate-
gies, and to contribute to ﬁscal sustainability and the competitiveness
of European businesses.” Some commentators consider these state-
ments an important step to reach closer real ﬁscal integration. Others
are more cautious and see such a possibility only in the longer term,
if at all. The main element hindering faster ﬁscal integration is the re-
11 Euro Summit Statement (2011)
12 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2013b)
13 This citation and the next come from Annex I to A Pact for the Euro Stronger Economic
Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and Convergence annexed to Conclusions of the
Heads of the State or Government of the Euro Area, 2011. 
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quirement of unanimous voting on taxes, which is extremely difﬁcult
to achieve among 28 very different EU member states. The consen-
sus rule can be voided by using – under certain conditions – the pro-
visions of the Treaty of Lisbon on enhanced cooperation.14
Altogether, the pact is an instrument of coordination of national
policies and not of their harmonisation. Its commitments are of a po-
litical character and not legally binding. In the medium and longer
term their implications can be, however, far reaching. One cannot ex-
clude that coordination will lead to much closer cooperation and har-
monisation in new areas. It may be that a formal, fully voluntary
process will take place under peer pressure and will induce countries
to adopt new commitments, e.g., in the ﬁscal area. Therefore, since
the very beginning Poland has considered it better to be inside this
process in order to monitor changes and gradually better integrate
with eurozone members, even if the decision to introduce the euro
seems quite distant at the moment. 
Surveillance of economic and fiscal policies:
revised Stability and Growth Pact (Six-Pack)
A much stronger, and practically more important impetus to EU gov-
ernance reforms was created by the modiﬁcation of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) and adoption by the European Parliament and
the Council of six legislative proposals put forward by the Commis-
sion in September of 2010. The Six-Pack was adopted on Novem-
ber23, 2011 and entered into force on December13, 2011 with a new
set of rules for economic and ﬁscal surveillance.15 They aim at
strengthening the rules of the SGP, ﬁrst of all by adopting a quasi-
automatic procedure for imposing penalties in case of breaches of
either the deﬁcit or the debt ceilings.16
14 A recent example is the proposal of 11 countries which have been negotiating on the intro-
duction of a ﬁnancial transactions tax, see: Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhan-
ced cooperation in the area of ﬁnancial transaction tax, European Commission, Brussels,
25.10.2012, COM(2012) 631 ﬁnal/2. 
15 The legislative package was published in: Ofﬁcial Journal, L 306, Volume 54, 23 November
2011.
16 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2013b)
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The Six-Pack was adopted under the Polish Presidency, which
worked hard for its legal components. Before the February 2011
Summit Meeting Poland presented a document supporting the pro-
posals: “The Stability and Growth Pact is a vital asset in maintaining
a stable EU ﬁscal framework that promotes economic responsibility.
Poland therefore supports the attempt to improve economic gover-
nance among the European Union member states provided that there
is an increased ﬂexibility in the reform of SGP”. Thus, supporting SGP
reform, Poland opted for “more ﬂexible” ways to achieve the SGP
requirements, arguing that “Poland feels countries like itself may
need more time and lighter restrictions on debt levels in order to im-
plement desired economic policies requested under SGP”. No details
of “ﬂexibility” were deﬁned. At the same time, Poland expressed
strong opposition to the Commission’s proposal of ﬁnes for non-eu-
rozone countries breaching SGP rules in the form of withholding EU
funds for such countries (see more below).17
The legislative package18 has introduced several important com-
ponents which are presented below:
a) Stronger preventive action of the SGP. Member states are required
to make signiﬁcant progress towards country-speciﬁc, medium-
term budgetary objectives (MTO) for their budgetary balances to
ensure public ﬁnance sustainability. The new rules introduce a cap
on the annual growth of public expenditure. 
b) Stronger corrective action: The launch of an Excessive Deﬁcit Pro-
cedure (EDP) can now result not only from government deﬁcit de-
velopments (as was in practice before) but also from breaching the
government debt ceiling: member states with debt in excess of
60% of GDP should reduce their debt in line with a numerical
benchmark. 
c) A new surveillance mechanism aims to identify, prevent and cor-
rect divergences in competitiveness and major macroeconomic
imbalances between member states. It relies on an alert system
17 Poland Position for European Union Summit 2011, at: http://jsis.washington.edu/euc/ﬁle/
Model%20EU%202011/Position%20papers/Economic%20Governance/Position%20paper_
Economic_Poland.pdf
18 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/economic_governance/index_en.htm
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that uses a scoreboard of indicators and in-depth country studies,
strict rules in the form of a new Excessive Imbalance Procedure
(EIP) and better enforcement in the form of ﬁnancial sanctions for
member states which do not follow up on recommendations.
d) Rigorous enforcement. A strengthened enforcement regime has
been established for eurozone countries. It consists in the form of
“reverse qualiﬁed majority” voting. Under this voting system, a
Commission recommendation or proposal to the Council is con-
sidered adopted unless a qualiﬁed majority of member states votes
against it (in the Council). Sanctions can also be imposed for twice
failing to submit a sufﬁcient corrective action plan. In case of non-
euro area members sanctions are possible in the form of suspen-
sion of Structural Funds.19
Poland under the
excessive deficit procedure 
Poland has suffered from deﬁcits which exceeded the Maastricht cri-
terion ceiling since it entered the European Union. The high deﬁcit,
in excess of the prescribed reference value of 3% of GDP, caused
the European Commission to recommend the Council launch the ex-
cessive deﬁcit procedure upon Poland’s accession in May 2004. The
deﬁcit reduction efforts on the part of the government, aided by high
economic growth, proved successful: the deﬁcit gradually decreased
from 6.3% in 2003 down to 2% in 2007 – by the original deadline for
eliminating the excessive deﬁcit, as was established by the Council.
It allowed the EU to drop the procedure in July of 2008.20
19 In March 2012, the Council took the decision to suspend Cohesion Fund commitments in
the case of Hungary as a result of EDP procedure. The suspension would have taken effect as
of January 1, 2013. In June of 2012 this decision was lifted. It was the ﬁrst time since the Co-
hesion Fund was established in 1994 that a clause enabling the suspension of commitments
for a beneﬁciary country had been invoked. (Hungary: Council lifts cohesion fund suspension,
Council of the European Union, Luxembourg, 22 June 2012 11648/12 PRESSE 278). The cur-
rent law (under the programming period 2014-2020) even more explicitly provides for the sus-
pension of the totality, or part of, the Fund in the case of an excessive government deﬁcit and
an absence of effective action to correct it (Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, art. 19).
20 Council Decision (104§12) abrogating the Decision on the existence of an excessive deﬁcit,
see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/sg_pact_ﬁscal_policy/excessive_deﬁcit9109_en.htm
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In 2009 the Ecoﬁn Council (Economic and Finance Ministers of the
EU member states) established excessive deﬁcit in Poland once
again, as the deﬁcit again increased above the ceiling of 3% of GDP.
The deﬁcit was to be reduced to below 3% of the GDP in 2012 at
the latest. In 2012 economic growth slowed down and it appeared
that this target could not be achieved. In June 2013, the Ecoﬁn Coun-
cil postponed the deadline for elimination of the excessive deﬁcit by
2 years, i.e., to 2014. This date could not be achieved either and, as
a consequence, a new deadline for bringing an end to the excessive
deﬁcit was set up for 2015.22 In November of 2013 the European
Commission recognised23 – based on a report received from the Pol-
21 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2013b)
22 Council Decision of December 10, 2013 establishing that no effective action has been taken
by Poland in response to the Council Recommendation of June 21, 2013 (2013/758/EU), 
at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0906:FIN:PL:HTML 
23 Commission Staff Working Document: Analysis of the budgetary situation in Poland following
the adoption of the Council Recommendation to Poland of June 21, 2013 with a view to brin-
ging an end to the situation of an excessive deﬁcit, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/other_docu-
ments/2013-11-15_pl_communication_swd_pl.pdf
39
Box 1. Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)21
At the time when the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP) was adopted,
the assumption was that this procedure should be an essential element
preventing “excessive” deﬁcits and public debts and ensuring a sound
EU ﬁscal framework. Practice showed that this was not the case. En-
forcement appeared to be extremely weak. The budget deﬁcit ceiling was
exceeded many times by member states but no single ﬁne was intro-
duced. Public debt levels were never examined under the SGP as this
criterion was not taken seriously. Deﬁcits and debts increased instead of
decreased in the majority of EU members and in some of them became
a causeof serious economic troubles.
On December 13, 2011, a new set of rules entered into force under the
so called “Six-Pack”. Their main purpose is to enforce the SGP mecha-
nism. The new rules affect both arms of the SGP, namely the preventive
and the corrective arms (EDP). New enforcement mechanisms, including
ﬁnes, were drawn up for non-compliant euro area member states in order
to make the SGP more effective. Also, it is now possible to open an EDP
on the basis of the debt criterion. 
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ish Government24 – that the country had not taken effective action to
implement the Council recommendation of June. Taking into account
these circumstances, the European Commission found it necessary
to deﬁne a new deadline for the correction of the excessive deﬁcit. 
Following the existing procedure, at the end of April, 2014, Poland
adopted and later forwarded to the European Commission and the
Council the updates to both the National Reform Programmes and
Convergence Programme (Update 2014) (National Reform Pro-
gramme (2014); Convergence Programme (2014)). The update of the
Convergence Programme (2014) contained information on measures
taken by Poland in response to the Council recommendation of De-
cember 10, 2013. On the basis of the analysis of these documents,
the Council issued modiﬁed recommendations for economic policy
in Poland in the next period.25
Thus, it has taken Poland several years to introduce sufﬁcient
measures to improve the state budget situation and to exit – hope-
fully in 2015 – the EDP, partly because of low economic growth. It
goes without saying, however, that successive guidelines and peer
pressure have sped up government actions to introduce more radical
instruments. One of them was the reform of the Open Pension Funds
(OFE), which will result in a substantial one-off improvement (surplus)
in the Polish budget in 2014. In view of earlier, quite radical measures
to improve the public ﬁnance situation, very few new elements have
been introduced into the Recommendation of 2014 as compared
with the assessment of the previous year, except for two things. One
new element is a proposal for a Tax Council. Such tax councils exist
in several EU members but are not prescribed by EU law. A debate
on the usefulness of such a body, its functions, effectiveness, etc.,
has begun in Poland. Also, the Commission deleted the recommen-
dation to introduce the stabilising expenditure rule on a permanent
basis, as this proposal was introduced by Poland in 2013. 
24 Information on measures undertaken by Poland in order to implement the recommendations
of the Council pursuant to Art. 126.7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
of June 21, 2013. This information was prepared in accordance with The Stability and Growth
Pact which requires countries subject to the excessive deﬁcit procedure to provide EU insti-
tutions with—and publish reports on—measures undertaken in connection with the Ecoﬁn Co-
uncil recommendations.
25 Council Recommendation (2014)
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Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (TSCG)
The treaty is called the Fiscal Compact (or ﬁscal pact) for short. The
main goal of the Fiscal Compact is to foster ﬁscal discipline, notably
in the euro area, building on and enhancing the reinforced SGP. Be-
sides the ﬁscal part, the treaty includes a fostering of economic policy
coordination and convergence, as well as measures related to euro
area governance. As two member states were not willing to adopt
the TSCG, the new rules took the form of an intergovernmental
agreement among the contracting parties. After ratiﬁcation in mem-
ber states the treaty entered into force on January 1, 2013.
The treaty has conﬁrmed commitments undertaken in the Six-Pack
which entered into force in form of regulations (thus, they should be
binding for member states, without the possibility of introducing
changes in the process of transposition into domestic legal systems,
which is sometimes the case with directives). 
The reforms provided for by both sets of laws (Six-Pack and TSCG)
have resulted in a substantial reinforcement of the mutual surveil-
lance framework of EU member states. Some solutions are stricter
under the TSCG, e.g., an automatic correction mechanism, lower
structural deﬁcit ceiling, risk of the Court of Justice ﬁnes. A new ele-
ment holds that under the TSCG budget rules shall be implemented
into the national laws through provisions of “binding force and per-
manent character, preferably constitutional” (Art.3(2)).26
The main difference seems to be the very fact that the provisions
entered into force in the form of an intergovernmental agreement
which has not been endorsed by all member states (the UK and the
Czech Republic have decided not to sign and ratify the treaty). Such
a solution has a number of implications. It is a step toward having
more solutions in the EU on the basis of the intergovernmental in-
stead of the Community method. The result is different rules for sig-
natories and for countries staying outside this concept. If such a
solution becomes more popular in the future, the model of a several-
speed EU will be reinforced, at the expense of poorer EU members. 
26 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2013a)
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Poland’s ruling coalition and most of the country’s Eurodeputies
supported the government’s decision to join the new European ﬁscal
treaty on tighter budget discipline as a step in the right direction. But
the opposition has attacked what it described as a step that under-
mines Poland’s sovereignty. It is worth brieﬂy presenting these dif-
ferent opinions as they illustrate a quite strong scepticism about EU
affairs in Poland, which currently negatively affect the country’s
chances for quick euro adoption, and in the future may result in
shrinking role for Warsaw in shaping European integration projects
(e.g., should the political opposition win in the next parliamentary
elections scheduled for Autumn 2015).
“The main assumptions of the ﬁscal treaty indicate that Poland is
at the core of the European Union,” said Jerzy Buzek, former Presi-
dent of the European Parliament. He emphasised that the outcome
of the summit was good for Poland and several other non-eurozone
members. In his words: “We wanted very much to have the eurozone
repaired, so as to help Greece and possibly other countries... al-
though we are not taking part directly in this assistance and we are
not incurring ﬁnancial burdens.”27 “Today, Poland is fully taking part
in all preparations for a new eurozone, its restructuring, as well as ac-
tion designed to prevent crises from recurring in the future. This is
extremely important,” added Mr. Buzek.
Danuta Hübner, head of the European Parliament’s committee for
regional development, said that at the summit Poland managed to
reverse a trend toward replacing European integration with eurozone
integration. In her opinion, the provision that competitiveness prob-
lems will be discussed at summits attended by all signatories of the
treaty is of key importance. 
“The choice of whether or not to sign an imperfect ﬁscal treaty was
tantamount to a strategic choice between taking or not taking part in
Europe’s decision-making process,” said Janusz Lewandowski, the
EU commissioner for ﬁnancial programming and the budget. In his
view, the signiﬁcance of the EU summit went well beyond the content
of the ﬁscal treaty adopted by the 25 leaders. “This is a decision with
27 For all citations on the Fiscal Compact presented below see: 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/24574/article, 23 February 2012
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long-term consequences for the future of the EU. And the rationale
of signing it and of the pact itself should be assessed from a strategic
perspective rather than in terms of its economic meaning,”
Lewandowski said. “The content of the pact is imperfect and unsat-
isfactory. But Poland and other signatories of the treaty will be taking
part in all meetings about issues reaching beyond eurozone prob-
lems,” he added, stressing that Poland will take part in the decision-
making process and will have an inﬂuence on important issues, for
example ﬁnances.
“Joining the ﬁscal pact, Poland, as a non-eurozone country, is not
obliged to and will not submit itself to the sanctions resulting from
the pact’s provisions on ﬁnancial penalties for excessive deﬁcit,”
Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, Poland’s minister for European affairs, said
after the summit. “These rules apply to eurozone countries. No coun-
try outside the eurozone is obliged to comply.”
But opposition politicians disagreed. Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of
Poland’s largest opposition party, Law and Justice (PiS), said that
the decision to join the treaty undermines Poland’s sovereignty and
increases its dependence on the EU’s big players, especially France
and Germany. J. Kaczyński praised Britain and the Czech Republic
for their “courage and far-sightedness” in refusing to sign up.28
The real “ﬁght” on the Fiscal Compact took place in the Polish Par-
liament during the ratiﬁcation process. 
The government qualiﬁed the Fiscal Compact as “an international
treaty closed between some of the EU member states, outside of the
EU’s framework” and as “supplementing EU Treaties”.29 In its draft
Ratiﬁcation Act the government proposed Art. 89 (1) of Poland’s Con-
stitution as a legal basis for the ratiﬁcation of the Fiscal Compact.30
The majority of Parliament was in favour and, on July 24, 2013, on
28 http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/24574/article, February 23, 2012 
29 In the case of the Fiscal Compact, opposition MPs and Senators (PiS and SP) argued for a
higher, two-thirds majority vote, yet Art. 90 PC was not applied as a legal basis in the ratiﬁcation
of the Fiscal Compact.
30 Under this Article ratiﬁcation of an international agreement is based on Art. 120 of the Cons-
titution of the Republic of Poland: “The Sejm shall pass bills by a simple majority vote, in the
presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, unless the Constitution provides
for another majority.” The opposition argued that Article 90 of the Constitution should be app-
lied, which requires a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers of the Parliament.
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the basis of this afﬁrming vote in Parliament (in both chambers), the
President signed the Ratiﬁcation Act.31
Before it happened, the opposition MPs tried to block the ratiﬁca-
tion. They prepared a motion for the rejection of the Ratiﬁcation Act,
which was rejected by the majority of MPs. The main arguments of
the opposition were as follows: 
(a) the Fiscal Compact divides the EU member states and destroys
the unity of EU law (is outside of EU law regime, but uses EU in-
stitutions); 
(b) the Euro Summits do not give Poland the same voice in debates
as in the Ecoﬁn Council; 
(c) the Fiscal Compact and its ratiﬁcation process are contrary to the
Polish Constitution; 
(d) the excessive deﬁcit procedure in the Fiscal Compact impacts the
competence of Polish state organs; 
(e) the Balanced Budget Rule and its sanctions are causing some
asymmetries (namely, the penalties imposed on Poland would be
paid to the Commission, whereas the penalties of the eurozone
members would be paid to the Fund, from which Poland will not
beneﬁt); 
(f) the Fiscal Compact creates a possibility that Poland may be taken
before the ECJ by another member state. In general, the PiS op-
position criticised the Fiscal Compact as a part of the “pseudo-
democratic European federation”.32
In March of 2013 a group of opposition (PiS) MPs lodged an appli-
cation to the Constitutional Court asking for a constitutional review
of both the Ratiﬁcation Act of the TSCG and the TSCG itself (under
the ex-post constitutional review procedure).33
31 Out of 438 MPs attending, 282 voted in favour (governing majority PO and PSL and left-
wing opposition SLD and RP, as well as 2 independent) and 155 against (conservative oppo-
sition PiS and SP, 1 independent) and 1 abstained (PSL). The Senate did not introduce any
amendments and approved the Ratiﬁcation Act. Out of 83 senators attending, 57 voted in fa-
vour, 26 against. 
32 http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/topic/ﬁscal-compact/
33 In Poland, ex-ante review is available only on the request of the President who may, before
ratifying an international agreement or before signing a bill, refer to the Constitutional Court
with a request for the constitutional review of such treaty or bill.
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On June25, 2013, the Constitutional Court decided to discontinue
its proceedings with regard to the constitutional review of the TSCG
on formal grounds, namely because the request for constitutional re-
view by the MPs was lodged before the Ratiﬁcation Act became a
binding law.34 As Poland is not a euro area member yet, the Treaty is
binding for the country but its application is postponed to the mo-
ment of the abrogation of the derogation (Art. 14(5) TSCG).35
The practical effect is that Polish representatives have been granted
the possibility to participate in euro area summits on competitiveness
and debates on general changes affecting the eurozone. It is an op-
portunity to be better informed on any measures that might be intro-
duced in the area using the single currency. For Poland, as a country
aspiring for euro membership, such an opportunity means a great
deal as it allows for better ex-ante preparations. 
Poland’s position on the adoption of the Euro 
Under the Accession Treaty Poland has a status of a “Member State
with a derogation” (Art. 139 of TFEU). It means that it has committed
itself to adopt the euro after fulﬁlling all necessary criteria, ﬁrst of all
the Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence.
Of course, meeting the nominal Maastricht criteria is not enough.
The higher the real convergence of the Polish economy on the day
of euro adoption, the more stable and secure the situation of the
economy will be in the following period. Poland should be able to re-
main competitive without nominal exchange rate depreciation even
in the event of large adverse shocks. Without close economic con-
34 MPs lodged the application for constitutional review after the Parliament had approved the
ratiﬁcation of the TSCG but before the ratiﬁcation of the treaty by the President. Thus, accor-
ding to the Constitutional Court, the application for the ex-post constitutional review was lod-
ged too early. Hence, ex-post review was excluded. The ex-ante review was also excluded,
because the President did not demand it. Therefore, the Constitutional Court decided only on
the constitutionality of the procedure leading to the approval of the TSCG by Parliament and
did not review the TSCG. Several members of the Court did not, however, support, this deci-
sion. 
See: http://polska.newsweek.pl/trybunal-konstytucyjny--ustawa-o-ratyﬁkacji-paktu-ﬁskalnego-
zgodna-z-konstytucja,105761,1,1.html
35 In the view of the MPs, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (Pacta
sunt servanda) creates an obligation to observe and perform the TSCG in good faith.
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vergence of Polish economy to the better-developed EU countries
there is a risk of a number of problems including that of a strong Bal-
assa-Samuelson effect and loss of price competitiveness of Polish
products and services.36
Thus, in the medium and long term, the key role will be played by
structural reforms, going far beyond the public ﬁnance sector. They
include ﬁrst of all increased ﬂexibility of the labour market, improved
business environment, upgrading of transport infrastructure, an in-
creased role for innovations in economic development, etc. Such re-
forms are necessary to ensure sustainable growth and longer term
competitiveness of the economy. 
However, according to Polish representatives, recent turbulence in
the euro area has shown that another vital condition for the introduc-
tion of the single currency in Poland is the stability of the euro area
itself. Thus, the government aims to achieve this goal as soon as the
necessary conditions of secure euro area membership are met:
“...the issue of euro adoption in Poland has become highly conditional
on the enforcement of the economic governance enhancements in
the EU, which are of utmost importance for boosting the stability of
the euro area as a whole.”37
Representatives of the government have also stressed that from
the point of view of countries with a derogation, most of which can
be classiﬁed as catching-up economies, emphasis should be put on
the issue of differences in interest rates between those countries and
the developed member states.38 Bearing in mind those differences
as well as the centralisation of monetary policy decisions in the euro
area, it seems reasonable to leave at least some scope for country-
36 As some countries have to meet the convergence criteria in the catching up framework, the
European Economic Advisory Group in its report advices the introduction of a “Balassa-Sa-
muelson rebate” (maximum 1 percentage point) for the inﬂation criterion; this rebate would
provide more elasticity to reach the reference rate for countries with lower levels of economic
development [EEAG (2007)].
37 http://www.mf.gov.pl/en/ministry-of-ﬁnance/poland-in-eu/euro-in-poland/events/-
/asset_publisher/5djV/content/conference%3A-economic-governance-in-the-eu-euro-area-
%E2%80%93-what-lessons-for-poland-warsaw-5-july2012;jsessionid=C3D93FEE86330979C
CDA96B364B22AAF?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mf.gov.pl%2Fen%2Fministry-of-ﬁ-
nance%2Fpoland-in-eu%2Feuro-in-poland%2Fevents%3Bjsessionid%3D382C96641
E3FF3B8D1ED56C58CF2E4A7%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_5djV%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0
%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-
2%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D2
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speciﬁc macro prudential policy. Maximum harmonisation in terms
of ﬁnancial sector supervision may hinder member states’ efforts
aimed at fostering the stability of their ﬁnancial sectors, especially in
terms of preventing (or reacting to) boom-bust cycles after having
adopted the euro.
As a candidate for euro area accession, Poland is strongly inter-
ested in playing an active role in discussions on new rules that are to
be obeyed by Poland in the future, after adopting the common cur-
rency (as conﬁrmed by signing and ratifying the TSCG).
Apart from nominal and real convergence, there is also a problem
of domestic politics. Adopting the euro requires a change in Poland’s
constitution. This can be enacted by a two-thirds majority in parlia-
ment. Public discussions and opinion polls show the majority of vot-
ers do not back euro adoption. According to surveys, public support
for joining the euro is as low as 12%.39 The constitution will need to
be changed, though there is no legal requirement to hold a referen-
dum. In this situation, an important and necessary task for the gov-
ernment that decides on introducing Poland into the euro area will
be to prepare society for replacing the zloty with the single European
currency. Without restoration of public support it will not be possible
to reverse the present situation and get the support to change the
Constitution. Also, it is impossible to imagine preparations for euro
adoption should an signiﬁcant part of society be against it: they could
risk de-stabilisation of the domestic political situation. 
As a ﬁnal conclusion, let us say that in the present context, prepa-
rations for euro membership, including proper economic policy to
meet the Maastricht criteria, are more important than the concrete
date of euro area entry. After the worsening of the political situation
in Europe as a result of the annexation of Crimea by Russia, a new
38 http://www.mf.gov.pl/en/ministry-of-ﬁnance/poland-in-eu/euro-in-poland/events/-
/asset_publisher/5djV/content/conference%3A-economic-governance-in-the-eu-euro-area-
%E2%80%93-what-lessons-for-poland-warsaw-5-july-2012;jsessionid=C3D93FEE86330979
CCDA96B364B22AAF?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mf.gov.pl%2Fen%2Fministry-of-ﬁ-
nance%2Fpoland-in-eu%2Feuro-in-poland%2Fevents%3Bjsessionid%3D382C96641
E3FF3B8D1ED56C58CF2E4A7%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_5djV%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0
%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-
2%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D2
39 http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSBRE89N10P20121024
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element has appeared as a factor in euro adoption. Some voices
claimed that, in a new situation, the economic criteria should not be
required with great precision and that fast adoption of the euro would
enhance Poland’s security. They seem to have gained support from
the National Bank of Poland governor, Mr. Marek Belka who said that
events in Ukraine had made him more positive on the beneﬁts of
Poland accepting the single currency.40 Of course, there is still a long
distance between such a statement (and a very general position on
the euro) and the ﬁnal euro changeover.
Fiscal union concepts
In November of 2012 the European Commission presented the doc-
ument “Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary
Union” which describes the necessary elements and the steps to-
wards a full banking, economic, ﬁscal and political union, including
the concept of a euro area budget: “in the long term (beyond 5 years),
based on the progressive pooling of sovereignty and thus responsi-
bility as well as solidarity competencies to the European level, the es-
tablishment of an autonomous euro area budget providing for a ﬁscal
capacity for the EMU to support Member States in the absorption of
shocks should become possible.”41 Also, a banking union has been
suggested by the Commission. Such a union: “would be able to end
the disintegration of the EU's ﬁnancial market and ensure reasonably
equal ﬁnancing conditions for households and business across the
EU; it would help sever the negative feedback loops between Mem-
ber States and banks.”42 Any such decision, however, will be difﬁcult
politically, taking into account high oppositionin member states vis-
à-vis EU level ﬁscal federalism. 
There is a widespread opinion that in order to survive, the EMU
needs more ﬁscal discipline at the national level.43 In this context ef-
40 http://www.reuters.com/art ic le/2014/03/27/us-poland-cenbank-osiatynski-
idUSBREA2Q1CV20140327
41 Communication from the Commission (2012), p. 12.
42 Communication from the Commission (2012), p. 12.
43 The problem does not exist at the EU level because – under the treaty – the EU has to run a
balanced budget.
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forts to strengthen ﬁscal surveillance rules under the revised Stability
and Growth Pact and TSCG as well as other decisions presented
above and reinforcement of both “preventive” and “corrective” arms
(including automatic and meaningful sanctions) under those laws are
usually assessed as a move in the right direction. A few economists,
including Ch. Wyplosz, argue, however, that such solutions will
never work efﬁciently. The reason is that “…ﬁscal discipline is and
remains a deep-seated national prerogative of each national govern-
ment and parliament… The pact never worked and cannot work be-
cause it presupposes that a sovereign government can be told what
to do with its budget. Eurozone governments should not waste time
trying to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact. Strengthening
means adding sanctions but sanctions cannot be really imposed on
democratically elected governments.”44 According to Ch. Wyplosz,
ﬁscal discipline should be enforced by new national institutions. The
responsibility of national institutions and laws for observing ﬁscal
discipline has been included in the recently signed Fiscal Compact
and is already in force as a constitutional requirement in several
countries (as a constitutional ceiling for government debt together
with automatic mechanisms to correct divergences from these
rules): e.g., in Poland since 200745, in Germany since 2009, and in
Slovakia and Hungary since 2011 (in Hungary a debt break amounts
to 50% of GDP).
Instead of strengthened national rules, some economists propose
constraints on ﬁscal discretion imposed, monitored, and enforced by
an independent ﬁscal policy council.46 They argue that governments
are unable to maintain ﬁscal discipline because either they abandon
the rules due to political demands, or they conduct a highly pro-cycli-
cal policy during downturns, thereby further exacerbating the reduc-
tion of demand during recessions. Independent ﬁscal policy councils
would act as an anchor that helps governments ensure sustainability. 
44 Wyplosz (2010), p. 35.
45 This constitutional rule is one of the reasons Poland has avoided breaching the 60% of GDP
ceiling for public debt, despite regular political pressures to increase public expenditure in
order to “support economic growth”. The 60% debt break rule was introduced in Poland in
1997, when the new constitution was prepared, to adjust the country to the anticipated EU
accession.
46 Fatás – Mihov (2010), p. 69.
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Others argue for the necessity of closer political union, which en-
tails a major uploading of budgeting and receipt powers to a federal
EU executive and legislature. At the same time, they usually admit
that a full political union seems unrealistic in the short and medium
term. In this context, a more pragmatic approach has been presented
by P. de Grauwe, who argues that “…the survival of the eurozone
depends on its capacity to embed itself into a political union … But
a full political union seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future, as it
would imply a signiﬁcant transfer of spending and taxing powers to a
central EU government and parliament.”47 In such a situation, enforc-
ing the SGP may be a necessary condition for preventing future
crises, but it is far from sufﬁcient. According to Prof. de Grauwe,
“[t]he domain of the Stability and Growth Pact must be broadened: it
must include the monitoring of private debt developments as well as
public debts.” This would be the minimum ingredient of a political
union that can keep the eurozone alive in the long run. 
Assessing successive agreements aimed at stronger governance in
the eurozone and in the EU as a whole, it is worth noting that no law
adopted thus far charts a path out of the crisis.48 On the contrary, rig-
orous ﬁscal adjustments, as recommended by the EU and IMF, have
delayed – according to many opinions – the pickup of growth in coun-
tries with the deepest problems, especially in Greece. In this context,
it is important to stress once again that the austerity measures imple-
mented by most European countries to counter the debt crisis are not
sufﬁcient and their continuation may worsen the situation. This is
partly related to the unclear sensitivity of GDP changes to ﬁscal in-
struments (via the mechanism of the so-called ﬁscal multiplier: see
Box 2). A mix of enforcement of recently adopted laws and the right
macroeconomic solutions might be necessary. In parallel to measures
aimed at restoring conﬁdence in sovereign debt markets, new efforts
to speed up economic growth are indispensable. 
47 The latter must imply some transfer of sovereignty in macroeconomic policies and the or-
ganisation of automatic solidarity between member states (see: De Grauwe 2010, p. 29.).
48 The very general Europe 2020 Strategy, with no binding ﬁnancial or other instruments, cannot
play this role.
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Poland’s changing role in the EU 
Since EU accession in 2004, Poland’s ambition has been to rank
amongst the key players of the EU. However, only in the past few
years has Poland been able to play an important role in many dis-
cussions and initiatives, mainly due to its relative domestic economic
stability (Poland was the only EU country to avoid recession in 2009
and to record relatively good economic indicators and ﬁscal stability),
which was in contrast to other EU members’ deep instability.
Poland’s potential was revealed at the time when the stakes were
the highest.50
49 Blanchard – Leigh (2013)
50 Parkers (2014)
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Box 2. Effects of the fiscal consolidation on GDP changes49
In January of 2013, on the basis of a publication by O. Blanchard, chief
IMF economist, and his associate D. Leigh, a heated debate started on
the so-called ﬁscal multiplier and the effects of ﬁscal consolidation upon
aggregate output. The ﬁscal multiplier is usually deﬁned as the change
in real GDP that is produced by a shift in ﬁscal policy equal to 1% of
GDP. Most economists prior to this paper assumed the ﬁscal multiplier
to be about 0.5. This would mean that government spending cuts equal
to 1% of GDP would reduce actual GDP in the coming year by about
0.5%. According to the ﬁndings of the two authors, based on data for 28
economies, actual multipliers in several recent years were higher, in the
range of 0.9 to 1.7. Thus, the conclusion should be that with such high
ﬁscal multipliers, the ﬁscal adjustments (in the form of deep budgetary
cuts and tax increases) suggested by the IMF and applied by a number
of countries (i.e., in Greece and Portugal) could not improve the economic
situation. On the contrary, they have resulted in a deeper production de-
crease and unemployment increase. The authors say that more work is
needed to examine the causes of this failure of multiplier assumptions.
They also add that their results need to be interpreted with care. As sug-
gested by both authors, theoretical considerations and the evidence in
empirical papers show that there is no single multiplier for all times and
all countries. There is no doubt that this paper has intensiﬁed the earlier
discussion on whether tight ﬁscal adjustments contribute to economic
recovery or instead result in deeper recession through the effects of the
ﬁscal multiplier.
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Throughout the debates over EU crisis management and required
reforms, Poland’s desire was ﬁrst of all to overcome the crisis and to
stop it from deepening. At the same time, Poland strived to accede
to the inner circle of EU decision-making. In the second half of 2011
Poland held the Presidency in the Council of the EU. This was a time
when Poland expressed its strongest support for closer EU cooper-
ation and strengthened its position in the EU as a clever negotiator
and a supporter of deeper integration. It presented a number of ini-
tiatives and worked hard during the 2011 Presidency to coordinate
the activities of plenty of committees, institutions and other EU mem-
bers’ proposals. Its relative success was highlighted by its participa-
tion in 2012 as the sole “new” (not so new at that time) member state
involved in drawing up a report of the so called Future of Europe
Group, composed of 11 foreign ministers.51 Also, the earlier de-
scribed active role of Poland in shaping the Euro-Plus Pact and other
EU-wide initiatives has conﬁrmed this ambition. An important
achievement, apart from the adoption of anti-crisis measures (Six-
Pack), was the initiation of a debate on economic growth and deep-
ening the European single market.52
It was not a coincidence that the ﬁrst priority of the Polish Presi-
dency was “European integration as a source of growth.”53 In the in-
troductory part of the Program of the Presidency, Poland declared
that “…the European Union is changing at a pace and scope not seen
for a long time. The economic crisis – the underlying cause of these
changes – has also demonstrated the strengths of European integra-
tion. By pulling together, Europe has overcome the shock wave of
the crisis.”54 This was a clear message that Poland identiﬁed Euro-
pean unity and further integration as the way to overcome the crisis.
Moreover, the Polish Presidency has conﬁrmed successful efforts in
assuring the integrity of the European Union by avoiding division be-
tween members of the euro area and other EU countries. Poland’s
role during its Presidency is well illustrated by the following opinion:
51 Parkers (2014)
52 Parkers (2014)
53 Two other priorities were “Secure Europe” and a “Europe beneﬁting from openness”
Przybylska-Maszner (2013). 
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011)
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The Polish Presidency was a period of initiatives and activities taken
in order to improve the regulation and supervision of member states’
ﬁnancial markets and develop the principles of crisis management.
Being outside the eurozone, and to a large extent not suffering from
the crisis, Poland found it highly difﬁcult to perform its tasks. It be-
came its goal to act as a broker of the “Six-Pack”, its endeavors were
concentrated on preventing divisions between Union states, and
maintaining Poland’s inﬂuence on decisions, as illustrated by the
metaphor that “Poland [had] its foot in the door, so as not to let it
close and separate states.” Importantly, Poland’s options were lim-
ited, because despite his formal Presidency over the EU Economic
and Financial Affairs Council, Polish Finance Minister Jacek Ros-
towski was not invited to the meetings of ministers of the Eurogroup.
It should be emphasized that Poland did not play ﬁrst ﬁddle in the
matters of crisis management security. Given the economic crisis,
the primary role in the debate was played by European institutions,
led by the duo of the presidents of the European Commission and
European Council, and the French-German tandem. Poland’s role
was limited to organizing numerous important meetings and admin-
istering their agendas.55
The EU Council Presidency held by Poland between July and De-
cember 2011 came at a very difﬁcult time when all EU institutions
and member states looked for remedies to the implications of a deep
ﬁnancial and economic crisis. Another analyst noticed that, being
outside the eurozone, Poland helped to overcome the eurozone crisis
and stabilise the situation in the whole EU. The best example was
the Six-Pack, which Poland helped to negotiate. Even if many of
Poland’s proposed priorities were overshadowed by developments
in North Africa (the Presidency coincided with revolutionary changes
in Arab states: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) and difﬁculties of the euro-
zone, the country succeeded in making its voice heard and providing
sound management of EU issues.56
A broader reﬂection on the EU’s future and Poland’s position on it
found its expression in a speech delivered on November 28, 2011,
55 Przybylska-Maszner (2013)
56 Parkers (2014)
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in Berlin at the German Society for Foreign Affairs, by Foreign Minis-
ter Radosław Sikorski, entitled “Poland and the Future of the Euro-
pean Union”.57 In his address, Mr. Sikorski underlined the need to
deepen the integration of the EU in economic matters, preferably
through European federalism. He also requested Germany take the
lead in solving the euro crisis.58
According to Mr. R. Sikorski, European institutions need to be
stronger. “The European Commission needs to be stronger. If it is to
play the role of an economic supervisor we need commissioners to
be genuine leaders, with authority, personality – dare I say charisma
– to be true representatives of common European interests.”59 He
added that to be more effective, the Commission should be smaller.
European institutions need, however, to have more democratic legit-
imacy. Equally important for Poland is that coherence between the
euro area and the EU as a whole be maintained. The minister clearly
said that EU institutions must remain central, which was a clear show
of support for the Community method of work, as opposed to inter-
governmental method. 
Conclusions
The recent crisis was the most serious since the Great Depression,
which started in 1929. Thanks to relatively good economic manage-
ment, inﬂow of EU funds, ﬂexible domestic currency and a large do-
mestic market, the Polish economy has performed relatively well
throughout the entire ﬁnancial crisis and since. Poland has been,
however, deeply worried that the crisis might remove the export
source of growth and reduce the country’s role to the status of a
“second-class member” of the EU, outside the eurozone and not
consulted on laws which will affect its future. To avoid such a situa-
tion, the government has supported successive initiatives to
strengthen economic governance in the EU, including European Se-
57 Polonia.pl (2011) 
58 “The biggest threat to the security and prosperity of Poland would be the collapse of the
eurozone. And I demand of Germany that, for your own sake and for ours, you help it survive
and prosper. You know full well that nobody else can do it.”
59 Polonia.pl (2011) 
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mesters, the Euro-Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact, and to reduce
the risk of a future crisis. Poland has worked to contribute to this task
through – among other things – joining the initiatives presented by
other actors, putting forward its own initiatives and trying to meet
more and more demanding requirements of ﬁscal stability. Moreover,
the Polish Presidency was marked by successful efforts in assuring
the integrity of the European Union by avoiding division between
members of the euro area and other EU countries. 
The foundation of Poland’s European policy is its participation in
decisions about the future of integration in order to prevent future
crises and to enhance beneﬁts from EU membership. The main chal-
lenge to continue and strengthen this role is that Poland is outside
the eurozone which takes important decisions. To put it differently:
all Poland needs to do to be included in the decision-making is to
join the common currency. But it is exactly this task that is unrealistic
in the near future (see section on euro adoption). The other obstacle
to continuing this policy would be the change of the governing coali-
tion after the parliamentary elections to be held in Autumn of 2015.
As already mentioned, the strongest opposition party (PIS) is much
more sceptical about the EU and critical as regards the deepening
of integration. One of the lessons of the recent difﬁcult times is that
international cooperation and coordination on various issues is of ut-
most importance. By pulling together, the EU countries have man-
aged to overcome the deepest wave of the crisis.
There are divergent opinions on the efﬁciency of the economic gov-
ernance initiatives and actions adopted recently by the EU or euro-
zone members. Some observers consider them the right solution,
sufﬁcient to ensure stability of the eurozone – under the condition
that the new mechanisms are observed rigorously. Others criticise
those solutions from two opposite angles: either they call for more
stringent rules of the SGP, including external independent control of
the application of the SGP, or they argue for giving up SGP rules as
politically unworkable and for the adoption of stronger national insti-
tutions to effectively control national ﬁscal discipline. 
Even those who accept the recent strengthening of economic gov-
ernance in the EU are aware of the fact that there is no guarantee the
new solutions will work better than the previous laws. The tricky issue
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is that the ﬁnal decisions, including those under the TSCG, are still
subject to political considerations to be taken into account by the
Council. Much will also depend on the progress of implementing and
applying the national constitutional requirements as provided for in
the TSCG. Also, reverse voting in the Council provides a chance for
a more pragmatic, economically justiﬁed use of the modiﬁed SGP.
Faced with a lack of political will to move forward into a political
union, the new governance mechanisms and their rigorous enforce-
ment seem the only realistic approach to ensure ﬁscal stabilisation
and keeping the eurozone alive in the short and medium run. The key
structural reforms lie in the hands of the national governments. Co-
ordination of economic policies is a useful instrument encouraging
governments to take care of their ﬁscal equilibrium and structural re-
forms. At the same time, however, it is not a sufﬁcient instrument to
force appropriate reforms upon the member states.60
A big challenge – apart from the necessity to continue structural
reforms and properly enforce the new principles of economic gover-
nance – is that different EU actions to increase the credibility of ﬁscal
policies and to enhance stability of the ﬁnancial sector of the EU
member states have resulted in fragmentation of the EU, or in multi-
track EU. Successive laws cover different groups of EU member
states (in particular the Euro-Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact) and
provide for different solutions for individual groups of EU countries.
For weaker partners there is always a risk of being deprived of some
privileges negotiated by the stronger partners. Also, the very fact that
their legal basis is not the same (EU treaties versus intergovernmental
legal basis) makes the future of the EU more unpredictable. 
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THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S POSITION
ON EU GOVERNANCE TRENDS
Vladimír Bartovic1
This paper aims at providing an analysis of Czech views on the cur-
rent developments in EU and Eurozone governance. It is based on
the input paper by Krisztina Vida called “EU governance trends –
dilemmas and recommendations for the Visegrad countries”.2 It
analyses the EU strategy of the Czech Republic, its ofﬁcial position,
as well as the positions of main stakeholders towards the newest de-
velopments in EU and Eurozone governance. It also strives to identify
interests and positions of the Czech Republic regarding possible di-
rections of European integration.
Introduction – What kind 
of Member State is the Czech Republic?
The Czech Republic entered the European Union 10 years ago in
2004, together with other seven post-communist states. This step
concluded a process that started already in 1989 during the Velvet
revolution in Czechoslovakia. One of the main slogans of this revo-
lution was “Return to Europe”. Czechs always considered them-
selves part of the Western hemisphere, thus Euro-Atlantic integration
was a natural step after the start of democratic transition. There was
a nation-wide consensus on the importance of becoming a member
of the European Union throughout the nineties. Only a few marginal
1 Director, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Prague
2 Vida (2013)
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political forces challenged this resolution. The Czech integration
process went relatively smoothly thanks to several facts: 
1) as mentioned above, membership in the EU was a shared goal of
main political actors,3 whether they came from the left or right part
of the political spectrum; 
2) the country avoided a backlash against democracy as was wit-
nessed in other countries – e.g., Slovakia; 
3) the country did not have to deal with minority rights issues like
most of the other post-communist states; 4) the Czech economy
was doing relatively well during the transition process, maintaining
stable growth and avoiding major economic turmoil.
Nowadays, the Czech Republic is considered a Eurosceptic coun-
try by many. Roots of Euroscepticism date back to the accession
process when part of the political elite started to challenge not the
integration process as such, but the conditions of accession negoti-
ated by the government. However, all the parliamentary political par-
ties (except the Communists, who did not offer any recommendation)
supported the yes vote in the referendum on EU accession. The po-
sition of the Czech population in the referendum was clear. With 55%
turnout, 77% of Czech participants voted for EU membership. How-
ever, the accession process itself was a very difﬁcult and demanding
process, and politicians failed to provide citizens with all the details
and consequences of this project. Fatigue of citizens from the long-
term process of profound reforms had an immediate result in the ﬁrst
elections to the European Parliament, when electoral turnout reached
only 28% and the political forces that led the country into the EU
(mainly Social Democrats) suffered electoral defeat. The trend of very
low electoral turnout in the European Parliament elections continued
in 2009 (the same turnout as in 2004) and especially in the latest elec-
tions in 2014, when it reached only 18%. This was the lowest turnout
in the whole European Union apart from Slovakia. The above-men-
tioned number conﬁrms that Czech citizens consider European Par-
liament elections second-class and unimportant.
3 The only relevant political force that had a rather negative or ambiguous attitude toward EU
integration was the Communist party. However, even this party refrained from advocating a
no-vote in the EU membership referendum.
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In the ﬁrst ﬁve years after EU accession, the Czech public was very
positive in its position on whether EU membership was beneﬁcial for
the country. Citizens started to enjoy the advantages of EU member-
ship, such as free travel without border controls, and freedom to
study, work and do business in any EU member state. They also wit-
nessed projects in their communities supported from EU funds. Sup-
port for EU membership was highest during the Czech presidency in
the Council of the EU in 2009 (69% in favour), when EU-related is-
sues received very broad coverage in media. Starting 2009 support
for EU membership among Czech citizens began to drop quickly. It
reached its lowest point so far in November of 2014, when only 45%
of Czech citizens said that the country faces a better future inside
the EU, while 44% said the opposite. This negative trend can be ex-
plained as mainly a consequence of the economic crisis in the Euro-
pean Union and Eurozone, when citizens began losing the belief that
the EU can overcome the crisis. They were also generally much more
critical about their own situation, the situation in the Czech Republic
and consequently in the EU. Another important reason for the drop
in support for EU membership was a very negative political discourse
that dominated public space, led by former Czech president Vaclav
Klaus (this will be analysed in the next part of this paper). 
The Czech Republic has not always behaved as a predictable and
responsible partner in the European Union. Whether the long delay
in ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, or the refusal to sign the Fiscal Com-
pact, these were steps that the country could not credibly justify to
its partners and which often cast the country in the position of an
outsider. The Czech Republic was generally perceived during the
government of Prime Minister Nečas as a country with a rather neg-
ative approach to the deepening of European integration, which was
(in addition to refusing the introduction of the common currency or
the bank union) also demonstrated by its unwillingness to engage in
certain projects of enhanced cooperation (a tax on ﬁnancial transac-
tions or the harmonization of divorce law). In terms of inﬂuence in the
European Union the country – with only the exception of the Presi-
dency and a few initiatives in foreign policy – cannot boast that it is
able to introduce new agendas and promote its initiatives.
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Domestic political framework
EU strategy
According to programmatic documents, the EU agenda has been
a priority for all Czech governments that have ruled the country
since EU accession in 2004. In the first five years after EU accession
Czech governments focused on preparation for the EU council
presidency that the country held in the first half of 2009. The EU
policy of the Czech Republic was defined in the foreign policy con-
cept for the period 2003-2006 and afterwards in the various ver-
sions of the Council presidency programme. Governments that
ruled the country after the elections in 2006 failed to adopt a new
foreign policy concept, thus the Czech Republic lacked guidance
in foreign policy in general, not only in EU issues. A new foreign pol-
icy concept4 was adopted only in 2011 and in 2013 it was followed
by the first EU strategy of the Czech Republic. The EU strategy es-
pecially was criticised for being vague and overly technical in indi-
vidual sector priorities. None of the documents offer answers to the
question of what kind of EU the Czech Republic wants, and they
avoid answering the question of Eurozone membership. The new
Czech government that was appointed in February 2014 after the
latest parliamentary elections has already signalled that it will re-
place both of the documents.
The current foreign policy concept mentions eight foreign policy
priorities. Two of them are EU-related. It includes support for an op-
erational, politically and economically strong European Union as the
ﬁfth priority only. In last place is the European integration of Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe. According to the concept, the Czech Re-
public considers the EU to be a pragmatic political project to which
it sees no alternative, but at the same time it strives to optimise its
political and economic costs. The European Union is seen as a tool
for the promotion of national interests. The key interests of the coun-
try within the EU are the internal market and energy security. In these
4 Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, http://www.mzv.cz/
ﬁle/681350/koncepce_zahranicni_politiky_2011_en.pdf
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areas the EU is perceived as the principle instrument through which
the country can pursue and realize its interests. The concept also
mentions other priorities such as Western Balkans EU enlargement
or the Eastern Partnership. However it gives no guidance on the
question of whether the Czech Republic supports further integration,
especially in the area of economic governance, or whether or not the
country wants to be in the hard core of EU integration. On the other
hand it gives a clear answer on the future of Common Foreign and
Security Policy, which in the opinion of the government shall remain
an intergovernmental platform.
The current EU strategy of the Czech Republic, called Active Policy
for Growth and Competitive Europe5, was adopted by the former
centre-right government in 2013. Its adoption was accompanied by
large disputes between the Ofﬁce of the Government (which is in
charge of EU policies in the Czech Republic) and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. The Ofﬁce of the Government (under the political lead-
ership of ODS – see stances of political parties below) had a quite
Eurosceptic approach (especially in issues related to further contin-
uation of the integration process), while the MFA (led by TOP09 - see
stances of political parties below) had the opposite approach. The
ﬁnal version of the document reﬂects the stronger position of the Of-
ﬁce of the Government. As mentioned before, the document is quite
detailed in its deﬁnition of Czech interests in individual sectoral pri-
orities, but lacks a clear vision for the Czech Republic on the future
of European integration. The strategy only acknowledges the coun-
try’s obligation to introduce the Euro and mentions that this can be
done only after the ﬁnal form of the Eurozone will be known. It is quite
negative toward the newest developments and measures that are
being implemented by the Eurozone and stresses that these devel-
opments are changing the nature of the Czech obligation to introduce
the Euro. The strategy is overtly sceptical toward further integration
(with an exception of the underlined necessity to accomplish the con-
struction of the internal market and further liberalisation of energy
markets). According to the document the current framework of EU
5 http://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/Strategie-pusobeni-CR-v-EU.pdf
65
Vladimír Bartovic66
primary law is sufﬁcient and well-functioning. The country “will be
ready to participate in the discussion on treaty reforms, only if it is
absolutely inevitable for sustainability of European integration”6 and
future transfers of competencies to the EU shall be subject to ap-
proval by citizens in referenda. 
The new centre-left government appointed in January 2014 de-
cided to shift the steering wheel of the Czech EU policy in the oppo-
site direction. The government declared a pro-EU policy and
committed itself to taking concrete steps in this direction. One of the
ﬁrst decisions of the government was to sign the Fiscal compact; this
is still to be ratiﬁed, however (see below). It has also decided to adopt
both a new foreign policy concept and EU strategy that would reﬂect
different opinions of state political leadership on EU integration. Both
documents are yet to be adopted (October 2014), but the draft ver-
sions of these documents conﬁrm a general change in opinions and
wording when discussing EU integration. The draft EU strategy
clearly states that the strategic interest of the Czech Republic is to
become a ﬁxed part of the EU and its aim is to be in the main inte-
gration stream. The EU is understood as a strategic choice and a po-
litical project as well as a basic economic, social, cultural and security
framework for the development of the Czech Republic.
Political parties and other actors
Despite an overwhelming image of the Czech Republic as being a
Eurosceptic country, most relevant political parties have a positive
opinion on the further continuation of European integration. The neg-
ative picture of the Czech Republic was created mainly by former
president Vaclav Klaus and in turn by the government led by Prime
Minister Petr Nečas (2010 – 2013) of the Civic Democratic Party
(ODS). President Klaus succeeded in becoming the most visible high
proﬁle opponent of European integration, especially during his sec-
ond term (2008-2013) in ofﬁce. He lingered long with the ratiﬁcation
of the Lisbon Treaty and he made ratiﬁcation conditional on a special
opt-out for the Czech Republic from the Charter of Fundamental
6 http://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/Strategie-pusobeni-CR-v-EU.pdf
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Rights.7 Although he ratiﬁed the Treaty in the end (the Czech Repub-
lic was the last country to ratify the Treaty), he remained extremely
critical of it. In his opinion, the Treaty has ended national sovereignty
of EU member states. He also absolutely refused the introduction of
the Euro in the Czech Republic and made anti-EU criticism his main
political programme. He was able to dominate public discourse on
EU issues in the Czech Republic; hence, the negative shift in the
opinion of citizens on the EU can be attributed to a great extent to
him. The government led by Nečas, and especially the Prime Minister
himself, was at all times under strong pressure from President Klaus.
In 2011 the government refused to sign the so-called Euro Plus Pact
as well as Fiscal Compact in 2012.
We can analyse general attitudes of political parties toward the con-
tinuation of European integration according to the ratiﬁcation of the
Lisbon Treaty. We can suppose that parties with pro-European atti-
tudes would not object ratifying the Lisbon Treaty and parties op-
posing ratiﬁcation can be assessed as Eurosceptic. During the
ratiﬁcation of the Treaty in both chambers of Parliament (House of
Representatives and Senate), only the Communist party opposed the
Treaty openly. The Social Democrats (ČSSD), Christian Democrats
(KDU-ČSL) and Greens (nowadays not represented in the Chamber
of Deputies) were in favour. All of these parties remained very pro-
European, with some reservations in the case of KDU-ČSL toward
harmonisation of civil law (especially family law).
Most complicated was the position of the ODS. Its general assem-
bly gave a free mandate to its deputies and senators to vote on the
Treaty. This was a result of internal division inside the party on EU
issues. The hawkish wing of the party, which recognised President
Klaus as their intellectual leader, refused to agree with ratiﬁcation,
while a dovish wing led by then-Prime Minister Topolánek pushed
his party members to ratify the Treaty for the sake of the country’s
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7 This opt-out aimed at securing that the Charter of Fundamental Rights will not challenge the
so-called Beneš decrees. These decrees among others expropriated possessions of Sudeten
Germans (and partly Hungarians) in Czechoslovakia after World War II. 
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reputation in the EU. The party remained divided on the issue and
more than half of ODS deputies and senators voted against the
Treaty. Since the ratiﬁcation of Lisbon Treaty, the party took a di-
rection toward even more Eurosceptic rhetoric. After elections to
European Parliament in 2009, ODS, together with British conserva-
tives, formed a new political group called the European Conserva-
tives and Reformists (ECR). Since a series of scandals almost
destroyed the party that used to be the leading right wing party in
Czech Republic, it is trying to ﬁnd an agenda (EU scepticism) that
would be attractive for citizens. For example, before the last elec-
tions to the European Parliament, the party organized a petition
against the introduction of the Euro and for keeping the Czech
crown as a national currency.
Currently, three new political parties that did not exist in 2009 are
present in the Parliament. TOP09 was established mainly by politi-
cians that left KDÚ-ČSL (the party proclaims to be conservative, but
its electorate is mostly liberal) and has replaced ODS as the strongest
right wing party. This party is very pro-European and supports further
continuation of European integration, including Czech participation
in the Euro Plus Pact and Fiscal Compact along with quick adoption
of the Euro. The second strongest party in the Chamber of Deputies
is ANO 2011 (a political party established in 2011 by a billionaire of
Slovak origin, Andrej Babiš): it lacks a comprehensive programme on
EU issues. Although it considers itself pro-European, the party is cur-
rently against the introduction of the Euro. The last party is the Dawn
of Direct Democracy (Úsvit), a newly established populist political
party that got into parliament with populist anti-establishment, xeno-
phobic and anti-immigration programmes. This party can be consid-
ered Eurosceptic, although they do not have a deﬁned programme
on EU issues.
Although, we have deﬁned three Eurosceptic political parties in the
Czech Parliament, we can label them as modestly Eurosceptic par-
ties, as they oppose further continuation of EU integration process,
but they do not call for leaving the EU altogether. There is only one
relevant political party with this aim: Party of Free Citizens (Strana
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svobodných občanů), which succeeded in the elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament, wherewith the support of around 5% voters it won
one seat in the European Parliament.
The formulation of national positions on EU policies during the
House of Representatives term of 2010-2014 was negatively inﬂu-
enced by the fact that the Prime Minister came from the Eurosceptic
ODS, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance
were from the pro-European TOP09. Especially strong tension was
witnessed between the Ofﬁce of the Government and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Both institutions publicly fought for inﬂuence in policy
formulation. Another problem that arose was the issue of represen-
tation of the country in the Council for General Affairs (GAC). In the
area of EU economic governance, the Ministry of Finance and the
Ofﬁce of the Government often promoted divergent positions. The
current government managed to establish a higher level of conver-
gence. First, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs are
now from the same party – Social Democracy. Second, although the
Minister of Finance is Andrej Babiš, leader of ANO2011, the discrep-
ancies in their views on economic governance are not so profound
(although they have different opinions on introduction of Euro).
Other important actors that are able to shape positions of both
the Czech Republic and public opinion are the President, the
Czech National Bank and the Constitutional Court. Current Czech
President Miloš Zeman, who took office after Václav Klaus, con-
siders himself a “European federalist”. He supports the quick in-
troduction of the Euro, participation of the Czech Republic in core
Europe, and a real common foreign policy. The Czech National
Bank and its Board of Governors also play an important role in
defining Czech EU positions, especially in the area of economic
governance. Given the fact that with one exceptionall serving
members of the Board of Governors were appointed by former
President Klaus, the Bank has a very negative stance on introduc-
tion of Euro and on the country’s participation the in mechanisms
such as the Banking Union. The Constitutional Court was crucial,
especially during the ratification of Lisbon Treaty, when in two de-
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cisions it confirmed that the Treaty does not violate the constitu-
tion. However, the Court (similar to the German equivalent) re-
served for itself the right to scrutinize conformity of any new EU
treaty with the constitution of the country.
Position of the Czech Republic toward
new developments in the EU and Eurozone
As suggested in the previous chapter, attitudes of the Czech Repub-
lic toward the newest developments in the economic governance of
the EU and Eurozone were reserved. Under the leadership of previ-
ous governments the country adopted a “wait and see” strategy that
resulted in a very passive approach toward negotiations of new ac-
quis within the EU. This attitude had a negative consequence in mar-
ginalising the Czech Republic in the EU. As such the country had no
chance to inﬂuence proposed measures in a way that would be ben-
eﬁcial for the country. A few times the former government threatened
to veto new measures (e.g., in the case of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism), but in the end never did so. The image of a country that
does not want to be in core Europe was established mainly by its re-
fusal to participate in both the Euro Plus Pact and the Fiscal Com-
pact. As mentioned above, the current Czech government
announced a change in the general attitude of the Czech Republic
toward changes in economic governance in the EU and Eurozone,
although concrete steps are yet to be taken (to this point the Czech
government has signed Fiscal Compact and sent it to Parliament for
ratiﬁcation). 
Implementation of European Semesters
The Czech Republic supported the creation of the European semes-
ter as a measure that would be used for the evaluation of economic
policies of the member states of the Union. Since its start, the gov-
ernment has annually prepared and adopted the so-called Conver-
gence Programme and National Reform Programme. The
Convergence Program sets the basic direction of the government’s
macroeconomic policies but also serves as a basis for the European
Commission’s and EU Council’s decision-making on abrogation of
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the excessive deﬁcit procedure. The National Reform Programme
(NRP) represents a conceptual national policy document, which sets
a plan of key measures to stimulate economic growth in the Czech
Republic. The reform measures included programmes aimed to fulﬁl
national targets set within the Europe 2020 Strategy. At the same
time they reﬂect the implementation of country-speciﬁc recommen-
dations the country receives in the framework of European Semester
each year.
Recommendations that the country has received since 2011 are
mostly consistent, due mainly to the fact that the Czech Republic has
to this point not been able to implement most of them.
Recommendations require:
– Proper implementation of the convergence programme, especially
the aim to achieve the so-called medium term objective;8
– Changes in tax legislation, including increasing the efﬁciency of
tax collection, simplifying the tax system and harmonising the tax
bases for personal income tax and social and health contributions,
reducing the high level of taxation on labour and reducing discrep-
ancies in the tax treatment of employees and the self-employed,
and shifting taxation to areas less detrimental to growth, such as
recurrent taxes on housing and environmental taxes;
– Accelerating the increase of the statutory retirement age in order
to ensure long-term sustainability of the public pension scheme;
– Implementing measures that would enable the employment of
women with small children, youth and older workers;
– Reforming higher education in order to improve its quality and es-
pecially its labour market relevance;
– Removal of unjustiﬁed and disproportionate requirements for reg-
ulated professions;
– Adopting a Civil Service Act that would ensure a non-politicized
state administration service.
8 A medium-term objective (MTO) represents a budgetary position that safeguards against
the risk of breaching the 3% of GDP threshold budget deﬁcit and ensures the long-term sus-
tainability of public ﬁnances.
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According to the analysis conducted by the European Parliament9
which monitors the implementation of Country Speciﬁc Recommen-
dations for the years 2011 and 2012, the Czech Republic fully imple-
mented only 13% of recommendations from both years, while the
EU average was 18%; not implemented at all were 52% of recom-
mendations (the EU average was 43%) and serious work underway
was observed for 35% of recommendations (the EU average is 39%).
The country is doing worse than most EU countries, but some
progress can be witnessed this year, when foremost the Civil Service
Act was ﬁnally adopted and the Czech Republic was able to leave
the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure. The government agreed with all the
recommendations from the European Commission, except for the
one asking for acceleration of increase of statutory retirement age in
order to ensure long-term sustainability of the public pension
scheme. This is a very sensitive issue, especially for a government
led by Social Democrats, although social partners (trade unions and
employers’ federations) back the position of government.
Euro Plus Pact
The Czech Republic is one of the four Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (along with the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary and
the Czech Republic) that do not participate in Euro Plus Pact. The
government claimed that it agrees with most of the proposed meas-
ures in the Pact, but does not want to commit the country and hence
would not participate in the Pact. This decision was justiﬁed by two
main reasons: 1) since the Pact was negotiated only between the Eu-
rozone Member States, the Czech Republic did not have an oppor-
tunity to promote its interests during the negotiation process; 2) the
government was against the harmonisation of the tax base, and al-
though the ﬁnal text of the Pact included only a delicate reference to
this topic, it was used as a main reason for rejecting the Pact. Rejec-
tion of the Pact was supported by President Klaus, but heavily criti-
cized by the ODS’s coalition partners as well as by the Social
Democrats who were the main opposition party at that time. 
9 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/497735/IPOL-
ECON_ET(2014)497735_EN.pdf
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Nowadays, there is no discussion on the possibility of joining the
Euro Plus Pact in the Czech Republic, as it is considered an obsolete
project with little relevance.
Surveillance of economic and fiscal policies: 
revised Stability and Growth Pact (Six-Pack)
The Stability and Growth Pact was created as a basic measure that
would maintain stability of Eurozone by setting ﬁscal criteria that
every Member State of the Union has to follow. Debt crisis in the Eu-
rozone proved that the Stability and Growth Pact cannot work if it
doesn’t have a functioning corrective and sanction mechanism that
would enforce adherence. The response of the European Union was
the adoption of six legislative measures that increased enforcement
of the SGP by strengthening and simplifying possibilities of sanction
imposition in the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure – the corrective arm of
the SGP. Among these measures the Six-Pack introduced surveil-
lance over economic policies of EU member states through the cre-
ation of the so-called Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP).
The Czech position toward their introduction was mostly positive,
although discrepancies between the Ofﬁce of the Government and
the Ministry of Finance arose. While the Ministry of Finance sup-
ported the Six-Pack from the very beginning, the Ofﬁce of the Gov-
ernment adopted a more cautious attitude. The Czech government
fought for very strict enforcement of the SGP for Eurozone members.
The main objective of the country’s strategy was to preserve sanc-
tions for Eurozone members exclusively. The country was against the
possibility of punishing other member states of the Union. The Czech
Republic did not welcome the ﬁnal compromise whereby non-Euro-
zone Member States can be punished by suspension of payments
from the Cohesion Fund, as this measure tackles only countries that
are below 90% of EU GDP per capita.10 It promoted (unsuccessfully)
the idea that in such cases, other payments (such as payments from
10 In the end, this measure can result in stronger punishment of non-Eurozone members of the
Union as payments from the Cohesion Fund in several countries exceed the maximum level of
ﬁne (1% of GDP) imposed under the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure on Eurozone member states.
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Common Agricultural Policy) should be subject to suspension as well.
The government also strictly refused the idea that the Council could
suspend voting rights of countries severely breaching the SGP. The
country successfully promoted some technical amendments to the
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure that better reﬂect differences
in character of economies of individual member states (for example
the inﬂux of Foreign Direct Investments to the Czech Republic, which
is much higher than domestic investments, could be assessed as a
macroeconomic imbalance, although their primary context for the
Czech Republic is convergence to economies of richer member
states).
The Czech Republic entered the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure in De-
cember 2009, mainly as a consequence of lower budget incomes
and greater budget spending inﬂamed by the economic crises that
seriously hit the Czech Republic – together with most of EU Member
States – in 2009. Due to a strict ﬁscal policy implemented by the pre-
vious governments that included huge cuts in budget spending and
increases of both VAT and income taxes, in 2013 the country lowered
the deﬁcit of public ﬁnance to 1.5% of GDP despite the fact that the
economy of the country declined by 0.9%. It was able to leave the
Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure in June 2014, together with ﬁve other
member states of the Union.
To this point the Six-Pack provisions have not been implemented
into national legislation. The former government proposed a consti-
tutional amendment that would enact the so-called “Financial con-
stitution,” limiting government debt and imposing sanctions in case
certain limits of the debt are reached, in 2013. The draft of the con-
stitutional amendment also assumed the creation of an independent
National Budget Council that would oversee the ﬁnancial manage-
ment of the state and local governments, monitor transparency of
the management of public funds, or issue opinions on important laws
and their impact on the budget.
The draft amendment was, however, not approved, due to the fact
that the government collapsed in June 2013, following a scandal con-
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nected to political corruption and abuse of the military information
agency. A caretaker government that lead the country to early elec-
tions took no steps in promoting the law in the Parliament. The law
would not have been enacted anyway, as the two main opposition
parties (Social Democrats and Communists) were against the strict
limits anticipated by the draft.11 Their argument was that these limits
would not allow for investing in a re-start of economic growth of the
country.
The current government declared that the adoption of similar law
would be a priority. To this point (November 2014) the Ministry of Fi-
nance presented similar draft law that anticipates sanctions only in
cases where the debt reaches 55% of GDP. However, it will be difﬁ-
cult for the coalition to agree on the ﬁnal version of the law and to
ﬁnd support for it among opposition parties.
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)
The Czech Republic was – together with the UK – the only EU mem-
ber state that did not signed the TSCG in March 2012. It was a sur-
11 Constitutional amendments or laws have to be approved by qualiﬁed majority of both de-
puties and senators. The coalition government did not have this majority.
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Debt as a 
percentage of GDP
Sanctions imposed
40 – 45
The government must provide the Chamber of Deputies with reasons
for such developments and propose measures to reduce the debt.
45 – 48
The government must freeze spending by at least 3% of the approved
state budget. It will also reduce by 20% the salary basis for calculating
salaries of the highest state ofﬁcials, except for judges. The govern-
ment will also freeze the growth of salaries of employees in public
services and administration.
48 – 49
The government can submit to the Chamber of Deputies only a pro-
posal of balanced or surplus state budget.
50 and more
The government has to ask the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of
conﬁdence.
Table 1. The government proposal set the following sanctions in
cases of reaching certain limits of public debt
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prising decision made by Prime Minister Petr Nečas in the very last
moment of the negotiations.12 During the negotiations, the govern-
ment adopted a rather positive attitude towards the Fiscal Compact. 
The decision not to take part in the TSCG was explained PM Nečas
with three reasons: 
1) uncertainty on the ratiﬁcation process in the Czech Republic; 
2) discontent with the participation of the non-Eurozone Member
States in only some Eurosummit meetings; 
3) the fact that the TSCG did not operationalize debt criterion en-
forcement through the possible imposition of sanctions. The Prime
Minister’s decision not to sign the Fiscal Compact received signiﬁ-
cant criticism from the coalition partners of ODS, namely from TOP09
(represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Fi-
nance), as well as from the main opposition party – the Social De-
mocrats. These actors criticised the fact that this decision excluded
the country from the mainstream of European integration. They also
stressed the fact that the provisions of the TSCG are binding only for
Eurozone member states, and the fact that the Czech Republic did
not join would have major consequence for ability of the country to
participate in Eurosummit meetings. The current Czech government,
after some hesitation from the ANO2011, decided to accede to the
Fiscal Compact in Spring of 2014. Ratiﬁcation in Parliament is yet to
take place and the result is not guaranteed. The governing coalition
does not have the qualiﬁed majority required for the ratiﬁcation of the
Treaty in Parliament and needs support from opposition parties. The
only opposition party that is willing to support the ratiﬁcation of the
Fiscal Compact in Parliament is the pro-European TOP09. This party,
however, conditions ratiﬁcation on the adoption of declaration of the
government that the Czech Republic will be bound by all the ﬁscal
and economic provisions of the Treaty.13 This is opposed by the
coalition, as it would constitute restrictions on ﬁscal policies of the
12 Interview with former Head of Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the Eu-
ropean Union, Milena Vicenová.
13 The same step by other non-Eurozone countries was taken only by Denmark and Romania
so far.
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government, such as the necessity to lower the structural deﬁcit by
0.5% annually. In the opinion of the coalition parties this does not ﬁt
in with their pro-growth programme. Moreover, it would mean that
the Czech Republic could be sanctioned should it fail to introduce
the so-called debt brake to its constitution.
Banking Union
The Czech Republic was cautious from the very beginning on the
plans to build a Banking Union. Although it expressed general sup-
port for the idea, it also insisted that membership in the banking
union be compulsory only for Eurozone member states. The most
vocal opponent of the banking union was the Czech National Bank
(CNB). It did not want to lose competencies in overseeing the stability
and ﬁnancial health of Czech banks. In the opinion of the national
bank, Czech banks are in much better condition that Eurozone banks
thanks to their low dependence on foreign capital and very cautious
lending policies. The government and the Czech National Bank per-
ceived the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as the
most problematic question. Most of the banks in the Czech Republic
are subsidiaries of banks in the Eurozone. Should they transform
from subsidiaries into branches, they would fall under the regulation
of the ECB. The Czech government was even prepared to use its
veto to block the creation of the SSM. In the end, the government
was satisﬁed with guarantees that the transformation of Czech banks
from subsidiaries (under the supervision of CNB) to branches (under
the supervision of the ECB) would be possible only with the consent
of the CNB.
The Czech government was also rather sceptical toward creation
of the Single Resolution Mechanism. In the end, the country sup-
ported the so-called bail-in principle, which introduces a proposal
whereby the ﬁrst actors to rescue banks would be shareholders and
creditors rather than public funds.
There is a general consensus that the membership in Banking
Union shall be connected with the accession to Economic and Mon-
etary Union and adoption of the Euro.
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Position on the adoption of Euro 
Since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, discussion on the
introduction of Euro almost stopped. Mainstream political discourse
argued that the preservation of an independent monetary policy
helped the country to withstand the negative consequences of the
crisis.14 The introduction of the Euro became very unpopular among
citizens. While before the crisis supporters and opponents of the Euro
were almost equal, in the latest opinion poll from March 2014, only
24% of Czechs support the introduction of the Euro in the Czech Re-
public, while the rest oppose it. However, these numbers already in-
dicate a change in the trend: in 2012 polls showed only 17% of
Czech were in favour of the Euro, while more than 50% opposed it
strongly.15 The change in the trend is even more visible among busi-
ness leaders. While in June 2013 only 25% of business representa-
tives supported introduction of the Euro and around 50% opposed
it,16 the latest poll showed a dramatic shift according to which around
75% of business leaders now support Euro introduction.17
The Czech ruling coalition did not promise the introduction of the
Euro during the current legislative term (2013-2017), mainly due to
opposition from ANO2011 – a coalition partner. While the other two
coalition parties (Social Democrats and KDÚ-ČSL) support introduc-
tion of the Euro (although due to negative public opinion, they do not
stress this fact), ANO2011 claimed that this goal should lie beyond
the current legislative term. The coalition, on the other hand, prom-
ised to prepare the country for possible accession. Opposition par-
ties – with the exception of TOP09 – are against the introduction of
the Euro. ODS in particular used this question as a main topic of its
campaign in the European Parliament election, when it launched a
“Campaign for the Czech Crown”. Together with two other opposi-
14 The exchange rate of the Czech crown to the Euro devaluated by around 20% between
summer 2008 and spring 2009. Many argue that this helped Czech exporters and thus pre-
vented an even stronger decline of Czech economy.
15 STEM Trends 3/2014; http://www.stem.cz/clanek/2929
16 http://ekonomika.Eurozpravy.cz/ceska-republika/72390-Euro-nechceme-krici-ceske-ﬁrmy-
z-ceho-maji-nejvetsi-strach/
17 http://byznys.lidovky.cz/preji-si-cesti-podnikatele-Euro-ruzne-pruzkumy-maji-odlisne-
vysledky-1el-/ﬁrmy-trhy.aspx?c=A140430_121034_ﬁrmy-trhy_mev
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tion parties (Communists and Úsvit, which are against the Euro) they
demand that possible accession be subject to a referendum.
The Czech Republic currently fulﬁls all the Maastricht criteria for in-
troduction of the Euro except for the criterion demanding participa-
tion in the ERM2 mechanism. Due to the low political support as well
as opposition from the Czech National Bank, it is almost impossible
that this government would set a ﬁxed date for introduction of the
Euro and make a decision on participation in the ERM2 mechanism.
Fiscal Union
The Czech position toward the creation of Fiscal Union is rather neg-
ative. The EU strategy of the government claims that the EU, and es-
pecially Eurozone, should ﬁrst properly implement and utilize already
existing mechanisms, such as the internal market, the European se-
mester, a revised SGP, etc. Steps envisioned in European Commis-
sion blueprint18 for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union
are considered unrealistic and too ambitious. The government espe-
cially rejected the idea of debt-sharing and possible joint issuance of
bonds or treasury vouchers. The main argument against these is the
risk of moral hazard. Countries protected by debt-sharing would not
be motived to follow cautious ﬁscal policies and implement structural
reforms. At the same time the government refuses the creation of a
“central” European budget funded by a new EU tax and also the cre-
ation of ﬁnancial instruments for Eurozone (Convergence and Com-
petitiveness Instrument) that could provide incentives for member
states of the Union to implement necessary structural reforms.
Interest and positions of the
Czech Republic to ward possible
directions of European integration
Differentiated integration was an important topic of discussion in the
Czech Republic during the ﬁrst years of its EU membership. The Ac-
cession Treaty contained many aspects that positioned the country
18 https://eur-lex.Europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0777&from=EN
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into a different level of integration compared to those of old EU mem-
ber states. Within the relatively narrow transitional period with a ﬁxed
maximum duration (e.g., EU regulations in the ﬁeld of environmental
policy, common agricultural policy, free movement of persons and
capital), the country faced derogations from the application of EU ac-
quis without a clear time frame. The two most important exceptions
in this category were full participation in Economic and Monetary
Union and Schengen cooperation. The Czech government advocated
a quick termination of transitional periods especially in the area of
free movement of labour. It also promoted accession to the Schen-
gen zone at the earliest possible moment. Similarly, the country pro-
moted the accession of Romania and Bulgaria and did not agree with
political reasons that were behind the denial of their accession. Dur-
ing the ﬁrst years of membership in the Union the Czech Republic
carried out the ﬁrst steps that would lead to accession to the Euro-
zone. It created the position of Coordinator for Euro Introduction in
the Ministry of Finance and it also set indicative data for accession
to the Eurozone to in 2009-2010. 
The Czech Republic did not request permanent derogation from
higher levels of integration such as Schengen or the Eurozone during
the accession process and never impugned its obligation to access
the Eurozone should all the Maastricht criteria be met. Hence, the
country accepted and promoted the full level of integration although
it accepted the fact, that this could only be achieved at a different
speed. 
After the outbreak of the debt crises, the EU and Eurozone took
several steps with the aim of promoting the stability of the Eurozone
that have had a signiﬁcant impact on the EU and Eurozone gover-
nance. The creation of rescue mechanisms, such as the European
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), European Financial Sta-
bility Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
changes in the economic governance of the EU and Eurozone, the
promotion of the coordination of ﬁscal policies of Eurozone member
states and the Banking Union signiﬁcantly increased the difference
in the level of integration of Eurozone Member States and other
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members of the Union. During the negotiations for new mechanisms
the Czech Republic made clear that they be open to non-Eurozone
member states as well, although they decided not to participate in
them for the moment (Euro Plus Pact, TSCG, Banking Union). On the
other hand, it never blocked such initiatives where its consent was
needed, such as in the creation of the EFSM or the incorporation of
ESM into the EU legal structure (Amendment to Art. 136 TFEU). 
The Czech Republic also consistently expressed its concerns re-
garding the growing importance of para-union structures involving
only Eurozone member states, such as Eurosummit meetings or the
possibility of creating Eurogroups beyond the ECOFIN formation of
the Council of the EU. On the other hand, the country was never very
active in promoting its positions during negotiations and mostly
adopted a wait and see strategy, thus refraining from shaping the
format of the new measures. The reason behind this position was a
signiﬁcant difference in opinions among different political parties
within the ruling coalition towards more intensive levels of EU inte-
gration.
Generally, the Czech position towards changes in Eurozone gov-
ernance can be described as a gradual acceptance of the multi-
speed or even multi-level model of EU integration on the condition
of relative openness of the Eurozone toward other EU member
states. This openness shall include the possibility of opt-in for some
of the new mechanisms created by the Eurozone, such as the Bank-
ing Union, but also the requirement that the Eurozone itself will re-
main open to other EU countries that would like to join it. As was
envisaged before, the current Czech government would like to posi-
tion itself into the core of European integration. That includes not only
membership in the Eurozone (as declared by the government, the
country will not join until at least 2018), but also other initiatives, such
as harmonisation of legislation in the area of police and judicial co-
operation. The government also declared that it wants to be active
in shaping the new instruments of the Eurozone, even though they
would serve only Eurozone member states. Hence, its strategic in-
terest is that measures be taken in the EU-28 format. 
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Areas and interests of the
Czech Republic in Visegrad co-operation
The Czech Republic considers Visegrad co-operation to be one of
the most important components of its foreign policy. The Visegrad
group was set up in 1991 in order to facilitate association and ac-
cession processes of Central European countries into the EU. When
this process was accomplished, the Visegrad group had to ﬁnd a
new justiﬁcation for its existence. Nowadays, the Czech Republic
views Visegrad cooperation as the most natural way to increase the
inﬂuence of Central European countries in the EU decision-making
process. In the Czech view the importance of Visegrad cooperation
has increased in recent years together with the outbreak of crisis
and consequent EU efforts to solve it. The Visegrad group is more
and more active in information exchange, cooperation and coordi-
nation of positions vis-à-vis EU decision-making. Coordination
meetings of Prime Ministers before each European Council have al-
ready brought about results, for example in the successful negotia-
tion of ﬁnancial perspectives for 2014–2020. Although, there are
areas where Visegrad countries’ interests diverge (for example agri-
culture), for most issues interests are similar. Czech diplomats un-
derstand that the ﬁrst countries to approach in cases where they
would like to promote an idea on the EU level are their counterparts
from other V4 countries. Although the Czech Republic does not en-
dorse enlargement of the Visegrad group with other countries, it
views more frequent cooperation in Visegrad Plus format positively,
when representatives of other countries are invited to join the group
for discussion or joint projects.
V4 Cooperation includes various levels of decision makers and
state administration. Frequent meetings of Prime Ministers and line
ministers are supplemented by meetings on the working level and in-
creasingly vivid cooperation between civil society organisations. In
this respect the activities of the International Visegrad Fund that en-
able cultural and scientiﬁc cooperation between academia and civil
society are viewed very positively. The Czech government also wel-
comed and supports the recent extension of Visegrad Fund activities
toward Eastern Partnership countries and the Western Balkans.
The Czech Republic’s position on EU governance trends
Czech priorities for Visegrad cooperation are very similar to its EU
priorities. These include increasing competitiveness and fostering eco-
nomic growth mainly through the completion of the internal market,
energy security, including interconnectivity and diversiﬁcation of en-
ergy sources and transportation routes, Eastern Partnership and West-
ern Balkans. In addition, cooperation in defence, including the
formation of the Visegrad Battle Group in 2016, transport infrastructure
and internal cohesion in Central Europe are also seen as priorities.
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EU GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC
CHALLENGES – PERSPECTIVES FROM
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Boris Hošoff 1
Introduction
In this paper we present some of the challenges relevant to macro-
economic policies brought on by the developments of last couple of
years. The contemporary period and accepted policy measures are
strongly affected by the ﬁnancial crisis and subsequent public ﬁnance
problems. Here we will emphasize those main challenges that in this
regard are more or less similar for all V4 countries. We will focus on
current economic developments heavily inﬂuenced by external con-
ditions and the process of population ageing, while analyzing actual
policies applied in the process of ﬁscal consolidation. Particularly im-
portant are activities focused on better competitiveness and hence
economic growth prospects purportedly brought by the Euro, plus
pact measures and sustainability of government ﬁnances supported
by the Fiscal compact rules, which are also our objectives. Then we
shift our focus to the federalization of the EU and the position of the
Slovak Republic regarding ﬁscal union. Further, we analyze the po-
tential for cooperation among the V4 countries.
Long term factors affecting the fiscal position
The IMF Mission concluded that the Slovak Republic’s strong ﬁscal
commitment is evident and that since 2009 the budget deﬁcit has
1 Research fellow, Institute of Economic Research, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava
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been reduced by about 5.0 percentage points to 2.8 percent of GDP
in 2013, just below the threshold for exiting the EU´s Excessive Deﬁcit
Procedure.2 The Slovak Republic’s debt of around 55 percent of GDP
is manageable, this being reﬂected in relatively favourable market
conditions and low interest rates for government debt.
A demographic trend whereby people will live and work longer is a
common feature of all European economies, including V4 countries,
and is directly related to future consumer behaviour or employment
developments.3 An immediate pursuit of sustainability of public ﬁ-
nances is in this regard a condition for the future sustainability of pen-
sions, social security and health care systems. Therefore it is
important to interconnect the whole social system with demographic
evolution. For example, the Slovak Republic has in this regard intro-
duced binding pension age tied to life expectancy, imposed restric-
tions on early retirement and enacted labour market policy focused
on the employability of persons 55 and older.4 In these terms, to pre-
vent the potential growth of public debt induced by an ageing pop-
ulation, the Slovak Republic is implementing several structural
reforms in its social, pension, or health care systems. 
An alternative to the current regulation of retirement age will be pre-
pared by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slo-
vak Republic by the year 2017. An integral part of this new regulation
should be speciﬁcation of the length of pension insurance participa-
tion (in years) needed to apply for full pension beneﬁts without any
conditions pertaining to the actual age of the insured person. There
is the option to radically increase the number of minimal pension in-
surance participation years needed to apply for a full pension from
the current 15 years up to 30 years.5
The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family will set the mini-
mum pension to accord with the number of years worked and be in
line with the presumption that the person who worked the prescribed
2 IMF (2014)
3 Not to neglect the inﬂuence on public ﬁnances.
4 In this regard it is important to mention that an older population will work longer, which could
create obstacles for the employability of younger generation. Therefore it is important to pay
attention to work opportunities for other age groups and to support intergenerational dialogue.
5 Ministry of Labour Social Affairs and Family (2013)
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number of years should not ﬁnd him/herself6 ﬁnancially dependent
on the social aid system. The age of the person will therefore not be
the key precondition for pension beneﬁciaries. According to the Min-
istry plan, when dealing with pre-retirement age beneﬁciaries, par-
ticipants in the third pillar of the pension system will be allowed to
leave the labour market earlier and ﬁnance their living expenses with
private funds held on personal accounts.
In the year 2012 the Slovak Republic adopted an amendment to
the Act on Social Insurance to improve the long-term sustainability
of the pension system, facilitate the consolidation of public ﬁnances
in the short-term and also abolish certain exemptions and special
regimes applicable to social security contributions. Adopted meas-
ures have different repercussions in the short and medium term as
they affect mainly the net income of insured persons (through an in-
creased tax burden).In the long-term the amendment will mainly af-
fect pensioners (higher retirement age, indexation of pensions solely
to inﬂation, reinforced solidarity in the system). There are indications
that most insured persons will not be able to accumulate enough
pension savings on their private accounts, and thus there should be
supplementary charges to their pensions from the government. When
confronted with such weaker household demand inﬂuenced both by
short term as well as long term factors, future growth prospects are
dependent on competent reaction and strategy from the respective
institutions and authorities.
Fiscal Compact measures and consequences
The above mentioned measures will be implemented in line with the
procedure called the Fiscal Compact, which entered into force in
January of 2013. The Slovak Republic established this policy frame-
work with the institution of the Council for Budget Responsibility
(CBR). Slovakia established the CBR to deal with overall ﬁscal health
and conduct policies. It was formed as an independent body
equipped with competences to monitor and evaluate the ﬁscal per-
6 When obliged to receive the pension.
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formance of the government.7 This is a transparent step towards pre-
cise targeting and more sound and better quality measures imple-
mented in the ﬁeld of ﬁscal management. It provides comprehensive,
independent and politically unbiased information on the development
of public ﬁnances, hence it is an important new element in the ﬁscal
policy framework and a reaction to the sharp growth of the budget
deﬁcit and public debt in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crisis and reces-
sion. It also serves as a signal to ﬁnancial markets, indicating that
public ﬁnances are now much better monitored than before: this
should lead to more sustainable public ﬁnances and better conditions
for ﬁscal ﬁnancing under pressure.
One of the key elements of this new framework is the adoption of
the Fiscal Compact rule of debt brake, limiting the general govern-
ment debt, which corresponds with binding government expenditure
ceilings to ensure better ﬁscal discipline in the medium term.8 An-
other important feature is an approved tightening of rules for munic-
ipalities and self-governing bodies (which are independent in their
decision making but constitute a part of the public ﬁnance sector).
This new ﬁscal framework should improve the overall understanding
of ﬁscal policies pursued by the government, particularly in the con-
text of long-term sustainability of public ﬁnances, hereby creating a
better overview for private as well as public institutions and investors
to make better decisions.
According to the report entitled “Long-Term Sustainability of Public
Finances”,9 the purpose of which is to evaluate the situation in public
ﬁnances within the context of long-term sustainability while taking into
account positive and negative impacts of adopted legislative meas-
ures and policies, the most important and challenging areas are:
1. Pension system and health care (population ageing)
2. Major expenditure programs which have consequences over a
longer term horizon (e.g., PPP projects)
7 Council for Budget Responsibility (2012)
8 Council for Budget Responsibility (2012)
9 Council for Budget Responsibility (2012)
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3. Contingent liabilities that constitute potential risks for public ﬁ-
nances (e.g., lost court cases)
4. Macroeconomic shocks which may change the ﬁscal position
(e.g., narrowly deﬁned tax base)
One of the main tasks of CBR is to inform Parliament on compli-
ance with ﬁscal responsibility and ﬁscal transparency rules – it serves
to evaluate whether all the rules laid down in the Fiscal Responsibility
Act have been met. This institutional framework should be relevant
for other members of V4 as well, since the basic idea is to incorporate
Fiscal Compact rules into existing EU treaties as soon as possible.
This is a new development and could cause problems in the future,
because European institutions (neither the European Parliament, nor
the European Commission) are not playing a signiﬁcant role in the
process of the negotiation or application of Fiscal Compact rules.
This political stance with EU institutions as “bystanders” has created
more space for the activity of individual states and their representa-
tives, which is particularly visible in the success of Germany’s agenda
in this regard. The marginalization of European institutions rises once
again in terms of the question about their legitimacy (i.e., democratic
deﬁcit) and the structure and competences they should represent in
the future. On the other hand, in the absence of adherence to com-
mon principles, ﬁscal imbalances in the EU could persist and estab-
lished negative externalities could possibly spread to all member
states of the EU.
The basic idea behind this stricter version of the Stability and
Growth Pact is to obstruct the repetition of mass bailouts that oc-
curred in Europe after the onset of the ﬁnancial and debt crisis. The
Fiscal Compact will have especially severe consequences for those
countries that are highly indebted, because they will have to carry
out radical austerity reforms to boost their competitiveness and bring
budgets back into balance. Balanced budget requirements could
lead to a much smaller need for ﬁscal transfers in Europe (compared
to current levels) and potentially hinder the growth of V4 countries.
It is uncertain whether the reforms needed to comply with Fiscal
Compact would enable the depressed economies of Europe to regain
their competitiveness, when their membership in the EMU has to this
89
Boris Hošoff90
point brought higher disparities and deﬁcits.10 It is questionable
whether prescribed reforms and proposals could be effectively im-
plemented in every member state of eurozone at the same time, and
that is why we will probably witness the persistence of imbalances
between countries in the years to come.
In the environment of restrained economic growth, along with the
pursuit of spending cuts already contained in the Fiscal Compact
rules, we can see the ambition to carry out deeper income reforms
through unifying tax rates or tax bases, from which tax rates are cal-
culated. This (along with the impossibility to weaken their currency)
could further undermine the former competitive advantages of na-
tional states that joined the EMU and hence possibly force individual
countries to make vital structural reforms.11 How the process of
budget balancing will look will depend very much on the particular
country and its political representatives. On the other hand, one force
behind potential implementation of ﬁscal reforms could be pressure
from ﬁnancial markets, which will probably penalize those countries
that are unable to undertake needed reforms and lower their public
debts or ﬁscal deﬁcits with higher interest rates.
In the absence of democratic institutions on the federal level, this
new concept could lead to budget cuts in social services, even though
the ongoing crisis and recession around Europe has very negative im-
plications reﬂected in record high unemployment, high long term un-
employment, rising income polarization and growing poverty rates.
This is in sharp contrast to the proclaimed objectives set out in the
Europe 2020 strategy, for example, which has clear targets for poverty
reduction and social inclusion, as well as targets for developing the
smart economy and better education, the ﬁnancing of which is now
under threat. These targets are jeopardized by possible expenditure
cuts and continuous ﬁscal consolidation imposed by markets.
A well-prepared ﬁscal concept of balanced budgets is a vital part
of greater economic governance reform gradually leading eurozone
10 In the states which are deprived of the ability to weaken their respective currencies, imports
are growing much faster than exports (low competitiveness) and during the crisis this fact cont-
ributed to rapid growth of foreign debt.
11 For example, reforms leading to a more ﬂexible labor market.
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member states to a more uniﬁed ﬁscal system – likely ﬁscal and po-
litical union. After the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis eurozone member
countries began implementing coordinated policy measures. It is very
likely that the process of closer integration and deeper cooperation
will continue not only on the level of eurozone, but also on the level
of the whole EU.
This system is moving Europe closer to the existing arrangements
of macroeconomic policy and institutions as we know them in the
USA, where member states of the Union are obliged to have bal-
anced budgets. This means that every country posting a deﬁcit in the
case of a cyclical downturn, while recording a combination of lower
revenues and higher expenditures, must take steps to rebalance the
budget, which in practice means cutting (social) spending, and/or in-
creasing taxes. This fact, without appropriately strong federal expen-
diture support in Europe – contrary to the USA12 – will reinforce the
risk that even a relatively small recession could be transformed into
a major one.
In the light of the experiences from the ﬁnancial crisis we can mean-
ingfully expect higher savings rates in the eurozone member states.
Extended public spending cuts, labour cost reduction and persisting
high unemployment could harm the growth models of V4 countries.
Developments in many European countries during the period 2009-
2012 have clearly shown that austerity measures adopted in the ma-
jority of EU member states under the patronage of European
Commission and IMF have had a much more pronounced impact on
economic growth than was previously expected, hence creating self-
defeating ﬁscal consolidation. Therefore we assume that V4 countries
should cooperate more closely on the theoretical and institutional
challenges imposed by the process of EU federalization, which if
properly conducted, could counterbalance the rules imposed on
member states’ non-deﬁcit budgetary planning.
12 Fiscal union in USA has a very different nature and functioning institutional framework, where
the Federal government collects revenue equalling around 24% of the GDP – which is much
more than approximately 1,5% equivalent in Europe. This means that the Federal government
in the USA has a bigger social impact and better ability to inﬂuence the cyclical behavior of
the economy. The Federal government can in this way compensate for demand losses resulting
from balanced budget requirements passed by individual states during the economic cycle.
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Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the
Economic and Monetary Union was signed by all leaders with the ex-
ception of the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom, but it has
an inclusive character, meaning that it can be joined in later phases
of its implementation. On the other hand, it is impossible to withdraw
from it. TSCG is intended to strengthen ﬁscal discipline by (a) estab-
lishing a ‘balanced budget rule’ and automatic correction mecha-
nism, and (b) introducing stricter surveillance mechanisms. The
Slovak Republic ratiﬁed TSCG on January 11th of 2013.Incorporated
into the national legal system were the balanced budget rule with a
structural deﬁcit not higher than 0,5 % of the GDP and the institute
of a correction mechanism in the case of a breach of this rule. This
mechanism is an integral part of economic partnership programmes,
which contain detailed structural reforms member states are intended
to put in place for improving competitiveness and boosting economic
growth. In 2013 the Slovak Republic proceeded to its medium-term
budgetary objective and avoided signiﬁcant variation in terms of the
Fiscal Compact, while the consolidation effort was signiﬁcantly higher
then those stated in Fiscal Compact requirements.13
The Slovak Republic has to comply with the agreed rules three
years after the excessive deﬁcit procedure has ended. According to
the Stability and Growth Pact, the Slovak Republic was put under
the excessive deﬁcit procedure in the year 200914, because general
government deﬁcit was 8% of the GDP at that time. Nevertheless,
after four years SR had completed the process of budget consolida-
tion, moving the deﬁcit under the threshold of 3% of the GDP.15 In
June of 2014 SR was taken out of the excessive deﬁcit procedure. 
The objective of the budgetary strategy is to ensure the sustain-
ability of the correction of the excessive deﬁcit and to reach the
medium-term objective of a structural deﬁcit around 0.5% of the GDP
by 2017, as mentioned in Recommendation (8) of the European
Council (EC, 2014). The structural deﬁcit stood at the level of 3.0%
13 Ministry of Finance of SR (2014b)
14 Ministry of Finance of SR (2009)
15 European Commission (2014a)
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of the GDP in 2013, and we can expect that the largest part of the
consolidation effort to reach the medium-term objective will take
place in the years 2016 and 2017.
Table 1. Fiscal indicators, 2008-2013 (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
The effort of the SR government is systematically concentrated on
the continuation of successful ﬁscal consolidation, the ﬁght against
tax evasion and effective VAT collection. The European Commission
advises these efforts be complemented by the broadening of the tax
base and by the use of taxes less harmful for economic growth – e.g.,
taxation of property and environmental taxes. 
The Euro plus pact corresponds with Fiscal Compact rules and es-
tablishes an important policy framework representing strategy for
higher competitiveness as well as more sustainable growth brought
by lower macroeconomic and structural imbalances between EMU
member states.16 The Euro-Plus Pact focuses primary on ﬁve impor-
tant objectives: competitiveness; employment; sustainability of public
ﬁnances; strengthening of ﬁnancial stability; and coordination of tax
policies. In this regard there are several challenges particularly im-
portant for the Slovak Republic.
The Euro-Plus Pact upgrades the cooperation within the planned
macroeconomic policies on the national level. It is clearly inspired by
macroeconomic policy conducted by Germany, which is based on a
balanced budget (constitutional law), export-led GDP growth and
competitiveness based on wage deﬂation. Obviously, these objectives
can´t be reached by all EU countries at once and are going to have
different impacts on particular member economies through con-
ducted policies and their cyclical behaviour. There are some doubts
16 Beyond EMU member states Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania also
joined the Pact.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Public debt 27.9 35.6 41.0 43.6 52.7 55.4
Deﬁcit -2.1 -8.0 -7.5 -4.8 -4.5 -2.8
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that suggests the limited ability of the Euro-Plus Pact to impact unit
labour costs, hence restraining expected inﬂuence on the accumula-
tion of current account imbalances.17 Common economic interests
could therefore be reached only by a respective macroeconomic pol-
icy mix realized by individual countries, which should be obliged to
discuss with partner countries the repercussion effects of principal
reforms they are going to implement and hence create better condi-
tions for regional stability, which is precisely the case for V4 countries. 
Important parameters of the Euro-Plus Pact should include features
such as markedly improved monitoring, adherence and evaluation of
the obligations with which individual countries have to comply.
Stricter required compliance and penalizations are important features
of new European institutional architecture, because the disfunction
of similar control mechanisms was one of the triggers contributing
to activation of ﬁscal and debt crisis in Europe. 
Figure 1. Real unit labour costs (Index, 2005=100)
Source: Eurostat (2013)
Probably the most important parameter of the Euro-Plus Pact – the
competitiveness objective – should be based on wages, productivity
development, market ﬂexibility and quality of institutions. Optimal com-
17 Hubert and Karsten (2012)
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bination of these parameters should create higher ﬂexibility and space
for needed adjustments throughout the business cycle on the national
level. With regard to wages, responsible institutions will monitor unit
labour costs and mechanisms of wage creation (European Council,
2011), hence substituting monetary authority on the ﬁscal side. The
development of labour costs in V4 countries is illustrated Figure 1,
where we can see a continuous declining trend of real unit labour costs
in the Slovak Republic after the adoption of the Euro in 2009.
In contrast to other V4 member states, the Czech Republic is ex-
periencing a rather long period of rising labour costs since the year
2007, which could undermine its competitiveness18 when compared
to neighbouring countries. Important factors of competitiveness, pos-
sibly compensating for higher labour costs, are expenditures on ed-
ucation and R&D (research and development) activities, which are
basic preconditions for a modern economy in the era of the knowl-
edge society. In the next ﬁgure we present the structure of these ex-
penditures and different positions of V4 countries, reﬂecting the
urgent need for further structural reforms, especially in the Slovak
Republic.
Figure 2. Structure of R&D expenditure
in V4 countries and EU-27, 2011 (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat (2013)
18 If not matched by higher productivity and added value.
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Expenditures in the Slovak Republic and Poland are lagging be-
hind those in Hungary and especially the Czech Republic, when Slo-
vakia was spending only 0,68% of GDP on the research and
development agenda. In the two former countries, there is an espe-
cially big share of government sector gross domestic expenditures
on R&D, reaching 55.8% of total expenditures in Poland and 49.8%
of total expenditures in Slovak Republic – in comparison to Hungary
and Czech Republic, where the share of the government sector was
less than 40% of total gross domestic expenditures on research and
development (but still well above the EU-27 average). This position
is reﬂected in a higher share of the business enterprise sector in total
gross domestic expenditures in the Czech Republic and Hungary,
and a much lower share of this sector in the Slovak Republic and
Poland. Lower private sector participation in the ﬁnancing of R&D
could hinder the competitiveness of domestic markets and ﬁrms in
the latter two countries.
When comparing V4 countries in the area of expenditures on edu-
cation as a percentage of GDP we observe considerably more simi-
larities than in the area of research and development ﬁnancing.
Nevertheless, the Slovak Republic was spending the lowest share of
GDP on funding education among the V4 countries. Average total
public expenditure on education was slightly below 5.5% of GDP in
the EU-27, in comparison to 5.17% of GDP in Poland, 4.88% of GDP
in Hungary, 4.24% of GDP in the Czech Republic and 4.22% of GDP
in the Slovak Republic. 
When compared with other V4 countries, the Slovak Republic is
also underperforming in the area of life-long learning, where only
10.5% of total population in the age group of 18-64 years old were
participating in education and training programs during 2011. Ac-
cording to Eurostat data the Slovak Republic is the second-worst in
this area after Hungary (9%), followed by Poland (12.6%) and the
Czech Republic (16.9%), which achieved a higher share than the av-
erage for the EU-27 (14.7%).
The Slovak Republic’s research and development as well as edu-
cational systems are under-ﬁnanced. We need to breakthrough and
advance further in this area to stay in touch with our neighbours and
to meet the requirements for post-industrial knowledge-based soci-
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eties of the modern world. These conditions are complicating the
path towards higher competitiveness and lower unemployment.
Funding for active labour market policies in Slovak Republic is low
when compared with other countries, even though it is an important
tool and should not be neglected during the process of budget con-
solidation. This again highlights the importance of improving the ef-
fective application of EU funds, which can be very useful and
compensate for expenditure cuts during the process of ﬁscal con-
solidation. According to the Euro-Plus Pact agreements, progress
will be monitored in the area of long-term unemployment, unemploy-
ment of young people and labour force participation rate. Responsi-
ble authorities should also monitor labour market reforms towards
the support of ﬂexicurity and life-long education.19
Especially worrying is high unemployment among youth, which in
SR (together with long-term unemployment) among the highest in the
entire EU. Recent reforms to active labour market policies are an im-
portant step in the right direction, but additional reforms are needed,
especially with regard to the improvement of quality and labour-mar-
ket relevance of education. Slovakia also needs to improve educa-
tional outcomes of children from marginalized communities.20
Table 2. Long-term unemployment in 2004-2012 (% of total)
Note: Unemployed 12 months and more. Source: Eurostat (2013)
To lower the very high unemployment rate it is essential to match
education know-how with labour market demands and to support
19 European Council (2011)
20 European Council (2013)
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Czech
Republic
51.0 53.0 54.2 52.3 49.3 30.1 41.0 40.6 43.4
Hungary 45.1 45.1 45.1 46.8 46.5 41.6 49.3 47.9 45.0
Poland 53.7 57.7 56.2 51.4 33.5 30.3 31.1 37.2 40.3
Slovakia 63.9 72.0 76.3 74.2 69.5 54.0 64.0 67.8 67.3
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training and active labour market policies. Despite a high nominal
rate of unemployment, this problem is complicated by its high long
term and regional patterns, with high unemployment rates remaining,
especially in eastern regions of Slovak Republic.
There are other important labour market factors, although some of
them could be politically or ﬁnancially hard to achieve, for example a
relatively high tax wedge on labour hitting especially low-wage work-
ers, or low labour mobility – access to rental housing and better
transport infrastructure must be improved; they are currently insufﬁ-
cient to meet transportation needs in the modern globalized econ-
omy, especially in eastern parts of the Slovak Republic. The mobility
of work force could represent another important objective of
prospective cooperation for V4 countries when trying to comply with
the Euro-Plus Pact. 
Taxes are turning out to be important area for possible cooperation
among V4 countries. Pressure for consolidation and sustainability of
public ﬁnances is concentrated mainly on the expenditure side of na-
tional budgets21 and more or less absent on the side of budgets rev-
enues, where we ﬁnd various problems unsolved. These problems
include: 
1) income inequalities connected to the structure of taxes and trans-
fers; 
2) tax avoidance and arbitrage; 
3) tax havens; 
4) transfer pricing.
Lasting effects of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis and Fiscal Com-
pact initiatives have intensiﬁed the debate over the international har-
monization of VAT and the harmonization of corporate income tax.
Preoccupation over such tax harmonization is prompted by the pre-
sumption that existing tax competition has resulted in a shift away
from taxes on mobile capital and toward taxes on comparatively im-
mobile labour. Another area of concern and a common V4 approach
is the fact that there is relatively wide gap between the old EU-15
member states and the new ones, with the former having on average
21 Weakening social standards and public services that were available before the debt crisis.
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higher tax rates than the latter.22 These harmonization trends are
clearly undermining national interests and competitiveness of indi-
vidual countries on part of the EU and transnational corporations in-
terests and are therefore another theme which could inspire dialogue
among V4 countries and foster their closer cooperation on the Euro-
pean level. Proposed tax harmonisation will eliminate the opportunity
to compete with lower-tax countries and will bring selected countries
on the same level in this regard. Here we will loose some competitive
edge, because the Slovak Republic was able to progress in eco-
nomic transformation, and in some areas to outperform its neigh-
bours or competitors23 thanks to lower taxes (and labour costs).
Fiscal Union
In principle we have already established some sort of ﬁscal union,
but instead of transfers ﬁnanced through taxes, we have transfers ﬁ-
nanced with debt, or Eurobonds, which are bonds issued within the
framework of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – an intergov-
ernmental institution under public international law, which was es-
tablished to solve the problems of indebted EMU member countries.
These bonds were, for example, used for the recapitalization of the
banking sector in Spain and Cyprus. This permanent institution has
an authorised capital stock of 702 bn Euro, with 80 bn. Euro of paid-
in capital and 622 bn. Euro of committed callable capital. The capital
contribution of the Slovak Republic is 0.8217 %, what can be ex-
pressed as a capital subscription of 5.77 bn. Euro and paid-in capital
in the amount of 0.66 bn Euro.24
The European Monetary Union was not intended to be a ﬁscal
union. This huge step towards possible ﬁscal union (federalism) is
ongoing, in a more or less uncontrolled manner, without proper dis-
cussion or initiative from within the EMU member states, with the ex-
ception of the biggest and economically strongest members –
especially Germany. Proper preparation in terms of real and structural
22 The difference between European countries is relatively smaller when comparing the rates
of indirect taxes.
23 For example in FDI inﬂow, or productivity.
24 European Stability Mechanism factsheet (2014)
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integration was replaced by the notion that this is the only way to
deal with existing structural problems and to avoid the repetition of
the ﬁscal and subsequent debt crisis in the EMU. In the light of im-
posed legislation in terms of the Fiscal Compact and conditions for
balanced budgets, ﬁscal union is the only next, logical step in an al-
ready designed direction.
One of the main unsolved institutional problem concerns the com-
petent authorities that could and should be able to pursue adherence
to agreed conditions and rules. This lack of competences and ability
to enforce rules was one of the main reasons for the misbehaviour
of governments that led to the onset of debt crisis in the European
Monetary Union. The current situation, in which many countries are
experiencing the impacts of the debt crisis and realising the true
costs of their past policies and behaviour, is probably best suited for
the formation of self-awareness that could naturally lead to adher-
ence to agreed principles. 
In this respect we ﬁnd two main problems in the ongoing debate
on European level. First, there is the lack of coordination and political
will: there are only 11 countries fully supporting a “Stabilization mech-
anism”. Second, the discussion on ﬁscal union is almost solely driven
on the expenditures side of public ﬁnances, missing the important
points on the side of revenues mentioned above.
Another problem is that in the past and even today too many coun-
tries did not comply with the adopted rules, whether these were
Maastricht rules for the future, or Fiscal Compact rules for today.
How could ﬁscal union could possibly function under the current
framework in the future is questionable. Hence, we can reasonably
anticipate that ﬁnancial funds available through a “Stabilization
mechanism” will be used by some countries just to deal with Fiscal
Compact rules.
Signiﬁcantly different economic, political, social and cultural sys-
tems that exist under the framework of eurozone and the EU have
very different capacities and of course opportunities to address pre-
scribed ﬁscal rules. We can reasonably expect that economically
weaker countries will be under signiﬁcant pressure that will dampen
their recovery and future progress. We already mentioned the insti-
tutional problem with the enforcement of rules, which without proper
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management and execution could lead to the repetition of the situa-
tion before the onset of the ﬁscal crisis, when countries were not ad-
hering agreed rules under the Maastricht framework. But we also
have to mention the other side of the coin: in the environment of
proper enforcement of ﬁnes from the countries not in compliance
with agreed criteria, it could be a burden to load the European rescue
mechanism with funds that are to a large extent transferred from
strong economies to weaker ones. This could lead to an even more
pronounced polarization of European economies.
Ideas of collective guarantees for debts have many risks involved.
There is the obvious problem of moral hazard, when countries will
tend to use the mechanism of collectivism more readily when they
are recipients, as contrasted with the opposite situation, when they
are donor countries.25 Mandatory set quotas for individual countries
could distort market forces by supporting moral hazard and poten-
tially make the ﬁnancing of indebted countries easier as it would be
under the operation of market forces and impositions to borrow on
foreign ﬁnancial markets. 
The main precondition for the optimal functioning of the ﬁscal union,
inherent in structurally balanced member states with low real diver-
gences, is not met. There are obviously real risks – according to past
experiences and the inability to form optimal monetary union – that we
will perhaps abandon vital reforms, leading to a selection of countries
capable of forming optimal monetary and ﬁscal union. Fiscal union
could be the preferred solution over EMU breakup.26 Unfortunately the
EMU’s current composition will perpetuate structural imbalances and
problems in indebted countries, hence giving justiﬁcation for ﬁscal
union as a ﬁnancing mechanism for indebted countries. 
The question is, how will the process of transformation, connected
with various forms of ﬁscal austerity measures, look in individual
countries, especially when it will be connected with expenditure cuts
affecting already weakened middle class families? The fact that politi-
cians are forced to make reforms in a situation of high unemployment
25 Not to mention possible higher tensions between actual beneﬁciaries and payers of transfers.
26 And its reduction to fewer member states that are capable of adhering to agreed rules and
reforms needed to form monetary union that better resemble its optimal form. 
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and unsatisﬁed hopes of voters could create obstacles for the proper
execution of reforms: hence deﬁcits and debts could persist. But they
could be lowered after at least some reforms are carried out and the
eventual ﬁnancial burden will be shared among member countries.
When adherence to agreed rules and policies in the case of adverse
development of deﬁcits or debts is properly conducted, countries will
be forced to make sometimes drastic expenditure cuts, which will
certainly affect levels of existing social services. Therefore it is im-
portant to transform existing models of social programs and make
public service more effective. To lower the possible negative impact
of reforms on the expenditure side, these should be accompanied
through reforms on the receipts side of ﬁscal budgets. Here we con-
sider more effective tax policies (tax collection), probably higher taxes
and broader tax bases, lower corruption and tax avoidance (tax
havens), and last but not least measures against the grey and black
economy. These policies can only be effective in a coordinated man-
ner, creating space for V4 countries to have tighter cooperation in
this regard. 
Fiscal union will encompass tax harmonization and cooperation in
tax policies, as is manifested with the ﬁrst steps in this direction
through VAT harmonization or a common tax on ﬁnancial transac-
tions (not valid before 2016). The Slovak Republic is participating in
this enhanced cooperation with 10 other countries, namely Belgium,
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal and
Slovenia.27 The initiative to harmonize value added taxes28 is creating
a new legal framework by offering two general possibilities based on
basic rules: 
1. supplies of goods and services are normally subject to a VAT rate
not lower than 15%;
2. member states may apply one or two exemptions for restricted
rates of no less than 5%. 
In praxis, some states (LU, IE, IT, FR, ES) have in addition intro-
duced super reduced VAT rates (less than 5%). VAT rates in the Slo-
27 European Commission (2014b)
28 European Commission (2014c)
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vak Republic are 20% as standard rates and 10% as reduced rates
for pharmaceutical products, medical equipment for disabled per-
sons, and books. Hence, with regard to VAT rates we cannot speak
of total harmonization, because there are some differences in partic-
ular countries, but this initiative is an important step toward the
broader harmonization of ﬁscal policies. 
Another common activity on the side of revenue harmonization
concerns taxes on ﬁnancial transactions, corresponding with the
overall perception that the ﬁnancial sector – largely responsible for
ﬁnancial and debt crisis – should take greater responsibility for its
risky behaviour. Common taxes on ﬁnancial transactions are aimed
to reduce the fragmentation of the single market for ﬁnancial serv-
ices, now highlighted with different bank levies and ﬁnancial taxes
on the national level. In any case, the fact that only 11 states are will-
ing to introduce coordinated measures in this direction so far is un-
dermining the effectiveness of such attempts. 
These activities are validated by the presumption that initiatives to
introduce separate levies and ﬁnancial transaction taxes on national
levels are leading to the fragmentation of the single market for ﬁnan-
cial services, hence risking tax arbitrage or avoidance. The concept
of tax harmonization is acting against “ﬁscal competition” and im-
poses a loss of ﬂexibility that could in some countries lead to poten-
tially slower growth dynamics. With strengthening of coordination in
this regard we can clearly move toward the gradual disposal of tra-
ditional competitiveness advantages created with various tax
regimes and rates. This form of competitive advantage is probably
over and we should expect similar institutional activities to ensure
better monitoring, higher transparency and harmonization of taxes
being undertaken on a global level too.
From our point of view it is very important to have a debate about
ﬁscal union that targets not only expenditures, but also receipts, or
taxes, because only the combination of measures on both sides of
the budget can bring expected results in the form of consolidated
public ﬁnances and functioning ﬁscal union. Therefore it is important
to pay attention to tax evasion, fraud or aggressive tax planning and
to coordinate measures in this regard on both European and global
levels. In order to consolidate national budgets these actions have
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to be accompanied by country-speciﬁc measures, because a large
part of tax evasions happen on the national level. 
The Slovak Republic introduced an Action Plan to combat tax eva-
sion in 2012. An important source of tax evasion is the loss on ex-
pected receipts from VAT, which in 2010 stood at the level of 3.5%
of the GDP.29 The Action Plan has three steps. The ﬁrst step was en-
acted in 2012 and involved measures in the area of tax law, commer-
cial law and criminal law. The second step, enacted in 2013, further
enhanced already implemented measures in the three areas of law
mentioned above, for example with the introduction of reinforced sur-
veillance over risky business entities established in non-cooperative
jurisdictions, or the introduction of special courts in the area of tax
crime. Overall in this second phase ﬁnancial administration intensiﬁed
its anti-corruption program and established specialized tripartite
teams (tax specialists, investigators, prosecutor) to address serious
tax offences, which in combination with other enacted measures
contributed to a better awareness and reputation of ﬁnancial admin-
istration authorities, leading to higher tax collections.
Third step will have take effect no later than October 1st, 2014. This
phase will introduce a new obligation to submit data on the domestic
supply of goods and services to tax administrators in electronic form
(summary statement), followed by the introduction of ratings for tax-
payers and mandatory labelling of their ratings on tax documents. In
the area of commercial law there is going to be an established reg-
ister of disqualiﬁed persons and an insolvency register, as well as a
stricter law on bankruptcy (deadline for bankruptcy with conse-
quences of asset penalties and criminal sanctions for statutory bod-
ies). In the area of criminal and ﬁnancial law, there will be
comprehensive reviews of elements of “tax crimes,” with the possi-
bility of introducing a new category of criminal act, namely “estab-
lished fraudulent limited liability company”. Legally seized ﬁnancial
assets will be held in the institution called the Asset Management Of-
ﬁce. According to the Financial Policy Institute at the Ministry of Fi-
nance it is possible to reduce total loss thanks to actions taken in the
Action Plan by at least 1,6% of the GDP (1,1 billion Euros) up to the
29 Slovak Government (2010)
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level of 1,9% of GDP, which would correspond to the average efﬁ-
ciency in the rest of the V4 countries and EU countries in 2009.30
Visegrád cooperation
from Slovak Republic perspective
Cooperation among V4 countries is developing in the line with
broader policy objectives that are also apparent on the European
level. They can be categorized as three key areas, namely: energy
security; transport; and defence. The Slovak Republic in this regard
emphasises the building and upgrading of transmission infrastructure
in the north-south gas interconnections networks and electricity grids
in order to overcome unilateral import dependence on energy carriers
(gas, oil). Further, Slovakia also emphasises the completion of single
EU energy market as a key element for global climate and energy
policy. The Slovak Republic also pays attention to building missing
transport links, particularly through the development of a north-south
transcontinental axis and the construction of an integrated inter-
modal transport system between the countries of Central Europe,
which is one of the crucial factors for the intensiﬁcation of trade,
tourism, inward investments, sustainable factors of economic growth
and the competitiveness of the region as a whole. Therefore SR will
continue to support and implement the recommendations of the V4
working group on closer and better transport links.
The Visegrád cooperation strategy is closely connected with
broader European integration and is particularly important when fac-
ing a dramatically changing external environment. SR will continue
to strengthen growth and competitiveness of the V4 region as an in-
tegral part of Visegrád cooperation. In this respect we should focus
particularly on a new framework for climate and energy policy, and
promotion of an economic framework by implementing sustainable
pro-growth measures, not excluding the use of foreign ﬁnancial funds
and the prevention of tax evasion. In order to increase regional com-
petitiveness SR is implementing a policy supporting technological
and social innovations. Common interests in energy, transport and
30 Slovak Government (2010)
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regional infrastructure could be ﬁnanced through European Instru-
ments (for example CEF – Connecting Europe Facility) and there
should be space created for the exchange of experiences and “best
practices” in order to achieve synergic effects on growth and jobs in
the V4 countries.
Foreign policy
For the Slovak Republic the Visegrád group was a very important
platform in the process of integration into international structures,
e.g., NATO. This platform for cooperation also supported political,
economic and social transformation of the whole region. From this
point of view the V4 format is still important, establishing a good ex-
ample for democratization processes in Eastern countries. SR has
no intention to enlarge the V4 group, but is supporting the develop-
ment of cooperation with other regional groups and individual coun-
tries (in the V4+ format).
The cooperation of the V4 group within the EU, cooperation with
other individual countries, or with other regional blocks (for example
with Benelux, Baltic states, Gulf countries, Central Asian countries,
Japan, USA, Russian Federation, Turkey and others) is a very impor-
tant feature of future Visegrád strategic frameworks. European part-
ners and Russia are for example important in dealing with the
diversiﬁcation of the energy supply. V4 countries should ﬁnd a com-
mon voice when trying to achieve reasonable compromise between
regulations on the European and respective national levels in the area
of common agricultural policy. A common approach represented
through the V4 platform could also be communicated in the area of
changing climatic conditions and various global initiatives. Another
area suitable for common representation and communication could
be the exchange of information about cultural heritage, tourism and
international policy in general, especially when dealing with very dis-
tant countries (and regions) like Japan, China, Australia, etc. 
Whereas global partners often perceive V4 countries as one region,
it is strategically important to be consistent when negotiating exter-
nally. In this respect we should better utilize the V4 format, focus on
deepening already existing partnerships and identify potential new
partners if there is room for value added in terms of V4 countries
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(Austria, Croatia). Regular dialogue of V4 legislators is important and
highlights the possibility of a deeper parliamentary dimension of V4
cooperation and exchange of views on current developments in the
EU, foreign and regional policy levels. SR therefore supports
strengthening the involvement of national parliaments in EU policy
making.
SR also emphasizes a focus on strengthening the civic dimension
of Visegrád cooperation, perhaps through closer cooperation of pub-
lic television and radio organizations leading to increased awareness
among the general public about current events and challenges, as
well as our cultural heritage and historical links. In line with this com-
munication strategy we should support activities of V4 public diplo-
macy to promote the Visegrád “brand” inside as well as outside the
framework of V4 countries (the recent Visegrád cycling race, for ex-
ample). The visibility of a Visegrád “brand” in the public eye could be
increased through the synergistic effect of closer cross-border co-
operation. To highlight the common approach of the Visegrád Group
and strengthen international cohesion we should continue to build
regional platforms such as GLOBSEC conferences or Tatra Summits
and support the activities of the International Visegrád Fund with in-
creased national contributions.31
V4 should be more active and visible in the process of EU policy
formulation, especially when dealing with the eastern vector of Eu-
ropean policy (Eastern partnership, Western Balkans). Eastern part-
nership should be accomplished not only as a technical process, but
with help of the V4 example as a policy with a pronounced and clear
political vision of “opening the door” to the EU. The V4 group could
coordinate its activities or support individual activities of members in
the area of development policy and help. There is the possibility for
strengthening cooperation among V4 countries in the process of can-
didatures to various bodies of international organizations. There is
space for closer cooperation when formulating positions of V4 coun-
tries during the process of mitigating the effects of the global eco-
nomic, ﬁnancial and social crisis, as well as when formulating the EU
position in areas which have global dimensions, for example in ne-
31 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of SR (2014)
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gotiations on global climate change (including ﬁnancial instruments
to address the impacts of climate change).
An important area for possible joint policy is to achieve closer co-
operation in providing assistance to V4 member country citizens in
third countries, where one of the V4 members does not have diplo-
matic representation, or it is difﬁcult to access such help (in large
countries). Therefore it is important to pursue closer cooperation and
communication on the level of Foreign Affairs ministries, with possi-
ble beneﬁts from the coordination and rationalization of V4 diplomatic
and consular presence abroad. In this regard V4 countries could seek
mutual support abroad and search for effective options, or even
share the premises and buildings owned by one of the V4 member
countries.32
Policy towards Eastern countries
When compared with old EU-15 countries, the V4 platform has –
thanks to similar languages and experiences – a natural advantage
toward assisting the integration process of eastern countries. Com-
mon cooperation with Central European countries outside the EU
(Eastern partnership, Ukraine) and with Western Balkan countries
could be targeted on various issues, for example migration and de-
mocratization.There is space for a more flexible exchange of views
and information on issues threatening national security, with em-
phasis on the security in the Central European region. It is also pos-
sible to take a more coordinated and active part in the preparation
of NATO strategic concepts. With regard to NATO there is space
for establishing common tactical units.
An important area where we can ﬁnd common interests is
strengthening the global approach to migration – i.e., legal migration
management, the ﬁght against illegal immigration and strengthening
the synergies between migration and development of the eastern
and south-eastern dimensions. In this regard it is important to ad-
dress issues of institutional and systemic linkages between migra-
tion and development policy. Sharing experience from the
transformation and implementation of sectoral policies could be the
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premise for setting sectoral policies as part of the dialogue with
countries of the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnerships. Experi-
ences from economic transformation and economic and social re-
forms, plus joint sharing of expertise achieved during the Visegrád
group countries’ accession process to the EU and NATO, are im-
portant areas where we can help. The active engagement of V4
countries should facilitate the achievement of positive results in var-
ious areas of cooperation, such as energy, agriculture, justice,
homeland security, human rights and democratization, as well as
administrative capacities building.32
Integration to EU and NATO (open door policy) are still strategic in-
struments for achieving stability, democracy and prosperity in Eu-
rope. But developments during the last couple of months in the
Ukraine and policies pursued by EU and NATO are clearly further es-
calating the conﬂict with separatists from Eastern Ukraine and espe-
cially with Russia. Therefore we assume that V4 countries should act
as mediator in this conﬂict and try to introduce a more helpful form
of dialogue, especially without economic sanctions, which are very
costly for European countries and not helping to solve the problems
of Ukraine in any way. V4 should coordinate its efforts to end the civil
war in Ukraine, consolidate democratic institutions and put the coun-
try back on normal economic and social development paths as soon
as possible. We should ensure the effective implementation of the
Eastern Partnership with its bilateral and multilateral dimensions,
paying special attention to dialogue with Russia.
Transport
Transport is a very important area of existing and prospective cooper-
ation. Such cooperation should continue through the process of revis-
ing the policy of Trans-European transport networks on the European
level, in order to formulate common position and future priorities for
V4 countries. V4 countries should intensify common efforts in support-
ing the development of international rail freight corridors and road in-
frastructure within the Trans-European Transport Network, as well as
efforts to promote the development of the European Rail Trafﬁc Man-
33 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of SR (2014)
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agement System. Last but not least there are unexploited opportunities
for the development and construction of joined waterways.
Social infrastructure
Social infrastructure is important to promote intercultural dialogue,
cultural diversity and cultural exchange programs in V4 countries and
neighbouring regions. We should further support joint projects and
events within the activities of institutes and V4 cultural centres to
strengthen the platform for a continued effort of V4 presentation
through cultural and historical heritage. Cooperation could be further
strengthened in the operation of public-service television and radio.
Ministries of education should continue to provide internships to stu-
dents in all active and new programs. Supported programs should
strengthen Visegrád civic participation, particularly in the areas of
scholarships and academic exchange, culture, tourism, science and
research, ofﬁcial development assistance and cross-border cooper-
ation. Cooperation among V4 countries should in this area focus on: 
a) the transfer of good practices with regard to the problem of long-
term unemployment; 
b) exchange of information and experience when dealing with post-
crisis measures in the ﬁeld of active labour market policies and; 
c) exchange information and intensify efforts leading to the integra-
tion of the Roma population.
V4 countries should exchange expertise and continue to imple-
ment, in collaboration with the EU, the strategy for promoting Roma
inclusion in society. Possible common strategy could incorporate and
elaborate speciﬁc modalities for the purposes of implementation and
closer cooperation between V4 countries and the EU. V4 cooperation
should in this regard strengthen the coordination mechanisms lead-
ing to the social integration of the Roma population.34
Regional development
We should support regional development through strengthening the
territorial cohesion of V4 countries, while respecting the speciﬁcities
34 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of SR (2014)
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of each country. There is space for cooperation in the development
of integrated plans for particular towns and villages. Rural area de-
velopment and the agricultural sector should be objectives for the
coordination of common positions when mutual interests arise, es-
pecially during discussions with major international institutions (EU,
OECD, WTO, etc.). Implementation should particularly focus on: 
1) common approaches in order to prevent the decline of livestock
and to revitalize the dairy sector; 
2) common approaches when dealing with the current market situ-
ation – where we should prevent the abuse of the dominant mar-
ket share by multinational chains against domestic suppliers and
food processors, with particular emphasis on small and medium-
sized producers. In this regard coordinated support is helpful,
through the creation and promotion of producer association inter-
ests against oligopolies and monopolies.
A further unexploited sector for joint initiatives is in the area of food
safety, where V4 countries should make efforts to eliminate problems
related to the import of low-quality agricultural products from third
countries and, subsequently, persuade the European Commission to
lobby WTO negotiators for better management of low quality imports
and for limiting harmful food (GMO) imports to EU member states as
well. This could lead to greater improvement in the quality of food.
Also important is the continual coordination of the long-term com-
mon goal to minimize the differences between “new” and “old” EU
member states and ensure their equal treatment in the ﬁeld of common
agricultural policy. Regarding the solution to the potential energy crisis,
V4 countries should discuss and cooperate in increasing the produc-
tion of biofuels and other sources of sustainable energy (e.g., thermal).
Security of energy supplies has in the last couple of years been
granted significant economic importance. Therefore it is important
to jointly elaborate possibilities for mutual cooperation among V4
countries, especially during critical situations. V4 countries should
assess the possibility of a crisis plan for the region and to exclude
the possible creation of isolated energy islands out of reach of al-
ternative (emergency) supplies of energy. Therefore it is important
to strengthen the interconnections of gas infrastructure, including
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the reverse flow of gas. In the field of environment Visegrád coop-
eration should reflect eco-efficient development under the Europe
2020 strategy for sustainable development and the strategy to com-
bat climate change. Another important issue, but one with more re-
gional impact, is waste management and related prevention,
recycling and biodegradable waste, with regard to the responsibility
for the illegal cross-border transportation of waste. It could be use-
ful to intensify cooperation in the fields of chemical and industrial
security, with emphasis on the prevention and correction of envi-
ronmental damage.
Industry and innovation offer another potential cooperation agenda,
where the V4 platform could create a beneﬁcial environment for the
promotion and coordination of innovations development within the
V4 framework. The development of infrastructure is necessary in this
regard. For example, the creation of common fund for the co-ﬁnanc-
ing of selected innovation projects, or the establishment of a “V4 in-
novation centre” that would enable the transfer of technologies and
knowledge, transfer applied research results to the business com-
munity, as well as help in the search for and marketing of innovative
ideas (technologies, processes and services) to the market, in order
to improve the quality of innovative environment in cooperating coun-
tries, is possible. Such a policy could be also helpful for promoting
innovative ﬁrms from V4 countries to various domestic and foreign
partners.35
Conclusions
The consolidation process post-recession and post-debt crisis is well
under way in the Slovak Republic, and sustainability of public ﬁ-
nances is regarded as a key feature of future economic expansion.
Strong ﬁscal commitment is evident and the health of public ﬁnances
is visible through the sustainability of pensions, social security and
health care systems. These systems are crucially inﬂuenced by an
ageing population and therefore it is important to connect whole so-
cial system with demographic evolution. In these terms, to prevent
35 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of SR (2014)
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the potential growth of public debt induced by an ageing population,
the Slovak Republic is implementing several structural reforms. Im-
portant measures are going to be implemented in the line with pro-
cedure called the Fiscal Compact, which entered into the force in
January of 2013. The new ﬁscal framework should improve overall
understanding of ﬁscal policies pursued by the government, partic-
ularly in the context of long-term ﬁscal sustainability.
However, it is uncertain whether the reforms needed to comply with
the Fiscal Compact will enable the depressed economies of Europe
to regain their competitiveness, because it is questionable whether
prescribed reforms and proposals could be effectively implemented
concurrently in every member state of eurozone, and that is why we
will probably witness persistent imbalances between countries in the
years to come (without appropriate economic growth).
The ﬁscal concept of balanced budgets is part of the greater eco-
nomic governance reform gradually leading eurozone member states
to a more uniﬁed ﬁscal system – probably ﬁscal and political union.
Probably the most important parameter of Euro-Plus Pact treaty –
the competitiveness objective – will be based on wages, productivity
development, market ﬂexibility and quality of institutions. A continu-
ous declining trend in real unit labour costs in the Slovak Republic
after the adoption of the Euro in 2009 is shaping competitiveness,
with active labour market policies, research and development and an
educational system that are under-ﬁnanced. We need to break-
through and advance further in this area to stay within reach with our
neighbours and to meet the requirements for post-industrial knowl-
edge-based societies of the modern world. These conditions are
complicating the path towards higher competitiveness and lower un-
employment. 
High unemployment is probably biggest challenge SR has to face,
because of its systematic implications on regional differences. Dif-
ferences between particular regions are now (data for 2011) bigger
than at the beginning of 21st century. This regional pattern of the SR
economy is creating space for regional cooperation within the V4
framework. There are several other important areas for Visegrád co-
operation, which is especially important during these times of rapidly
change in the external environment. Well-deﬁned common interests
113
Boris Hošoff114
are to be found in the areas of energy supply and safety, or transport
and regional development. The V4 should be more active and visible
in the process of EU policy formulation, especially when dealing with
the eastern vector of European policy (Eastern partnership, Western
Balkans). Whereas global partners often perceive V4 countries as one
region, it is strategically important to be consistent when negotiating
common interests externally.
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MANIFESTATIONS OF RUSSIA'S
GREAT POWER INTERESTS IN
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGION,
AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE VISEGRAD
COOPERATION
András Rácz1
Amidst the crisis in Ukraine and the cool-down of EU-Russia rela-
tions, the role and position of Central Europe – a region neighbouring
Ukraine – also receives increasing attention regarding its relations
with the Russian Federation. This paper is aimed at providing an
overview of how the role of the Visegrad region has changed in Russ-
ian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main
aim is to deﬁne the main strategic interests behind the foreign policy
of Moscow towards the region.
Hence, the paper seeks to answer the following research questions.
First, what are the main interests of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis
the Visegrad countries? Second, whether Russia’s general, strategic
interests related to the EU and NATO may overwrite or change the
bilateral, country-speciﬁc interests?
The paper is composed of ﬁve main parts. Following the introduc-
tion, the ﬁrst chapter brieﬂy discusses the self-perception of Russia
as a geopolitical player. In the second part, the historical context of
Central Europe – Russia relations is discussed, focusing on the im-
1 Senior researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki. The views presen-
ted here are exclusively of his own, and they do not represent the ofﬁcial position of either the
FIIA, or of Finland. For questions and comments the author can be contacted on his ofﬁcial
email address: andras.racz@ﬁia.ﬁ 
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mediate post-1989 period. The third chapter describes the similarities
and differences of Visegrad foreign policies vis-à-vis Russia, includ-
ing the analysis of how the present conﬂict in Ukraine has affected
the Visegrad. Thereafter, in the fourth part a brief effort is made to
map out the main scenarios of the future of Visegrad – Russia rela-
tions. The paper ends with a ﬁnal, concluding chapter.
Concerning sources, the analysis is built on both primary and sec-
ondary sources. From the ﬁrst group, the researcher is in a lucky sit-
uation, as the foreign policy strategies of the Visegrad countries are
publicly available, as well as the documents of the International
Visegrad Fund. From the Russian side, several relevant documents
are published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, and also on the one of the Kremlin. In addition
to all these, one can rely on numerous declarations and public
speeches of Central European and Russian politicians too.
Secondary sources are also richly available. Numerous Central Eu-
ropean researchers publish regularly about various aspects of Viseg-
rad-Russia relations. From Poland the publications of the Centre for
Eastern Studies need to be mentioned on the ﬁrst place.2 From the
Polish Institute of International Affairs, Dariusz Kałan regularly pub-
lishes about the Visegrad cooperation, including its relations to the
Russia-Ukraine crisis.3 A valuable contribution to the research on
Visegrad foreign policies was the 2011 special issue of the Perspec-
tives, the reviewed academic journal of the Institute of International
Relations in Prague. This issue, edited by Elsa Tulmets discussed in
detail the identity-related dimensions of the Eastern foreign policies
of the Visegrad countries.4
Alexander Duleba is frequently publishing about Slovakia’s relations
with Russia5 and the functioning of Visegrad Eastern policies, as well
as about the development of the EU neighbourhood policy. The com-
prehensive study of Juraj Marušiak about the history of Slovak for-
eign policy vis-à-vis Russia also worths reading.6 From the Hungarian
2 See, for example: Gniazdowski et al. (2014)
3 Kałan (2013)
4 See: Perspectives (2011)
5 Duleba (2009)
6 Marusiak (2013) 
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academic community, Andras Deak frequently assesses the energy
policy dimensions of Visegrad-Russia relations,7 while Zsuzsanna
Végh regularly contributes to the debate about the future of the East-
ern Partnership, including the role of the Visegrad countries in it.8
Moreover, there is certain Western interest in the subject as well:
one may mention the insightful papers of Martin Dangerﬁeld on the
Visegrad cooperation9, for example his valuable comparative study
about the Russia policies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo-
vakia, published in 2013.10 The Center for European Policy Analysis
(CEPA) in Washington D.C. also publishes regularly about the Viseg-
rad region.11
From the Russian side, one may mention the works of two promi-
nent researchers of the Russian Academy of Sciences, namely Svet-
lana Glinkina and Lyubov Shisheslina.12 Moreover, in 2012-13 with
the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation a highly interesting col-
laborative research was carried out under the project leadership of
Andrei Zagorski from the Moscow State Institute of International Re-
lations (MGIMO), discussing the relations of the wider Central Europe
and Russia and the possibility of a fresh start.13 Though the Ukraine
crisis annulled the possibilities identiﬁed in this project, the assess-
ment was anyways remarkable.
As the paper was ﬁnished in December 2014, certain questions are
obviously left open regarding the relations of Russia and the Visegrad
countries, such as whether the winter would bring a lasting ceaseﬁre
in Ukraine, or how the V4 countries will vote in spring 2015 about
maintaining the EU sanctions against Russia. In the paper the term
“Central Europe” is going to be used in a narrow sense, as a syn-
onym to the Visegrad region, thus meaning only the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
7 Deák et al. (2013) 
8 Végh (2014)
9 Dangerﬁeld (2012)
10 Dangerﬁeld (2013)
11 For example, see: Lucas et al. (2014)
12 The Russian names mentioned in the study are transliterated according to the English spel-
ling rules.
13 Zagorski (2013)
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The self-perception of Russia 
as a geopolitical player
There is wide consensus among both Russian and Western experts
that the Soviet heritage, i.e. the former status of a global power still
plays a key role in the foreign policy of Russia. In addition to the his-
torical heritage, the continuity among the foreign and security policy
decision-making elites, particularly among the so-called siloviki14
plays a role as well. The strong anti-Western ideology that one may
witness today is also deeply rooted in the Soviet past: as pointed out
by Marie Mendras, the West was the rival self of the Soviet Union, as
“the myth of a hostile and unjust Western civilization legitimized the
Soviet Union.”15 The present Russian ofﬁcial discourse on the West
often uses the very same ideological and communication panel like
the Soviet propaganda did.
Regarding the real status of Russia, one has to add that the con-
temporary strategic documents of Russian foreign policy admit more
or less openly that Russia is not a global power any more. The Na-
tional Security Strategy adopted in 2009 spoke about the need of
“transforming the Russian Federation into a world power”,16 which
implies that it was not one at the time when the strategy was
adopted. The Foreign Policy Concept from February 2013 declared
that the CIS region is the priority area of Russian foreign policy,17 and
admits that Russia contributes to the settlement of global problems
mostly via its permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council
and in many regional organizations,18 thus not on its own like the So-
viet Union was able to do.
The Foreign Policy Concept also reﬂects to Russia´s opposition to
the global leadership role of the U.S. In his famous speech given at
the Munich security conference in 2007, Vladimir Putin accused the
United States of endangering global stability, trying to build a unipolar
world by imposing its will on other states, and of generating a new
14 The word originates from the Russian term ’sil’, meaning ’force.’ The expression ’siloviki’ is
used as a collective name for all those, who are active or former members of the various state
force structures, such as the armed forces, the police, or various secret services.
15 Mendras (1997)
16 Ofﬁce of the President of the Russian Federation (2009), Paragraph 21.
17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013), Paragraph 42.
18 Ibid, Paragraph 23.
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arms race with its missile defense system, but without putting an end
to any of the new wars it has started. Hence, Putin declared the
whole U.S. foreign and security policy to be fundamentally mistaken,
and called for the complete reconsideration of the global security ar-
chitecture.19 An important Russian initiative into this direction was
the proposal of then President Dmitry Medvedev about a new Euro-
pean Security Treaty, launched in 2009. The Medvedev-plan envi-
sioned the creation of a new security institution, in which Russian
would have had a de facto veto power over all important questions
of European security.20 The proposal received no serious considera-
tion on the West, despite the “reset” policy of the Obama-adminis-
tration, because empowering Russia with an institutionalized veto
power would have been a step too far for Western policymakers.
Because Russia has perceived and still perceived the former Soviet
Union as a zone of its special interests, consequently it was vehe-
mently opposed to any changes which may endanger its inﬂuence
in the region. In other words, one may well call Russia a status quo
power, as did, for example, Anne Clunen in 2009.21 Moscow has
been ﬁrmly against the so-called color revolutions, i.e. the series of
democratic, pro-Western political turns in a number of post-Soviet
countries, which removed the previous, pro-Russian elites from
power. Some of these revolutions were successful, like the ones in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, while other failed, like they did in
Moldova, Belarus and Uzbekistan. 
Moscow has also been traditionally against any policies of the EU
and NATO to expand their activities to those countries of the former
Soviet Union, which choose the pro-Western track. This concerned
particularly the intentions of Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO: dur-
ing the Bucharest summit in 2008, Putin accused the U.S. of not tak-
ing into account the legitimate security concerns of Russia when
trying to make Tbilisi and Kyiv become members of the Alliance.22
The Russian Military Doctrine from February 2010, adopted shortly
after the Bucharest summit openly named the Eastwards expansion
19 Watson, Rob: Putin’s Speech: back to cold war? BBC, 10 February 2007
20 President of Russia: The draft of the new European Security Treaty. 29 November 2009
21 Clunan (2009), p. 174.
22 Erlanger (2008) 
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of NATO as a primary security threat for Russia.23 The change came
shortly after Bucharest: the August 2008 war in Georgia and the
recognition of the “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
demonstrated that Russia was not a status quo power any more, but
a revisionist actor that was ready to challenge the existing world
order, as Paul Goble wrote already during (!) the war.24 The annexa-
tion of the Crimea and the massive armed intervention into Ukraine
in 2014 may well ﬁt into the very same framework: Russia is not ac-
cepting any more the existing world order. Moreover, it is increasingly
able to do so, as the lengthy military reform, which got a new impetus
as a reaction to the several deﬁciencies experienced during the Geor-
gia war, has started to bore fruits. To early 2014 the Russian con-
ventional and nuclear armed forces were much more mobile, ﬂexible,
better led and better equipped than they were in 2008, as Giles and
Monaghan argue in their comprehensive study.25
The increasing assertiveness of Russian foreign and security policy
obviously affects Moscow´s relations with the European Union as
well. Vis-a-vis the EU Russia has long been trying to maximize and
utilize the existing differences between the member states. Instead
of negotiating with the EU as a whole, a partner much stronger and
economically more powerful than Russia, Moscow prefers to nego-
tiate bilaterally with the member states, thus pursuing a traditional,
“divide and rule” type of policy, as it was pointed out by Mark
Leonard and Nicu Popescu in 2007.26 This obviously affects Russia´s
relations with the countries of Central Europe as well.
The historical context of Central Europe
– Russia relations
The relations of Central Europe and Russia indeed have a turbulent
past. The Russian Empire played a key role in the partitions of
Poland in the 18-19th century, and the 1830-31 uprising of Poles,
often called the Cadet Revolution was quickly cracked down by the
23 President of Russia (2014). Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii
24 Goble (2008)
25 Giles – Monaghan (2014)
26 Leonard – Popescu (2007), p. 13.
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Tsarist forces. Russia helped Austrian Emperor Franz Josef defeat
the Hungarian uprising in 1848-1849, and another Polish uprising
in 1863-1865 was also brutally crashed by the Russian Empire.
Russia was a menacing enemy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on
the Eastern Front in the First World War, where tens of thousands
of Slovak and Czech nationals fought against the Tsarist forces.
Following the revolution in 1917, Soviet Russia launched a deadly,
though finally unsuccessful attack against the newly independent
Poland in 1919, and peace was restored only in 1921. Meanwhile,
in Hungary a Soviet-style Communist regime came to power for a
short while, the so-called Hungarian Soviet Republic (Tanácsköztár-
saság) in 1919.
In the beginning of the Second World War, Poland was jointly in-
vaded by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, while parts of Czecho-
slovakia were already annexed by Hitler, and in Slovakia the satellite
state of the First Slovak Republic was installed, led by Jozef Tiso.
Meanwhile, Hungary under Regent Miklós Horthy was striving for re-
gaining as much as possible of the territories lost in 1920 by the
Treaty of Trianon. The promised of Hitler to support Hungarian revi-
sionism, as well as the fear from the Soviet Union made Budapest to
join forces with Berlin, thus Hungarian forces were ﬁghting against
the Soviet Union almost until the very end of the war. 
In the post-war period, the Sovietization of Central Europe was ﬁn-
ished to 1949, and loyal Communist regimes were installed to War-
saw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest. Hundreds were executed in
political show trials, while tens of thousands got deported or impris-
oned. The Soviet Union cracked down all protests and uprisings
against its rule, let them be in Poland in 1953, in 1956, in 1970, in
Budapest in 1956, or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The heritage of the
Communist past left lasting marks on the societies of all Central Eu-
ropean countries.
However, nowadays the strategic leverages of Russia over the
whole region are much smaller than they were in the Soviet times.
First and foremost, with the Soviet Union falling apart, Central Eu-
rope has no common border with Russia any more, except a short
section in northern Poland at the Kaliningrad region. Second, oc-
cupying forces of the Red Army were withdrawn from the whole re-
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gion peacefully, without any major problems.27 The Warsaw Pact
also ceased to exist peacefully in July 1991. Besides, since the
Visegrad countries have joined NATO in 1999 and 2004, the region
enjoys the collective defense provided by the Article V. of the Wash-
ington Treaty. Though debates are frequent about how meaningful
NATO collective defense is,28 Central Europe still enjoys a much
higher level of military security vis-a-vis Russia than it ever did.
Third, the old, pro-Moscow Communist elites were ousted from
power in the whole region and they have no chance to return. In-
stead, all four countries of Central Europe are firmly integrated into
the European Union and the NATO. Fourth, unlike in the Baltic
States, there are no significant ethnic Russian minorities living the
Central Europe. Even though there are a considerable number of
Russian citizens investing and often residing in the Czech Republic
and Hungary, they do not constitute such an organized, ethnic mi-
nority which could cause any political turmoil, or could serve as a
pretext for any action from the side of Russia. 
In other words, Russia does not possess any of the classical hard
security leverages over Central Europe any more that the Soviet
Union did. The direct control that Moscow was able to exercise over
Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava or Budapest until 1989 disappeared.
The maximum Russia is able to do is to rely on a rich toolbox of po-
litical and economic inﬂuencing vis-a-vis the Visegrad countries, for
example, to use energy prices or lucrative business contracts, etc.
These, one has to admit, may be very effective in certain cases.
However, it is important to keep in mind the historical past: in the
context of the last two centuries, the post-1989 period was the ﬁrst
time when Central Europe needed to be concerned only of the soft
power potential of Russia, but not of any direct hard security threat
from Moscow. This period of grace came to a quick end by the
Russian occupation of the Crimea in March 2014, which has funda-
mentally changed the overall context of European security, including
the one of the Visegrad region, which is to be discussed in the next
chapters.
27 For more information, see: Nadovič (2005) 
28 See, for example, a brief, but serious contribution by Jamie Shea: Shea (2013)
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Russian policies towards 
the Visegrad region after 1991
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign
policy had a brief, pro-Western period, characterized by the estab-
lishment of the basic structures of a multi-party democracy, liberal
economic reforms and a strongly pro-Western foreign policy led by
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev.29 This time many in Russ-
ian believed that because Russia and the newly free countries of
Central Europe experienced similar problems, this may produce a
common ground for a friendly approach towards each other.30 In
line with these hopes, President Boris Yeltsin visited Budapest in
1992 and Warsaw in 1993, and besides addressing questions of bi-
lateral cooperation, he made important gestures as well: in Poland
he laid flowers at the memorial of the Katyń massacre,31 and in Bu-
dapest he apologized for the breakdown of the 1956 Hungarian rev-
olution. Yeltsin also expressed his understanding of the will of
Poland to join NATO.
However, this initial euphoria quickly faded away both in Russia
and in Central Europe. As pointed out by Davydov, both sides had a
share in the blame. Russia failed to elaborate a new strategy towards
the region, while Central European leaders wanted to limit the inﬂu-
ence of Russia. They preferred to have a weak, but stable Russia –
something which quickly turned out to be impossible, as it was
demonstrated by the conﬂict of Yeltsin and the Russian parliament
in autumn 1993. The mutual mistakes were exploited by nationalists
on all sides, and the emotional moods of the societies were not help-
ful either.32
Hence, the pro-Western momentum of Russian foreign policy was
gradually replaced by a more critical, increasingly nationalist line
starting from late 1992.The failure of the IMF-promoted “shock ther-
apy” economic reforms, the war in Yugoslavia and the conﬂict in
Chechnya all played a role in changing the Russian foreign policy
course towards the West, including Central Europe as well. Russia
29 On this foreign policy line see in detail: Tsygankov (2006)
30 Davydov (1997)
31 Perlez (1993)
32 Davydov (1997), p. 371.
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started to perceive the intention of Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary to join NATO as a threat to its own security. Russian con-
cerns about the 1999 enlargement of NATO are well documented by
several Western and Russian authors. According to the Russian per-
ception, NATO enlargement meant not only as a principal violation
of the Gorbachev – James Baker talks in early 1990, but also as an
important national security threat.33 The latter was well reﬂected in
the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in 2000.34
The overall negative Russian attitude over Central European NATO
enlargement prevailed in the late 1990s. The August 1998 ﬁnancial
crisis in Russia also contributed to the cool-down of Central Europe-
Russia relations. Bilateral trade dropped radically, and the dominant
players of Central European exports to Russia either ceased their
trade activities, or decreased them to a signiﬁcant extent.
In 1997 the Russian Council for Security and Defense published an
analytic report on the interests of Russia in the Central and Eastern
European region.35 This was actually the ﬁrst foreign policy document
of Russia which speciﬁcally addressed the role and place of Central
Europe for Moscow. The document was remarkably sober compared
to the earlier ‘ﬂat refusal’ attitude of Russia regarding NATO’s Eastern
enlargement.36 It pointed out that despite the historical attractiveness
of the Balkans region the real interests of Russia lay in nearby Central
Europe. Consequently, it suggested that Russia should strive for
strengthening its economic positions in the Visegrad countries before
they became members of the EU, then expected to happen in 2005.
The document also demonstrated that the primary importance of
Central Europe for Russia did not originate from the bilateral rela-
tions, but from the region’s foreseeable membership in the NATO
and EU.
Central Europe - Russia relations started to again develop approx-
imately from the year 2001, motivated both by political and economic
elements on both sides. First, the rapid recovery of the Russian econ-
omy had an important role to play: the Russian market became in-
33 Arbatov (2000)
34 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (2000) 
35 Sz. Bíró (1997) 
36 On the ’Karaganov-doctrine’, see for example Valki (1995)
Manifestations of Russia's Great Power Interests...
creasingly attractive for Central European export companies again,
and Russian business circles also became more active in the Viseg-
rad region. Second, following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the
United States considerably improved its relations with the Russian
Federation, and so did the NATO. Consequently, Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary as NATO member states were also to follow
this track, in addition to the above mentioned economic factors. Slo-
vakia, not yet a NATO member, but clearly on the way towards ac-
cession, followed the same line. Third, Moscow ﬁnally realized the
inevitability of the EU enlargement, thus started to pursue the policy
described in the mentioned 1997 strategy. This change was well
demonstrated by the declarations of various Russian decision-mak-
ers. For example, First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Avdeyev
said in Moscow on the scientiﬁc conference titled ‘Russia and Central
Europe in the New Geopolitical Situation’ in 2001 that ‘In the light of
the coming enlargement of the European Union, Russia considers the
development of lasting good neighbourly relations with countries of
Central and Eastern Europe of high signiﬁcance.’37
However, the cool-down of Russia-West relations under the U.S.
administration of President George W. Bush affected the Central Eu-
ropean countries as well. This was particularly so, because Poland,
and to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic as well were actively en-
gaged in supporting the “color revolutions” in the former Soviet
Union, thus indirectly challenging Russia´s perceived privileged in-
terests there. Besides, decisive majorities of the Visegrad foreign pol-
icy elites have been in favor of strengthening the EU´s and NATO´s
cooperation with countries of Eastern Europe, and particularly with
Ukraine and Georgia. It is not surprising that the Czech Republic and
Poland were among the leading champions of the launch of the East-
ern Partnership in 2009, following the war in Georgia. Slovakia and
Hungary have also been supportive to the initiative, though on slightly
different motivations and with a bit lesser enthusiasm.
The Visegrad skepticism on Russia was further strengthened by the
“energy wars” between Russia and Ukraine (and, to a lesser extent,
between Russia and Belarus), concerning particularly the mont-long
37 Quoted by Siselina (2002), p. 61.
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supply interruption in January 2009, which seriously affected Slova-
kia and Hungary. The crisis gave an important push for speeding up
the gas supply diversiﬁcation efforts in the region, in order to de-
crease the dependency on Russia.38 Visegrad countries were also
very supportive to the Nabucco pipeline project, motivated by the
same diversiﬁcation intentions. Not surprisingly, as a counter-reac-
tion, Russia has done its best to kill the Nabucco,39 and also to ham-
per Polish shale gas extraction projects,40 which would mean another
possible alternative to the Russian gas. The approach to energy se-
curity and Russia is currently perhaps the most important dividing
factor inside the Visegrad cooperation.
Divided We Stand:
Visegrad Foreign Policies on Russia
Regarding the crisis in Ukraine, though the Visegrad countries share
many common interests related to Ukraine as a neighbouring state,
but they are very much divided on Russia, the main actor in the con-
ﬂict. The Russia-related differences inside the Visegrad Four contain
both normative and policy ones as well.
Speaking in a broader context, one needs to be aware of the strong
normative differences between the four Visegrad countries vis-à-vis
Russia Poland has a traditionally very strong Trans-Atlantic commit-
ment and, furthermore, taking a hard stance on Russia often serves
certain geopolitical ambitions of Warsaw as well. Foreign policy of
the Czech Republic has been long characterized by a strong focus
on human rights, and this attitude often makes Prague taking a very
Russia-critical position. At the same time, both Slovakia and Hungary
are much more pragmatic on Moscow and pay much less attention
to normative issues, including the situation of democracy and human
rights in Russia than Poland and the Czech Republic do. Besides,
Hungary, under Viktor Orbán is likely to continue its increasingly
Euro-skeptic, more East-oriented policy track, often described as
38 Nosko (2013)
39 Geropoulos (2012)
40 Harvey (2014)
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“Opening to the East.”41 Though originally the “Eastern opening” was
launched only as an economic policy, since the July 2014 speech of
Orbán in Tusnádfürdő, where he announced his will to build an illib-
eral state,42 one may have very few doubts that the project has nor-
mative motivations as well.
In terms of military security, though Russian troops are ﬁghting a
war in Ukraine, these groupings do not pose any direct military threat
on the Visegrad region, which is ﬁrmly protected by the NATO mem-
bership. Hence, a Russian military attack directly against any V4
country is very unlikely, though since the occupation of the Crimea it
cannot be fully excluded. Besides, the Visegrad countries are, of
course, well aware of the security concerns of the Baltic NATO allies.
Hence, Poland and the Czech Republic are ready even to militarily
contribute to strengthening NATO’s Eastern European defense ca-
pabilities. Besides demanding the deployment of U.S. troops to the
country, from 1st May Poland leads the NATO mission aimed at en-
hancing the air defense of the Baltic States. Poland contributes with
four MiG-29 ﬁghters and hosts other NATO air force units as well.43
Prague has offered Gripen ﬁghters and 300 Czech soldiers to
strengthen the Alliance.44 Besides, Hungarian Gripen ﬁghters are par-
ticipating in the defense of the Baltic airspace, in the framework of a
NATO operation.
Regarding energy security, Gazprom is clearly the dominant player
of the region45. The Czech Republic is least dependent, with Russian
gas having a 66% share in all gas imports. Hungary and Poland re-
ceive 81 and 83 per cents of their gas imports from Russia, while Slo-
vakia is dependent on Russian import to the extent of 93%. It is
important to note however that there are considerable differences in
the Visegrad countries’ level of dependence on Russian gas supplies,
and not only in terms of numbers. Both Poland and Slovakia are key
transit countries of the Russian gas ﬂowing westwards, and the
41 Kałan (2014a) 
42 Egy munkaalapú állam korszaka következik” [The Era of a Labour-Based State is to Come],
www.ﬁdesz.hu, 26 July 2014. Ofﬁcial website of the Fidesz party.
43 NATO (2014)
44 Radio.cz. 18.4.2014. 
45 Deák – Naumenko (2013), p. 11.
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Czech Republic also plays a transit role. Hence, these three countries
are protected by their transit positions, meaning that Russia cannot
simply turn off their gas supplies without endangering its other West-
ern clients. It should be added that Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia have already renewed their long-term gas delivery contracts
with Gazprom. 
In terms of gas dependence, Hungary is perhaps the most vulner-
able country of the region. Unlike the other three Visegrad states,
Hungary has no signiﬁcant transit position moreover, Budapest has
not yet signed a new gas delivery contract instead of the previous
one expiring reportedly in early 2015. These factors make Budapest
very vulnerable both to Russian price hikes in connection with the
new gas contract, and also to possible supply interruptions. Besides,
the government-managed cut of household costs, particularly of gas
and heating costs has played a decisive role in the re-election of
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in April 2014 by attracting many voters.
Among such circumstances Orbán simply cannot afford any increase
in the gas prices, because its domestic political costs would be far
too high. This makes his government very cautious about any con-
frontation with Russia.
Noteworthy, one needs to note that the Visegrad countries are
jointly pursuing a number of projects aimed at decreasing their de-
pendence on Russian gas. The building of North-West gas intercon-
nectors and enabling reverse-ﬂows are going on, as well as the
construction of an LNG terminal in Poland. In the long run these proj-
ects may enable the Visegrad region to considerably decrease the
share of Russian gas in its imports, thus to decrease the dependence
on Gazprom. However, as none of these projects are yet completed,
in the short run they could not help either against unwanted supply
breaks, or against deliberate punitive measures of Russia.
This latter concern is particularly relevant taking into account the
strong capabilities Russia has and is ready to use to reciprocate for
anti-Russian actions. Moscow’s inventory includes gas price hikes,
breaks and delays in oil supplies, non-signing of pending contracts,
sudden bans on agricultural imports, etc. 
Regarding trade, among the Visegrad countries Russia has the
highest share in Poland’s exports with 5,4 per cent. According to the
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ofﬁcial Russian statistics,46 in 2013 Poland exported to Russia in the
worth of 8334 million USD, the Czech export reached 5318 million
USD, the export of Slovakia was 3554 million USD, and of Hungary
3007 million. This implies that in economic terms it is actually Poland
that has the most to lose in case Russia reacts with economic
counter-measures to EU sanctions.
However, the other three Visegrad countries are engaged in a number
of large, demonstrative political-business projects with Russia. Slovakia
planned to build two new nuclear reactors in Jaslovske Bohunice to-
gether with Rosatom, and hopes to be partner of Russia in getting the
broad-gauge railway network extended to Slovak territory. Besides,
Slovak defense industry has a number of important Russian partners.
Until very recently the Czech Republic planned to get its Temelín nu-
clear power plant extended by Russian contractors. However, the
Czech Minister of Defense already declared that it was highly unlikely
that the Temelín project could be ﬁnished by a Russian company. This
is in strong contrast with the policy of Hungary, as Budapest has signed
a contract in December 2013 about two new reactors to be built in
Paks, and took also a credit line of 10 billion euros to ﬁnance it. 
As a result of all these differences, the Visegrad Group has been un-
able to adopt a similarly common position on Russia like it did on
Ukraine. The V4 is very much divided about how to react on Russia’s
actions in Ukraine. In particular, the Czech Republic and Poland have
been very much supportive to the ﬁrst two rounds of EU sanctions, in-
cluding the latest expansion of targeting Russian leaders,47 whereas
Slovakia and Hungary were far less active. Regarding the most critical,
third round of sanctions, though in the beginning all the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary were opposed to them, ﬁnally they all gave
their consents, though reportedly under strong pressure from Ger-
many. The Russian food ban, introduced as a reaction to the third
round of EU sanctions, came as an unpleasant surprise for the Viseg-
rad region, and particularly Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary,
who imported agricultural products to Russia. Though the share of
46 Vneshnaya torgovlya (2014)
47 EU Prepares More Sanctions Against Russia. EurActiv.com 8 May 2014. Available at:
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/eu-prepares-more-sanctions-against-russia-
301998, accessed 25 October 2014.
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Russia in their overall exports is marginal, the food ban may anyways
cause a minor drop in their GDP, around 0.1-0.2%.48 The fact that
Moscow introduced the import ban without any distinction against the
whole EU was particularly painful for Viktor Orbán, as it delivered a
bow to the credibility and proﬁtability of his “Eastern opening” project.
Interestingly enough, though Hungary is striving for becoming a re-
liable ally of Russia, Moscow is not hesitating to put pressure on Bu-
dapest either, when it comes to weaken either the EU or the NATO.
One may remember the fake information published by an obscure
Hungarian-language website linked to Russia, based on which
“news” Russia ofﬁcially accused Hungary of delivering tanks for the
Ukrainian government.49 Besides, Hungary has recently faced a high-
level spying scandal as well: a Member of the European Parliament
fraction of the opposition party Jobbik, Béla Kovács is ofﬁcially ac-
cused of spying for Moscow.50
The recent Russia-related espionage scandal in the Czech Republic
ﬁt into the very same picture. Though Prague tends to be sympa-
thetic with Moscow in terms of being reluctant to further EU sanc-
tions, Russia has anyways been trying to put pressure on the Czech
Republic by intensifying the activity of its intelligence services there.51
A closer look on the recent espionage cases reveals another, ac-
tually not at all new Russian motivation besides weakening the EU’s
coherence on the sanctions, namely to gather information on the
NATO. Very recently, in October 2014, a high-level ofﬁcer of the Min-
istry of Defense of Poland was arrested, accused of spying for Rus-
sia.52 In late December, a major spy ring was uncovered in a
NATO-operated airbase in Lithuania.53 This leads readers to the con-
clusion that for Moscow the strategic relations vis-à-vis the EU and
particularly the NATO are much more important than the bilateral re-
lations with individual member states. This obviously concerns the
Visegrad countries as well.
48 Carney et al. (2014)
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2014) 
50 Orenstein – Krekó (2014)
51 Fitsanakis (2014) 
52 Foy (2014)
53 Sharkov (2014)
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Scenarios for the Visegrad cooperation
As the whole project, in the framework of which this study is pre-
pared, is focused on the future of the Visegrad, it is certainly useful
to consider a few possible scenarios about the foreseeable develop-
ments in the light of the Ukraine crisis.
First and foremost, it is important to see that regardless how deep
the Russia-related intra-Visegrad divisions are, the complete collapse
or cease of existing of the cooperation is absolutely unlikely. The
main reason is that simply all four countries need the Visegrad co-
operation. Besides, both the political and the foreign policy adminis-
trative elites have been socialized in the “Visegrad way” already more
than a decade, and this provides strong internal coherence. In addi-
tion to this, the present tensions are not the ﬁrst internal crisis the
cooperation has witnessed: in the mid-90s the V4 hardly functioned
at all, particularly due to the skepticism of the Czech leadership of
that time, and also due to the pro-Eastern orientation of Slovakia dur-
ing the era of Vladimir Mečiar, i.e. until 1998.
Hence, Visegrad four is going to stay Visegrad four: no members
will be expelled from the group (the consensus-based decision-mak-
ing would not even make this possible), and no new members will be
admitted, despite sporadic proposals to do so.54 Recently a Polish
analyst suggested that Poland should increasingly rely on the Viseg-
rad+ mechanism and cooperate closer with Lithuania and Romania
in order to outweight the Ukraine-related resistance of Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia,55 this is unlikely to happen, again be-
cause of the need to take decisions by consensus.
Visegrad taking the lead
Theoretically, if the Visegrad countries could be able to form and ef-
ﬁciently represent a common position on Ukraine and Russia inside
the EU, this would signiﬁcantly boost both the visibility and prestige
of the cooperation, as well as of its individual member states. A uni-
son Visegrad voice could indeed be heard very well, as the four coun-
54 For more information, see the analysis prepared in the framework of the Think Visegrad pro-
ject in 2013: Rácz (2013)
55 Kałan (2014b), p. 2.
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tries altogether have the same 58 votes in the Council of Europe like
Germany and France have together. Moreover, a uniﬁed Visegrad co-
herent on Russia could be a much more valuable and respected part-
ner of the U.S. as well, than it currently is.
However, as it was demonstrated above, differences between the
Visegrad countries are far deeper than occasional, minor disagree-
ments. Instead, many of them are of strategic and structural nature,
such as size, economic power, the level of energy dependence on
Russia, etc. Hence, it is highly unlikely that a common, meaningful
Visegrad position could be formed about Russia.
Visegrad in coma
Another, theoretically possible option is that due to the deepening
lack of trust between the Visegrad countries the cooperation gets
halted or suspended, similarly to the mid-1990s. A possible political
frontline inside the V4 could emerge if any (or more) of the countries
would veto the continuation of the EU sanctions against Russia in
spring 2015. Such a move would probably alienate Poland, a ﬁrm
supporter of the sanctions, and would signiﬁcantly decrease the
readiness of Poland to rely on the Visegrad cooperation. In this case,
the above-mentioned scenario could come true, namely that Poland
would increasingly rely on ad-hoc cooperation projects with Lithua-
nia, Romania and other EU member states, which have a similar
agenda vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine, instead of dedicating too much
efforts or resources to the Visegrad.
Business as usual
The third, probably the most likely scenario is that Visegrad will re-
main to be unable to form a common position about Russia, due to
the prevailing differences in business and political interests. However,
as it was already argued above, this is not the ﬁrst time in Visegrad
history when no common positions could be formed. Actually inside
the Visegrad cooperation there is a so-called “art of disagreeing”,56
meaning that if no consensus can be reached on a concrete ques-
tion, then the problem is put aside, and cooperation continues in
56 Rácz (2013)
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those other issues where a joint position can be agreed on. An addi-
tional factor pointing towards this scenario is the very existence and
functioning of the International Visegrad Fund (IVF). The Fund, jointly
operated by the four member states and managed by a Bratislava-
based secretariat and a rotating executive director, has a budget of
8 million euros,57 donated by the four member states on an equal
basis. The Fund is the primary foreign policy arm of the Visegrad co-
operation and its sole institutionalized component. The need to keep
the Fund operational is an important factor preventing the member
states from halting or suspending the cooperation.
Conclusions
The Visegrad is deeply divided over how to address Russia on the
Ukraine crisis. Most of the divisions are either of structural type, such
as size, and the level of energy dependence on Russia, or of norma-
tive nature, such as approach to democracy and the West in general,
and neither of these is easy to change. Hence, most likely the intra-
Visegrad differences will prevail in the future as well. However, the
very functioning of the Visegrad is unlikely to change, because the
cooperation has a rich routine in handling disagreements between
the member states.
Russia, in line with its general strategy vis-à-vis the EU, has been
doing its best to deepen the differences among the Visegrad coun-
tries, thus to weaken both the EU and NATO. Moscow has been re-
lying both on political, economic and informational tools in order
increase intra-Visegrad tensions. 
It is important to note that weakening the Visegrad coherence is
not an objective, only a tool of Russian foreign and security policy.
The main objective is to weaken the two great, strategic adversaries
according to the perception of Moscow, namely the EU and the
NATO. From this perspective, contemporary Russian foreign policy
seems to be a clear continuation of the approach drafted already in
the 1997 strategy on Central Europe: countries of the region are not
important because of their per se importance, but because of their
57 About. International Visegrad Fund. Available: http://visegradfund.org/about/ Accessed: 25
October 2014.
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membership in the EU and NATO. In order to achieve the strategic
goal of weakening the EU and NATO Russia is ready to take up se-
rious losses in its bilateral relations vis-à-vis the Visegrad countries.
As demonstrated by the Russian pressure put on Hungary, even the
imaginary status of a prioritized ally, like Viktor Orbán would like to
perceive himself, does not guarantee any protection from Russian
economic and information measures, or espionage activities.
All in all, the role and place of the Visegrad region in Russian foreign
policy is deﬁned by the strategic considerations of Moscow towards
the EU and NATO, and not by the bilateral agendas vis-à-vis the
Visegrad countries. This leads to the ﬁnal conclusion that for a Viseg-
rad country it is probably impossible to achieve any privileged status
in the eyes of Vladimir Putin. A small Central European country can
never be more for Russia than a useful weak point inside the EU and
NATO, and also in the Visegrad cooperation. 
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PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE
VISEGRAD COUNTRIES: HEADING
TOWARDS MORE CONVERGENCE?
Krisztina Vida1
Introductory remarks
This chapter aims at giving a snapshot of the performance of the
Visegrad countries (V4) in the ﬁrst decade of their EU membership
and, based on past trends and available forecasts, attempts to out-
line the prospects for their future catching up. The evaluation is done
along several aspects mainly focusing on growth, real and nominal
convergence, as well as basic elements of competitiveness. The
main question of the paper is whether there has been convergence
by the Visegrad countries to EU averages/benchmarks as well as to
each other since 2004, and whether converging or diverging trends
can be expected until the end of the decade. 
Growth and catching up
The Visegrad countries entered the EU with a GDP growth rate of
5% on average, but right after accession they took a diverging
trend.2 In fact, Slovakia got the biggest impetus from membership,
but the Czech and (with the exception of a slow-down in 2005) the
1 Senior researcher, Institute of World Economics – Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
2 Statistical data used here stem from the Eurostat database unless indicated otherwise.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/abc (consulted in January 2015).
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Polish rates were also impressive in the first years. The Czech and
Slovak expansion was fuelled by both domestic demand (especially
high investment rates) and exports, while in Poland domestic de-
mand was the main driver of growth. Only the Hungarian economy
showed a steadily declining trend after EU entry (with exports being
the single stable pillar of growth); to suffer from the deepest reces-
sion in 2009 (-6.6%). The Czech and the Slovak negative GDP rates
were similar to the EU average (-4.4%) while Poland – due to its ro-
bust internal market and lower exposure to external effects – was
the only country in the group and also across the EU to avoid re-
cession at all. 
As Figure 1 illustrates it, in the years of 2010-2013 the four coun-
tries have been recovering at a higher (Poland, Slovakia) or lower
pace (the Czech Republic and Hungary experiencing even a milder
recession). But the gap among their rates has been narrowing lately,
and 2014 was the first year since accession when the rhythm of
economic expansion was in harmony in the region (ca. 2-3%).
Moreover, according to medium-term forecasts by the Economist
Intelligence Unit,3 the growth rate of the V4 countries until 2019 is
expected to remain within the band of 2.2-3.8% and their cumu-
lated average will be around 2.8% in the coming years.
Given the fact that, according to the same forecast, the EU28 av-
erage growth rate will oscillate between 1.3 and 1.9% (and the euro
area between 1.1-1.8%), the better performance of the V4 will en-
able a sustainable continuation of catching up until the end of the
decade.The high pre-crisis dynamism is however not to return to
the region in the foreseeable future,4 but a steady and more modest
convergence – supported also by the EU’s financial assistance in
the 2014-2020 period5 – can be predicted. As regards the structure
of growth, according to European Commission forecasts,6 in all four
3 Country Reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2015. 
4 Mainly due to two factors: ailing export partners and lack of „easy” borrowing. IMF (2014),
p. 60. 
5 In the current seven (plus three) year budgetary period, the V4 countries taken together will
beneﬁt from more than 135 billion euros in the form of development assistance (and over 57
billion under the common agricultural policy).
6 European Commission (2014a)
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countries it will be driven overwhelmingly by domestic demand.
Within that investments will take the lead while public and private
consumption will have varied patterns in the V4. Net exports will
again contribute positively to growth in the three smaller Visegrad
countries while Poland was not able to maintain its post-crisis im-
proving trend of external trade. 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth rate (%)
Figure 2. GDP per capita (PPS, EU28=100)
Source: Eurostat, Economist Intelligence Unit (2015a; 2015b; 2015c;
2015d)
Convergence of living standards to the EU average has actually
been one of the major reasons for joining the Union. In this respect,
very promising trends – measured in GDP per capita – could be de-
tected in the cases of Poland and Slovakia (improving equally by 18
percentage points in the ﬁrst decade of membership). In contrast,
the Czech rate remained rather constantly at roughly 80% compared
to the EU average, while the Hungarian catching up process has
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been a very modest one (up from 62 to 66%).7 As Figure 2 shows it,
these developments mean two things: an obvious narrowing of the
gap within the Visegrad group – led by the Czech Republic, followed
by Slovakia and Poland-Hungary sharing the third place – and a
gradual convergence of the V4 as a whole towards the EU average.
Thus, the development of the region validated the theory of beta
convergence, according to which poorer countries are capable of
higher growth rates when catching up, while, the relevance of sigma
convergence is shown by the narrowing of the gap among the V4
as well as between them and the EU average. Furthermore, as it was
mentioned, thanks to continuously higher growth rates in the next
ﬁve years, the catching up of the V4 in terms of GDP per capita can
be continued. This convergence will however happen at a more re-
duced pace than the Polish and Slovak examples in the past ten
years, and will be closer to the Hungarian performance demon-
strated so far. 
As regards catching up at the level of regions, the picture is partly
similar to the national performances (see Table 1).8 This means that
the most spectacular catching up took place in NUTS-2 regions of
Slovakia and Poland while the Czech and especially the Hungarian
regions did not experience a similar convergence. Hungary is the
only Visegrad country where some regions even reported a negative
closing up rate in 2011 compared to 2004, and here can be found
the poorest regions too – which was not the case at the time of ac-
cession. The regions surrounding the capital cities (or in the Czech
Republic the capital itself) are the ﬂagships of catching up. At the
same time, it seems to be a shared challenge that there is a huge
discrepancy in development levels between those central regions
(reaching well above 100% of EU average – in the Slovak and Czech
cases closer to 200%) and the rest being below 75%. Paradoxically,
7 If one looks behind the trends and examines Eurostat’s nominal sums of per capita GDP at
current prices (in euros), then the developments show an even sharper picture. Namely, in the
case of Slovakia and Poland GDP per capita more than doubled (!) from 2003 to 2013, while
in the Czech case the multiplier was 1.75 and for Hungary merely 1.4.
8 Eurostat data for 2004: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-07-23_en.htm?locale=en
Eurostat data for 2011: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/1-27022014-
AP/EN/1-27022014-AP-EN.PDF (no newer data were available at the time of writing the paper)
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REGION NUTS-2
GDP/capita 2004,
PPS, EU27=100
GDP/capita 2011,
PPS, EU28=100*
Change
(percentage points)
CZECH REPUBLIC
Praha 157 171 +14
StredníCechy 70 73 +3
Jihozápad 70 70 0
Severozápad 61 63 +2
Severovychod 64 67 +3
Jihovychod 67 73 +6
Strední Morava 60 66 +6
Moravskoslezko 61 71 +10
HUNGARY
Közép-Magyarország 102 110 +8
Közép-Dunántúl 61 59 -2
Nyugat-Dunántúl 67 68 +1
Dél-Dunántúl 46 45 -1
Észak-Magyarország 43 40 -3
Észak-Alföld 42 43 +1
Dél-Alföld 44 44 0
POLAND
Lódzkie 47 60 +13
Mazowieckie 77 107 +30
Malopolskie 43 56 +13
Slaskie 57 70 +13
Lubelskie 35 44 +9
Podkarpackie 35 44 +9
Swietokrzyskie 39 49 +10
Podlaskie 38 47 +9
Wielkopolskie 55 68 +13
Zachodniopomorskie 47 55 +8
Lubuskie 45 54 +9
Dolnoslaskie 52 74 +22
Opolskie 44 52 +8
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 45 54 +9
Warminsko-Mazurskie 39 47 +8
Pomorskie 50 62 +12
SLOVAKIA
Bratislavskykraj 129 186 +57
ZápadnéSlovensko 53 72 +19
StrednéSlovensko 47 59 +12
VychodnéSlovensko 42 51 +9
Table 1. Catching up of NUTS-2 regions in the Visegrad countries
(2004-2011)
Source: Eurostat, *EU27 comparison not available, minor changes due to
accession of Croatia
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this problem seems to be the gravest in the smallest Visegrad coun-
try: Slovakia. If disregarding the capital cities/regions we can also
see that the most homogenous country in terms of regional devel-
opment is the Czech Republic (with just a 10 percentage points dis-
crepancy between the most and the least developed regions) while
the other three countries struggle with gaps of between ca. 20 (Slo-
vakia) or even around 30 percentage points (Poland and
Hungary).The fact that regional gaps did not start narrowing, while
some regions switched to a high gear than others, validates the
trade-off theory regarding convergence, according to which “…in
case a less developed national economy starts to converge to the
international average, an increase of dispersion will be experienced
among the domestic regions within the national economy, thus the
more developed regions will grow faster than the less developed
ones.”9
Besides the national and regional level achievements, at the citi-
zens’ level wage convergence must be mentioned too. In this re-
spect important changes took place between 2004 and 2012. First
of all, the initially leading position of Hungary melted away, and was
signiﬁcantly outstripped by the Czech Republic and also Slovakia
(while the gap with Poland almost disappeared). This means that –
according to Eurostat ﬁgures in purchasing power parity – in 2012
the net annual earnings reached approximately 8,000 euros in the
Czech Republic, 6,300 in Slovakia, 5,700 in Hungary and 5,400 in
Poland. These ﬁgures should be contrasted with the nearly 20,000
euros average earnings in the EU27 in the same year. However,
there has been some catching up: taken the four Visegrad countries’
average in 2012 (6,350 euros) it was “only” one third of the EU av-
erage instead of one fourth in the year of accession. In parallel, it
must also be mentioned that price convergence happened signiﬁ-
cantly faster. By 2012, the prices of communication devices and
services reached 102%, clothing and footwear 89% while electricity
and gas 80% of respective price levels of the EU15.10
9 Kertész (2010), p. 2. 
10 Kotian–Münz (2014)
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Overview of macroeconomic performance
When analysing the macroeconomic performance of countries – in-
ﬂuencing their competitiveness too – several factors can be taken
into account. Here the external balances, labour market indicators,
investments, productivity and innovation performances will be high-
lighted shortly. Starting with the external balances, there is an obvi-
ous difference among the Visegrad countries. The three smaller and
highly open economies have a much higher ratio of exports to GDP
(between ca. 75-95% reﬂecting a greater vulnerability) than Poland
with its big domestic market and having a less than 50% export-to-
GDP ratio. The external trade position of these countries has varied
signiﬁcantly in the ﬁrst ten years of membership: the Czech Republic
has had a goods’ trade surplus practically since accession, but this
has been the case for Hungary and Slovakia only since 2009 (which
was however the deepest point in value terms for both exports and
imports across the region). While export orientation became an im-
portant tool to mitigate the effects of the crisis11 imports fell back as
consumption shrunk in the crisis years – having a benign impact on
the trade balances of all the Visegrad countries (see Figure 3).As
however growth is back to the region, it seems to reinforce the dy-
namism of net exports in the smaller Visegrad countries while gen-
erates increasingly more imports than exports in Poland. This striking
gap can mainly be explained by the fact that the three smaller Viseg-
rad countries are hosting relatively more manufacturing plants run by
foreign investors who realise the overwhelming part of their exports,
than in the case of Poland. In parallel to these important changes,
some geographical reorientation of exports has been taking place in
the V4 since accession. While these countries are far (by ca. 15-20
percentage points) more integrated into the EU markets than the EU
average itself – testifying that the V4 is very far from being a periphery
in economic terms – Table 2 shows a signiﬁcant retreat from their
traditional export markets towards news ones, as a result of pro-
tracted recovery of the euro area. This outward orientation actually
goes hand-in-hand with the same trend at the EU level. In the case
11 Novák (2012)
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of the Visegrad countries exports – especially in the period of 2009-
2013 – picked up mainly in the direction of Russia, Ukraine, China
and Turkey.12
Table 2. Share of EU exports in total exports
Source: Eurostat
Connected with trade performances, the current account balances
(Figure 4) have been improving in the post crisis years in the V4, but
since 2013 Poland seems to take a downward trend again. When
looking deeper into the composition of the balances of the current
account, the following speciﬁcities (beyond trade in goods) can be
stated. As regards trade in services, it has recently been positive in
all Visegrad countries. As to income ﬂows, due to substantial proﬁt
repatriations of foreign-owned companies, all V4 countries have sub-
stantial deﬁcits which cannot be counterbalanced by the relatively
low level of net transfers. The latter is the highest in Poland due to
signiﬁcant remittances of Polish workers from abroad, while it is neg-
ative in Slovakia which, although a net beneﬁciary of EU funds, has
to contribute to the eurozone’s rescue fund. Finally an important re-
mark on Hungary’s good performance in this respect: from the V4
Hungary is by far the biggest outward investor in share of GDP,13
meaning that returns on its investments make a signiﬁcant positive
contribution to the current account. 
12 Éltető (2014)
13 According to Eurostat, this rate in 2012 amounted to: 26.6% for Hungary (up from 5.4% in
2004!), 11.4% for Poland, 8.3% for the Czech Republic and only 4.7% for Slovakia.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU27 68.5 67.7 68.3 68.2 67.3 66.6 65.1 64.2 62.6 61.8
CZ 87.1 85.5 85.7 85.3 84.9 84.8 84 83.1 81 80.8
HU 83.1 80.9 79.2 79 78.2 78.7 77.2 75.9 75.7 76.5
PL 80.3 78.6 79 78.9 77.8 79.6 79.1 78 76 74.6
SK 86.7 87.2 86.8 86.8 85.4 85.9 84.4 84.8 83.8 82.6
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Figure 3. Balance of trade in goods (% of GDP)
Figure 4. Balance of the current account (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2014a)
Investments play a crucial role in macroeconomic developments.
In the year of accession, the three smaller Visegrad countries started
with rather close GDP-ratios of gross ﬁxed capital formation (24-
28%), while Poland was lagging behind them (18%). Regarding the
Eurostat ﬁgures, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic increased
or preserved their levels, while the Hungarian one took a declining
path. Later on, the crisis resulted in lowering investments across the
Visegrad region, similarly to the EU as a whole. So, what has been
the reason for that? 
Figure 5 testiﬁes that it was not due to a decline in foreign direct
investments: looking at FDI stocks as percent of GDP – even if
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through some ups and downs – they are signiﬁcantly higher in each
Visegrad country (according to 2012 data) than in the year of acces-
sion, and always well above the EU average. Consequently, domestic
(both private and public) investments were declining which was to
some extent eased by EU assistance. 
Figure 5. FDI stock in the reporting economy (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
However, in this respect the Visegrad countries seemed to undergo
a long learning process: by mid-2013 not even the half of ﬁnancial
support earmarked in the period of 2007-2013 for the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary could actually be spent in those beneﬁci-
aries, while the best performing Poland reached nearly 60% by that
time.14 Thanks to the n+2 rule, the Visegrad countries still have time
until the end of 2015 to use up the EU funds which has indeed been
speeded up in all of them recently. By mid-2014, the contracting ratio
was actually the highest in Hungary, followed by Slovakia (98%),
Poland (95%) and the Czech Republic (92%), but the payment ratio
was still just 53% in Slovakia, 62% in Hungary, and 64% in both the
Czech Republic and Poland.15 In general, the Visegrad countries
tended to spend most of the money from the EU funds on physical
infrastructure16 which was understandable given their backwardness
in this respect. But thanks to the new rules, the current cycle is likely
14 Information taken from Insideurope website: http://insideurope.eu/
15 KPMG (2014)
16 Ibid.
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to be dominated by investments promoting small and medium sized
enterprises and job creation. Medium-term forecasts of the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit show that the Visegrad countries will be char-
acterised in general by investment growth in line with or above their
GDP growth rates in the coming years; anticipating the end of the
post-crisis downward trends.
As regards employment and unemployment – as can be seen in
Figures 6 and 7 – in the dynamic period between accession and the
crisis the Czech Republic, Slovakia and especially Poland (starting
from the worst position) managed to steadily improve these rates.
Employment went up and unemployment fell to historically low levels
(due also to outmigration of labour especially from Poland). While
both labour market indicators took a spectacularly improving path in
three Visegrad countries, the Hungarian ﬁgures – due to mismanage-
ment of the economy – went into the opposite direction: in parallel
with slowing growth and investments after accession, employment
decreased and unemployment increased. The crisis broke the posi-
tive trends in the three members of the group but a few years after
the crisis, recovery of labour market indicators started. According to
European Commission forecasts, by 2016 only Slovakia will have
two-digit and above-EU-average unemployment rate in the Visegrad
region, while the employment rate will be rising until the same year.17
Here some exchange of good practices might also be useful, includ-
ing the high share of self-employed and of the elderly at work cou-
pled with a low share of early retired in the best performer Czech
Republic, or the job protection action plan (protecting among others
the younger-than 25 and the older-than 55) as well as the public work
programmes (designed partly to lead people back to the labour mar-
ket) in Hungary. 
Finally, productivity and innovation are also key factors of compet-
itiveness where the Visegrad countries are still facing challenges. Re-
garding the labour productivity per person employed, the V4 are all
lagging behind the EU average by some 20-30 percentage points. 
17 European Commission (2014a), p. 155.
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Figure 6. Employment rate (%)
Figure 7. Unemployment rate (%)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2014a)
Despite the initial convergence of all four countries upon accession,
the Czech performance has been worsening in the past few years.
Poland, on the other hand, after some initial deterioration, has regis-
tered a spectacular catching up by over 10 percentage points be-
tween 2007 and 2012; thanks mainly to improved productivity in the
manufacturing, energy services and construction sectors.18 After
some convergence upon accession, the overall Hungarian perform-
ance has recently been rather stagnating. In the V4 group Slovakia
has by far the best record in labour productivity (on average by 10
percentage points higher compared to its Visegrad partners) thanks
primarily to signiﬁcant pick-up in the manufacturing sector in the past
18 European Commission (2013a), p. 37. 
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few years.19 Despite the overall still weak productivity performance
of the V4 against the EU average, according to Eurostat data, their
real unit labour cost growth rates have been positive each year since
2011 and are forecast to remain until 2016. Even if – due to the men-
tioned still big wage level gaps – the price of labour should continue
to catch up with Western European standards, it should go hand in
hand with steady improvement of labour productivity, to avoid a loss
of competitiveness. Finally, it is also relevant to evoke here the inno-
vation performance of the V4. The European Commission publishes
each year the complex index (composed of 25 indicators) of the EU
countries’ performances (including among others the gross expen-
diture on research and development, the contribution to innovation
by the enterprise sector, the number of patent applications or that of
new doctorate graduates). According to this index,20 the performance
of the Visegrad countries is also well below the EU average. From
among the four categories (deﬁned by the Commission) none of them
is in the range of innovation leaders or innovation followers. The three
smaller Visegrad countries are classiﬁed as moderate and Poland as
modest innovator. Figure 8 certainly suggests some catching up by
the V4, but this is a policy area where much greater efforts are
needed in the coming years (and for which there are now increased
resources available in the multiannual budget of 2014-2020).
Figure 8. Innovation index
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2014b)
19 European Commission (2013b), p. 45.
20 European Commission (2014b) 
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Public finances and monetary developments
Sound public ﬁnances are not only an obligation under the Maastricht
convergence criteria, but actually also building blocks of a country’s
competitiveness. The Visegrad countries entered the EU with very
different levels of budget deﬁcit but – as Figure 9 shows – by 2007
three of them managed to put their public households in order (sim-
ilarly to the EU average). The only exception has been Hungary which
– in parallel with a slowing GDP and lack of prudent ﬁscal policy –
took a sharply diverging path and accumulated a huge (9.4% of GDP)
budget deﬁcit by 2006. Thus, from 2007 onwards Hungary – under
excessive deﬁcit procedure practically since accession – had to
make considerable efforts to consolidate its budget and, as a con-
sequence, the country was hit by the crisis in the midst of austerity
measures. Due to these developments, and contrary to the other
Visegrad countries, Hungary had no room of manoeuvre to temporar-
ily relax its ﬁscal discipline. While the European Commission put a
pressure on Hungary to cut back its deﬁcit, it also brought all the
other Visegrad countries under the excessive deﬁcit procedure in
2009. Thanks to serious efforts by the Hungarian government, the
country was ﬁnally released from EDP in 2013, followed by the Czech
Republic and Slovakia in mid-2014.21 In early 2015 Poland is still
there but this year is its deadline for correction.22
Figure 9. Public budget balance (% of GDP)
21 Overview of excessive deﬁcit procedures (as of 31 January 2015): http://ec.europa.eu/eco-
nomy_ﬁnance/economic_governance/sgp/corrective_arm/index_en.htm
22 Ibid.
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Figure 10. Structural balance (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2014a)
Figure 9 shows the improvement of budgetary positions of the V4
in the post-crisis period. When looking at the methods applied to in-
crease revenues and rationalise expenditure, it can be stated that the
four countries introduced on both sides many similar but also several
country-speciﬁc steps. Table 3 summarises in a simpliﬁed way the
most important anti-crisis measures taken in the past few years by
the Visegrad countries – leading ﬁnally in all of them to a budget
deﬁcit below 3% of GDP by 2015. 
The different conventional and non-conventional measures applied
to consolidate the public budgets also led to some increase of the
state’s role in redistribution in the region, which however should de-
cline again until 2017 according to each stability/convergence pro-
gramme of the V4, as published in April 2014. These countries also
envisage to reduce their structural deﬁcits, i.e. the public budget’s
position rid of cyclical and one-off ﬂows. As can be seen in Figure
10, structural deﬁcits seem to get stabilised between 2.6 and 1.1%
of GDP in the V4 countries by 2016.The medium-term plans of Slo-
vakia and Poland foresee a gradual improvement of this indicator
until 2017 while the Hungarian and Czech ﬁgures would rather be
stagnating (indicating a postponement of further structural reforms). 
The other pillar of public ﬁnances is the level of indebtedness by
the state. Here the Visegrad countries had very different initial posi-
tions but all of them remained below the Maastricht benchmark of
60% of GDP in 2004. 
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Figure 11. Public debt (% of GDP)
Figure 12. Public debt as % of GDP
(share of foreign currecy denominated debt in total debt)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission, Stability/Convergence Pro-
grammes of the V4 (2013)25
As Figure 11 demonstrates it, after accession the Hungarian rate –
due to the mentioned mismanagement of ﬁscal policy – took a steep
upward direction until the crisis, while in the other Visegrad countries
this level was stagnating or declining. As a response to the crisis, these
governments thus had a greater room of manoeuvre to accumulate
higher debts, while always remaining under 60% of GDP. Moreover,
none of these states’ stability or convergence programme calculates
23 All four Visegrad countries revised their mandatory private pension system. Poland and Slo-
vakia decided to eliminate it partially, while Hungary opted for its full abolishment, and – based
on a decision in autumn 2014 – the Czech Republic will do the same by 2016.
24 Those documents can be retrieved here: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/economic_
governance/sgp/convergence/index_en.htm
25 Those documents can be retrieved here: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-hap-
pen/country-speciﬁc-recommendations/2013/index_en.htm
159
Krisztina Vida160
with ever breaching this threshold in the foreseeable future. At the same
time, Hungary – in parallel with budgetary consolidation – started to cut
back its debt ratio after 2011. Despite some promising results however,
the Hungarian case is more vulnerable as nearly 40% of the debts are
denominated in foreign currencies exposed to volatile exchange rate
movements. It must also be mentioned that three countries already
have a public debt ceiling in their constitutions or high-level laws: for
Poland and Slovakia it is 60%, for Hungary it is 50% of GDP, and – in
parallel with joining the Fiscal Compact – the Czech Republic is prepar-
ing for a similar step, even if it is not a smooth process.26
Finally, when looking at the monetary environment since accession:
after very hectic and heterogeneous developments between 2004 and
2013 – as can be seen in Figure 13 on inﬂation and in Figure 14 on
long-term interest rates – recently very promising converging trends
can be detected. As regards the harmonized indices of consumer
prices, they reached historically low levels: between -0.1% (Slovakia)
and 0.5% (Czech Republic) in 2014, while medium term forecasts by
the Economist Intelligence Unit calculate with an inﬂation rate of be-
tween ca. 1-3% across the Visegrad region until 2019 – resulting in
the most harmonious price developments since accession. Similarly,
gaps among long-term interest rates have been quite substantial in
the region, mainly due to the extremely high rates in Hungary. Recently
however, as shown by Figure 14, thanks to the monetary policy in both
Hungary and Poland, the 10 years bond yields started a gradual con-
vergence to each other as well as to the EU average. These processes
have to be welcomed and – together with the above mentioned public
ﬁnance efforts – should be seen as a smoother way leading up to the
introduction of the single currency also by the three bigger Visegrad
countries. Based on the described facts and forecasts it is not unreal-
istic to foresee a (desirably) common joining of the euro area in 2022,
provided that the favourable nominal convergence trends will continue
and the zloty, the koruna and the forint would all join the ERM-2 system
by 2020 the latest. Another key prerequisite is of course that there will
be no political obstacles to entering the eurozone (like in Poland ).27
25 See more on this in Vladimír Bartovic’s chapter in this volume.
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Figure 13. HICP - inﬂation rate (%)
Figure 14. Long-term interest rates* (%)
*EMU criterion series for ten years government bond yields
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2014a)
SWOT analysis for the Visegrad
countries for the time horizon of 2022
Based on the ﬁndings on main macroeconomic trends in the Viseg-
rad countries, it can be useful to draw up an inventory of their
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Such a SWOT
analysis can contribute to more efﬁcient national and joint, region-
wide strategies for development in the coming seven-eight years.
27 See more on those political obstacles in Elzbieta Kawecka’s chapter in this volume.
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The SWOT analysis below is however limited to those aspects that
were treated in this study (so it does not include issues of e.g. polit-
ical stability, energy security, migration, demography or external
threats which would be equally relevant, but would stretch over the
scope of the present paper).
Table 4. SWOT analysis of the V4 countries
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
arket indicators,
strong attraction 
of FDI, consoli-
dated public ﬁ-
nances, low
inﬂation, interest
rate synchronisa-
tion
slower post-crisis
recovery, sluggish
catching up of
GDP per capita
since accession,
declining invest-
ments and produc-
tivity
continued conver-
gence to EU aver-
ages, harmonious
development at V4
level, strong indus-
trial and export po-
tential, rising
domestic demand,
attraction of FDI,
use of EU funds,
diversiﬁcation of
export markets,
own monetary pol-
icy, upward trend
of innovation
low growth of main
export partners, in-
come outﬂows
(higher repatriation
of proﬁts), nearly
zero interest rate
discourages sav-
ings, productivity
and ULC trends
not in harmony, no
signiﬁcant im-
provement of
structural balance,
exchange rate vul-
nerability
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
growth, good trade
performance, high
current account
surplus, improving
labour market indi-
cators, strong at-
traction of FDI,
signiﬁcant invest-
ment activities
abroad, consoli-
dated public ﬁ-
nances, low
inﬂation, interest
rate convergence
modest catching
up of GDP per
capita, poor con-
vergence perform-
ance of regions,
slow wage conver-
gence, low rate of
ﬁxed investments,
recent worsening
of productivity 
continued conver-
gence to EU aver-
ages, harmonious
development at V4
level, good manu-
facturing and ex-
port potential,
rising domestic de-
mand, attraction of
FDI, use of EU
funds, diversiﬁca-
tion of export mar-
kets, own
monetary policy,
upward trend of in-
novation
low growth of main
export partners,
still high public
debt, high (but
shrinking) share of
foreign-currency
denominated debt
in total debt, no
signiﬁcant im-
provement of
structural balance,
exchange rate vul-
nerability 
H
un
g
ar
y
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Summary and conclusions
This chapter attempted to give a snapshot of the experience and per-
formance of the Visegrad countries in the ﬁrst decade of EU mem-
bership along a set of important aspects, as well as to make some
medium-term projections with the help of forecasts. In the analysed
developments a clear sequencing of three stages could be identiﬁed:
the post-accession and pre-crisis years (2004-2008) of diverging but
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Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
dynamic growth,
faster catching up
at national, re-
gional and wage
levels, improving
productivity, im-
proved public ﬁ-
nances including
structural balance,
low inﬂation, inter-
est rate conver-
gence
sluggish invest-
ments, stagnating
labour market indi-
cators, negative
and declining trade
and current ac-
count balances,
poor innovation
performance
continued conver-
gence to EU aver-
ages, harmonious
development at V4
level, big domestic
market, lower ex-
posure to external
effects, rising do-
mestic demand,
use of EU funds,
diversiﬁcation of
export markets,
own monetary 
policy
low growth of main
export partners,
further worsening
of the current ac-
count balance,
considerable part
of debt denomi-
nated in foreign
currency, ex-
change rate vul-
nerability, political
resistance to the
euro
P
o
la
nd
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
growth, faster
catching up at na-
tional, regional and
wage levels, good
trade performance,
current account in
balance, strong at-
traction of FDI,
high pace conver-
gence of produc-
tivity, consolidated
public ﬁnances, in-
cluding structural
balance, low inﬂa-
tion
big gaps in re-
gional develop-
ment, still sluggish
investments, stag-
nating employ-
ment, high (but
decreasing) unem-
ployment, recent
retreat in innova-
tion performance
continued conver-
gence to EU aver-
ages, harmonious
development at V4
level, good manu-
facturing and ex-
port potential,
rising domestic de-
mand, attraction of
FDI, use of EU
funds, diversiﬁca-
tion of export mar-
kets, shelter
against exchange
rate volatilities
thanks to euro
membership
low growth of main
export partners, in-
come outﬂows,
very low interest
rate discourages
savings, potentially
higher contribu-
tions to euro-re-
lated fundsS
lo
va
ki
a
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mostly improving macroeconomic trends especially by Poland, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, the crisis years (2009-2013) of reces-
sion, stagnation or low growth and gradual recovery/consolidation,
and ﬁnally the post-crisis years (2014 and beyond) marked by har-
monious converging trends to each other as well as to several EU
averages/benchmarks. 
As regards growth trends, the four countries joined the EU with
around 5% rates which have been signiﬁcantly diverging until 2014.
While Poland, the Czech Republic and especially Slovakia got an im-
petus from membership, the Hungarian economy has been on a de-
clining path after 2004 just to experience the worst recession in the
group in 2009. Recovery from contraction (Hungary, the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia) or slower growth (Poland) has been happening at
different paces again, however, growth rates were in harmony in the
V4 in 2014 (around 2-3%) and, according to forecasts, the region may
enjoy an economic expansion of between 2-4% until 2019 which
would mean the most homogenous development since the year of EU
entry. It will also mean a modest but steady continuation of catching
up by the region to the EU and euro area averages, as growth rates
for both will remain below 2% throughout the forecast period. As it
was evidenced, the Visegrad region is actually characterised by a pro-
tracted catching up process at the national, regional and wage levels
too. Regarding national and regional convergence Slovakia and Poland
were the best performers while in terms of wages the Czech Republic
took the lead. All in all, the V4 countries did converge to each other as
well as to the EU, but they need a very long way to reach EU averages
in national and wage levels and to bring up all their regions at least to
the 75% level (in terms of GDP per capita) of the Union average. 
When analysing labour market and investment developments, it
was demonstrated that very positive pre-crisis trends in Poland, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia were interrupted by the crisis. Employ-
ment, unemployment and gross ﬁxed capital formation rates have
been spectacularly improving in those three countries while in Hun-
gary these indicators took a deteriorating trend after accession, thus
leaving the country in an extremely weak position by 2009. In the
past few years, slowly improving trends on the Visegrad countries’
labour markets can be detected while investments are still sluggish.
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The latter is however not due to lower foreign direct investments in
general, but to the shrinking private and public investment activities
resulting from ailing demand and austerity measures during the crisis
years. Investments are expected to be boosted now by EU funds, as
big parts of the money earmarked for the Visegrad countries between
2007-2013 have still to be spent until the end of 2015 (which add up
to the new resources available for the 2014-2020 framework).
In the case of external balances the mostly negative pre-crisis
trends seem to improve in the post-crisis period as exports of goods
are growing dynamically (although still inferior to imports in Poland).
Thus the current account balances took very positive trends with sur-
pluses in Hungary and Slovakia and with relatively small and shrink-
ing deﬁcits in the Czech Republic. Poland is the only Visegrad
country where this indicator is again deteriorating, signalling some
challenges of competitiveness. 
Last but not least, compliance with the Maastricht benchmarks
were also scrutinised shortly. Here too, very positive achievements
were disrupted by the crisis in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, while the unprecedented mismanagement of the Hungarian
public ﬁnances left the country in an extremely vulnerable state by
the crisis. Thus Hungary had to start with ﬁscal stabilisation earlier
than the other three countries without, at the same time, having any
room of manoeuvre to relax its budgetary discipline and debt policy.
The situation was recently reversed: while – thanks to a mix of meas-
ures aiming at spreading the burdens across all the actors of the
economy – Hungary could ﬁnally be released from the excessive
deﬁcit procedure in 2013, the Czech Republic and Slovakia followed
it only in 2014 and Poland’s correction deadline is 2015. The prom-
ising consolidation processes in all four countries seem to keep
budget deﬁcits under 3% also in the medium run. In parallel, public
debts are slowly declining in high-rate Hungary while – despite in-
creases – are kept below 60% of GDP in the other three Visegrad
countries. The stabilising public ﬁnance trends are recently coupled
with stabilising monetary trends too, which – in case of their contin-
uation – may result in the three bigger Visegrad countries’ introduc-
tion of the euro at the beginning of the next decade. In any case,
given the signiﬁcance of political and economic relations among the
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four countries, a common joining to the eurozone by the three out-
siders would be desirable. 
In this study it was shown that within the Visegrad group, Hungary
used to be the “black sheep” under most of the analysed aspects
between accession and the crisis; meaning that it was not able to
grasp the opportunities offered by membership and used by its
Visegrad peers more successfully. But in the past few years this
speciﬁcity has been fading away, and recently there seems to be
more converging trends among the V4 as well as by the region to EU
averages/benchmarks than ever before; and, according to forecasts,
those trends may continue in the medium-term. Building on their
strengths and opportunities, the Visegrad countries should con-
sciously maintain the mentioned converging trends. Furthermore, in
the process of improving among others labour market indicators, in-
novation capacities, absorption of EU funds or public ﬁnance con-
solidation, the Visegrad platform should be used more intensively in
the future with a view to exchanging best or even unsuccessful prac-
tices and to tighten cooperation in major macroeconomic develop-
ments, including an eventual coordination of investment projects and
public procurements linked to the inﬂow of EU assistance until
(thanks to the new n+3 rule) 2023. 
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VISEGRAD COUNTRIES AS PART
OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY – SOME
ASPECTS OF COMPETIVENESS
AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL
OF THEIR EXPORTS
Gábor Túry1
The purpose of this study2 is to review some factors of national
competitiveness and examine the development of exports in the
four Visegrad countries (i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia), in order to show how these economies have benefited
from integration into world economy from the beginning of the
1990s. First, we will review the performance of the Visegrad coun-
tries in institutional competitiveness rankings. Second, the external
trade performance of the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis the European
Union, BRIC, USA and Japanese economies will be reviewed. Fi-
nally, the study analyses the international trade competitiveness of
the V4 countries based on the most widely used classifications:
SITC for trade and ISIC/NACE for economic activities.
Introductory remarks
Competitiveness of nations is high on the agenda. While emerging
countries are increasing their shares in the global economy, one of
the key questions for developed economies is how to improve their
1 Researcher, Institute of World Economics – Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
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competitiveness in the global market. There are ever more research
groups and think-tanks that produce rankings to compare countries3,
providing information able to help the decision-making process.
However, competitive comparisons can produce different results,
due to different approaches. Using yearly rankings based on inter-
national benchmarks easily results in premature statements on the
reasons for good or bad performance. But can the development poli-
cies be based on single-year data? This is an important issue as one
of the main goals of government development policies is to enhance
national competitiveness. Nevertheless, due to different interpreta-
tions of the concept, the way forward is not clear.
Competitiveness at the national level
The question of the national competitiveness arose in the mid-1980s
when new competitors emerged in the world economy. Because of
increasing competition, the American economy was starting to lose
competitive advantage in its internal market. Research dealing with
the examination of American competitiveness formulated the con-
cept of national competitiveness. Scott and Lodge deﬁned national
competitiveness in 1985 as that which refers to a country’s ability to
create, produce, distribute and/or service products in international
trade while earning rising returns on its resources4. 
In the early 1990s, the OECD (1992, p. 237) deﬁned national com-
petitiveness as follows: „the degree to which an economy can, under
free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which
meet the test of international markets, while simultaneously maintain-
ing and expanding the real incomes of its people over longer run”.5
Rapkin (1995, p. 2.) offered a similar deﬁnition stressing the impor-
tance of the economic development as a result of national competi-
2 An earlier version of this paper was presented at UniaEuropejska.pl (Diverging competitive
performances of the Visegrad countries: some conclusions from the technology level of external
trade. 2014/24:(3) pp. 36-51.)
3 World Economic Forum, International Institute for Management Development, Economist
Intelligence Unit, International Finance Corporation, European Commission. Cf.: Lukovics
(2008), p. 55.
4 Scott–Lodge (1985)
5 OECD (1992), p. 237. cited in Thompson (2003), p. 632. 
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tiveness. In his work, he described the challenges for the U.S. econ-
omy posed by East Asian capitalism over the 1980s and 1990s. The
above works commonly refer to competitiveness as a factor in cre-
ating a country’s welfare.
The unilateral approach of competitiveness emphasising economic
growth also appears elsewhere. The annually-published World Eco-
nomic Forum Global Competitiveness Report6 deﬁnes competition
“as the ability of a country to achieve sustained high rates of growth
in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita”7. This competitive ap-
proach highlights economic growth to show the way in which a given
economy is able to provide sustainable growth in changing global
economic conditions.
The academic literature of the past decades (including Aiginger8
and Thompson9) conﬁrms that the concept of national competitive-
ness is highly controversial. Some authors like Reich10 and Krugman11
judge any effort to measure competitiveness as meaningless. They
stress that national competitiveness has broad and diverse interpre-
tations and lacks a clear and agreed deﬁnition. Several methodolog-
ical questions arise during measurement (Buckley et al.12; Lall13;
Szentes14; Török15). Losoncz refers to more than 10,000 different ap-
proaches to competition.16 No consensus has been achieved regard-
ing the factors and measurement. Further, this ﬁeld of research is
characterised by subjectivity. On this basis we can distinguish be-
tween two different “schools”. Knack and Keefer17, Krugman18, Lall19
and Reinert20 emphasise that public policy matters in national com-
6 World Economic Forum (1998)
7 Cited in Dijck–Faber (2000), p. 74.
8 Aiginger (1998)
9 Thompson (2003)
10 Reich (1990)
11 Krugman (1994)
12 Buckley et al. (1998)
13 Lall (2001)
14 Szentes (2011)
15 Török (1989)
16 Losoncz (2004)
17 Knack- Keefer (1995)
18 Krugman (1991)
19 Lall (2001)
20 Reinert (1995)
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petitiveness. The notion of the “competition state „was coined by
Cerny21. He emphasised that the way state intervention had been
formed was a response to the changing global environment to pre-
serve the competitiveness of the nation. Stiglitz also strengthens this
political line when he points out to the situation of market turmoil
when government intervention can improve market efﬁciency.22 The
other idea approaches the problem from the business side. Porter23,
Oral and Chabchoub24 emphasise that business investment deci-
sions are the key factors. Michael Porter, in his book “The Compet-
itive Advantage of Nations”, used a truly economic perspective, and
added that competitiveness was basically a microeconomic issue,
and was thus hard to interpret on a macroeconomic level.25 In a
study26 published later Krugman pointed out that – according to
Tyson’s27 deﬁnition – internal factors matter in the case of a nation
with minor international trade. He provided an example of domestic
productivity growth. He also highlighted that stressing national com-
petitiveness could cause faulty government policies if governments
began wasteful spending to enhance competitiveness. In extreme
cases it might result in protectionism in international trade.
Central European authors have also shown interest in the topic of
competitiveness. Bieńkowski28 highlighted the importance of the in-
stitutional framework and macroeconomic policy in enhancing the
competitiveness of companies. Kutasi et al. utilise the competitive-
ness approach to the economic policy, i.e. the nation's economic
competitiveness originates from a competitive state.29 This vision dis-
tinguishes between the state responsibility and market functions for
competitiveness and development. However, they state that a mul-
titude of available resources does not provide a clear answer to cer-
21 Cerny (1990)
22 Stiglitz (2002)
23 Porter (1990)
24 Oral–Chabchoub (1996)
25 Porter (1990)
26 Krugman (1991)
27 Laura D'Andrea Tyson chairs President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors and she
wrote a paper titled: Who's Bashing Whom? (Institute for International Economics, November
1992).
28 Bieńkowski (2007)
29 Kutasi–Vigvári–Dani (2012)
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tain questions. Excessive intervention can be detrimental to the mar-
ket. Ágh examines the performance of the domestic public/state in-
stitutions, and underlines that “social progress” (as deﬁned by the
European Union) is a basic variable measuring progress in competi-
tiveness.30 Regarding this question, Kovács provides an even more
speciﬁc answer: in order to enhance economic competitiveness the
harmonious functioning of public households and a sustainable path
of modernisation should be kept in mind.31 Others analyse competi-
tiveness with sectoral breakdowns.
Verner investigates the relationship between competitiveness and
expenditure on higher education and research and development in
the triad countries (the European Union, Japan, and the USA)32. Based
on panel data analysis he concluded that increasing expenditures on
education and research and development did not always promote na-
tional competitiveness. Concerning the situation in Slovakia during
the (current) economic crisis, Ručinská and her co-authors highlight
that the production factors are not the only important factors of com-
petitiveness.33 The question is more complex, because providing
long-term sustainability of total production and relative satisfaction of
the population concurrently are also the determinant factors.
Mrak referring to the OECD method34, investigates cost- and qual-
itative competitiveness35. He points out that at the cost-competitive-
ness side of wages in foreign currency is crucial, thus exchange
rates inﬂuence external trade performance. A study by Landesmann
and Wörz deals with the global competitiveness of the CEE region
vis-à-vis the EU-15 and Asian emerging economies.36 The authors
use hard data such as external trade positions, market shares and
costs of ﬁnancial intermediation as well as some soft points (based
on perceptions of entrepreneurs) like costs related to running busi-
ness (negotiation costs and distribution costs) in the business sec-
tor. In a global comparison, the CEE countries have gained a
30 Ágh (2011)
31 Kovács (2005)
32 Verner (2011)
33 Ručinsk –Urge–Ručinský (2009)
34 OECD (1998)
35 Mrak (2000)
36 Landesmann–Wörz (2006)
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relatively strong competitive position. However, the new member
states are found in the middle position between the ﬁrst and the sec-
ond development wave of “Asian tigers”37 and the third wave, in-
cluding China and India.
Kovačič, in order to rank factors of the World Economic Forum’s
(WEF) competitiveness report38 for the selected countries, uses the
standard deviation method.39 Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia have the leading positions, ahead of Poland, Croatia
and Romania.
Visegrad countries in institutional rankings 
– an analysis of national competitiveness
Measuring international competitiveness and preparing benchmark-
ing lists, economic development is often used in analyzing the per-
formance of countries (c.f., World Competitiveness Yearbook). The
other main institutional competitiveness observer, the World Eco-
nomic Forum deﬁnes40 competitiveness as the ability of a country to
achieve sustained high rates of growth in gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita. In recent years during the “great crisis” that af-
fected the performance of the economies, regional distribution of
growth has changed. The crisis interrupted a long growth period in
the US economy, moderated Chinese development and ampliﬁed the
structural problems of public ﬁnances in the countries of the Euro-
pean Union. 
Regarding benchmarking of economies, there are two widely used
sources based on international competitiveness. These ranks are
comparisons with “non-priority countries”41, which means that the
competitiveness of a country is not measured in relation to others.
The World Economic Forum – a private think-tank – has been pub-
lishing the Global Competitiveness Report since 1979. The WEF de-
37 The ﬁrst development wave of the newly industrialized countries (NIC) covered Hong Kong,
the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the second one Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
and Thailand, the third one – Philippines, India and China.
38 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report.
39 Kovačič (2008), pp. 3-26.
40 World Economic Forum (1998)
41 Szilágyi (2008)
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veloped a measure called the Global Competitiveness Index, which
is a weighted complex indicator42 based on twelve different obser-
vational points of view. These areas43 cover different governmental
policies as well as different economic sectors. The driving point of
the index is GDP growth.44
The other highly cited source is the International Institute for Man-
agement Development (IMD) World Competitiveness Center, which
has been publishing the World Competitiveness Yearbook since
1989. International benchmarking is calculated over 300 criteria, two-
thirds of which is based on hard data statistics and one-third on opin-
ion surveys of business executives.
Based on the data of the Global Competitiveness Report, the V4
countries are in the lower-third of the ranking list of examined
economies.45 Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece from the European
Union, and Brazil and India from the BRIC countries have ranks that
are similar to those of the four Visegrad countries. It is obvious that
those Central and Eastern European emerging economies which have
been economically embedded in the EU for the last 20 years face dif-
ferent conditions than the South European or the BRIC countries. Fig-
ure 1 shows the score numbers46 for the last eight years. Three
Visegrad countries, as well as the European Union countries, experi-
enced deteriorating performances. For those emerging economies
that based their growth and development on inward FDI and increas-
ing demand in external markets, the question of the competitiveness
cannot be independent from their external economic environment.
Real differences and competitive factors between countries become
apparent when we consider more detailed data, i.e., dissimilar per-
42 Further: World Economic Forum (2012), pp. 8-9.
43 The 12 pillars of competitiveness: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic environment,
Health and primary education, Higher education and training, Goods market efﬁciency, Labour
market efﬁciency, Financial market development, Technological readiness, Market size, Busi-
ness sophistication, Innovation
44 van Dijck–Gerrit (2000), p. 74.
45 We examine the EU28 plus Brazil, India, the U.S., People’s Republic of China, Russian Fe-
deration and Japan
46 The Global Competitiveness Report provides scores between 1 and 7.
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formance of along sub-indexes.47 Considering the average values of
their rankings, the Czech Republic and Poland have the best positions.
Compared to the other countries examined V4 countries showed the
worst position for governmental/state performance (institutions) and
some market/business indicators (labour market efﬁciency). 
Figure 1. Scores of the Visegrad countries compared to the best
and worst scores from the EU28 between 2006 and 2013
Source: author’s calculations based on relevant issues in the World Eco-
nomic Forum Global Competitiveness Report
The former plays an important role in investment decisions and the
organization of production of business entities, and further deter-
mines cost-beneﬁt calculations for the costs of development strate-
gies. The efﬁciency and ﬂexibility of the labour market are critical for
the effective allocation of the appropriate workforce. We can distin-
guish advantageous and disadvantageous factors among nations as
well, e.g., a large-scale internal market and the lack of a trans-Euro-
pean road transport network in Poland, or favourable innovation ca-
pacity in the Czech Republic and the (small) size of the domestic
market in Slovakia. The World Competitiveness Yearbook edited by
47 1. Institutions; 2. Infrastructure; 3. Macroeconomic environment; 4. Health and primary edu-
cation; 5. Higher education and training; 6. Goods market efﬁciency; 7. Labour market efﬁci-
ency; 8. Financial market development; 9. Technological readiness; 10. Market size; 11.
Business sophistication; 12. Innovation
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IMD is also continuously ranks an increasing number of countries48
according to their competitiveness. It is one of the most thorough
and comprehensive annual reports on the competitiveness of na-
tions. Overall the calculations are based on 327 variables49 organized
into four groups: economic performance, government efﬁciency,
business efﬁciency and infrastructure. There is high volatility between
different years thanks to the complexity of measurement methods.
Based on data for different years in the World Competitiveness
Scoreboard we compared the best and worst values of the EU coun-
tries50 with the scores of the Visegrad countries (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. IMD scores of Visegrad 4 countries compared to the best
and worst ﬁgures from the EU15+V4+Estonia+Slovenia
Source: author’s calculations based on the IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook 2013 and relevant years of the IMD World Competitiveness
Scoreboard
A review of the two competitiveness rankings (see Table 1) reveals
discrepant results in long-term time series. The comparison of the
48 In 2002: 49 countries; in 2013: 60 countries
49 This can be problematic when making comparisons – when comparing successive years.
For example, in 2007 the competitiveness ranking was investigated under 232 indices.
50 Due to a lack of national data we use the EU15 countries and the Visegrad 4 countries plus
Estonia and Slovenia.
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ranks between the two investigations not useful, thanks to divergent
sampling methodology and the ranking of countries taken into ac-
count. However, summarizing the most important experiences is use-
ful. The trends of the time-series are clearly drawn out for developing
economies and the lagging economies. Concerning the Global Com-
petitiveness Report, the European Union (EU28) continuously
dropped down in the list. Emerging economies performed differently,
with Brazil, China (PRC) and the Russian Federation improving their
performances. Traditionally developed economies like the USA and
Japan dropped down in the list, as did the EU. Small Visegrad coun-
tries dropped in competitiveness while Poland was able to move for-
ward. If we take into account previous years, among the new
member states Poland was the only EU member that avoided reces-
sion, due to its favourable internal demand. The economic output in
the other three Visegrad countries was signiﬁcantly affected by the
crisis, leading to other structural problems as well.51 IMD’s World
Competitiveness Yearbook conﬁrmed the good performance of
Poland in recent years. The report also highlighted the Czech Re-
public as an example of a well-performing country for businesses.
The European Union saw improvement in its competitiveness, con-
trary to the Global Competitiveness Report. All noted developed and
developing economies have been improving their competitiveness
over the last 11 years.
External trade performance 
of Visegrad countries
The external trade balance and the global market share in high-tech
industries are the easiest way to compare national economies in the
global economy. Investigating external trade is the obvious way to
deﬁne the competitiveness of nations (Éltető52; Tomáš53) because it
is a comprehensive concept, expressing the potential of national
economies to stand the test of international products. 
51 Túry (2012)
52 Éltető (2003)
53 Tomáš (2011)
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Table 1. Competitiveness development in the countries studied
Some (Török54) believe that measuring competitiveness on the de-
mand side is impossible. Further, Török points out that there is a
weak linkage between the export structure, technological level of
manufacturing output and R&D expenditure.55 A globalised examina-
tion of the international trade raises further questions. Is it possible
to speak of the national competitiveness or just competitiveness of
ﬁrms in the 21st century, when numerous transnational companies
carry out production in almost all regions/countries of the world?
There is ample evidence of the existence of isolated multinational
corporations in national economies as a result of globalisation.56
Firms with global value chains across economies create a global net-
work of production and distribution. 
The Central European emerging markets57 are open and highly de-
pendent on foreign demand. If key partners experience shrinking de-
mand, export development is hit hard. In terms of external trade,
Poland – with its rather large internal market – is different from the
54 Török (1998)
55 Török (2008)
56 Sachs–Yang–Zhang (2000)
57 I use this term in parallel with the term “the Visegrad countries” despite the two terms are
not equivalent. The Visegrad countries are part of the Central European region, here deﬁned
as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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Ranks and period/country
WEF Global Competitive-
ness Report 2006-2013
IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook 2002-2013
Czech Republic - +
Hungary - -
Poland + +
Slovak Republic - +
China + +
United States - 0 (+)
Japan - +
Brazil + +
India - +
Russian Federation + +
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other three countries, which are deeply involved in external markets.
The net value of exports showed a positive turn during the time of
breakdown of internal consumption and the relapse of the import-
based production of large multinational companies during the world
economic crisis. The improvement of the trade balance took place
despite a declining trade performance, i.e. the decreasing volume of
exports due to the lack of demand growth in external markets
The Central European countries have been showing tremendous de-
velopment – in terms of both quantity and quality – in foreign trade
since the beginning of the 1990s. According to WTO statistics58, from
the beginning of 1990 until 2012 the world trade increased threefold,
while the external trade turnover of the Visegrad countries tenfold.
Landesmann and Wörz highlighted that evolution of trade balance
was a sign of the catching-up processes of the Central and Eastern
European countries.59 Concerning export competitiveness, despite a
relative export price growth, productivity gains were able to offset the
process. In this regard, a number of studies have explored the rela-
tionship between trade development, economic growth and pattern
of trade in the CEE region. Pavličková deals with the export compet-
itiveness of the Slovak Republic, giving a comprehensive summary of
the empirical studies dealing with the topic60. She investigated export
data using Peneder’s61 classiﬁcation of industries according to in-
volvement of human resources between 1999 and 2011. Using sta-
tistical methods (Constant Market Share Analysis, Revealed
Comparative Advantage, Michaely Index, and unit export and import
values) she conﬁrmed the increasing competitiveness of Slovak ex-
ports in European markets. Nevertheless, she did not assess any sig-
niﬁcant change in the Slovak commodity structure during the
observed period. Price competitiveness fulﬁls the main role in trade
development. Outrata and co-authors examined foreign trade trends
as part of intra-industry trade tendency using the Grubel-Lloyd
Index62. They found that CEFTA countries had a comparative advan-
58 WTO (2013)
59 Landesmann–Wörz (2006)
60 Pavličková (2013)
61 Peneder (1999)
62 Outrata–Gajdošová (2004)
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tage in products of lower added value. CEE countries are competitive
in the labour-intensive industries and have disadvantage in market-
ing- and technology-driven industries. Vokorokosová and Čarnický,
using the Revealed Competitive Advantage and the Michaely Index,
added to this claim, showing that in term of international trade Slova-
kia had a competitive advantage not just in the labour-intensive in-
dustries but also in those industries which are relatively higher
capitalised.63
The mentioned articles deal with a time period far before the crisis.
In this paper, I concentrate on the developments of the recent decade.
A deeper analysis of external trade development is necessary. Addi-
tional methods were used to attain a picture of a qualitative aspect.
First, the share of high-technology products in total exports and the
structure of the high-technology products are analysed. Second, high-
technology production and the high-technology trade are compared.
The Eurostat’s high-technology aggregation64 based on OECD’s
high- and medium-high-technology manufacturing classiﬁcation65, re-
veal remarkable developments and differences among the Visegrad
four (see Table 2). The Czech Republic and Hungary are in the leading
position, while Slovakia and Poland can be found behind them. De-
spite the outstanding ﬁgures, the trend of Hungarian high-technology
exports in the last decade was showing a remarkable decrease. 
How did exports vs. high-technology export growth develop over
the last decade? Determining the nexus between growth of exports
and high-technology trade between 2000 and 201366, we use the
Pearson product-moment correlation coefﬁcient.67 There are strong
correlations between the yearly export ﬁgures and high-technology
export ﬁgures in all V4 countries (the Czech Republic: 0.9918; Hun-
gary: 0.9379; Poland: 0.9482; Slovakia: 0.9541). If we examine the
relative ﬁgures, i.e. year-on-year ﬁgures of the growth of total and
63 Vokorokosová–Čarnický (2003)
64 Eurostat (2009). High-technology aggregations based on SITC Rev. 4
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an5.pdf
65 OECD (2013), p. 240.
66 For long tern analysis I use Eurostat data. For comparison to developed and emerging eco-
nomies I use the database of UN Comtrade based on the same classiﬁcation as Eurostat’s
data.
67 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pearson_product-moment_correlation_coefﬁcient
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high-technology exports, the dynamics of the two series are similar
in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but the correlation is low in the
case of Poland and Slovakia.
Table 2. Share and growth of high-technology
products in total exports (%)
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext (2014)
The reason should be the different growth rates of total and high-
technology exports (see Table 2). The table also shows the level
of sustainability of exports of the high-technology products in the
examined economies. There is a remarkable development in high-
tech exports in three Visegrad countries. The increase of high-
technology exports was growing above the export growth by 3.4
times in Slovakia 2.5 times in Poland and almost doubled (1.9
times) in the Czech Republic, while in Hungary the high-tech
growth was below (0.7 times) the dynamics of overall exports. Con-
cerning Hungary, the cause of the decline is that in 2008 the ex-
ports of computers (SITC Rev.4.: 752) decreased and in 2012 the
exports of telecommunications equipment (SITC Rev.4.: 764, ex-
cluding 764.93 and 764.99) also decreased. There were corporate
issues explaining these developments, reflecting changing global
circumstances and multinational-network reorganisations. In 2008,
the U.S. company Sanmina-SCI sold its global computer facilities.
The deal affected Hungarian production as well68. 
68 Sanmina-SCI sold its PC manufacture, including the production capacity of the Hungarian
facilities (Eladja PC-gyártását a Sanmina-SCI, közte magyar kapacitásának egy részével)
http://www.hwsw.hu/hirek/35382/sanmina-sci_hon-hai_foxconn_foxteq_szerzodeses_elekt-
ronikai_gyartas_ems_lenovo_ﬂextronics.html
Country 2000 2005 2010 2013
Growth rate 2013/2000 
total exports high-tech exports
Czech Republic 7.7 11.8 16.1 15.0 386 750
Hungary 23.7 20.8 21.8 16.1 267 182
Poland 2.7 3.0 6.0 6.7 443 1086
Slovakia 2.8 6.3 6.6 9.6 505 1711
Visegrad countries as part of the global economy...
In 2011, the Finnish communications and information technology
corporation Nokia had announced the restructuring of its produc-
tion and reallocations of its facilities69 that caused the downsizing
of the Hungarian production plant in 2012.
Figure 3. Share of high-technology
exports in the selected countries
Source: author’s calculations, based on the data of the UN Comtrade (2014)
For the comparative analysis of the high-technology exports of the
V4 countries with the leading developed and emerging economies, I
used the database of the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics70
(UN Comtrade) for the available years (i.e. between 2007 and 2013).
China has the leading position with an almost 30% high-technology
export ratio. The shares of high-technology products in the total ex-
ports of Hungary and the Czech Republic are about the same level as
in exports of the European Union and the most developed countries
(Japan and the USA). However, there is a strong decreasing trend of
the ratio of high-technology exports in the USA and Hungary (see Fig-
ure 3). Regarding the technological level of the exports of the Slovak
69 Nokia press release: Nokia continues to align its workforce and operations. 29 September
2011 http://company.nokia.com/en/news/press-releases/2011/09/29/nokia-continues-to-
align-its-workforce-and-hai_foxconn_foxteq_szerzodeses_elektronikai_gyartas_ems_
lenovo_ﬂextronics.html operations.
70 Based on Eurostat’s high-technology products classiﬁcation.
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Republic and Poland, in recent years the ﬁgures have been exceeding
the values of Brazil and India and catching up to the most developed
countries in terms of output. The values of the Russian Federation, the
fourth member of the BRIC countries, are extremely low.
Based on this comparison we can say that some Visegrad countries
are among the leading high-tech exporting economies, while some
are in the catching-up process. Have these Central European coun-
tries completed the catching-up process? Are they technologically
at the same level as the developed countries? In order to obtain a
full picture we will analyse more detailed data.
Breakdown of exports by 
technological intensity – international 
comparison of the Visegrad countries
Beside the differences in shares of high-technology exports among
the countries, there are other characteristics as well. The structure of
high-technology exports indicates remarkable differences among the
economies (see Table 3) that justiﬁes more detailed research of the
added value of the manufacturing industry. There are certain charac-
teristics of the countries appearing ﬁrst. Clusters are based not on the
geographical location but on characteristics of economies. Comput-
ers and ofﬁce machines71 have a large share in high-technology ex-
ports in China and all V4 countries. Exports of the electronic
telecommunications have the largest share in emerging economies
such as China, India, Hungary and Slovakia, and in Japan from the
developed world. The export share of the aerospace industry is high
in Brazil, the Russian Federation and Poland.72 Due to the above-men-
tioned corporate issues, these indices can ﬂuctuate year-to-year, in-
ﬂuencing the dynamics and composition of high-technology exports.
Although there are some differences in the export structure of the
countries in question, electronic equipment plays the main role in
high-technology industries in all V4 counties. In Hungary and Slova-
kia, telecommunications equipment (excluding 764.93 and 764.99)
71 For the detailed SITC code see Eurostat (2009): High-technology aggregations based on
SITC Rev. 4 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an5.pdf.
72 There are differences in terms of the aerospace industry. While in Brazil the civil aviation in-
dustry has the leading role, in the Russian Federation the production of military aircrafts leads.
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has the highest share with computers (752). In the Czech Republic
and Poland computer production (752) has the highest rate alongside
electronic boards and consoles (776.4+772.61).
This one-sided high-tech trade structure and the high rate of the
electronic telecommunication products raise the question of the
structure of output. Authors dealing with the high-technology content
of external trade focus their analyses on the structural and geograph-
ical fragmentation of production.73 We have to take into consideration
that the international network of multinational enterprises, i.e. global
value chains, have become a dominant feature of world trade, en-
compassing developing, emerging, and developed economies.74
Saito and his co-authors referring to the World Input-Output Data-
base75, deal with the input and output sides of world production and
trade development.76 They pointed out to the increasing role of global
value chains in terms of global output. The global division of labour
in the global value chain means that every country has its own role
and value added phase within the global production chain.
Based on the academic literature the following trends can be drawn
up. The amount of trade, related to output, has been increasing dur-
ing the last decades. This is shown in the world export-to-output
ratio, which has grown from 20 to 30 per cent from 1995 to 2008.77
Concerning export growth, global value chains have a decisive role.
Due to the global activity of multinational companies, production of
the same output involves more intermediate products in global trade.
More income is generated by being part of global value chains. This
was led by the increase of value-added exports78 (or income gener-
ated by exporting) that are becoming a bigger part of world income.
During the 1995-2008 period, it increased from 15 per cent to 22 per
cent of the world GDP.79
Higher value added in exports has a correlation with the presence
of the global value chain. Saito and his co-authors, using VAX Ratio
73 Grodzicki (2014)
74 OECD (2013)
75 www.wiod.org/new_site/database/wiots.htm
76 Saito–Ruta–Turunen (2013)
77 Ibidem, p. 8.
78 Value added produced in a country and absorbed in another country.
79 Saito–Ruta–Turunen (2013), p. 9.
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(Value-Added Exports to Gross Exports, as a summary measure of
value-added content of trade) by Johnson and Noguera80 examined
the correlation between the vertical specialisation and value added
exports. There are countries with low VAX Ratio at the assembly part
of the global value chain (Ireland, the Czech Republic, Taiwan), and
countries with high VAX Ratio providing the largest value added to
global chains. There are many other measures developed to captured
the role of value chains in exports: the import-content of exports81,
foreign value-added shares in exports82, vertical specialisation of
trade83, and imports to exports.84 Between 1995 and 2008 the Central
and Eastern European region increased its share in the global value
chains.85 The paper by Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) based
on the World Input-Output Database shows that importing to pro-
duce, i.e. the share of the foreign value added in the exports in 2009,
are the highest in the Czech Republic (39%), Hungary (40.5%) and
Slovakia (45%) among the countries measured. This conﬁrms Bald-
win and his co-authors’ (2013) position that multinationals using their
own technology and know-how do not rely on local technologies. 
Analysis of the production
and exports of high-technology industries
Beside the analysis of the export structure and the high-technology
share, another aspect is the comparison of the nexus between pro-
duction and external trade in high-technology industries. The pur-
pose of the comparison is to provide a picture of the value added of
the high-technology sector vis-à-vis exports of high-technology
goods, i.e. a comparison of the internal and external performance of
the countries. 
There are several classiﬁcation systems regarding high-technology
production and products. The World Bank aggregates high-technology
products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers,
80 Johnson–Noguera (2012)
81 Hummels–Ishii–Yi (2001)
82 Koopman–Powers–Wang–Wei (2010)
83 Daudin–Rifﬂart–Schweisguth (2010)
84 Baldwin–Lopez-Gonzalez (2013)
85 Grodzicki (2014), p. 8.
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pharmaceuticals, scientiﬁc instruments, and electrical machinery.86 Eu-
rostat refers to high-tech industry and knowledge-intensive services.87
The OECD88 has a technology intensity deﬁnition and classiﬁcation of
manufacturing industries based on R&D intensities.89 Using OECD
classiﬁcation on the gross value added (GVA) side and Eurostat high-
technology products (based on the OECD’s classiﬁcation of high- and
medium-high-technology industries) on the export side, Table 3 (se-
ries01) shows the share of high-technology products in the share of
the total exports. 
Concerning the examined EU countries90, the Pearson’s correlation
coefﬁcient is rather low (0.4192), showing a low dependency between
high-technology GVA and the exports of high-technology products,
what conﬁrms the results of some authors (Török 2008; Koopman,
Powers–Wang–Wei 2010; Daudin–Rifﬂart–Schweisguth 2010; Bald-
win – Lopez-Gonzalez 2013) previously mentioned. Another conclu-
sion is that there are rather huge gaps in some countries between
the GVA and the export ratio. On one hand, higher high-technology
ratio shows a competitive export structure, while on the other hand
it can show the “real value added” of the country regarding high-
technology products.91
On the methodological side this comparison and common visuali-
sation raises some questions. If we compare the gross value added
(GVA) of high-technology production and trade of the high-technol-
ogy products, we ﬁnd that data is not compatible. GVA data are
based on NACE92 industry classiﬁcation, while trade data are based
on goods classiﬁed by SITC.93 There is a problem regarding concor-
dance, because the former classiﬁcation is activity based, while the
86 World Bank (2014). World Development Indicators, Science and Technology: High-technology
exports (% of manufactured exports) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS
87 Eurostat: Reference Metadata in Euro SDMX Metadata Structure (ESMS) http://epp.euros-
tat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/htec_esms.htm
88 OECD (2013), p. 240.
89 OECD (2011)
90 Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France,
Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slo-
vakia, Finland, and the United Kingdom
91 Saito–Ruta–Turunen (2013)
92 General Industrial Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities within the European Communities
(NACE) Rev. 2 system
93 Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation, Revision 4. nomenclature
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latter is product/goods based. Therefore, based on correspondence
tables, the classiﬁcations were converted to make them suitable for
comparison.94
Figure 4 shows the dispersion of the exports of high-technology in-
dustries and high-technology gross value added (GVA) regarding the
selected countries, i.e. the internal and the external performance of
the economies. Against the former dependence value (cf.: Table 3)
between the GVA and high-technology export data, the Pearson's
correlation coefﬁcient of the recalculated data shows a stronger re-
lationship (0.7557). The position and the rank of the V4 countries
were not changed. The Czech Republic and Hungary have the lead-
ing position, very close to Germany. There is a change regarding the
unusual ﬁgure of Hungary. The distance between Hungary and the
Czech Republic in the second calculation was largely reduced (see
Figure 4). It may have occurred for several reasons. In the Czech Re-
public, the branches using high technology are presented with
broader activity (more products and more variance), expressly high-
technology products are not presented as high rate as in the case of
Hungary. Poland is in last place and Slovakia is nearer to the average
(trend line). Compared to the previous ﬁgure (see Table 3), the tech-
nology level of Czech and Hungarian exports is much higher, show-
ing a competitive advantage. Taking into account that the Hungarian,
Czech and Slovak economies are highly involved in global value
chains95 (foreign value added in the exports in 2009 were the highest
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) among the countries,
these outstanding values are due to the activity of the largest
transnational companies. Taking into account the data of the World
Input-Output Database, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia
have the highest rate (around 60% of foreign inputs and domestically
produced inputs used in foreign exports as per cent of gross exports)
of foreign inputs in direct exports among the selected countries96 in
94 See detailed: Túry (2014)
95 As in the paper of Baldwin–Lopez-Gonzalez (2013)
96 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Japan, the
USA, Brazil, China, India, Russia.
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2009 concerning electrical and optical equipment and transport
equipment industries97. Export values represent the value of the semi-
ﬁnished or ﬁnished products which formed only a small proportion
in the examined CE countries. That shows the large differences be-
tween the GVA and the exports of high-technology products. 
Figure 4. The ratio of exports and GVA of industries using
high technology in selected EU countries (2011): series02
Source: author’s calculations, based on UN Comtrade and Eurostat Comext
data.
Analysing the high-technology branches and products, we can see
large differences between the examined V4 and EU countries (see
Table 3). Having made datasets compatible based on correspon-
dence tables, the differences between the countries are even more
pronounced. Sample variance98 of series01 is 5.4039, while that of
series02 is 11.5656, showing that in some countries the industries
using high technology are not represented in the whole vertical pro-
duction, but only in the production of parts.
97 European Commission (2013), p. 84-86.
98 http://www.math.uah.edu/stat/sample/Variance.html
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Comparing the GVA with series02 (ratio of series02 per GVA; see
Table 3), the above shown sequence of the Visegrad countries will
be almost the same order. The value of the exports of high-technol-
ogy branches per GVA, in the case of Poland is 8.1, Slovakia 5.5, the
Czech Republic 5.1 and Hungary 4.8. From one side this could mean
that Poland is more competitive because relatively less high-tech-
nology industries export relatively more high-technology products.
On the other side, lower values in the V4 countries, i.e. higher GVA
and higher export share, may indicate a better export performance.
In this comparison Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia form
one cluster, while Poland is far behind them.
Summary and conclusions
Regarding international competitiveness of the V4 economies, the
picture is diverse according to different benchmarking ranks. There
is increasing competitiveness on one side and a drop in ranking po-
sition on the other. There is a signiﬁcant lagging of the V4 countries
based on the rankings of the World Economic Forum Global Com-
petitiveness Report. Further, this trend of the V4 countries parallels
the globally declining competitive performance of the European
Union. This highlights dependence on European trends as well as the
increasing role of emerging markets (e.g., China, Brazil), which will
be determinative for the global position of the V4 economies within
global value chains.
Because of their export driven economies, most Central European
emerging economies are highly dependent on foreign demand. Poland
has a unique position with its large internal market. Another part of the
picture is that their outstanding export performance derives from the
fact that they are deeply involved in global value chains. This, however,
causes further differences between the countries examined. One con-
sequence of this is a high proportion of high-technology products in
total exports in some countries. Regarding the exports of high-tech-
nology products, Hungary and the Czech Republic show the best per-
formance, while Slovakia and Poland have lower exports of this kind.
In order to compare the international competitiveness of the Visegrad
countries, the study analysed the relation between the internal and ex-
Visegrad countries as part of the global economy...
ternal performance of high-technology production. At ﬁrst, the OECD’s
high-technology ISIC classiﬁcation was recounted into SITC classiﬁ-
cation. In terms of gross value added and export shares of branches
using high technology, the Czech Republic and Hungary again have
higher values compared to Slovakia and Poland. Regarding the ratio
of GVA and exports of branches using high technology, Slovakia
catches up to Hungary as well as to the Czech Republic thanks to in-
creasing foreign investments in the automotive industry in recent years.
Poland has less favourable data and low GVA and export share, de-
spite developing industrial capacities. The reason is, on one hand, the
different level of Poland’s integration into the global value chains,
which is a crucial factor in export performance. The other issue is
Poland’s large internal market, which distinguishes it from the other
three economies, which are highly export dependent.
Besides these facts, further investigation of the countries involved
in the analysis shows there are signiﬁcant country-speciﬁc features.
The ratio of exports of the high-tech intensive branches (series02)
per GVA of the branches using high technology can be interpreted
in two ways. On the one hand, high values can mean better external
performance. On the other hand, low values indicate relatively higher
export shares of high-technology industries. Therefore, ranks cannot
be interpreted without knowing the internal characteristics of the
countries, which give us a basis for further investigation. 
Based on the examples examined in this paper, we see that cor-
porate decisions affect the external performance of the countries in
terms of the level of connection or disconnection of these economies
to/from global value chains. For a complete picture we have to take
into account the internal structure of the economy, i.e., the proportion
of high-technology branches, corporate issues or characteristics of
the economy.
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TRENDS OF THE SOCIAL SITUATION IN
POLAND BETWEEN 2005 AND 2013
– CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska1
Introduction and methodological remarks
The Europe 2020 strategy, adopted by the European Council on 17
June 2010, is the EU’s agenda for growth and jobs for the current
decade. It emphasises smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a
way to overcome the structural weaknesses in Europe’s economy,
improve its competitiveness and productivity and underpin a sustain-
able social market economy. Social cohesion should be achieved
through actions addressing inclusive growth targets. Inclusive growth
is measured against the employment rate and poverty or social ex-
clusion headline indicator (see Box 1.).
Also, the Europe 2020 strategy set up targets related to education,
in particular to early school leaving and tertiary education. They
should also help to reduce social disparities among member states
and their regions. 
To meet the overall EU targets related to Strategy Europe 2020,
member states have set their own national targets2 in their National
Reform Programmes. Poland’s targets (vis a vis the EU targets) are
presented in Table 1. They form the background against which
changes in 2005-2012 are assessed. Whenever possible, data for
2004 and 2013 were included as well. Changes in the Polish situation
are accompanied by the average indicators for the EU 27 countries
(Croatia joined the EU in 2013).
1 Professor of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw
3 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/targets_en.pdf
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The target related to inclusive growth is addressed directly by the
employment rate indicator (Poland has set a target of achieving an
employment rate of 71% of the population of working age, 20 - 64
years) and by indicators on reducing the population at risk of poverty
or social exclusion (to lift at least 1,500,000 people out of the risk of
poverty and social exclusion by 2020). The respective targets for the
EU 27 are 75% and 20 million people by 2020. Education, being one
of the targets of smart growth objectives, is assessed through the
measurement of early school leavers and tertiary education attain-
ment. 
The other indicators analysed in this chapter are: income distribu-
tion (as illustrated by changes in Gini indicator), working abroad, de-
mography, changes in the quality of health care and changes in
budgetary expenditures in social areas. 
3 Eurostat (2013)
Box 1. The Europe 2020 strategy3
The Europe 2020 strategy puts forward three mutually reinforcing priori-
ties to make Europe a smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive
place to live:
• It envisions the transition to smart growth through the development of
an economy based on knowledge, research and innovation.
• The sustainable growth objective relates to the promotion of more re-
source efﬁcient, greener and competitive markets.
• The inclusive growth priority encompasses policies aimed at fostering
job creation and poverty reduction.
The smart growth objective is covered by the indicators on innovation
(gross domestic expenditure on R&D) and education (early leavers from
education and training and tertiary educational attainment). The sustain-
able growth pillar is monitored by three indicators on climate change and
energy (greenhouse gas emissions, share of renewable energy in gross
ﬁnal energy consumption and primary energy consumption). Inclusive
growth is measured against the employment rate and poverty or social
exclusion headline indicator (combining three sub-indicators on monetary
poverty, material deprivation and living in a household with very low work
intensity).
Trends of the social situation in Poland between 2005 and 2013...
Table 1. Europe 2020 Targets in Poland as set in the National 
Reform Programme in April 2011 vis a vis the EU targets 
Source: National Reform Programme. Europe 2020, Warsaw April 2011,
p. 6.
Whenever possible, Eurostat statistics were used to analyse the
changes in the above-mentioned areas. This allowed us to compare
Poland’s situation with that of changes in other EU countries, based
on the same methodological approach to data collection.
Inclusive growth indictors
In this subchapter we analyse inclusive growth trends. As already
mentioned, these are measured by the employment rate and poverty
or social exclusion headline indicator (combining three sub-indicators
on monetary poverty, material deprivation and living in a household
with very low work intensity). The changes of these indicators in the
years 2004-2012 are presented in Table 2. 
Employment rate 
Poland has set a target of achieving an employment rate of 71% (of
persons aged 20-64), while for the whole EU it was set at 75%. In
2013 this indicator measured 64.9%, while the average value for the
entire European Union amounted to 68.5%. Thus, Poland is still be-
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hind the average for the EU but has made a signiﬁcant progress since
EU accession (in 2005 this indicator measured 58.3%).
Table 2. Employment rate of persons aged 20-64 (%)
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table& init=1&plu-
gin=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_10
The other side of the issue of employment situation is the unemploy-
ment rate. In 2013 it was close to the EU average, reaching 10.3%.
This was an increase compared to the pre-crisis period in 2008 when
it stood at 7.1% in Poland (and 7.0% in the whole EU). The high rate
of unemployment has been a consequence of the unfavourable macro-
economic situation in Poland and in other EU countries.
Table 3. Unemployment rate, annual average (%)
Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset= une_rt_
a&lang=en
Other trends on the labour market are illustrated by (a) the long-
term unemployment rate, in particular youth unemployment, and (b)
young people not in employment, education or training (Table 4).
The long-term unemployment rate is the number of persons unem-
ployed for 12 months or longer as a percentage of the labour force.
This indicator has decreased substantially in Poland in the years
2004-2012: from 10.3% to 4.1% of the active population. In the EU
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Target
Poland 58.3 60.1 62.7 65.0 64.9 64.3 64.5 64.7 64.9 71.0
EU 27 68.0 69.0 69.9 70.3 69.0 68.6 68.6 68.5 68.5 75.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Poland 17.9 13.9 9.6 7.1 8.1 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3
EU 27 9.0 8.2 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.6 10.4 10.8
Trends of the social situation in Poland between 2005 and 2013...
27 this indicator in 2012 was slightly above 10% for both the total
and the population aged 20 to 64. A positive trend in Poland is that
youth unemployment (as a % of the active population in the given
age group) decreased substantially in the 2004-2008 period. Later,
after the crisis, it increased signiﬁcantly: from 17.2% in 2008 to
26.5% in 2012. An increasing trend characterised each year of the
period 2009-2012, which suggests that the effects of the crisis on
the labour market had not been overcome by 2012.
A similar trend characterised the third indicator: young people not
in employment, education or training. The percentage of people in
this category had decreased in the period 2004-2008 and later lightly
increased year to year.
Table 4. Indicators of changes of in the social situation
in Poland in the years 2004-2012
Source: Alert Mechanism Report 2014. Commission Staff Working Docu-
ment. Statistical Annex. Accompanying the document. Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Central
Bank and the European Economic and Social Committee (prepared in ac-
cordance with Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the pre-
vention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances), p. 154.
Poverty and social exclusion
Following the Europe 2020 strategy Poland has a goal of reducing
the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 1.5 mil-
203
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Long-term unemploy-
ment rate (% of active
population)
10.3 10.3 7.8 4.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.1
Youth unemployment (%
of active population in
the same age group)
39.6 36.9 29.8 21.6 17.2 20.6 23.7 25.8 26.5
Young people not in em-
ployment, education or
training (% of total popu-
lation)
15.0 13.9 12.6 10.6 9.0 10.1 10.8 11.6 11.8
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lion by 2020 compared with 2008. Poland has already exceeded this
target as the number of this category of people has decreased from
2008 to 2013 by 1.743 millions. This was the highest and the biggest
decrease of the indicator in the whole EU.4 Still, the share of people
at risk of poverty or social exclusion was in Poland in 2013 higher
(25.8%) than in the EU 27 (24.5%).
Monetary poverty is the most widespread form of poverty. The per-
centage of people at risk of poverty after social transfers in 2012 was
17.1% of the total population in Poland. It was slightly higher than in
the EU 27 where the respective indicator was 16.9%. However, in
Poland this indicator has been steadily decreasing in recent years
(from 20.5% in 2005) while in the EU 27 the average percentage in-
creased slightly: in 2005 it amounted to 16.4%. 
Material deprivation directly affected 13.5% of all Polish citizens.
This indicator was still much higher than in the EU 27 where it
reached 9.9%. However, in the EU 27 this percentage decreased in
the period 2005-2012 by only one percentage point, while in Poland
it decreased from 33.8% in 2005. Thus, Poland recorded signiﬁcant
progress in this respect. The third dimension is low work intensity,
with 6.9% people experiencing it in 2012 in Poland. While this indi-
cator was much higher in 20055, in 2012 it appeared to be much
lower than in the EU 27 where it stood at 10.3%.
In the majority of EU member states the year 2009 marked a turning
point in the development of all three dimensions of poverty. While
monetary poverty had been stable in the EU 27 until 2009, it started
to increase afterwards. Also, the other two dimensions started to in-
crease from 2009, while earlier they had decreased considerably. 
In Poland the majority of indicators analysed recorded interrupted
decrease and were not reversed as a result of 2008-2009 (with the
major exception of the unemployment rate among young people).
This of course reﬂected the fact that Poland was the only EU member
state which avoided recession in 2009. Also, Poland’s relatively good
position could be a result of faster improvement in the education
ﬁeld. 
4 Radę Ministrów, Rzeczpospolita Polska (2015), p. 48.
5 14.3%, which was higher than in the EU 27 (10.4%)
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The poverty or social exclusion indicator is based on a multidimen-
sional concept, incorporating three sub-indicators on monetary
poverty (“People at risk of poverty after social transfers”), material
deprivation (“Severely materially deprived people”) and low work in-
tensity (“People living in households with very low work intensity”).
The general observation is that in case of each of the indicators the
situation in Poland has been improving (with minor exceptions).
These trends are presented in more detail below. 
Changes in multidimensional indicators
Measuring poverty and social exclusion requires a multidimensional
approach. Household income is a key determinant of standard of liv-
ing, but other aspects preventing full participation in society – such
as access to labour markets and material deprivation – also need to
be considered. People can suffer from more than one dimension of
poverty at once. Therefore, the European Commission adopted a
broad “at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate” indicator to serve
the purposes of the Europe 2020 strategy.6 This indicator is an ag-
gregate of three sub-indicators: (1) monetary poverty, (2) material
deprivation and (3) low work intensity.7 Normally, people can be af-
fected by these forms of poverty. The aggregate indicator for Poland
(as against the EU 27) is presented ﬁrst and is followed by sub-indi-
cators. Poland has made clear progress in integrating its most vul-
nerable citizens into society.
As shown in Table 5, the number of people at risk of poverty or so-
cial exclusion in Poland has been decreasing since 2005. The indi-
cator reached its lowest level in 2013 with about 9.8 million people
6 Cf: Eurostat (2013) “Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy” is the ﬁrst of a new type
of Eurostat ﬂagship publications providing statistical analyses related to important European
Commission policy frameworks or economic, social or environmental phenomena. It provides
statistical support for the Europe 2020 strategy and backs up the monitoring of its ﬁve headline
targets. The analysis in this publication is based on the Europe 2020 headline indicators chosen
to monitor the strategy’s targets. Other indicators focusing on subgroups of society or on re-
lated issues showing underlying trends help deepen the analysis and present a broader picture.
The publication presents ofﬁcial statistics produced by the European Statistical System and
disseminated by Eurostat. They cover the period from 2000 or 2005 up to the most recent year
for which data are available (2011 or 2012).
7 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-
_poverty_and_social_exclusion 
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in this category. Contrary to the EU average, where the number of
affected people increased again in 20118 as compared to 2008 and
2005, in Poland there was a further decrease of people at risk of
poverty. Even more importantly, Poland recorded a substantial de-
crease in the category of people categorised as such in relative
terms: from 45.3% of the total population in 2005 to 25.8% in 2013.
This is a 43% improvement.
Table 5. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
(% of total population and 1,000 persons): Poland and the EU 27
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=
table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_50&language=en
There is a greater risk of poverty or social exclusion for women than
for men. For each year shown the indicator for women was higher,
both in Poland and the EU 27. In 2011, 27.3% of women in Poland
were at risk of poverty or social exclusion while for men this ﬁgure
was slightly lower, at 26.1%. Young people aged 18 to 24 are more
at risk than other age groups (especially those that live in single-par-
ent households, those with lower educational attainment, and mi-
8 Most probably this was related to the impact of the economic crisis in member states of the
EU.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Poland
1,000
persons
17,080 14,938 12,958 11,491 10,454 10,409 10,196 10.128 9,748
% of total
popula-
tion
45.3 39.5 34.4 30.5 27.8 27.8 27.2 26.7 25.8
EU 27
1,000
persons
124,339 123,051 119,360 116,418 114,328 116,821 120,171 122,857 121,626
% of total
popula-
tion
25.7 25.3 24.4 23.7 23.2 23.7 24.3 24.7 24.5
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grants). People with low educational attainment are three times more
likely to be at risk. 
Changes in sub-indicators
(a) Monetary poverty
Monetary poverty is related to disposable income after social trans-
fers. In 2005-2013 Poland recorded a decrease of the share of the
population at risk of monetary poverty (in terms of incomes), from
20.5% to 17.3% of the total population (Table 6). However, the de-
clining trend in 2005-2008 was interrupted by a slight increase of the
indicator in 2009-2011 (from 16.9% to 17.7%), which was related to
the crisis. In next year the trend was reversed. In the whole period
Poland was one of the worst-performing EU member states for mon-
etary poverty. The best-performing member states for this type of
poverty (with the highest decrease of the number of people at risk of
monetary poverty) were the Czech Republic (9.8%), the Netherlands
(11.0%) and Austria (12.6%). However, monetary poverty increased
in over half of the member states.
Table 6. People at risk of poverty after social transfers
(% and 1,000 persons): Poland and the EU 27 situation
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=
table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_52&language=en
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Poland
1,000
persons 
7,756 7,215 6,540 6,353 6,435 6,588 6,623 6,478 6,520
% of total
popula-
tion
20.5 19.1 17.3 16.9 17.1 17.6 17.7 17.1 17.3
EU 27
1,000
persons 
79,306 80,424 80,650 81,130 80,505 81,090 83,679 84,121 82,527
% of total
popula-
tion
16.4 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.9 16.9 16.6
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(b) Material deprivation
Material deprivation covers issues relating to economic strain,
durables, and housing and environment of dwellings.9 Severely ma-
terially deprived persons have living conditions much constrained by
a lack of resources. 
Table 7. Severely materially deprived people
(% and 1,000 persons) Poland and the EU 27 situation
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&
plugin=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_53
In 2013, 4.4 million people in Poland were severely materially de-
prived people (Table 7). This equalled 11.9% of the total Polish pop-
ulation, making severe material deprivation the second most
common form of poverty. The percentage of people severely mate-
rially deprived in Poland was one of the highest among EU countries
soon after accession, as measured in 2005. 
Only in Latvia was it slightly higher (39.3%). The percentage of this
category of people has been decreasing over time, especially in the
9 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-
_poverty_and_social_exclusion
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Poland
1 000
persons 
12,752 10,445 8,415 6,680 5,625 5,331 4,885 5,108 4,480
% of total
popula-
tion
33.8 27.6 22.3 17.6 15.0 14.2 13.0 13.5 11.9
EU 27
1 000
persons 
52,032 48,214 44,595 41,907 40,232 41,276 43,736 49,017 47,640
% of total
popula-
tion
10.8 9.9 9.1 8.5 8.2 8.4 8.8 9.9 9.6
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ﬁrst years after EU accession. The only increase was in 2012, by 0.5%.
By that time it moved closer to the EU 27 average. In 2013 Poland oc-
cupied the eights place from the last (it performed better than, among
others, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Greece).
Still, the level was a signiﬁcant improvement over 2005. Progress was
most likely related to the positive effects of EU accession, including
faster economic growth, income increases (especially among farmers),
a larger diversity of industrial products on the market, etc.
(c) Work intensity
A large proportion of people live in households with very low work
intensity. The problem is that lack of access to labour lowers people’s
income security. Very low work intensity describes the number of
people aged 0 to 59 living in households where the adults worked
less than 20% of their work potential during the past year. In the en-
tire analysed period the number of households in Poland with very
low work intensity decreased substantially: from 14.3% of the total
population to 7.2% (Table 8). 
Table 8. People living in households with very low work intensity
(% and 1,000 persons): Poland and EU 27 situation
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=
table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_51&language=en
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Poland
1,000
persons
4,446 3,862 3,104 2,444 2,102 2,211 2,073 2,063 2,124
% of total
popula-
tion
14.3 12.4 10.1 8.0 6.9 7.3 6.9 6.9 7.2
EU 27
1,000
persons
39,242 39,902 36,885 34,433 34,454 38,222 39,003 39,103 40,240
% of total
popula-
tion
10.4 10.6 9.7 9.1 9.1 10.1 10.4 10.4 10.8
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Thus, Poland recorded the second biggest improvement (after Ro-
mania): the number of households with very low work intensity de-
creased from 2005 to 2012 by more than 50%. Moreover, there was
steady improvement in this indicator (with the exception of 2010 and
2013) over the whole period. 
Education 
In the ﬁeld of education, Poland’s achievements are in general better
than the EU 27 average. This assessment is based, ﬁrst of all, on the
comparison of two Europe 2020 targets: early leavers from education
and training, and tertiary educational attainment. Also, expenditure
on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP in Poland was
close to the EU 27 average.
According to OECD’s Programme for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA), Polish education is one of world's leading education
systems, as measured by performance of 15 year olds with a partic-
ular focus on science (see more next).
Early school leaving
Early school leaving (ESL) is a Europe 2020 strategy indicator to be
monitored by member states. The reason is that early school leaving
is an obstacle to economic growth and employment.10 Young people
who leave education and training prematurely are bound to lack skills
and qualiﬁcations, and to face serious, persistent problems on the
labour market. As a result, early school leaving negatively affects pro-
ductivity and competitiveness, and contributes to poverty and social
exclusion. Early leavers from education and training as an indicator
tracks the proportion of individuals aged 18-24 who have ﬁnished no
more than a lower secondary education, and who are not involved in
further education or training.
In the EU 27, some 12% of 18-24 year-olds were classiﬁed as early
leavers from education and training in 2013 (Table 9). This was an
improvement as compared to the situation in 2004 (16.1%) but still
below the EU target of 10.0%. In Poland this indicator was two times
10 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/29_early_school_leaving.pdf
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lower in 2013, thus being one of the lowest levels in early school leav-
ing rates in the EU. At the same time, however, Poland has recorded
stagnation and even a slight increase in recent years (Table 9). Apart
from Poland, countries with similar trends include: Czech Republic,
Luxembourg, Sweden, and Slovakia. In all of them the rate of early
school leaving has actually increased. Among these countries Poland
is still on track to reach its national target of 4.5%. The data available
also show that early school leaving is signiﬁcantly higher for boys
than for girls. This applies for almost all member states (with the ex-
ception of Bulgaria) but is most visible ﬁrst in Poland, Slovenia, Lux-
embourg, Latvia, Cyprus and Estonia.11
Table 9. Early leavers from education and training* (% of total
population aged 18 to 24): Poland and the EU 27 situation
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&
plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdsc410
Tertiary education
Tertiary education – provided by universities and other higher edu-
cation institutions – is the level of education following secondary
schooling. It is offered by universities, vocational universities, insti-
tutes of technology and other institutions that award academic de-
grees or professional certiﬁcates. Higher education plays an
essential role in society. Educated people are better prepared to cre-
ate innovations, to ﬁnd easier new jobs, to perform more sophisti-
cated jobs, etc. 
11 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/29_early_school_leaving.pdf
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Target
Poland 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 4.5
EU 27 16.1 15.8 15.5 15.0 14.8 14.3 14.0 13.5 12.8 12.0 10.0
* The denominator (total population) consists of the total population of the same age group,
excluding no answers to the questions "highest level of education or training attained" and
"participation to education and training". 
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska212
In 2010 (the 2009/2010 academic year), the number of students en-
rolled in tertiary education in the EU 27 stood at 19.8 million; this was
equivalent to 62.7% of all persons aged 20-24. Poland registered
one of the highest ﬁgures as regards the number of tertiary students:
more than 2 million students in 2010 (higher ﬁgures were registered
only in Germany, the United Kingdom and France).12 In order to ex-
plain different results, enrolment in tertiary education for 18-34 year
olds as a percentage of the total population can be calculated. This
indicator reached 18.8% in Poland in 2009 (recent available compar-
ative data) while in 2004 it amounted to 18.3%. The countries with
higher indicators (2009) were the following: Lithuania (23.1%, the
highest ratio), followed by Finland (21.7%) and Slovenia (21.5%); the
lowest rates were registered in Malta (8.9%), Portugal (13.1%),
Cyprus (13.3%) and the Czech Republic (13.1%).13
According to data published by the Ministry of Science and Higher
Education, the number of full-time students at public schools (study-
ing without fees) has been growing steadily, despite the decline in
the total number of students in the last few years. This resulted in an
increased percentage of full-time students at public universities in
2011/2012; such students accounted for more than half of the total
number of students (while in 2001/2002 the ﬁgure was only 38%).14
At the same time, the number of foreign students at Polish univer-
sities has been steadily increasing. In the years 2004-2011 the num-
ber of foreigners increased almost three times. In 2012 nearly 25
thousand foreigners studied in Poland. Most students come to
Poland from Ukraine (over 6.3 thousand), Belarus (almost 3 thou-
sand), and Norway (over 1.5 thousand). While the number of students
coming to Poland via Erasmus has been growing steadily (around 9
thousand students in 2011), it is still much lower than the number of
outgoing Polish Erasmus students (about 15 thousand two years
ago). 28% of international students in Poland study economics and
12 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Tertiary_education_statistics
13 Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (2012), p. 21.
14 http://www.naukawpolsce.pap.pl/en/news/news,396570,ministry-of-science-and-higher-
education-report-the-number-of-students-in-poland-will-drop-by-400.html
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business, 26% medicine, 11% technology and 8% social sciences.
Polish universities offer over 400 programs taught in English.15 Across
the EU 27, just over one-third (34.0%) of the students in tertiary ed-
ucation were studying social sciences, business or law. The second
largest number of students by ﬁeld of education was in engineering,
manufacturing and construction-related studies which accounted for
13.6% of all students in tertiary education. In Poland the pattern of
education was the same: 39.7% of all students in 2010 were studying
social sciences, business or law and 13.2% were studying engineer-
ing, manufacturing and construction.
The strategic framework for European cooperation in education and
training that was adopted in May 2009 set a number of benchmarks,
including one for tertiary education. The Europe 2020 strategy has
conﬁrmed the main benchmark, namely that by 2020 the share of 30
to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment should be at least
40% (Table 10). Educational attainment is frequently used as a meas-
ure of human capital and the level of an individual’s skills, in other
words, a measure of the skills available in the population and the
labour force.16 The level of educational attainment is the percentage
of a population that has reached a certain level of education. Higher
levels of educational attainment are strongly associated with higher
employment rates and are considered a basis to ﬁnd any job or a
better paid job. Good (higher) education is particularly important in
recent times, when knowledge is the key to economic success in
every country.17
In 2013 the share of the population aged 30-34 having completed
tertiary or equivalent education in the EU reached 36.9% and was
higher than the 2011 ﬁgure by 1 percentage point.18 In Poland this
indicator was 40.5% (and 39.1% a year ago) – see Table 12 – while
the national target is 45%. The EU target is however lower, aiming at
15 Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland (2012)
16 OECD (2013a), p. 26 and next. 
17 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Tertiary_education_statistics
18 Europe 2020 Target: Tertiary Education Attainment, see: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/
pdf/themes/28_tertiary_education.pdf 
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40%. A better situation (rate above 40%) was found in Ireland,
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Fin-
land, Belgium, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain. By con-
trast, around 20% of people in this age range had a tertiary education
in Italy, Romania and Slovakia.
Table 10. Tertiary education attainment in Poland
and the EU 27 in 2000-2012 (%)
Source: Europe 2020 Target: Tertiary Education Attainment, p. 5, at:
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/28_tertiary_education.pdf and
http://ec.europa.eu/education/dashboard/tea/tea_en.htm
Secondary education
Another way to look at the level of education is to analyse the per-
centage of population with basic education, e.g., those who attained
at least upper secondary education. Such ﬁgures are presented in
Table 11, both for Poland and the average for the EU 21 (see the ex-
planation of this group at the bottom of Table 11). 
Table 11. Percentage of the population that has attained 
at least upper secondary education, by age group (2011)
Source: OECD (2013a), p. 36.
2000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Target
Poland 12.5 32.8 35.3 36.9 39.1 40.5 45
EU 27 22.4 32.2 33.5 34.6 35.8 36.9 40
Age group
25-64 30-34 25-34 35-44 44-45 55-64
Poland 89 94 94 92 90 80
EU 21* 76 84 84 80 75 65
*Indicator for the EU 21 average is calculated as the unweighted mean of the data values of
the 21 countries that are members of both the European Union and the OECD for which data
are available or can be estimated. These 21 countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
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We can see that in all age groups the percentage of the population
that has attained at least upper secondary education was signiﬁ-
cantly higher in Poland than in the EU 21 on average.
Expenditure on education
As regards expenditure on education, an average of nearly two-thirds
in the EU 21 countries is devoted to primary, secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary education, while a quarter goes to tertiary ed-
ucation, and nearly one-tenth to pre-primary education. In Poland a
slightly lower proportion of money is spent on tertiary education (24%
of total expenditure for education): see Table 12.
Table 12. Expenditure on educational institutions as 
a percentage of GDP, by level of education (1995, 2000, 
2005, 2010) from public and private sources, by year
Source: OECD (2013a), p. 191. 
Table 13. Expenditure on educational institutions as 
a percentage of GDP, by source of fund and level of education
(2010; from public and private sources of funds)
Source: Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators. OECD 2013, p. 193.
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Primary, secondary
and post-secondary
non-tertiary education
Tertiary
education
Total all levels
of education
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010
Poland 3.7 3.7 1.6 1.5 5.9 5.8
EU 21* average 3.6 3.8 1.3 1.4 5.5 5.9
*See explanation at the bottom of Table 5.
Tertiary education Total (all levels of education)
Public (1) Private (2) Total Public (1) Private (2) Total
Poland 1.0 0.4 1.4 5.0 0.8 5.8
EU 21 average 1.2 0.3 1.5 5.5 0.5 6.0
(1) Including public subsidies to households attributable for educational institutions, and
direct expenditure on educational institutions from international sources.
(2) Net of public subsidies attributable for educational institutions.
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In Poland, the majority of all types of education was ﬁnanced from
public funds (71% of tertiary education and 93% of other types of
education in 2010). These proportions were not much different from
the average for the EU 21 countries. Public funding accounted for
86% of all funds for educational institutions, on average across the
EU 21 countries (Table 13).
Other indicators
The ratio of students to teaching staff indicates how resources for
education are allocated. This ratio is usually calculated as the number
of students per teacher in full-time equivalents. In 2011 in Poland this
ratio was exactly the same as the average for OECD countries and
amounted to 17 students.19 However, as the OECD stressed in the
report referred to here, comparisons at this level should be made
with caution since it is difﬁcult to calculate full-time equivalent stu-
dents and teachers on a comparable basis. 
According to OECD’s Programme for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA), Polish education is one of world's leading education
systems, measured by performance of 15 year olds with a particular
focus on science.20 In the latest PISA yardstick comparing school
learning across 65 countries around the world, Poland came in 10th
for reading, an improvement of four ranking spots on the last report
three years ago. The success has also come despite spending far
less money than in richer states. 
Income distribution 
Gini index changes
Income distribution is usually measured by the Gini index which
measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.21 A
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 im-
19 OECD (2013a), p. 370. 
20 OECD (2013b) 
21 http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/poland/gini-index 
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plies perfect inequality. The higher the value of this indicator, the big-
ger the difference between incomes of the richest and poorest people
in a given country (region). Poland’s situation against the EU 27 is il-
lustrated in Table 14.
Table 14. Gini coefﬁcient of equivalised disposable income 
(from 0 to 100): Poland and the EU 27 situation
Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di12
&lang=en
The Gini index has been gradually decreasing in Poland in the pe-
riod 2005-2012 and reached 30.7 in 2013, it was not much higher
than the average index in the EU 27 (30.4).22 It has been more or less
stable in the same period in the EU 27. In this respect, Poland occu-
pies the middle position among the EU countries, between Germany,
France, Denmark and Luxembourg (lower indices in 2012) on one
hand and countries like Spain, Portugal, Greece, Romania and the
UK (higher indices in 2012) on the other. 
The decreasing trend of the Gini index suggests that there is cur-
rently a better redistribution of incomes in Poland than in the previous
years. The richest citizens earn more than several years ago but they
pay more money in the form of taxes, and this money is redistributed
to the bottom income group of society. The other reason for the de-
creasing Gini index has been the relatively fast growth of the lowest
salaries. Only in 2011-2012 they increased by 35% (from PLN 1,386
to PLN 1,500 in gross terms), while the average salary in the economy
22 Let’s add that different institutions calculate the Gini index in slightly different ways and as
result the nominal value of this indicator may vary according to different statistical sources.
For example, calculations of the World Bank show that Poland recorded a Gini indicator of
34,9 in 2005 and 34,7 in 2009 (http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/poland/gini-index). These ﬁ-
gures are higher than those calculated by Eurostat. The trend, however, is the same in both
cases.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Poland 35.6 33.3 32.2 32.0 31.4 31.1 31.1 30.9 30.7
EU 27 30.6 30.3 30.6 30.9 30.5 30.5 30.8 30.4 30.4
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increased by 18%. A positive impact has also been exerted by the
increase of the number of employed people in the economy: by 9%
in 2005-2010.23
Changes of other indicators
The map below shows the average income of Polish households by
regions (relation of disposable income in a region to the average dis-
posable income in Poland). The shade of the region corresponds to
the magnitude of the indicator. The darker the shade, the lower the
value. The region with the highest incomes in Poland is the central
region (where the capital is located) with the income at 112.7% of
the average of the country. The poorest regions are located in the
eastern part of Poland. More than half of the regions are charac-
terised by higher than average risk of poverty. The lowest risk of
poverty is in the Slaskie and Podlaskie Wojvodhships. The highest
risk is registered in Lubelskie Wojvodhship and it has been rising con-
sistently since 2005: see Figure 1.24
Figure 1. Differentiation of incomes in Polish households 
by regions (NUTS 1 level)
Source: http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/wz_badanie_dochodow_i
_warunkow_zycia_EU-SILC_2010r.pdf
23 http://www.wynagrodzenia.pl/artykul.php/typ.1/kategoria_glowna.51/wpis.1778
24 http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/wz_badanie_dochodow_i_warunkow_zycia_EU-
SILC_2010r.pdf
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Governments try to address poverty and the risk of poverty in dif-
ferent ways, ﬁrst of all through different forms of transfers of public
money to the poorest people. An open question is, however, whether
the redistribution really supports the poorest citizens or only reduces
the incomes of the richest people. The situation is different in indi-
vidual countries. An extreme case is Australia, where the poorest
20% of citizens receives more than 40% of all types of social sup-
port. Poland is an example of the opposite situation: the poorest 20%
of the society receives less than 10% of the total social support.25
Working abroad
Over the last two decades, a number of Poles have left their country,
and only a fraction has come back, in spite of the 2008-2009 crisis
that hit some of the host countries. In 2012 about 2.1 million Poles
stayed abroad: among them 1.7 million stayed in other countries of
the European Union (for a period above 3 months). These ﬁgures do
not include seasonal emigration, which usually is not registered and
therefore impossible to estimate. 
Emigration affects the home and host countries in a number of
ways. In both cases it has both positive and negative implications.
Emigrants working abroad have contributed to GDP growth in host
countries instead of Poland. This has sometimes been treated as a
potential loss for the Polish economy. On the other hand, very often
emigrants could not ﬁnd a job (or a job with a satisfactory level of
salary) in their home country and therefore emigrated. Their remit-
tances (and compensations) to families in home countries con-
tributed to the improvement of the current account balance and GDP
growth of the home country. According to Eurostat data, remittances
and compensation inﬂows from Polish emigrants staying in other EU
member states amounted in 2010 to 1.2% of the GDP. 
Relatively high emigration was responsible for labour shortages in
speciﬁc occupations and salary increases in several sectors of Polish
economy where emigration was highest.
25 http://www.wynagrodzenia.pl/artykul.php/typ.1/kategoria_glowna.51/wpis.1778 
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The number of emigrants 
The Central Statistical Ofﬁce (Główny Urząd Statystyczny) publishes
data on Polish citizens who stay abroad for a temporary period (em-
igrants). This group involves people who stay abroad for a period
longer than three months and are still registered in Poland (they have
a permanent address in Poland).26
Data presented by the Central Statistical Ofﬁce of Poland shows
(Table 15) that in 2012 about 2.1 million Poles stayed abroad. Among
them, 1.7 million stayed in other countries of the European Union (for
a period above 3 months). Emigration in 2012 was higher than in
2011. Around 78% of emigrants (more than 1.5 million people) stayed
abroad 12 months or longer. These ﬁgures do not include seasonal
emigration which usually is not registered, therefore making it impos-
sible to estimate. 
The main country of destination is the UK (637 thousand people,
or 37% of total emigration within the EU), followed by Germany (500
thousand, or 29.1%), Ireland (118 thousand; 6.9%), the Netherlands
and Italy (97 thousand in each country; 5.6%).27 It is interesting to
see that this pattern has changed since EU accession. In 2004, the
ﬁrst year of EU membership, emigration from Poland to other EU
members was not only 1.3 times lower, but it was headed mostly to
Germany (51% of total number of emigrants within the EU). In the
following years the nominal increase of emigration to Germany was
relatively low, and as a result the share of this country decreased to
37% of total emigration within the EU. The UK, currently the main
destination of Poles looking for jobs, occupied the second position
in 2004 with a 20% share.
The vast majority of emigrants stay abroad in order to work. More
and more emigrants stay abroad with their families who may or may
not work (spouses and child/children). There are, however, other mo-
26 Occasionally this data is corrected by the National Census data which (generally) is similar
to data collected and published by GUS. Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski
w latach 2004–2011. GUS (2012).
27 Another important emigration destination is Norway. As a member of the European Econo-
mic Area, the country is a part of the free movement of persons zone and did not introduce
any temporary restrictions for Poles. On the contrary, Norway encouraged Poles with some
types of education (mostly nurses and medicine doctors) to go to this country. In 2012, 65 tho-
usand Poles stayed in Norway, compared 56 thousand in 2011.
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tivations for going abroad. According to the Central Statistical Ofﬁce,
in the end of March 2011, 73% of emigrants stayed abroad because
of work (worked or were looking for a job). This indicator was much
higher than in 2002 when it was 44%. For around 1/3 of emigrants
who decided to go abroad and look for a job, the main motivation
was the hope to get a higher salary than at home. The second most
common reason for emigration (31%) was difﬁculty in ﬁnding a job
in Poland. Three percent of emigrants expected to ﬁnd more oppor-
tunities for their vocational development abroad. 
Table 15. Temporary emigration from Poland in the period 
2004-2012 (situation at the end of the year, number of emigrants 
in 1,000 and %)*
Source: Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach
2004 –2012, GUS Warszawa 2013. (Information about the size and direc-
tions of emigration from Poland in the years 2004-2012, GUS, Warszawa
2013, p. 3)
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 %
Total 
emigration 
1,000 1,450 1,950 2,270 2,210 2,100 2,000 2,060 2,130
EU 27 750 1,170 1,550 1,860 1,820 1,690 1,607 1,622 1,720 100.0
Austria 15 25 34 39 40 36 29 25 28 1.6
Belgium 13 21 28 31 33 34 45 47 48 2.8
Denmark 17 19 20 19 21 23 1.4
France 30 44 49 55 56 60 60 62 63 3.7
Greece 13 17 20 20 20 16 16 15 14 0.8
Netherlands 23 43 55 98 108 98 92 95 97 5.6
Spain 26 37 44 80 83 84 48 40 37 2.2
Ireland 15 76 120 200 280 140 133 120 118 6.9
Germany 385 430 450 490 490 465 470 470 500 29.1
Sweden 11 17 25 27 25 31 33 36 38 2.2
UK 150 340 580 690 650 595 580 625 637 37.0
Italy 59 70 85 87 88 88 92 94 97 5.6
Other EU
Members
1.1
* – data relates to persons staying abroad for a temporary period: for 2002-2006 – more than
2 months, from 2007-2012 – above 3 months; since 2006 – for 25 countries 
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Effects of remittances and compensations
of Polish emigrants on the Polish economy
According to Eurostat, which regularly publishes data related to
workers' remittances, remittances of Polish workers amounted (the
last available data) to 2.7 billion euro in 2010. The ﬁgure in 2008 was
2.2 billion euro. Poland is the third biggest EU country in terms of the
value of workers' remittance inﬂows - after Spain and Romania.
Emigrants working abroad contribute to GDP increases in host
countries, and not in home countries. This is sometimes treated as a
potential loss for source countries of emigration. On the other hand,
very often emigrants cannot ﬁnd a job (or a job with a satisfactory
level of salary) and therefore emigrate. Their remittances (and com-
pensations) to families in home countries contribute to the improve-
ment of current account balances and GDP growth of a home country.
Remittances and compensations of Polish emigrants have been a
very important source of revenue for families living in Poland and
have contributed substantially to the improvement of the Polish eco-
nomic situation. The peak of Polish emigration was in 2007 when
around 2.27 million Poles stayed abroad (in other EU countries and
outside the EU). The total value of their remittances reached around
6.2 billion euro, i.e., 2.5% of Poland’s GDP. Since then, the value of
remittances has been decreasing. In 2011 it amounted to 3.7 billion
euro, which is 2.42% of Poland’s GDP.28 According to Eurostat data,
remittances and compensation inﬂows from Polish emigrants staying
in other EU member states amounted to 3.9 billion euro in 2010 (ta-
bles above). This sum was the equivalent of 1.2% of the GDP.
Let’s add that ofﬁcial data can be underestimated. Such calcula-
tions do not include sums brought by emigrants who visit their fam-
ilies at home and leave money. They do not include the money
brought by emigrants coming back to their home country either. The
last type of ﬁnancial “transfer” is sometimes – according to some ex-
perts – even more important for the Polish economy than regular re-
mittances. First, it can be higher in ﬁnancial terms (all savings brought
28 Transfery pieniężne emigrantów a rozwój gospodarczy Polski na podstawie danych NBP, ra-
port, Centrum im. Adama Smitha (2012). cited by: http://inwestor.msp.gov.pl/si/polska-gos-
podarka/wiadomosci-gospodarcze/21971,Transfery-pieniezne-polskich-emigrantow-i-ich-zna
czenie-dla-polskiej-gospodarki.html
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home by emigrants). Second, this money is often spent on invest-
ments (opening of own business, tuition for studies, etc.). 
Other effects on Polish economy
Emigration – on a large scale – can affect the level of salaries at
home. According to estimates of the Rockwool Foundation Research
Unit, high emigration in the years 1998-2007 was responsible for 1/10
of the increase of salaries in Poland.29 According to the 2014 OECD
Report on Poland, based on the opinion of Polish researchers, worker
outﬂows were likely to have generated wage pressures, but they
seemed to have been limited.30
A more important impact was observed at the sectoral level. Emi-
gration since 2004 has fuelled labour shortages in speciﬁc occupa-
tions, such as construction, retail trade and healthcare. Between
2004 and 2009, 5.8% of physicians, 2.6% of dentists and 3.4% of
nurses were granted a European certiﬁcate of professional qualiﬁca-
tion, a good proxy of their propensities to emigrate. The most ex-
treme case was anaesthesiologists, about 19% of whom requested
such a certiﬁcate. Overall, the increase in the stock of emigrants
since 2004 was estimated to be equivalent to about 4.1% of the
working-age population.31 With the world economic crisis and
Poland’s good relative performance, this trend has been partly re-
versed.32
Effects of emigration from Poland on host countries
The conclusions on the 8th anniversary of Poland’s EU accession,
prepared by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012, cited for-
29 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/ue-emigracja-wplynela-na-wzrost-zarobkow-w-
polsce,1,5293986,wiadomosc.html, 2 November 2012.
30 Budnik (2008); Kaczmarczyk, P. (2012). Labour Market Impacts of Post-Accession Migration
from Poland, Chapter 7, cited by: OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2014, OECD Publishing,
Paris 2014, p. 79. Free Movement of Workers and Labour Market Adjustment: Recent Experi-
ences from OECD counties and the European Union
31 Okólski M. –Topinska I. (2012). Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in
Central and Eastern Europe. Final Country Report, Poland, on behalf of the European Com-
mission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, April, cited from: OECD Economic Sur-
veys … op.cit., p. 78. 
32 A stronger propensity to migrate abroad has been observed among young people who ori-
ginate from economically backward areas, giving some credit to the idea that emigration was
a response to the oversupply of labour (OECD Economic Surveys … op.cit., p. 78).
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eign opinions on the positive effects of emigration from new member
states on economic growth rates in the majority of the EU 15 coun-
tries (host countries).33 According to one such expert’s opinion, mi-
gration was responsible for 0.89% of the UK’s GDP growth, 0.33%
of Denmark’s, 0.18% of Sweden’s and 0.15% of Italy’s GDP
growth.34 Ireland and the UK beneﬁted the most from migration from
the EU 8 (Central European new EU members), while Spain and Italy
beneﬁtted the most from the EU 2 (Malta and Cyprus). 
The conclusions also cited the opinion of a British research institute
whereby the increased immigration of workers to the EU 15 did not
lead to a long-term increase in unemployment levels in the host coun-
tries.35 This fact has been corroborated by reports of the British min-
istries,36 which concluded that the opening of the labour market was
beneﬁcial to the British economy because workers from new member
states, including from Poland, ﬁlled employment gaps in many pro-
fessions and eased local shortages of workers, while at the same
time not representing a heavy burden on the British social welfare
system. 
Demographics of Poland (birth, death,
mean age, frequent causes of death)
The demographic situation in Poland has been changing signiﬁcantly
over recent years. Two major trends are occurring: 
(a) decreasing population (mainly because of low birth rates and con-
tinued emigration); 
(b) ageing of the population
An ageing population means that a decreasing number of workers
will have to maintain an increasing number of pensioners, with major
negative implications for the public pension system. 
33 Economic and Social Impact of Poland’s EU membership, accounting for the impact of en-
largement on the EU-15 (1 May 2004 – 1 May 2012) - key conclusions on the 8th anniversary
of Poland’s EU membership, at: http://polskawue.gov.pl/Eight,years,of,Poland%E2%80%99s,
membership,in,the,European,Union,11162.html
34 Baas (2012), op.cit. 
35 Fic et al. (2011), op.cit. 
36 Department for Work and Pensions, Home Ofﬁce and the Ofﬁce for National Statistics.
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The health status of the Polish population has improved substan-
tially, with average life expectancy at birth improving, which can be
attributed to a number of factors, including rising living standards,
improved lifestyle and better education, better nutrition and sanita-
tion, as well as greater access to quality health services. However,
there is still a vast gap in life expectancy between Poland and west-
ern European Union (EU) countries.
Poland recorded worse indicators in all types of diseases as com-
pared to the EU 27 average, except for respiratory disease and breast
cancer. Speciﬁcally, the gap was signiﬁcant for circulatory diseases
and transport accidents. In general, given its modest ﬁnancial, human
and material health care resources and the corresponding outcomes,
the overall ﬁnancial efﬁciency of the Polish system can be assessed
as satisfactory.
Level of population 
According to data of the Polish Central Statistical Ofﬁce (Główny
Urząd Statystyczny - GUS), at the end of 2013 Poland’s population
was estimated at 38,496,000. 
The number of the population has been slowly declining in recent
years: from 38.6 million in 1995, to 38 million in 2011, to an expected
32 million in 2050.37 In 2013 Poland registered a negative population
growth of minus 0.09%.38 There are two main reasons for Poland’s
population decline: (a) low birth rates and (b) continued emigration.
The birth rate is the total number of births per 1,000 of a population
(for a given year): in 2013 it amounted to 9.88 births/1,000 persons.39
Poles have fewer children as they are afraid of the crisis, fear uncer-
tainty and unemployment and lack a sense of stability. With a fertility
rate (number of children that would be born to a woman over her life-
time) of 1.3 children per woman, Poland holds 212th position out of a
total of 224 countries. A total fertility rate of around 2.1 live births per
woman is considered to be the replacement level (a number required
to keep the population size constant if there were no inward or out-
37 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2012/06/14/poland-aging-and-the-economy.
38 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html 
39 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html.
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ward migration). Demography works in waves. There are about 3.2
million women between the ages of 25 and 35 today, in the most pro-
creation-friendly period of their lives. But because fertility fell in the
1990s, there are only 1.8 million girls between 5 and 15 years, the
potential mothers of the next generation: even if they all were to have
2.1 children, this would not sufﬁce to stop the demographic decline.40
If the birth rate in Poland does not increase signiﬁcantly, the coun-
try's population may drop by almost 8 million in the next 47 years,
according to a report compiled by the Social Insurance Institution
(ZUS).41 ZUS considered several scenarios for Poland. One option
uses forecasts from the EU's statistical ofﬁce Eurostat, which sees
the average fertility rate in Poland growing from the current level of
1.3 to 1.56 in 2060. However, even if that happens, the population
will still shrink to 32.3 million by 2060. The most pessimistic scenario
sees the fertility rate at roughly 1.4-1.2, similar to what it has been in
the last few years, with population numbers shrinking to 30.56 million.
Even in the most optimistic scenario the country's population would
still fall to 34.3 million by 2060.
Emigration trends have contributed to declining population levels.
Over the last two decades, a number of Poles have left their country,
and only a fraction has come back, in spite of the 2008-2009 crisis
that hit some of the host countries. Emigrants tend to be young, and
they have/will have children in foreign countries. Future trends will
largely depend – as previously – on levels of economic growth, al-
though some people go abroad looking for a better paid job and bet-
ter work environment. At the same time, with the continued rise in
living standards, Poland will become an increasingly attractive des-
tination for immigrants, especially those coming from non-EU coun-
tries. 
The female population is bigger (51.8% of total population, see
Table 16), mainly because women live longer than men. The share of
the rural population was 39.1% in 2011 and has gone largely un-
changed in recent years (38.8% in 2006 and 38.4% in 2001).
40 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2012/06/14/poland-aging-and-the-economy
41 http://www.wbj.pl/article-63478-polands-population-to-shrink-signiﬁcantly.html 
and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html 
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Table 16. Population changes in Poland 
Source: http://www.quandl.com/poland/poland-demography-data
In 2013 life expectancy42 at birth was 76.5 years for the total pop-
ulation, 72.5 years for males and 80.6 years for females. In 2010, the
respective ﬁgures were: 75.8 years for the total population, 71.9 years
for men and 80.1 years for women.43 Thus, while all indicators have
improved over recent years, life expectancy for women as compared
with that of men has slightly increased. 
Increased life expectancy at birth reﬂects reductions in mortality
rates at all ages. These gains in longevity can be attributed to a num-
ber of factors, including rising living standards, improved lifestyle and
better education, as well as greater access to quality health services.
Better nutrition, sanitation and housing also play a role.44
Statistics on deaths remain one of the most widely available and
comparable sources of information on health. The mortality rate from
all causes of death in the EU 27 in 2010 was 866 for males, 509 for
females and 663 for the total population. In Poland respective ﬁgures
42 Life expectancy measures how long, on average, people would live based on a given set of
age-speciﬁc death rates.
43 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html 
44 OECD (2012), pp. 16-17.
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Indicator Level Units As of
First year
change
~5Y
Ago
~10Y
Ago
~25Y
Ago
Total
Population
38,216 1,000s 2011 0.08% 38,121 38,230 37,668
Female 
Population
51.77% % 2011 0.02% 51.68% 51.56% 51.25%
Rural
Population
39.11% % 2011 0.05% 38.75% 38.39% 39.53%
Urban 
Population
60.89% % 2011 -0.05% 61.25% 61.61% 60.47%
Population
Below Age 15
14.69% % 2011 -0.10% 15.59% 18.09% 25.54%
Population 
Aged 15 to 64
71.50% % 2011 -0.10% 71.05% 69.20% 64.91%
Population
Above Age 64
13.81% % 2011 0.20% 13.,36% 12.71% 9.55%
Population
Growth Rate
0.08% % 2011 0.00% -0.05% -0.05% 0.56%
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were: 1,065 for males, 557 for females and 776 for the total popula-
tion. Thus, all those indicators were higher in Poland than in the EU
27 on average.45
Ageing of Polish population
Poland’s population is ageing, and ageing fast. Ageing population
refers to the increase of the average (and median) age for the popu-
lation and an increasing share of older members in the population.
One proof of this development is the increasing share of the popula-
tion above age 64: it grew from 12.7% in 2001 to 13.8% in 2011. In
the past 25 years, the number of Polish citizens aged 65 and over
has risen by over 50% to 5.6 million. In 2060, over a third (34.5%) of
Poles will be aged 65 or higher, according to forecasts from
Eurostat.46 No other EU country other than Latvia will have as many
senior citizens (in relative terms).
Ageing is already observable. However, in the near future, changes
will accelerate, thus altering the structure of the population and the
age of the workforce. Recent developments and projections of the
Central Statistical Ofﬁce of Poland are presented in Figure 2.
This means that a decreasing number of workers will have to main-
tain an increasing number of pensioners. This will have negative im-
plications for the pension system ﬁnanced mostly from the state
budget. Specialists also warn that such a situation will bring with it
the risk of revolution and cause a wave of emigration. In order to bal-
ance the equation, Poland would have to have an inﬂow of at least 5
million immigrants by 2050. In order to achieve this goal, the country
would have to compete with richer western countries for these im-
migrants. Besides, Poland would stop being an ethnically homoge-
nous society and Poles do not seem ready for this.47
Another sign of an aging population is the change of the median
age, which is the age that divides a population into two numerically
equal groups – i.e. half the people are younger than this age and half
are older. It is a single index that summarises the age distribution of
45 OECD (2012) 
46 http://www.wbj.pl/article-64731-poland-facing-demographic-catastrophe.html?type 
47 http://www.wbj.pl/article-64731-poland-facing-demographic-catastrophe.html?type=wbj.
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a population. In 1950, the median age in Poland was 25.8: half of the
Polish population was younger, half older than this age. In 2011 it was
38.2. In 2013 it was 39.1 years. It will be 51 in 2050.48 The median age
is higher for females: 40.9 years and 37.5 years for men in 2013.
Figure 2. Aging of population in Poland: changes in 
the size of age groups 
Source: Central Statistical Ofﬁce of Poland, 2012, cited from: Demographic
transition and an ageing society: Implications for local labour markets in
Poland. OECD (2013), p. 29.
Although the ageing of Polish society is underway, it should be
noted that Polish society is relatively young. According to Eurostat
(2011), the proportion of those aged 65 or over in the population is
one of the lowest in the European Union, and is signiﬁcantly below
the average for the EU 27. In 2011, with a rate of 13.5% (see Table
17), Poland was an EU country with one of the lowest proportions of
population aged 65 years and older. It was outpaced only by Ireland
where the indicator was 11.9%, by Slovakia with 12.8% and Cyprus
at 12.8%.49
48 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2012/06/14/poland-aging-and-the-economy 
49 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_
ageing; see also: Demographic transition and an ageing society: Implications for local labour
markets in Poland, OECD 2013, p. 30.
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Table 17. Population age structure by major age groups
in 2011 (% of the total population)
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
Population_structure_and_ageing
Changes in the quality of health care
Since EU accession the share of public money spent on healthcare
(as a percentage of the GDP) increased slightly in Poland but it was
still one of the lowest shares in the EU 27 (slightly above 6% of the
GDP). The highest shares amounted to 10% of the GDP in a few EU
countries.
The number of practicing physicians in Poland in 2010 amounted
to only 247,9 per 100,000 residents and was lower than 10 years ear-
lier (in 2000 it was 221,1). It was one of the lowest indicators in the
EU. Nurses play a critical role in providing health care. In 2010, there
were over 7.9 nurses per 1,000 population in the EU 27 and 5.3 in
Poland. In the period 2000-2010 the situation in Poland has improved
but at a much lower rate than in the EU on average: the average an-
nual growth of the number of nurses in this period in the EU 27 was
1.2%, while in Poland it was only 0.7%. As regards the number of
hospital beds, the situation in Poland was better compared to the EU
27 average. There were 6.6 hospital beds per 1,000 persons in 2010
in Poland (compared to 5.3 beds in the EU 27).
Public expenditure on healthcare system
In Poland citizens are granted free access to the publicly funded
healthcare system.50 In particular, the government is obliged to pro-
vide free healthcare to children, pregnant women, disabled people
and to the elderly. However, in practice a number of Poles use private
healthcare. 
50 According to Article 68 of the Polish Constitution everyone has a right to free health care.
0-14 years old 15-64 years old 65 years old or over
Poland 15.2 71.3 13.5
EU 27 15.6 66.9 17.5
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In 2012, according to Eurostat, Poland spent 6.33% of its GDP on
health (Table 18).51 This share has been slightly decreasing since
2009. Since EU accession this indicator has increased, however, by
0.5 percentage points. Poland belongs to the group of EU countries
with the lowest healthcare expenditure (in relative terms). In ﬁve EU
member states (France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and
Austria) the share of current healthcare expenditure exceeded 10%
of the GDP, which was almost double the share of healthcare expen-
diture relative to the GDP recorded in Romania and Cyprus, where
the indicator was the lowest (below 6% of the GDP).
Table 18. Healthcare expenditure by ﬁnancing agent 
in Poland in 2005-2011 (% of GDP)
Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=hlth_sha
_hf&lang=en
The majority of healthcare expenditure is incurred by the public
sector (slightly more than 70% of total expenditure in 2012), generally
meaning government (including social security funds). The private
sector accounted for almost 30% of total expenditure. The relatively
high share of private expenditure is explained mostly by out-of
pocket (OOP) payments, meaning direct household payments, mainly
in the form of co-payments and informal payments.52 Voluntary health
insurance (VHI) does not play an important role and is largely limited
to medical subscription packages offered by employers. Compulsory
health insurance covers 98% of the population and guarantees ac-
cess to a broad range of health services. However, the limited ﬁnan-
51 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=hlth_sha_hf&lang=en
52 Poland. Health system review. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, He-
alth system review. Vol. 13 No. 8 2011, at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/
pdf_ﬁle/0018/163053/e96443.pdf, p. x.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
All ﬁnancing agents 5.85 5.85 5.93 6.43 6.72 6.55 6.39 6.33
General government 4.02 4.05 4.15 4.61 4.82 4.69 4.53 4.43
Private sector 1.83 1.80 1.77 1.82 1.91 1.85 1.86 1.90
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cial resources of the National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz
Zdrowia–NFZ) means that broad entitlements guaranteed on paper
are not always available.
Number of physicians and nurses
One of the key indicators for measuring healthcare staff is the num-
ber of physicians per 100,000 inhabitants. In this context, Eurostat
gives preference to the concept of practicing physicians.53 In 2010
the highest number of practicing physicians per 100,000 inhabitants
was recorded in Austria (478.0), followed by Sweden (380.2). In
Poland, the respective indicator amounted only to 247.9 physicians.
It was one of the lowest indicators in the EU. Over the years 2000-
2010 the situation in Poland has worsened. The average annual
growth rate of the number of practicing doctors per 1,000 persons
was minus 0.1%, while the average for the EU 27 was 1.4.54 Poland
and France were the only EU countries with negative growth of this
indicator (the rate of decline in France was the same as in Poland).
The decreasing number of physicians per capita in Poland (since
2003) results mostly from outward migration, attributable to better
remuneration, working conditions and prospects for professional ad-
vancement abroad.55
The share of generalists56 in 2010 was 21%. Specialists accounted
for 79%. In the EU 27 the respective shares were 30% and 62% of
the total number of doctors.
In 2009 there were 82,900 doctors, 12,100 dentists, 24,200 phar-
macists, 200,500 nurses and 22,400 midwives employed in health
care institutions providing publicly ﬁnanced health care services in
53 Practicing physicians are deﬁned as doctors who are providing care directly to patients. This
approach has been adopted by Eurostat despite the fact that data are not available for eight
EU member states – being replaced by the number of professionally active physicians in Ire-
land, Greece, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Finland, and by the number of li-
censed physicians in Portugal.
54 OECD (2012), p. 69.
55 The reduction of practicing physicians in Poland may be explained by several breaks in the
data series – for example, from 2004 onwards the Polish data has excluded private practices
(thought to account for about 2,000 physicians).
56 Generalists include general practitioners (“family doctors”) and other generalist/non-speci-
alist practitioners who may be working in hospitals or outside hospitals, see: Health at glance
… op.cit., p. 68.
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Poland. Although there are no reliable estimates on the adequacy of
stafﬁng levels, available evidence suggests a shortage of health care
professionals. The number of health professionals per 1,000 popu-
lation was lower in Poland than in the EU 15 on average for all key
health professions: 2.2 physicians per 1,000 in Poland (compared
with 3.5 in the EU 15), 5.2 nurses (EU 15 = 9.1), 0.3 dentists (EU 15
= 0.7) and 0.6 pharmacists (EU 15 = 0.8).57
Nurses are usually the most numerous health profession, outnum-
bering physicians in most European countries. Nurses play a critical
role in providing health care not only in traditional settings such as
hospitals and long-term care institutions but increasingly in primary
care (especially in offering care to the chronically ill) and in home care
settings.58 In 2010, there were over 7.9 nurses per 1,000 population
in the EU 27 and 5.3 in Poland.59 In the period 2000-2010 the situa-
tion in the majority of EU countries has improved (with the exception
of Slovakia and Lithuania): the average annual growth of the number
of nurses in this period was 1.2%, while in Poland it was 0.7%. 
The number of hospital beds provides an indication of the re-
sources available for delivering services to patients in hospitals. The
number of hospital beds per 100,000 inhabitants averaged 538.2 in
the EU 27 in 2010.60 Between 2000 and 2010 there was a reduction
in bed numbers across the whole of the EU 27 which equalled 101.9
beds per 100,000 inhabitants. This was partly related to decreasing
population levels and partly to progress in medical technologies
which has enabled a move to same-day surgery and a reduced need
for long hospitalization.
In Poland there were 6.6 hospital beds per 1,000 persons in 2010,
which was one of better indicators among EU countries (the best sit-
uation was in Germany (8.3 beds), Austria (7.6 beds), Hungary (7.2
beds) and the Czech Republic (7.0 beds). These are minor differ-
ences. The average number of hospital beds per 1,000 population in
the EU 27 was 5.3.61
57 Poland. Health system review. .. op.cit. 
58 OECD (2012), p. 69.
59 OECD (2012), p. 69.
60 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Healthcare_statistics. 
61 OECD (2012) op.cit., p. 69.
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Changes in the budgetary expenditures in
the social areas of the overall budget and 
the internal structure of social spending
In Poland, like in other EU countries, expenditure on social protection
increased during the crisis in 2008-2009. The level of social protec-
tion expenditure in relation to GDP in 2011 was lower than in highly
developed countries but higher than in several other EU countries,
thus reﬂecting differences in living standards and the diversity of na-
tional social protection systems in the EU member states.
The main challenge faced by the social protection system in Poland
is related to the ﬁnancing of this system, as the proportion of older
persons grows while the number of persons of working age de-
creases. In recent years Poland introduced several reforms in order
to mitigate long-term problems resulting from drawbacks of the pre-
vious inefﬁcient pension system and in order to increase the stability
of ﬁnancing the pension system in the long term. 
Social spending
Social protection62 (also called social safety net or social security) is
the revenue (income) that is received for the funding of schemes to
combat poverty and inequality. It includes: social beneﬁts, adminis-
tration costs (which represent the costs charged to the scheme for
its management and administration) and other expenditures.63 They
62 Social protection can be deﬁned as the coverage of precisely deﬁned risks and needs as-
sociated with sickness/healthcare and invalidism; disability; old age; parental responsibilities;
the loss of a spouse or parent; unemployment; housing; and social exclusion (for a deﬁnition see:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Social_protection_statistics.
63 Social protection beneﬁts are classiﬁed according to eight social protection functions (which
represent a set of risks or needs): 
• sickness/healthcare beneﬁts – including paid sick leave, medical care and the provision of
pharmaceutical products;
• disability beneﬁts – including disability pensions and the provision of goods and services
(other than medical care) to the disabled;
• old age beneﬁts – including old age pensions and the provision of goods and services (other
than medical care) to the elderly;
• survivors’ beneﬁts – including income maintenance and support in connection with the death
of a family member, such as a survivors’ pensions;
• family/children beneﬁts – including support (except healthcare) in connection with the costs
of pregnancy, childbirth, childbearing and caring for other family members;
• unemployment beneﬁts – including vocational training ﬁnanced by public agencies;
• housing beneﬁts – including interventions by public authorities to help households meet the
cost of housing;
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include mostly old age (pensions)64 and sickness/healthcare beneﬁts.
In the period of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, general government
expenditure on social protection relative to gross domestic product
(GDP) increased by 2.8 percentage points between 2008 and 2009
in EU 27.65 In 2010 and 2011 the value of social protection expendi-
ture in relation to GDP decreased slightly in the EU 27 (Table 19). 
In Poland, expenditure on social protection also increased during
the crisis (from 18.6% of GDP in 2008 to 19.2% of GDP in 2009) and
then stagnated later. Among the EU member states, the level of so-
cial protection expenditure in relation to GDP in 2011 was highest in
Denmark (34.3%), France (33.6%) and the Netherlands (32.3%). By
contrast, social protection expenditure represented less than 20.0%
of GDP (thus less than in Poland) in Malta, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithua-
nia, Romania, Estonia and Latvia (where the lowest share was regis-
tered, at 15.1%). These disparities reﬂect differences in living
standards, but are also indicative of the diversity of national social
protection systems and of the demographic, economic, social and
institutional structures speciﬁc to each member state.
Table 19. General government expenditure
on social protection, 2001 - 2011 (% of GDP)
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
Social_protection_statistics
• social exclusion beneﬁts not elsewhere classiﬁed – including income support, rehabilitation
of alcohol and drug abusers and other miscellaneous beneﬁts (except healthcare).
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Social_protection_
statistics
64 Expenditure on pensions comprises the following social beneﬁts: disability pension, early
retirement due to reduced capacity to work, old-age pension, anticipated old-age pension,
partial pension, survivors’ pension and early retirement due for labour market reasons. 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Expenditure_on_pe
nsions). 
65 This increase reﬂected a 4.2% increase in overall social protection expenditure (in current
prices), combined with a fall in GDP (-5.8%).
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Poland 20.1 19.7 19.4 18.1 18.6 19.2 19.2 19.2
EU 27 17.0* 27.0 26.6 26.1 26.8 29.6 29.3 29.0
*EU 17 (euro area)
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Looking at expenditure per inhabitant, we see a big gap between
expenditure in Poland as compared to the EU 27 average – with more
than three times less in Poland (Table 20).
Table 20. Total general government expenditure on social
protection by country in 2011 (% of GDP, million euro and
euro per inhabitant)
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index. php?
title=File:7_General_government_expenditure_on_social_protection_by_cou
ntry_%25_GDP_MEUR_EUR_HAB,_2011.png&ﬁletimestamp=20130618074
834
The use of a purchasing power standard (PPS) facilitates a com-
parison of the level of social protection expenditure per inhabitant
between countries, eliminating differences in price levels. In Poland
this indicator amounted to 46% of the EU 27 average (100%) in
2011.66 Thus, the social protection level enjoyed by Poles was much
lower compared to the EU average. The highest level of expenditure
on social protection per inhabitant in 2011 was registered for the rich-
est EU country, Luxembourg (186% of the EU average). By contrast,
expenditure in Romania and Bulgaria was respectively only 28% and
29% of the EU average. These disparities between countries are
partly related to different levels of wealth, but may also reﬂect differ-
ences in social protection systems, demographic trends, unemploy-
ment rates and other social, institutional and economic factors.67
In 2011, social protection was the most important function of gov-
ernment expenditure. Governmental social protection expenditure in
the EU 27 was equivalent to 39.9% of total government expenditure.
In Poland the respective ﬁgure was not much lower, at 36.69%.
66 Social protection, Eurostat newsrelease, 174/2013 - 21 November 2013. 
67 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Social_protection_statistics.
% GDP Million euro Euro per capita
Poland 15.9 58,879 1,528
EU 27 19.6 2,480,614 4,932
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Old age and survivors beneﬁts accounted for 46% of total social
beneﬁts in the EU 27 in 2011, and were the major part of social pro-
tection beneﬁts in nearly all member states. The share of old age &
survivors beneﬁts in total was highest in Italy (61%), Poland (58%),
Portugal, Latvia and Malta (all 55%), and lowest in Ireland (23%) and
Luxembourg (37%).68
Expenditure on pensions across the EU 27 was equivalent to
around 13.0% of the GDP in 2011. In Poland this share amounted to
11.6%, thus being close to the EU average (Table 21). 
Table 21. Expenditure on pensions (current prices, % of GDP)
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&
language=en&pcode=tps00103&plugin=0
Table 22. Social protection receipts by type in 2001 and 2008 (%)
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
Social_protection_-_main_indicators
In 2008 (the most recent year available), the main sources of fund-
ing of social protection at the EU 27 level (Table 22) were social con-
tributions, which accounted for 57.5% of all receipts, and general
government contributions from taxes (38.2%). In Poland the share of
68 Social protection, Eurostat newsrelease, 174/2013 - 21 November 2013. 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Poland 13.3 12.7 12.5 11.6 11.6 11.9 12.0 11.6
EU 27 n/a 12.1 11.9 11.7 12.1 13.1 13.0 12.9
General gov-
ernment
contributions
Social contributions
Other 
receiptsTotal Employers
Protected
persons
2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008
Poland 33.2 34.6 52.4 42.8 28.6 23.4 23.9 19.4 14.4 22.6
EU 27 35.9 38.2 60.4 57.5 38.8 37.1 21.6 20.4 3.6 4.3
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social contributions in total social protection funding was lower and
amounted to 42.8%, while the share of general government contri-
butions was 34.6%. Social contributions can be broken into contri-
butions paid by the protected persons (employees, self-employed
persons, retired persons and others) and those paid by employers.
In both Poland and the EU 27 employers contributed more to social
contributions than protected persons (Table 22).
Reforms of the pension system in Poland
Pension systems can play a role in allowing beneﬁciaries to maintain
living standards they enjoyed in the later years of their working lives.
Poland’s population is getting progressively older. Thus, the main
challenge for the social protection system is related to its ﬁnancing,
as the proportion of older persons grows while the number of per-
sons of working age decreases. In order to address this issue, Poland
recently decided to introduce several changes. First, the decision
was taken to gradually increase the statutory retirement age effective
January 1, 2013. A uniform retirement age of 67 years for men and
women was decided upon, meaning an increase from 65 and 60, re-
spectively, starting from 2012 and to be completed by 2,020 (men)
and 2,040 (women). This decision will bring about substantial effects
on the economy: likely long-lasting effects, albeit in the medium- and
long run. It will, on the one hand, increase future pensions and, on
the other hand, improve the balance of the public pension fund, lim-
iting the imbalance of public ﬁnance. Moreover, raising the statutory
retirement age will mean an increase in the labour supply which, in
turn, shall foster economic growth, as a consequence of which the
improvement of the ﬁnancial situation should be visible in all institu-
tional sectors, including the public ﬁnance sector.69
The second decision referred to is the radical change of the private
pension fund sector (OFE) in Poland. In December 2013 the Polish
parliament passed a governmental bill to reform this sector.70 As a
result, 51.5% of the net asset value of open pension funds (OFE) was
69 Convergence Programme 2014 Update. The Republic of Poland (2014), Warsaw April.
70 It was passed despite receiving strong criticism from many economists and experts and ig-
noring warnings that that the bill could breach the Polish constitution, see more: http://www.al-
lenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publication_OFE_Investment_after_the_reform.pdf.
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transferred to the state’s Social Security Institution (ZUS) effective
January 31, 2014.71 The transfer of OFE assets involved primarily
treasury bonds and treasury bills worth around PLN 127 billion. It is
estimated that the transfer will lead to a decrease of public debt in
Poland from around 55% of the GDP to 47% of the GDP, and this is
the main short-term purpose of the reform. The government argued,
however, that the main reason for the reform was to provide im-
proved ﬁnancial security for retirees.
The third decision consisted of increasing the length of service
(from 15 to 25 years) required to qualify for early retirement in a spe-
cial scheme for uniformed services.
General summary and
challenges for the future
The objective of this paper was to analyse trends of the social situa-
tion in Poland in the period 2005-2012 and to draw conclusions with
regard to future economic and social challenges.
The approach undertaken in this paper derives from the Europe
2020 strategy, adopted by the European Council on June 17, 2010,
which is the EU’s agenda for growth and jobs for the current decade.
The strategy emphasises that inclusive growth (apart from a smart,
sustainable growth) is one of the ways to overcome the structural
weaknesses in EU economy, improve its competitiveness and pro-
ductivity and underpin a sustainable social market economy. The in-
clusive growth priority aims at fostering job creation and poverty
reduction and in this way creates the basis for an environment for
growth. In turn, inclusive growth is measured against the employment
rate and poverty (social) exclusion headline indicators (combining
three sub-indicators on monetary poverty, material deprivation and
living in a household with very low work intensity).
The smart growth objective of the Europe 2020 strategy is covered
by the indicators on innovation (gross domestic expenditure on R&D)
71 The decision also substantially affected the Polish capital market as open pension funds
were previously key private investors on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and thus a major player
in this market.
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and education (early leavers from education and training and tertiary
educational attainment). In this paper we addressed only the latter
indicator (education). The role attached to this indicator in the Europe
2020 strategy results from the widely accepted thesis that education
is one of the most important investments individuals and societies
can make in their future.
All these indicators were covered by the analysis presented above.
Concrete values of indicators were assessed against the targets
which have been established by Poland (and other member states)
in line with the overall goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. Each mem-
ber state prepares a National Reform Programme, which is updated
every year. Assessment of national reforms takes place in the EU –
from a formal point of view – within the European Semesters and cul-
minates in a Council recommendation on a proposal from the Euro-
pean Commission. Apart from the above mentioned indicators we
also assessed a number of other indicators characterising the social
situation, among them the Gini coefﬁcient, emigration and its role for
the country’s development, demographic situation, and changes in
the budgetary expenditures in the social areas as a proxy of the role
of social problems in the government’s policies.
This summary of main trends in the social situation reﬂects the
above indicators. 
In the case of employment rate, the target set by Poland is 71% (of
persons aged 20-64) while for the whole EU it was set at 75%. Al-
most no progress or even stagnation has been recorded since the
troublesome year 2009, when a signiﬁcant slowdown in GDP rate
was registered in Poland (from 5.1% in 2008 to 1.6% in 2009). The
same trend has been observed in the majority of EU countries.
Measuring poverty and social exclusion requires a multidimensional
approach. Household income is a key determinant of standard of liv-
ing, but other aspects preventing full participation in society such as
access to labour markets and material deprivation also need to be
considered. The number of people at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion in Poland has been decreasing since 2005. The indicator
reached its lowest level in 2012 with about 10.1 million people in this
category. Contrary to the EU average, where the number of affected
people increased again in 2011 as compared to 2008 and 2005, in
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Poland there was a further decrease of people at risk of poverty. Even
more important, Poland recorded a substantial decrease in the cat-
egory of people discussed here in relative terms: from 45.3% of total
population in 2005 to 25.8% in 2013, which is a decrease of 43%. In
other words, signiﬁcant progress seems to have been achieved in
this area. Poland’s target to reduce the number of people at risk of
poverty or social exclusion by 1.5 million people has been exceeded.
Still, the share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion was in
Poland in 2013 higher (25.8%) than in the EU 27 (24.5%).
As regards the three sub-indicators of poverty and social exclusion72
the conclusions are as follows. Monetary poverty, which is related to
disposable income after social transfers, recorded in Poland in the
period 2005-2013 a decrease – from 20.5% to 17.3% of total popu-
lation. However, the declining trend in 2005-2008 was interrupted by
a slight increase of the indicator in 2009-2011, which was related to
the crisis. In next year the trend was reversed. In the period as a whole
Poland was one of the worst performing EU member states in terms
of monetary poverty. Still, the Polish situation has improved slightly
since 2005, while the average for the EU 27 stagnated in recent years
or even increased (from 16.4% to 16.6% in 2005-2013).
In 2013, 11.9% of people in Poland were severely materially de-
prived people (because of lack of durables and housing). Poland
recorded signiﬁcant progress in reducing material deprivation, as the
percentage was one of the highest (33.8%) among EU countries
when Poland joined the EU. Only in Latvia it was slightly higher
(39.3%). Poland’s indicator is, however, still much higher than that
of the EU 27, where it reached 9.6%. 
In the whole analysed period, the number of households in Poland
with very low work intensity (activity in relation to the capacity for work)
decreased substantially: from 14.3% of the total population to 7.2%.
Thus, Poland recorded the second biggest improvement (after Roma-
nia): the number of households with very low work intensity decreased
in the period 2005-2013 by more than 50%. The EU average for this
indicator showed a slight increase: 10.4% in 2005 and 10.8% in 2013.
72 (1) monetary poverty, (2) material deprivation and (3) low work intensity.
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The analysis has revealed that in Poland the majority of indicators
relating to inclusive growth recorded interrupted decrease and this
trend was not reversed in the crisis years 2008-2009 (with the major
exception of the unemployment rate of young people). This of course
reﬂected the fact that Poland was the only EU member state to avoid
recession in 2009. 
In the field of education Poland’s achievements were in general
better than for the EU 27 average. This assessment is based, first
of all, on the comparison of early leavers from education and train-
ing and tertiary educational attainment. Also, expenditure on edu-
cational institutions as a percentage of GDP in Poland was close
to the EU 27 average. Of particular importance is early school leav-
ing, as this development negatively affects productivity and com-
petitiveness, and contributes to poverty and social exclusion. In
2013 this indicator amounted to 5.8% in Poland and was not much
higher than the national target (4.5%). In the EU 27 the indicator
amounted to 12.0% (the target being 10%). Thus, in Poland this in-
dicator was in 2013 two times lower than the EU average and was
one of the best results in the measurement of early school leaving
rates in the EU. At the same time, however, Poland recorded stag-
nation in this respect in recent years. The other side of the educa-
tion issue is the tertiary education attainment, as higher education
plays an essential role in society, contributing to an increased num-
ber of educated people who are better prepared to create innova-
tions, to better find new jobs, to perform more sophisticated jobs,
etc. In several recent years Poland recorded substantial progress
regarding the share of graduates of tertiary education – 40.5% in
2013, thus approaching the target of 45%. The average for the
whole EU is less ambitious and is at 40%. 
Analysing the changes in other non-economic areas which have
crucial importance for long term growth and competitiveness we’ve
observed the following elements. The Polish economy is charac-
terised by a relatively equal distribution of incomes as measured by
the Gini index, which in Poland amounted to 30.7 in 2013. Thus, in
Poland, differences between incomes are not extremely high. The
Gini index has been gradually decreasing in Poland over the period
2005-2013 (from 35.6 in 2005). This decreasing trend suggests that
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there is currently a better redistribution of incomes in Poland than in
previous years. This means that the richest citizens earn more than
several years ago (due to highly dynamic Polish economy and inﬂow
of FDI) but they pay more money in the form of taxes, and this money
is redistributed to the bottom income group of society. The other rea-
son for the decreasing Gini index has been relatively fast growth of
the lowest salaries. In EU 27 the index has been more or less stable
in this same period (30.4 in 2013). Poland occupies the middle posi-
tion among EU countries in terms of Gini index. Thus, the situation is
still unsatisfactory. In recent years several steps were undertaken to
reduce disparities, among them a faster increase of the minimum
salary as compared to the average growth of salaries. The results will
only be visible in the long term. 
Over the last two decades a number of Poles have left their country,
and only a fraction has come back, despite the 2008-2009 crisis that
hit some of the host countries. In 2012 about 2.1 million Poles stayed
abroad. Of that number, 1.7 million stayed in other countries of the
European Union (for a period of more than 3 months). These ﬁgures
do not include seasonal emigration which usually is not registered
and is thus not possible to estimate.
Emigration affects the home and host countries in a number of
ways. In both cases it has both positive and negative implications.
Emigrants working abroad have contributed to GDP increases in host
countries, but not in Poland. This has been treated sometimes as a
potential loss for the Polish economy. On the other hand, very often
emigrants were unable to ﬁnd a job (or a job with satisfactory level of
salary) in Poland and therefore emigrated. Their remittances (and
compensations) to families in home countries contributed to the im-
provement of the current account balance and GDP growth in the
home country. According to Eurostat data, remittances and compen-
sation inﬂows from Polish emigrants staying in other EU member
states amounted to 1.2% of the GDP in 2010. 
Relatively high emigration was responsible for labour shortages in
speciﬁc occupations and for increases in salaries in several sectors
of the Polish economy where emigration was highest. 
As regards the demographic situation in Poland, this study has
identiﬁed two major negative trends:
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(a) a decreasing level of population, mainly because of low birth rates
and a continued emigration (in 2013 Poland registered negative
population growth: minus 0.09%);
(b) aging of the population.
The population level has declined from 38.6 million in 1995 to 38
million in 2011, and is expected to decrease further to 32 million by
2050. The birth rate is the total number of births per 1,000 of a pop-
ulation (for a given year): it amounted to 9.88 births/1,000 persons in
2013. Poles have fewer children due to a poor economic and housing
situation, unemployment, etc. The trend of a declining population has
been intensiﬁed by emigration. 
An ageing population means that a decreasing number of workers
will need to maintain an increasing number of pensioners, with dra-
matically negative implications for the public pension system. Al-
though the ageing of Polish society is underway, it should be noted
that Polish society is relatively young. The proportion of those aged
65 or over in the population is one of the lowest in the European
Union, and is signiﬁcantly below the average for the EU 27. In 2011,
with a rate of 13.5%, Poland was the EU country with the second
lowest proportion of population aged 65 years and older (the EU av-
erage was 17.5%). 
Social protection (also called social safety net or social security) is
the revenue (income) that is received for the funding of schemes to
combat poverty and inequality. It includes mostly old age (pensions)
and sickness/healthcare beneﬁts. 
During the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, expenditure on social pro-
tection (revenue received for the funding of schemes to combat
poverty and inequality) increased in Poland (from 18.6% of GDP in
2008 to 19.2% of GDP in 2009) and later stagnated. This was also
the case in other EU member states. However, the level of social pro-
tection enjoyed by Poles was much lower as compared to the EU av-
erage. In 2011, social protection was the most important function of
government expenditure. Governmental social protection expendi-
ture in the EU 27 was equivalent to 39.9% of total government ex-
penditure. In Poland the corresponding ﬁgure was not much lower,
at 36.69%.
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Pension systems can play a role in allowing beneﬁciaries to main-
tain living standards they enjoyed in the later years of their working
lives. Poland’s population is becoming progressively older. Thus, the
main challenge for the social protection system is related to its ﬁ-
nancing, as the proportion of older persons grows while the number
of persons of working age decreases. In order to reduce the chal-
lenge of ﬁnancing social protection from public funds, Poland re-
cently decided to introduce several changes. They included: (a) the
gradual increase of the statutory retirement age up to 67 years, ef-
fective January 1, 2013, (b) radical change of the private pension fund
sector (OFE), (c) increased length of service (from 15 to 25 years) re-
quired to qualify for early retirement in a special scheme for uni-
formed services. These decisions will improve the balance of the
public pension fund, limiting the imbalance of public ﬁnance and also
– in the long term – will increase the labour supply, thus fostering
economic growth.
Social changes occur at slower pace than economic changes. At
the same time they constitute an important basis for short term and
long term competitiveness of each economy and its ability to de-
velop. Therefore it is important to identify possible risks and chal-
lenges as early as possible in order to prepare proper responses and
policy-oriented actions.
The analysis has revealed that in the last 9-10 years Poland has
made signiﬁcant progress in the majority of the areas monitored. But
the economy still faces serious challenges. In the area of labour mar-
ket and social situation, the most pressing challenges can be identi-
ﬁed as follows:
a) Work force shortage (because of aging and a shrinking workforce),
especially of skilled workers. There are two main ways of dealing
with this challenge: increasing the employment rate, and increas-
ing productivity. These efforts are of course mutually reinforcing
and they have one key ingredient in common, namely investment
in human capital.
b) A related challenge is a very low labour force participation rate (%
of population age 15+): as of 2010 it was 48.20 for females and
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64.30 for men.73 These rates were among the lowest among EU
member states. This is of particular concern in the medium- to
long term, given an aging population and growing life expectancy.
Low women’s participation in the labour market is very much a
result of the lack of affordable childcare. 
c) Regarding the poverty challenge, any improvement is dependent
on a number of factors, including education. In the short run, the
capacity of the government to reduce poverty is constrained by
ﬁscal consolidation. For a number of years Poland has been aim-
ing to exit the excessive deﬁcit procedure, which competes with
the objective of a more generous social policy. The best option to
address social needs is to promote economic growth and create
new jobs. 
All the above mentioned challenges have been addressed in Na-
tional Reform Programme. Europe 2020. Update 2014/201574 which
contains a detailed timetable of the adoption of various remedies (leg-
islative actions and ﬁnancial means to implement necessary actions).
Together with already implemented changes in the pension system
and pension age they create the basis for a continuation of positive
changes with regard to the situation in the labour market, education
system and social protection. As a result, the achievement of the Eu-
rope 2020 Strategy targets in those areas seems to be realistic.
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TRENDS OF THE SOCIAL SITUATION
IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
– CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
Vladimír Bartovic1
This paper provides an analysis of the trends of the social situation
in the Czech Republic in the period 2005-2013. It analyses the socio-
economic trajectory of the country, its demographics, labour market
and social situation. It strives to identify socio-economic challenges
that the country and its citizens might face in the near future. 
Demographics of the Czech Republic
According to the data of the Czech Statistical Ofﬁce, on September
30, 2014, the Czech Republic had population of 10,528,477 inhab-
itants.2 This is the highest number since the country gained inde-
pendence in 1993. However, the highest population the Czech lands
ever had was in 1944 before the post-war expulsion of the German
population (11,109,341). Since the end of Second World War, the
population of the Czech Republic grew steadily until the beginning
of the nineties when it started to decline. Growth of the population
was restored only in 2004. 
1 Director, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Prague
2 Population size (number of inhabitants) at a given moment of time refers to the resident population
of the Czech Republic, irrespective of citizenship. Since 2001, the ﬁgures also include (in accordance
with the Population and Housing census of 2001) foreigners with long-term stay (i.e., a stay based
on a visa of over 90 days, as stipulated by Act No. 326/1999 Coll.) and foreigners with asylum status
granted (in compliance with Act No. 325/1999 Coll.). Since May 1, 2004, in accordance with the
amendment to Act No. 326/1999 Coll., the ﬁgures also include citizens of the European Union with
temporary stay on the territory of the Czech Republic, and citizens of other countries with long-term
stay.
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Figure 1. Total population, 1950-2013
Source: Czech Statistical Ofﬁce
Vital statistics of the Czech Republic
The Velvet revolution in 1989 brought deep political and economic
reforms that had a huge impact on the social situation of Czech fam-
ilies. The number of live births decreased dramatically, especially
between 1991 and1996 when the number of newly born children de-
creased by 30 percent, from around 130 thousand in 1991 to 91
thousand in 1996. This was caused by a decreasing female fertility
rate that dropped from 1.89 in 1991 to less than 1.2 in 1996. 
Figure 2. Total fertility rate, 1950-2013
Source: Czech Statistical Ofﬁce
Note: The census years are marked by grey colours
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The changed economic situation of families, changes in the social
security system and also changes in the way of life had huge im-
pacts on the ability and willingness of families to have children.
Hence, a reduction in the total level of newly born children was
caused by changes in the reproductive behaviour of women newly
entering the age of intense fertility. In the ﬁrst half of the nineties
young women started to delay marriage and subsequently bore chil-
dren at older ages. Along with these delays the depth of the decline
in total fertility signalled low fertility in older women of reproductive
age, since most of these women fulﬁlled their maternal role at a
younger age in accordance with the previous reproductive model.
Since 2005 we can witness an increasing fertility rate, a growing
number of newly born children and a natural increase of population.
This can be explained by several factors, such as increasing living
standards, intensive construction of new housing and especially the
phenomenon of delayed deliveries. Since the beginning of the
nineties the mean age of women at birth of ﬁrst child rose from 22.5
to higher than 28.0 in 2013.
Since 2010, the number of newly born children started to decrease
again. The main reason is the fading factor of delayed deliveries com-
bined with uncertainty of families caused by the economic crisis that
hit the Czech Republic in 2009. While the number of newly born chil-
dren was changing sharply in the last 25 years – with a huge drop at
the beginning of nineties and a baby boom at the end of last decade
– the number of deaths is steadily decreasing: from 130 thousand in
1990 to 110 thousand in 2013. This can be explained by two facts: a
huge increase of life expectancy at birth for both genders and a de-
clining infant mortality rate. In the case of males life expectancy rose
from 67.6 years in 1990 to 75.2 years in 2013; in the case of females
it rose from 75.4 years in 1990 to 81.1 years in 2013. Further, the in-
fant mortality declined from 10.8 to 2.5 in 2013, placing the Czech
Republic among countries with lowest infant mortality rate in the
world. The dramatic increase in life expectancy in recent years can
be attributed to many factors, such as better living conditions, im-
provement in the quality of life, better education, healthier lifestyle,
but especially to the improvement of access to and quality of health-
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care available to Czechs. Increases in the quality of pre-natal and
natal healthcare is the main reason for the extraordinary achievement
in the decrease of infant mortality in the country.
Between 1994 and 2005 the natural increase of population in the
Czech Republic was negative. In 1996 the natural decrease of pop-
ulation peaked at more than 22 thousand people. During the 12 years
when the number of deaths exceeded the number of newly born chil-
dren, the natural decrease of population amounted to almost 200
thousand people, e.g., 1.9 percent of its total population. A change
in this negative trend started in 2006 and continued until 2012, a pe-
riod during which the number of newly born exceeded the number
of deaths. During this short period of time the natural increase of the
Czech population amounted to more than 49 thousand inhabitants.
However, the factor of delayed births since 2010 faded away, caus-
ing a decrease in number of births. This, together with a slight in-
crease in the number of deaths, caused the country to once again
face a natural decrease of population starting in 2013.
Migration
Migration is a very important factor in demographic trends in the
Czech Republic. The country’s migration balance has been positive
for most of the time since its independence in 1993. In 2001 the
country changed the deﬁnition of inhabitant to include foreigners who
reside in the country under so-called long-term visas or long stay
permits. This statistical change signiﬁcantly increased the number of
migrants, both those leaving the country and coming to the country.
Another impetus for increasing migration were accession of the
country to the EU (and the opening of the Czech labour market to all
the EU member states) in 2004, entry to the Schengen system (abo-
lition of border controls) and strong economic growth causing a
deﬁcit in the available workforce between 2005–2008. These factors
led to strong inﬂux of immigrants and their number signiﬁcantly ex-
ceeded the number of emigrants, thereby contributing to the growth
of the total population. So far the most prominent year in terms of
migration was 2007, when according to ofﬁcial statistics 104.4 thou-
sand people immigrated and 20.5 thousand people migrated. In this
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year net migration reached unprecedented high levels – 83.9 thou-
sand individuals. Between 2002 and 2013 net migration amounted
to 353 thousand inhabitants who represent 3.4 percent of total pop-
ulation of the country.
Figure 3. Structure of total increase, 1950-2013
Source: Czech Statistical Ofﬁce
The inﬂux of immigrants more than compensated for the natural de-
crease of population between 2002 and 2002 and added signiﬁcantly
to its increase between 2003 and 2013. While in the examined period
of 2005-2013 the total natural increase in population amounted to
41,320 inhabitants, immigration represented an increase of 296,561
inhabitants. Hence, the total population of the country increased by
337,881 inhabitants in the above-mentioned period.
Perspectives for the future
According to 2013 predictions of the Czech Statistical Ofﬁce3 for the
years 2013-2100, the number of inhabitants will be decreasing in
the country in the future. The Ofﬁce projected three scenarios (high,
3 Projekce obyvatelstva České republiky (Projekce 2013), http://www.czso.cz/csu/2013edic-
niplan.nsf/t/A6003061EE/$File/402013u.pdf
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medium and low variant) that differ by the intensity and rate of de-
crease. The medium variant is considered to be the most likely. If ex-
pectations of future development of fertility, mortality and migration
are correct, population growth in the Czech Republic will soon be re-
placed by a population decrease. According to the medium variant
projection, the population will steadily increase until 2018, when it
reaches 10.54 million inhabitants. According to the high variant pop-
ulation growth will last for a decade longer and the highest population
(10.66 million) will be reached in 2027. All increases will be recorded
due to migration. According to the results of the projection, 2012 was
the last year of natural increase of the Czech population. The low
variant estimates a decrease of the population of the Czech Republic
from the very ﬁrst year of the projection due to a stagnating low fer-
tility rate and negative migration balance at the beginning of the pro-
jection. According to all three scenarios, the most signiﬁcant
decrease of the population is expected in the period 2050-2080 re-
sulting in an expected number of inhabitants between 6.1 million and
9.1 million in 2100.
A decrease of live births will continue and the situation will not
change until the early 30s of this century, when the local minimum
expected is 78 thousand children (medium variant). Subsequent
growth will culminate in 2040 with a small secondary wave of birth
(85 thousand) that will reﬂect a higher number of children born at the
beginning of the century. The long-term projection for the period after
2040 counts on a further continuation of the decease in number of
live births to a level of around 60 thousand in 2100. Low and medium
variants of the projection describe similar trends in the number of live
births: they differ only in the level of recorded values.
Despite increasing life expectancy in all variants of the projection,
an increase in the number of deaths is expected: it will accelerate in
the thirties, when the people born in strong (post-Second World War)
baby boom years will come enter the age group with the highest mor-
tality rates. The highest number of deaths will be around 2070, with
140 thousand. A subsequent decline in the number of deaths will re-
turn the level to that observed currently (97-115 thousand).
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Very negative trends in the vital demographics of the Czech Repub-
lic could be inﬂuenced positively in the future by migration. The de-
velopment of migration is difﬁcult to predict, due to its strong external
conditionality to legislative measures, economic situation and poten-
tial source countries. According to the prediction of the Czech Sta-
tistical Ofﬁce, expected immigration from abroad is between 20-40
thousand people per year depending on the variant. The resulting net
migration as a reﬂection of the expected rate of immigration and em-
igration in the medium variant ranges from 8.6 thousand to 17.7 thou-
sand, with a high between 18.6 thousand and 25.4 thousand. In the
low variant, net migration in the early years of the projection moves
into negative territory, rising to 10.4 thousand persons. 
However, as was witnessed between 2005 and 2008, immigration
can change dramatically depending on economic development, op-
portunities for immigrants and legal regulation of immigration. In the
case of the Czech Republic most immigrants come from culturally
similar environments and integrated very quickly into society (26 per-
cent from Ukraine, 19 percent from Slovakia, 19 percent from Viet-
nam, 8 percent from Russia, 4 percent from Poland).4
In the following part of the study, dedicated to the labour market,
we will argue that vacancies – arising especially in industry – will have
to be ﬁlled by foreign workers. A very low unemployment rate and an
inability to match the demand for new labour from domestic sources
will create a demand for immigration, and the country will have to
adopt measures that will attract foreigners to move to the Czech Re-
public.
A debate on the expert and political level took place in 2007 and
2008. The conclusion was that the country need “managed” immi-
gration. The main consequence of this debate was the creation of
so-called green cards for non-EU immigrants, enabling them to get
job and residence permits through simpliﬁed procedures.
4 http://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci.nsf/kapitola/ciz_pocet_cizincu
257
Vladimír Bartovic258
Another major issue in the demographics of the Czech Republic
is the problem of ageing population. The number of working-age
population probably reached its peak in 2009 (7.43 million). In the fu-
ture, we can expect an overall downward trend. The fastest decline
will occur until 2020 (expected number is 6.69 to 6.82 million), when
baby boomers born in late 40s and in the early 50s will leave this age
category. However, weak boomers from the turn of the 20th and 21st
centuries will enter it. A more intense reduction in the number of peo-
ple of working age will begin at the end of the thirties of this century,
in connection with a shift of people from the numerically strong 1970s
age bracket, and the still relatively numerous 1980s births, over the
border of 65 years. According to the medium projection, the level of
working-age population between the years 2040 and 2060 will be re-
duced from six to ﬁve million. The proportion of people of working
age will fall from the current 70 percent to 55 percent at the end of
the century.
Contrary to this, the number of persons aged 65 and older will in-
crease until 2057, when it should culminate (almost doubling from
the current 1.7 million people to 3.2 million). The main characteristic
of the population of the Czech Republic in coming decades will
clearly be progressive ageing. The relative proportion of seniors in
the population will increase from today's one-sixth to one-third. The
mean age of the population shall increase from 41.3 years in 2013 to
almost 50 years in the sixties of this century.
The ageing of population will soon create sustainability problems in
the pension and health care systems. The dependency ratio will
reach 100 percent mid century; this means that the level of productive
population (20-64 years) will be equal to the sum of people under age
20 and above 65.
According to the current trend in the pension system (gradual in-
creasing of retirement age without an upper limit), the dependency
ratio that counts with working age people (instead of setting the limit
at 65 years) will be highest in the ﬁfties and sixties of this century,
surpassing 80 percent.
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Figure 4. Dependency ratios up to 2101 (medium variant; 1 Jan)
Source: Czech Statistical Ofﬁce, 2013 5
Socio-economic trajectory 
of the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic belongs among the most developed countries
in the world. According to World Bank data6, the country’s gross na-
tional income per capita in purchasing power parity (GNI per capita
PPP) amounted to 26,970 USD, thus placing the country at 31st place
in the world and 18th place in the European Union. Beyond economic
development, it also belongs among countries with the highest
human development. According to the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report for 20137, the
Czech Republic is 28th in the world and 15th in the EU in human de-
velopment. Both indicators also champion the Czech Republic as a
Visegrad leader in economic and human development.
Economic development
When the Czech Republic entered the EU in 2004 its GDP per capita
in purchasing power standard was at 79 percent of the EU average.
During the ten years of membership the country was not able to
5 Czech Statistical Ofﬁce (2013). Population projection of the CR up to 2100
6 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD/countries?order=wbapi_data_
value_2013+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc
7 http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
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catch up to the old members of the Union and converge toward the
EU average. The Czech economy grew quickly during the ﬁrst years
of membership, but the crisis that hit in 2009 stopped the conver-
gence process for ﬁve years. Convergence reached its highest level
in 2007, at 84 percent of the EU average. In 2013 it was 82 percent
of the EU average. The country has an economic development tra-
jectory similar to Hungary, while the other two Visegrad group mem-
bers – Poland and Slovakia – have been much more successful in
their convergence to the EU average.
While the average annual economic growth during the Czech Re-
public’s ﬁrst ﬁve years of EU membership – between 2004 and 2008
– was 5.3 percent, during the second ﬁve years it reached negative
average annual economic growth (-1.3 percent). The Czech economy
was able to return to growth only in 2014, when growth was 2 per-
cent. Long economic stagnation was caused by the world economic
crisis, but also by very strict austerity measures adopted by govern-
ment of Prime Minister Nečas that ruled between 2010 and 2013.
Czech GDP per capita in 2013 was 14,200 euro, while in 2008 it had
peaked at 14,800 euro, thus the economy is still lagging behind its
potential.
Employment and unemployment
The employment rate in 2014in the Czech Republic was 73.5 per-
cent while the EU average rate was 69.2 percent. The employment
rate grew from 70.1 percent in 2004 and the country has highest em-
ployment rate among the Visegrad countries. The Europe 2020 strat-
egy national target aims for at least 75 percent in 2020.
This target is realistic due to a very low rate of unemployment and
growing salaries that motivate more and more people to enter the
labour force. The male employment rate is considerably higher (81
percent) in comparison with the female employment rate (63.8 per-
cent). The employment gap is very profound and points to gender in-
equality in labour issues. Two main factors explaining women’s lower
labour activity are women’s lower statutory retirement age and long
parental leaves. The statutory retirement age of male and female
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population will be completely aligned only for those born in 1975 and
later (in the case of women who raised no children, for those born
after 1957; in the case of women who raised two children, for those
born after 1965). The main obstacles for women with children to enter
the labour market are the lack of affordable childcare services and
the limited use of ﬂexible working-time arrangements. Access to
childcare facilities remains among the lowest in Europe, with only 3
percent of children up to 3 years of age cared for in formal childcare,
far below the EU average of 28 percent (2012). A low level of part-
time working is another obstacle to employment: in 2014 part-time
work accounted for only 10.4 percent of female employment.
According to Eurostat data from February 2015, the unemployment
rate of 5.5 percent in the Czech Republic is the third lowest in the
EU after Germany and Austria. It had been decreasing since 2004 –
from 8.3 percent – to 2008 when it reached 4.4 percent. Thanks to
the economic crisis it started to grow again in 2009 and peaked at
7.3 percent in 2010. Unemployment among women is higher than
unemployment among men, although the gap between the genders
is smaller than in 2004.
Unemployment does not constitute a burden for the national econ-
omy as it represents mainly a regional problem and affects only cer-
tain disadvantaged groups within the population. The only region in
the Czech Republic with unemployment higher than 10 percent is the
Ústecký region of North-West Bohemia. Other regions with an un-
employment rate higher than 7.5 percent are found in eastern Czech
Republic. On the other hand, the capital city Prague is the region with
the lowest unemployment rate in the EU, at 2.5 percent (April 2015).8
Also, personnel agencies and companies report a shortage of qual-
iﬁed staff in many areas, especially those requiring technical qualiﬁ-
cations and IT specialists.9 Along with reforms to the educational
system, managed migration is considered to be a tool for how to
8 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/File:Regions_with_highest_and
_lowest_unemployment_rates_in_2014,_%25.png
9 http://www.ﬁnancninoviny.cz/zpravy/personalni-agentury-cr-bude-celit-silnemu-nedostatku-
odborniku/1175001
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tackle this issue. In 2009 the Czech Republic introduced a system of
green cards combining work and residence permits in order to sim-
plify the administrative procedures connected with employment of
non-EU workers. In 2014 the green card was replaced by a new “em-
ployment card” that further decreases the administrative burden for
employers and foreign workers.
The long-term unemployment rate is one of the lowest in the EU,
at 2.6 percent in 2014. It has been decreasing since 2004 when it
reached its maximum of 4.2 percent. Youth unemployment is also
much lower than the EU average rate, at 14.4 percent in December
2014.It is slowly decreasing. It bottomed out before the economic
crisis at 9.9 percent in 2008.During the crisis it almost doubled to
19.5 percent in 2012. The highest unemployment rate is among non-
qualiﬁed workers, at 20.7 percent in 2014 (in the age group 25-64).
This rate is quite stable; in 2004 it was 22.8 percent, it decreased to
17.3 percent in 2008 and due to the crisis it started to rise again until
it hit its maximum in 2012 (25.5 percent)after which it started to de-
crease again. 
Previous tables show that most vulnerable groups affected by the
economic cycle are young people and non-qualiﬁed workers. This
deﬁnes challenges for the future – to adopt the Czech educational
system to the needs of employers as well as to develop a system of
more efﬁcient assistance to recent school graduates in search of a
ﬁrst job.
Risk of poverty and social exclusion
The percentage of the population at risk of poverty and social ex-
clusion in the Czech Republic is the lowest in the European Union.
From 2005 until 2013 it decreased from 19.6 percent to 14.6 percent.
However, there are vulnerable groups in the population, where the
risk of poverty and social exclusion is considerably higher. In the
group of people with pre-primary, primary or lower secondary edu-
cation it is 32.4 percent (2013).This is still under the EU average (34.8
percent), but we cannot witness a positive trend like in the case of
other groups (in 2005 it was 33.8 percent). The highest percentage
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of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion can be identiﬁed in
the group of unemployed people (44.5 percent in 2013 compared to
51.21 percent in 2005). The second biggest group is single persons
with dependent children (35.1 percent in 2013), where the country
was able to reduce risk from 58 percent in 2005. After Finland this is
the best result in the EU.
The poverty rate in the Czech Republic is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by social transfers. After payment of social transfers the poverty rate
falls from 14.6 percent to 8.6 percent, which again is the lowest rate
in the EU. Government expenditures on social protection in the Czech
Republic represent 20.8 percent of GDP in comparison with the EU
average of 29.5 percent (2012). This indicates very high efﬁciency in
social transfers. The biggest problem in the Czech Republic is the ex-
panding number of socially excluded – mainly Roma populated –
communities that are characterised by high unemployment rates that
exceed the national average, restricted access to legal forms of liveli-
hood, low educational level, poor amenities, dilapidated infrastruc-
ture and higher incidences of risk behaviour. According to an analysis
from 2006, there are 30110 of these socially excluded localities, and
their number is constantly increasing11.
The government acknowledges the importance of the ﬁght against
poverty and social exclusion and set up several priorities in this area
that are included in the Social Inclusion Strategy 2014-2020 adopted
in 2011. The following priorities are deﬁned by the Strategy:
• Affordable and Professional Social Work 
• Adjustments to the social services system 
• Social beneﬁts scheme 
• Caring for vulnerable children 
• Socially excluded localities 
• Regulation of long-term care 
10 http://www.gac.cz/userﬁles/File/nase_prace_vystupy/GAC_MAPA_analyza_SVL_aAK_CJ.
pdf?langSEO=documents&parentSEO=nase_prace_vystupy&midSEO=GAC_MAPA_analyza_S
VL_aAK_CJ.pdf
11 http://www.vlada.cz/cz/ppov/zalezitosti-romske-komunity/aktuality/zprava-o-stavu-romske-
mensiny-roste-pocet-socialne-vyloucenych-lokalit-i-nezamestnanost-mladych-romu--113912/
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• Regulation of the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities 
• Social housing 
• Availability of rental housing and increased mobility of the work-
force 
• Preventing and addressing homelessness 
• Fight against indebtedness 
• Active ageing 
• Development of assisted living services 
Income distribution
The distribution of income in the Czech Republic is very even in
comparison with other EU countries. The indicator that shows the
ratio of total income received by the 20 percent of the population
with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20 per-
cent of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile) in the
country is the lowest in the EU. While the EU average was 5.0 in
2013, in the Czech Republic it was 3.4, meaning that the 20 percent
of families with the highest income have disposable income 3.4 times
higher than the 20 percent of families with the lowest income. Very
similar results arise from analyses of the so-called Gini coefficient
of disposable income distribution. The coefﬁcient provides values
from 0 to 100, where 0 means absolutely equal distribution of income
and 100, where all disposable income is in the hands of one person.
The value for the Czech Republic in 2013 is 24.6, the third lowest
level in the EU (after Slovakia and Slovenia).
Both indicators show that the Czech Republic is still a quite egali-
tarian country with a fair distribution of income and solid social poli-
cies. Both indicators are currently stable, so we do not witness any
negative tendencies that would indicate growing income disparities.
Working abroad
Although exact data on job migration is not available from the ofﬁcial
statistical resources (Czech Statistical Ofﬁce, Eurostat), studies and
indirect data (such as volume of remittances) prove that job migra-
tion from the Czech Republic abroad does not constitute a serious
problems for the Czech economy. According to Eurostat data, the
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Czech Republic does not belong among the top ﬁve immigrant
groups in any other EU countries, with the exception of Slovakia. 
Figure 5. Migration ﬂows in the Czech Republic (2004-2014)
Source: Eurostat
With the exception of 2013, net migration in the country was positive
during the whole period of membership in the European Union. During
the 10 years of EU membership total net immigration to the country
amounted to 337 thousand people. According to a study from 2009,
the most signiﬁcant impact of labour emigration of Czech citizens can
be identiﬁed among professional groups of highly skilled experts, such
as researchers, doctors or IT specialist12. According to the study, most
Czechs emigrate to Germany, the UK, the USA, Canada or Switzer-
land. Still, even in the above-mentioned areas, there are more foreign-
ers working in the Czech Republic than Czechs working abroad.
Changes in the quality of health care
Expenditures of the country on health care provision represented
7.55 percent of GDP in 2012. Their volume was gradually rising from
6.93 percent in 2004. The Czech Republic belongs to a group of
member states that joined the EU in 2004 and has among the lowest
healthcare expenditures in the EU. Among the Visegrad countries,
the Czech Republic is in third place after Hungary and Slovakia:
12 Vavrečková (2009).
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lower spending on healthcare occurred only in Poland. According
to Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
that is a part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic:
“Everyone has the right to the protection of her health. Citizens shall
have the right, on the basis of public insurance, to free medical care
and to medical aids under conditions provided for by law.”13 Public
insurance is compulsory for everybody with permanent residence in
the Czech Republic. The government makes payments to health in-
surance funds for some groups. These include children, pensioners,
people on maternity and parental leave, or registered unemployed
persons.
Even those who do not pay for healthcare insurance are entitled to
urgent care. Private expenditure on healthcare represented only 1.21
percent of GDP in 2012, placing the Czech Republic among those
countries with lowest private spending on healthcare (and the lowest
among Visegrad countries). However, there is a trend of increasing
private spending, as in 2004 it was only 0.75 of GDP – the lowest in
the EU. Previous governments attempted to secure higher contribu-
tions to the system from private sources but the Constitutional Court
declared them unconstitutional and the current government can-
celled them. Thanks to this, it is expected that the trend of increasing
private spending in healthcare will be stopped. Despite the fact that
expenditure on healthcare is among the lowest in the EU, people as-
sess the quality of healthcare positively. 
According to Eurobarometer14, 78 percent of Czechs (compared to
an EU average of 71 percent) have positive evaluations of the quality
of healthcare in the country. The country exceeds the EU average
level along other indicators as well. There are 367 practising physi-
cians per 100 thousand inhabitants in the Czech Republic. Among
the new member states, only Lithuania has a higher number of prac-
tising physicians per 100 thousand inhabitants. In 2011, there were
13 http://www.usoud.cz/en/charter-of-fundamental-rights-and-freedoms/
14 Eurobarometer (2013). Patient safety and quality of care; Fact sheet Czech Republic
http://ec.europa.eu/health/patient_safety/docs/ebs_411_factsheet_cz_en.pdf 
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684 (763 in 2004) beds per 100 thousand inhabitants in hospitals, out
of which 470 (540 in 2004) are curative. The government and health
insurance companies are trying to lower the number of hospital beds
and in-patient length of stay in hospitals: the average of 10.2 days is
the second longest in the EU (after Finland).
Education
According to the Europe 2020 strategy, there are two main indicators
in the area of education. The ﬁrst indicator is the proportion of early
leavers from education and training, while the second indicator
shows the proportion of people between 30 and 34 years of age with
tertiary (university) education. In the ﬁrst indicator the Czech Republic
performs well – with 5.5 percent in 2014 it has the fourth lowest level
of early school leaving (after Croatia, Slovenia and Poland). It is about
half the number for EU 28 and the country is fulﬁlling the national tar-
get which happens to be 5.5 percent. In the second indicator, the
country is performing bellow the EU average of 37.9 percent of terti-
ary education attainment in the given age group (30-34). In 2014 this
number was only 28.2 percent, while the national Europe 2020 target
is 32. However, we can observe a very positive trend, as this indicator
reached only 12.7 percent in 2004. Among the Visegrad countries,
Poland and Hungary are doing better, while Slovakia lags behind the
Czech Republic. The country is performing poorly in terms of the
number of students per teacher in primary education. With 18.9 stu-
dents per teacher it is in second place in the EU, after the United
Kingdom (together with France). Also below the EU average is the
share of population in life-long learning. In 2014, 9.3 percent of per-
sons aged 25-64 declared that they had received education or train-
ing in the last four weeks before the survey. On the other hand, this
indicator in the Czech Republic is the highest among Visegrad coun-
tries (Poland = 4 percent, Hungary = 3.2 percent and Slovakia = 3
percent). This indicator almost doubled from 2004 to 2011, and al-
though it started to decreasing again in the last three years, it is still
triple the average of other Visegrad countries.
In 2012 there were 440 thousand students enrolled in tertiary edu-
cation compared to 319 thousand in 2004. The country has one of
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the highest proportions of students coming from other EU countries.
In 2012, more than 28 thousand students from other EU member
states studied in the Czech Republic (this number more than tripled
in comparison with 2004, when it was only 8.9 thousand). The num-
ber of foreign students (from other EU member states) studying in
the Czech Republic is much higher than that in several times bigger
EU member states, such as Italy (20 thousand) or Poland (9 thou-
sand). Around 20 thousand of these students come from Slovakia
thanks to the practically non-existent language barrier. Slovak stu-
dents can study under the same conditions as Czech students. On
the other hand, there are 13 thousand Czech students studying in
other EU countries (in 2004 it was only 5.4 thousand).
Currently, there are intensive discussions in the country on the pro-
ﬁle of tertiary education graduates. Politicians as well as employers
criticise the country’s educational system, claiming it does not pro-
duce graduates in the areas where there is a demand for them. Ac-
cording to the criticism, there are too many graduates in social
sciences and humanities and a lack of graduates in technical sci-
ences. However, Eurostat data indicates that the career proﬁle of
graduates converges with the EU average. 
Budgetary expenditures in the social areas 
Budgetary expenditures on social protection represented 13.8
percent of GDP in the Czech Republic compared to the EU average
of 19.9 percent. Since accession to the EU the ratio to GDP increased
slightly (in 2004 it was 12.5 percent). Among Visegrad countries the
highest expenditures on social protection were spent by Hungary, fol-
lowed by Poland.
We can get another picture of the level of expenditure on social
protection if we analyse total expenditure on social protection in pur-
chasing power standards per capita. The EU average in 2012 was
7,185 euro (PPS) per capita, while the Czech Republic provided only
4,166 PPS per capita – still enough to be in ﬁrst place among Viseg-
rad countries. Similarly, the average old age pension in PPS in the
Czech Republic is highest among Visegrad countries. In 2012 it was
1,649 PPS monthly, while the EU average was 2,532 PPS. 
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Table 1. Total expenditures on social protection as a percentage of
GDP (2004-2012)
Source: Eurostat
Table 2. Total expenditure on social protection in PPS per capita
Source: Eurostat
One of the biggest challenges for the future in the Czech Republic
is the sustainability of the pension system. The dominant system in
the country is the on-going pension system. The capital pension pillar
is voluntary and the state is not doing enough to motivate people to
use it extensively for securing their pensions. The on-going pension
system is already in deﬁcit, whereby its revenues are lower than ex-
penditures every year (49.7 billion CZK in 2013 – approximately 1.8
billion euro). Although the retirement age is gradually going up, the
country will have to take further steps how to ensure the sustainability
of the pension system. There are intense discussions on the expert
as well as political levels about what kind of amendments should be
introduced to the system.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
European Union
(27 countries)
18.3 18.2 17.9 17.5 18 20 19.9 19.6 19.9
Czech Republic 12.5 12.3 12.3 12.5 12.5 13.7 13.6 13.7 13.8
Hungary 16.1 17 17.7 17.6 17.8 18.6 17.8 17.2 17.1
Poland 17.6 17 16.9 15.6 15.6 16.4 16.9 15.9 16.1
Slovakia 12.1 13.2 12.3 10.6 10.2 12.3 12.2 12 12.1
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
European Union
(27 countries)
6,079 6,312 6,530 6,709 6,970 7,218 7,329 7,591
Czech Republic 3,302 3,483 3,623 3,961 3,744 4,084 4,166 4,275 4,460
Hungary 2,969 3,253 3,523 3,641 3,754 3,691 3,896 3,913 3,880
Poland 2,272 2,339 2,479 2,672 2,890 3,134 3,323 3,358 3,367
Slovakia 2,224 2,344 2,529 2,841 3,015 3,267 3,547 3,590 3,732
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Summary and recommendations
The Czech Republic is one of the most developed countries in the
world. Apart from economic development, it also belongs among
those countries with the highest human development. According to
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Devel-
opment Report for 2013, the Czech Republic is 28th in the world and
15th in the EU in human development. Both indicators also champion
the Czech Republic as a Visegrad leader in economic and human de-
velopment. The country has one of the lowest rates of population at
risk of poverty and social exclusion in the world and belongs among
those countries with the most even distribution of income. It also has
a very low rate of unemployment, a well-functioning health-care sys-
tem and solid social protection for citizens.
The main challenges for the future development of the country arise
from its demographic trends. Thanks to the low fertility rate, the coun-
try will be facing a natural decrease of its population. Together with
the factor of ageing of the population this will lead to several threats
to its socio-economic developments, such as: shortage of qualiﬁed
labour as a prerequisite for future economic growth and sustainability
of the healthcare, pension and social protection systems. The country
should therefore take measures to increase the willingness of families
to raise children, such as social and tax beneﬁts, measures increas-
ing availability of housing and higher availability of child-care facili-
ties. Government should also continue the implementation of
measures that increase female participation in the work process and
secure gender equality in the labour market. The country also has to
adopt and implement a strategy of managed migration in order to at-
tract skilled workers from abroad.
Although the education system of the country is solid, the govern-
ment must take measures that will lead to a better correlation be-
tween the structure of graduates and the needs of the labour market,
such as scholarships or implementing a dual education system for
technical sciences. The country should also continue increasing the
share of workers with tertiary education and increase support for life-
long learning. Despite the fact that risk of poverty and social exclusion
Trends of the social situation in the Czech Republic...
is extremely low in the Czech Republic, there is a growing number of
socially excluded communities, mainly with signiﬁcant Roma popu-
lations. Government has to implement measures motivating people
living in these communities to increase their labour participation, e.g.,
through the establishment a stronger link between the level of social
protection and willingness to do community work and up-skilling. Af-
ﬁrmative actions should be taken especially in the area of access of
the young generation from the socially excluded communities to bet-
ter education. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES OF
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC – CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS FUTURE TRENDS
Boris Hošoff1
In this paper we present the characteristics of general demographic
developments with an eye to broader ageing population effects and
a labour market overview. In this regard we also analyse particular
policy measures and propose some areas of possible common in-
terests shared between V4 member countries.
According to ofﬁcial data from Statistical Ofﬁce of the Slovak Re-
public2, the Slovak Republic (SR) had population of 5,415,949 people
at the end of 2013, with the biggest regions being Western Slovakia
with 1,836,644 inhabitants and Eastern Slovakia with 1,613,672 in-
habitants. Then we have the region of Middle Slovakia with 1,347,233
inhabitants and Bratislavský kraj with 618,380 inhabitants. The Slovak
Republic has changed the concept used in demographic statistics:
the number of permanent residents was used until 2010 inclusively,
and since 2011 the arithmetic mean of the population has been cal-
culated. This change in the pattern is evident in the next table.
Table 1. Population as of December 31 (thousands of persons)
Source: Slovstat (2014)
1 Research fellow, Institute of Economic Research, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava
2 Slovstat (2014)
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
5,389 5,394 5,401 5,412 5,425 5,435 5,404 5,411 5,416
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When considering total population by age groups we can see a
rather clear trend of ageing3, demonstrated in the next Figure 1. Of
note is the development of the productive population age group (15-
64 years old), where we see divergence in the trend after 2009. This
development does not correspond with trends in the Europe as a
whole (EU-28), where the productive population actually increased
during the selected period, despite lower numbers of Europeans
under the age of 15. A possible explanation is immigration policy in
the EU. 
Figure 1. Total population by age groups (2000-2013)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
This development complicates the social and pension systems,
hence highlighting the need for comprehensive reform in this regard,
which we discuss in below. Therefore it is important and encouraging
that the trend of rather steep decline among those aged 15 years and
lower had slowed in recent years, probably indicating reversal of this
trend. If this is note the case then the only alternative to achieve
higher numbers in the productive population would be immigration.
We consider this question below.
3 As can be seen on the green line, with a rising number of people 65 years and older.
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One interesting feature is the reversal of trend between males and
females in the productive population age group (age 15-64), with two
other age groups (lower than 15 and 65+) still holding their develop-
ment trend after the year 2009. While until the year 2009 SR had more
females in working age population, after the threshold of 2009, which
marks the start of the decline in numbers of overall productive age
population, SR has at its disposal more males in the productive age
group. Declining numbers in the productive population and rising
numbers of people older than 65 years are connected to trends in
ageing, fertility and immigration. 
Encouraging, but very challenging from the state social services
point of view, is rising life expectancy at birth, which has increased
during the last decade more for males (+3.13 years) than for females
(+1.99 years), as can be seen in Table 2. This development is re-
ﬂected in a lower difference between life expectancy at birth for
males and females, which has been decreasing since 2008, when it
was around 7.88 years. It is now 6.71 years (in 2013). 
Table 2. Life expectancy at birth (years)
Source: Slovstat (2014)
Total fertility rate in Slovak Republic is amongst the lowest in the
whole European Union, where only Poland, Portugal and Spain hav-
ing worse indicators in this regard. According to Bleha and Vaňo
(2007) we can expect a gradual increase in the level of total fertility
rate by the forecast horizon of the year 2025. The most important as-
sumption is that the fall in fertility ﬁnally will abate (Figure 2), inﬂu-
enced by an improved climate and perhaps better general mood in
the population, with economic determinants leading to decreasing
fertility rates in transition economies slowly disappearing. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Females 77.62 77.83 77.9 78.2 78.08 78.73 78.74 78.84 79.35 79.45 79.61
Males 69.77 70.29 70.11 70.4 70.51 70.85 71.27 71.62 72.17 72.47 72.9
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Figure 2. Total fertility rate, Slovak Republic (1980-2012)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
A correspondingly positive trend (like that of total fertility rate) can
be observed when comparing data for total live births with total
deaths during a particular year. After 2008 the Slovak Republic ex-
perienced a positive divergence of live births from deaths.
Figure 3. Population projections (2020-2080)
Source: Eurostat
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However, a total fertility rate could anytime in the future reaching the
value of 2.1 is not to be expected in the near future, and Slovakia prob-
ably cannot count on achieving the replacement level in natural terms.
This assumption can only be turned through signiﬁcant immigration
into the population, with higher fertility rates. The same prognosis
(Bleha and Vaňo, 2007) expects a gradual increase of migration from
current low levels as determined by crises and overall aggravated ex-
pectations. This scenario is in line with similar projections published
by Eurostat, which also conﬁrm that gradual decrease of population
would be worse without the inﬂow of migrants to the Slovak Republic.
The potential of SR with regard to immigrant levels reached its top
level in 2008.When the negative repercussions of the economic crisis
disappear it is possible that levels of immigration similar to those ob-
served in 2008 will be attained in the mid-term. Emigration as well as
immigration levels have decreased in recent years, with a particularly
strong drop visible in the numbers of immigrants after the onset of
the crisis.
Figure 4. Movement of population (2000-2013)
Source: Údaje roku 2011 zohľadňujú výsledky SODB 2011
The growing difference between total immigrants and immigrants
from the EU27 diminished in 2011 and 2012, signalling a lower inﬂow
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of people from outside the EU27 to the Slovak Republic in recent
years. SR is one of those countries receiving relatively small numbers
of immigrants, with only Iceland, Liechtenstein and Estonia having
lower numbers for the year 2012. The Slovak Republic has a relatively
small numbers of immigrants when compared with other countries
of similar size or economic performance. This in combination with
low fertility rate could create problems in the future, as mentioned
earlier. According to statistics for the years 2008-2012, we have an
increasing proportion of third country nationals who were refused
entry at the external borders. These trends, combined with low fer-
tility rates and decreasing numbers in the productive population,
could create problems with regard to the sustainability of the social
system, particularly the pension system. 
Challenges and measures 
related to an ageing population
The European Commission published the Green Paper “Faced with
demographic change, a new solidarity between the generations“4 with
recommendations essential not only for the EU, but for policy in SR
in particular. This Green Paper concluded that Europe should pursue
three broad priorities: 
1) modernisation of social protection systems, increasing female em-
ployment and the employment of older workers, introducing inno-
vative measures to support the birth rate and appropriate
management of immigration; 
2) ensuring balance between generations in the sharing of time
throughout life and in the distribution of the beneﬁts of economic
growth; 
3) ﬁnding new bridges between the stages of life as young people
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to gain employment. 
An ageing population brought about by lower natality and longer
life expectancy will lead to lower numbers in the working age popu-
lation, hence we will have more pensioners than people in the pro-
4 European Commission (2005)
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ductive age bracket. That means we have to deal with the produc-
tivity of workers to sustain appropriate levels of pensions paid out.
Hence, to sustain economic growth5, we must proﬁt from technology
and other economic innovations. We have to build a framework for
sustainable growth based on knowledge, technological innovations
and more effective institutions, but still we will probably not be able
to avoid the introduction of higher taxes because of our obligations
to pensions, long-term health and social care systems. These meas-
ures and reforms will need broad support and consensus and we can
reasonably expect that pensions, health care and social issues will
be issues of higher importance for the electorate in the future. 
According to Eurostat projections6, the number of inhabitants in the
Baltic states, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
might fall by more than 10% overall between 2005 and 2050. The
largest population declines are witnessed in regions where both com-
ponents of population change (natural population increase/decrease
and net migration) are moving in a negative direction. The Slovak Re-
public, together with Poland and the Czech Republic, belong to this
group of European countries. Therefore we can conclude that a re-
versal of this trend can be reached only by strong pro-family policy
and/or pro-migration policy, which could compensate for natural de-
crease of the population.
The need for further reforms is illustrated in the development of the
old-age dependency ratio, or the population aged 65 years and older,
in relation to the population aged between 15 and 64 years. In recent
times the Slovak Republic had the lowest old-age dependency ratio
in the EU, while during the projected period 2013-2080 we will wit-
ness a dramatic shift in this regard. According to projections SR will
reach highest rate of old dependency ratio in the EU. Hence, the ur-
gency to be prepared in this regard is very important. The old-age
dependency ratio in the Slovak Republic is projected to increase well
above the EU28 average. Actually, it is projected that the Slovak Re-
public will experience the biggest increase in the whole EU28 over
the period 2013 to 2080, representing a 50.36% increase in compar-
5 Which will be probably slower than used to be before.
6 Eurostat (2008)
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ison to the EU28 average increase of 23.52%. This highlights the
need for comprehensive reform of social, pension and health care
systems, because the Slovak Republic will became the fastest ageing
country in the EU.
Figure 5. Old-age dependency ratio (2013-2080)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Pension system adequacy
The Slovak pension system consists of three tiers: a mandatory de-
ﬁned-beneﬁt pay-as-you-go scheme (pension insurance), a manda-
tory deﬁned-contribution funded scheme (old-age pension savings),
and a voluntary supplementary deﬁned-contribution funded scheme
(supplementary pension saving). The ﬁrst tier is administered by the
public Social Insurance Agency, the second and third tiers by six pri-
vate pension management companies and four supplementary pen-
sion companies, respectively. Mandatory tiers are ﬁnanced from
contributions paid by economically active persons, each at a rate of
9% from gross earnings and/or 18% of gross earnings if a person is
enrolled only in the deﬁned beneﬁt pay-as-you-go scheme. The min-
imum insurance/saving period for pension entitlements in the ﬁrst tier
is set at 15 years and is set at 10 years in the second tier. The statu-
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tory retirement age is 62 years. For men, the retirement age has grad-
ually increased from 60 to 62 years in the period 2004-2008. Women
will gradually reach the same level in 2024, depending on the number
of children raised. The pensions in the earnings-related deﬁned ben-
eﬁt scheme aim to provide an average 50% replacement rate after a
40-year working career. The level of pensions beneﬁts in the funded
scheme depends on the participant’s amount of contributions paid,
on the choice among available funds offering different level of risks
and revenue, and the performance of chosen funds. Beginning in
2015 beneﬁts will be paid out either in the form of life annuity or pro-
grammed withdrawal combined with life annuity.
Slovakia belongs to the group of EU countries with below-average
risk of poverty or social exclusion in old age. This is mainly due to low
relative monetary poverty amongst the 65+ population, which is along
with Hungary and Czech Republic the lowest in the EU. Slovak senior
citizens face a comparatively lower risk of poverty or social exclusion
than the pre-retirement population. This applies mainly to elderly men,
as women encounter a poverty risk 2-3 times more often than men in
the 65+ population.7 Obvious reasons are shorter working lives, lower
labour force participation rates and lower earnings of women.
Interestingly, in contrast to the working-age population, the income
situation of pensioners has relatively improved during the crisis, sug-
gesting that current provisions (and the pay-as-you-go system) for
the old-age population have not suffered from negative effects of the
crisis to the extent that those earning from regular work (and possibly
beneﬁts from private pensions systems) have. Between 2008 and
2013 the average pension in the Slovak Republic increased by 25%,
while the average wage increased by 14% and only slightly outpaced
the rise in prices.8 According to the European Commission the per-
centage of an average worker’s net pre-retirement income to be paid
out by a pension program upon retirement will decrease by 9.2 per-
centage points from 74.6% in 2010 to 65.4% in 2050. The evolution
7 see: Eurostat (2014)
8 see: Slovstat (2014); Sociálna poisťovňa (2014)
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of replacement rates9 will be inﬂuenced by a number of variables, in-
cluding demographic factors, economic development, labour market
performance, ﬁnancial market movements and pension system re-
forms (adjusting to various parameters like retirement age, pension
formula and actuarial corrections, or indexation of awarded pen-
sions). Future pension adequacy could be uncertain for example be-
cause of external factors such as capital markets, wage inﬂation, or
political interventions (European Commission 2012).
From pension and health care systems requirements point of view
it is important to analyse life expectancy after retirement. According
to OECD projections (OECD 2011), life expectancy of men after pen-
sion age in the Slovak Republic was among the lowest among OECD
countries, with only 14.9 years of expected life after retirement in
2010. Only Poland had a shorter retirement duration, with an ex-
pected life duration of 14.4 years after retirement. Average retirement
duration for OECD countries in 2010 was 18.5 years. The Slovak Re-
public will sustain this trend in the future, with expected retirement
duration for men in 2050 being 18.6 years, with only Poland, UK,
USA, Hungary, Denmark and Czech Republic having shorter life ex-
pectancy after retirement (OECD average in 2050 being 20.3 years).
The position of women in the Slovak Republic is much better in
comparison to men, when OECD was projecting life expectancy after
retirement for women in 2010 at 24.9 years, the highest number
among the V4 countries and also higher than the OECD average,
which predicts a life duration of 23.3 years after retirement. The
OECD expects a decline in life expectancy after retirement for women
in 2050 of one percentage point in comparison to the year 2010 (a
drop from 24.9 to 23.9 years), lower than in Poland or the OECD av-
erage (24.6 years). These trends are signalling a rather short life for
Slovak pensioners after retirement in comparison to other European
countries, highlighting the urgent need for proper development and
funding for health-care and social care for elderly systems.
9 Or effectiveness of the pension system.
Demographic processes of the Slovak Republic...
High unemployment and social inclusion
Another challenge – already mentioned several times – is the problem
of a relatively high level of unemployed people. This phenomenon
has several dimensions, from regional aspects or attained education
levels to social exclusion.
Figure 6. Unemployment rates by highest level of education
attained (age group 15-64 years, %)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Unemployment in the productive age group is strongly inﬂuenced
by the level of attained education. During the selected period there
is a slightly improved performance in the employment ﬁgures of peo-
ple with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education,
where SR has now recorded a smaller percentage of unemployed
people than at the beginning of new millennium. Especially encour-
aging was the trend after accession to the European Union, where
SR has since recorded a steep decline in unemployment levels, also
visible in the category of people with less than primary, primary and
lower secondary education. On the other hand, worrisome is the ris-
ing unemployment rate of people with tertiary and higher education.
This trend was also witnessed in Poland and Hungary. Overall, the
Slovak Republic has the worst record of unemployment structure in
all categories of attained education among the V4 countries, with an
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especially high percentage of unemployed people among those with
less than primary, primary and lower secondary education attained.
In developments within the inactive population we can identify sim-
ilar patterns in all V4 countries, especially when considering the lower
numbers in the subgroup of inactive people with pre-primary, primary
and lower secondary education. The other two groups with attained
upper secondary and tertiary education indicate growing numbers of
inactive persons, with the highest percentage increase during the pe-
riod 2000-2013 documented for the Slovak Republic, when com-
pared with the other V4 member countries. Especially worrisome is
a more than 300% increase of inactive persons with the highest lev-
els of attained education, indicating important limitations of the ed-
ucational system in terms of employability of graduates. This negative
trend is reﬂected in slightly higher overall numbers of inactive persons
(+3.75%) in contrast to other V4 member countries, where we have
witnessed a decreasing overall trend.
Figure 7. Employment by highest level of education
attained (1,000, age group 15-64)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Contrary to the inactive population, when comparing V4 countries
the overall numbers of employed persons, we can conclude that dur-
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ing the last 13 years the Slovak Republic has experienced the highest
increase of employed people within the productive population.10
Numbers for employed people with pre-primary, primary and lower
secondary education have declined during the selected time horizon
in all V4 member countries. The pattern is visible also in the subgroup
with attained upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary ed-
ucation, except in SR, where we have witnessed a 2.11% increase
in numbers. Encouraging are rather signiﬁcant increases of employed
people with ﬁrst and second stage tertiary education in all V4 mem-
ber countries. When analysing developments in the long-term unem-
ployment rates from the regional perspective, we can see rather clear
differences between Bratislavský kraj and the rest of Slovakia.
Table 3. Long-term unemployment rate (in %)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
The situation in this regard is particularly difﬁcult in the Výcho-
doslovenský kraj11 and Stredoslovenský kraj12 regions of the Slovak
Republic. This is also true when comparing them to regional patterns
of other European countries13, because of very high long-term un-
employment rates and a high share of long-term unemployed people
within overall unemployment.
10 People aged 15-64.
11 Eastern Slovakia
12 Central Slovakia
13 In the EU-28 in 2013 the percentage of the long-term unemployed among the total unemp-
loyed was approximately 47% and the long-term unemployment rate stood at 5.1%.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Slovakia 11.7 10.2 8.3 6.6 6.5 9.2 9.3 9.4 10.0
Bratislava region 2.1 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.0 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.7
Western Slovakia 8.7 7.2 5.5 4.2 5.2 8.2 7.6 7.5 7.9
Central Slovakia 13.7 12.1 11.5 9.6 8.8 10.6 10.5 10.9 12.2
Eastern Slovakia 18.1 15.9 11.8 9.4 8.7 12.3 13.3 13.5 13.8
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This clearly indicates local patterns and causalities of unemploy-
ment rates inﬂuenced by different labour market conditions in par-
ticular regions. These are accompanied by inadequate transport
infrastructure, outﬂow of talented people and low levels of FDI in the
affected eastern and southern regions of the Slovak Republic. Other
reasons for relatively low economic development include, for exam-
ple, marginal locations, which could be improved with an appropriate
strategy for border regions and targeted cross-border cooperation
for the development of business activities, development of cultural
and historical potential, development of transport and energy infra-
structure. When considering social cohesion trends according to in-
come gaps, we can identify growing inequality both from education
level attained and regional location perspectives.
From available data we can observe growing regional differences
according to education level attained, which supports the notion
about education effect on income inequality. When considering the
balance between primary income and disposable income on a re-
gional distribution, we can observe growing regional differences dur-
ing the selected time period. Primary income (ESA95, 8.22) is income
received by virtue of direct participation in the production process,
and income receivable by the owner of an asset in return for putting
the asset at the disposal of another institutional unit (the latter being
called property income). Rising differences among the households
are thus further pronounced on the regional level. Growth of primary
income had slowed in the light of the crisis, leaving Bratislavský kraj,
which has considerably fewer inhabitants than the three other regions,
behind other parts of the Slovak Republic. Differences between par-
ticular regions are now (based on 2011 data) larger than at the begin-
ning of 21st century. The same development is visible in disposable
income distribution, which better reﬂects the material well-being of
individuals and the gap between Bratislavský kraj and the rest of Slo-
vak Republic.
Eastern Slovakia (Východné Slovensko) had witnessed the slowest
improvement since the beginning of new millennium. Other regions
and SR as a whole have experienced better improvements during the
Demographic processes of the Slovak Republic...
selected period. Growing regional inequality corresponds with a
higher percentage of population belonging to the at-risk-of-poverty
category in concerned regions of Slovak Republic. Responsible au-
thorities should be concerned about the fact that the economic crisis
negated almost all improvements that occurred before the crisis, the
only exception being Bratislavský kraj, hence conﬁrming its outstand-
ing economic performance in comparison to the rest of the regions
of the Slovak Republic. 
With the exception of Stredné Slovensko14, all other regions and
Slovakia as a whole have reached a lower percentage of population
at risk of poverty than at the beginning of selected period. Neverthe-
less, after the onset of the crisis in 2008 they have experienced a re-
versal of positive trends, with the only exception again being
Bratislavský kraj. What is also worrisome is the fact that differences
between particular regions in the Slovak Republic are greater than
at the beginning of the selected period in 2005, indicating that re-
gions in SR have to tackle more diverse negative externalities than
before the crisis, hence underlining other already-mentioned regional
differences in this regard and the urgency for comprehensive policy
responses. We can see that the positive trend in this indicator was
reversed, hence creating conditions for the possible worsening of the
situation for the social inclusion and its regional patterns.
Unemployment is probably the most signiﬁcant challenge that au-
thorities in SR have to face. Even though this problem has persisted
for a rather long time, SR was unable to improve this indicator and
has still one of the highest long-term unemployment rates among EU
member countries. The European Commission is recommending the
reform of active labour market policies. This recommendation was
recognised by the government, which is ready to take further steps
in this regard. Besides education system reform, there are additional
labour market targeted measures necessary for the most disadvan-
taged jobseekers from marginalised groups of the population, young
unemployed people and also the elderly.
14 Central Slovakia
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Health care
Overall there was growing number of working posts in the SR health
care system during the years 2005-2011.At the beginning of selected
period in 2005 there were a total 16,783,21 full time equivalent (FTE)
working posts; in the year 2011 there were a total of 19,366,62 FTE
working posts in the Slovak Republic health care system. The regis-
tered numbers of working posts were recalculated based on full-time
contracts of the categories of health worker, physician and dentist.
Even though we have witnessed an overall increase during the se-
lected period 2005-2011, after the year 2009 there is evidence of a
decrease in total numbers. 
A visible decrease of FTE working posts was observed in the cate-
gory of general out-patient care units and special out-patient care
units, but also in natural curative spas and in institutes for treatment,
even though these two last categories are only marginal in terms of
the total number of working posts in health care system facilities. This
trend corresponds to a long-term decreasing trend in the category of
beds available in all mentioned units of health care, which is the out-
come of persisting overcapacity and the an effort to attain higher ef-
ﬁciency. Between the years 2008 and 2011 we witnessed a clear trend
of decreasing total numbers of in-patients, from 982,593 in 2008 to
954,024 in 2011. The quest for efﬁciency is visible in the fact of fewer
working posts per patient, as can be seen in the Table 4.
Table 4. Working posts and beds per patient (2005-2011)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
According to available data we can conclude that corresponding
to the trend of decreasing numbers of beds there is a visible increase
of patients per bed (from 19.74 to 21.64 in the selected period), as a
possible consequence of dismantling hospital over-capacities in this
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Working post per patient 57.2 55.9 45.8 53.5 49.3 49.0 49.3
Beds per patient 19.7 20.2 19.2 21.0 20.8 21.2 21.6
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regard. This trend is leading to fewer working posts and beds per
patient. If this trend is to be maintained of stabilised while maintaining
the current standard of health care service quality, authorities have
to increase efﬁciency through organisation and standardisation of
procedures performed.
The transformation of the health care system in SR during the years
2002-2006 highlighted workforce shortages, especially among spe-
cialists such as pathologists, paramedics, general practitioners, den-
tists, nurses, midwives, anaesthetists and psychiatrists. These
shortages are the results of several factors, especially the poor de-
mographic structure of the workforce, low numbers of educated pro-
fessionals and also workforce turnover in the system. These are
issues for all the EU. Statistical data which could help weigh these
shortages is not available. 
The health care sector is an important segment of the economy
from the employment point of view. The share of health and social
work employment in total employment in the Slovak Republic was
about 6.9 %in 2012, which means that about 161,300 people were
employed in this sector. Women are more dominant in this sector
than men: the share of women working in this sector among total fe-
male employment was at a level of around 12% during the period
2008-2012.
Figure 8. Share of health and social work employment 
in total employment in Slovakia (%)
Source: Slovstat (2014)
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The total numbers of employees in health care went down in 2011
and is reﬂected in selected occupations development, as shown in
Figure 9 below. Overall the trend exposes growing numbers, the only
exceptions being dentists, technicians, other health occupations, and
also nurses. In 2011 Slovakia had on average 3.3 practicing physi-
cians and 5.9 nurses per 1000 inhabitants. In comparison with EU27
and OECD countries the average numbers of nurses in SR is insufﬁ-
cient, in contrast with the average numbers of physicians, which is
approximately the same as in other developed countries.
There is a middle generation of doctors who leave for better salaries
and working conditions abroad, especially to Czech Republic, where
Slovaks have almost no language or cultural barriers. According to
the president of the Slovak Medical Chamber, the shortage of doc-
tors is manifested mainly in surgery or radiology units and in smaller
towns. Besides lower numbers in some occupations there is another
challenge for future employment, namely age structure and the fact
that health-care workforce is getting older.
An ageing population is manifesting itself especially among dentists,
with the proportion of dentists of the age 55 years and over standing
at 46.61% in 2009, compared with only 28.81% in the year 2003. 
Figure 9. Stagnant total numbers and rising ratio
of nurses aged 55 years and older
Source: Own calculation, National Health Information Centre (2014)
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Especially worrying are developments among nurses, with declining
total numbers and a growing percentage of those 55 years and older
in the total health care workforce. According to the President of the
Slovak Chamber of Nurses and Midwives, the situation is compli-
cated. Every year 1200 to 1600 nurses retire, but schools graduate
only 500, with at least 200 new nurses leaving the country to work
abroad. The average age of nurses is therefore increasing.15
The ageing population of physicists and nurses is also connected
with changes in the education system, where we are witnessing a
trend of increasing age of graduates. This phenomenon has several
consequences. One of them is a missing middle age generation
caused by migration, when many physicists and nurses have chosen
better wage conditions and work abroad, especially in the Czech Re-
public, but also in German-speaking countries, Great Britain and Ire-
land. It is estimated, than in the period 2004-2009 about 2800 Slovak
doctors, or approximately 15% of the total, went abroad. Migration
from abroad to Slovakia is minimal, and at present is limited to indi-
vidual arrivals mainly from Ukraine and foreign graduates of Slovak
universities. The number of doctors with foreign origin in the Slovak
Republic does not exceed 0.4% of the total. Data on reverse migra-
tion, i.e., doctors returning from abroad, is completely absent, al-
though estimates range up to 15% of those who departed from the
Slovak Republic.16
The driving force behind the mobility of health care professionals is
certainly higher salaries in Western Europe, but health care profes-
sionals earn more even in the neighbouring Czech Republic. Slovak
Republic cannot currently compete in this ﬁeld and from the provision
of health care point of view it is important to draw attention to the ur-
gent need to increase the wages of health care workers in SR, subject
to an increase in payments for the services of health care facilities by
health care companies. When considering the major causes of death
in SR it is obvious that the most frequent causes are the diseases of
15 Zachar (2012)
16 Zachar (2012)
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circulatory system followed by malignant neoplasms. These two di-
agnoses are responsible for almost 80% of all deaths in SR.
Other causes include non-malignant neoplasms; certain infectious
and parasitic diseases; endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases;
mental and behavioural disorders; diseases of the nervous system
and sense organs; diseases of musculoskeletal and connective tis-
sue; diseases of the genitourinary system; symptoms, signs and ab-
normal clinical and laboratory ﬁndings; certain conditions originating
in the pre-natal period; and congenital malformations, deformations
and chromosomal abnormalities. The number of deaths per cause
increased in all categories between 2001 and 2010 except for dis-
eases of the circulatory system and external causes of death, both
of them having a lower incidence in 2010 than in 2001.
Education
According to OECD data from 2012 PISA tests,17 Slovak Republic
students belong to one of the best participating countries and
economies, even though SR has one of the lowest quality of school
educational resources (ranked 55 among 64 participants). The only
exception is found in ﬁnancial literacy, where Slovak students
achieved one of the lowest scores among participating countries.
Students performance and the ranking of the Slovak Republic can
be seen in the Table 5.18
Table 5. Student performance (PISA test 2012)
Source: OECD (2012)
17 OECD (2012)
18 OECD (2012)
PISA score Rank
Mathematics 261 6/64
Reading 270 9/64
Science 260 8/64
Problem solving 251 10/42
Financial literacy 470 15/16
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The Slovak Republic has had a rather steady rise in participants in
early education (aged between 4 years and the starting age of com-
pulsory education) as a percentage of inhabitants in the correspon-
ding age group, oscillating between 75.4% and 79.3% in the
selected time period (2000 to 2012). At the same time we have wit-
nessed a clear decreasing trend in attendance in public schools, with
the percentage of students in public institutions (ISCED 1 to 4) – as
the percentage of all students in public and private institutions – de-
creasing from 94.9% in the year 2000 to 90.5% in 2012, the lowest
number during the selected period.
Figure 10. Trends in education (%)
Note: Number of students indicates category of tertiary education.
Source: Eurostat (2014)
When analysing the important category of tertiary education, the
growing trend of numbers of students (ISCED 5-6) peaked during the
years 2006-2010. In the following two years Slovakia experienced a
sharp decline in the numbers of students. On the other hand, since
the year 2005 the Slovak Republic has been experiencing a slow but
steady increase in the percentage of students (ISCED 5-6) studying
in another EU-27 country, with the biggest outﬂow of students going
to the Czech Republic. Decreasing long-term trends in the ratio of
students to teachers, as well as declining average class size could
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indicate trends towards better conditions for education. Neverthe-
less, the biggest challenge for the education system is the inade-
quate educational outcome of the children from marginalised
communities and the high youth unemployment rate, indicating lim-
itations in the labour market adequacy of the education system and
shortcomings with regard to individually tailored learning processes.
Therefore it is necessary to improve the quality and labour-market
relevance of education.
Income distribution
According to World Bank or Eurostat data, Slovak Republic has the
lowest dispersion of national income among the V4 countries and a
lower coefﬁcient than the EU-28 average. A well-known indicator of
income distribution is the GINI coefﬁcient, illustrated in Table 6,
where we can see a slightly decreasing trend in its value – an indica-
tion of a more equal distribution of income – and also the importance
of social transfers when dealing with unequal distributed income and
the possible negative repercussions of social exclusion. 
Table 6. Income distribution, 2005-2013 (GINI coefﬁcient)
Note: pensions included in social transfers
Source: Eurostat (2014)
When analysing income distribution in society by means of tenths
we can conclude, that the share of national equivalised income of
the ﬁrst ﬁve deciles is only slightly above 30%, indicating unequal
distribution in favour of tenth decile, which holds approximately 20%
of all income over the whole period. Over nine years we have not
seen any signiﬁcant changes in the distribution of income, with only
a slight increase in the income of lowest deciles at the expense of
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GINI before social
transfers
45.2 44.7 42.2 41.1 41.3 43.3 42.9 42.1 41.3
GINI 26.2 28.1 24.5 23.7 24.8 25.9 25.7 25.3 24.2
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the highest deciles directly after the year 2006. In comparison with
other V4 countries, only the Czech Republic has a lower percentage
of population at the risk of poverty or social exclusion. The Slovak
Republic achieved a rather signiﬁcant reduction of poverty risk during
the selected period. Currently Slovakia has fewer people threatened
with social exclusion when compared with the EU-28 average.
Slightly higher numbers – that correspond to EU-28 developments –
are found for the indicator of poverty and social exclusion for people
aged 6 years and less. Therefore it would be wise to pay greater at-
tention to this vulnerable group, especially when trying to break the
cycle of poverty. 
Table 7. Risk of poverty or social exclusion (% of total population)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Particularly difﬁcult is the situation of the marginalised Roma pop-
ulation. The Roma represent a large minority of the Slovak popula-
tion. According to various estimates about 430,000 Roma live in
Slovak Republic (8% of Slovak population) and about two-thirds of
them are in the productive age group. One problem is that a large
number of Roma rely on welfare beneﬁts. Further, Roma have very
low rate of employment – only one in ten Roma in the productive age
group works – resulting in poverty, which is passed from generation
to generation.19 Low education of parents negatively affects the ed-
ucation of their children. A substantial number of Roma children are
labelled mentally retarded and sent to schools for special-needs stu-
dents, which robs them of the chance to participate in the job market
in adulthood. The Roma population – including children – is rising
gradually, so the cost of welfare beneﬁts received by the Roma is ris-
19 Marcinčin and Marcinčinová (2010)
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 32.0 26.7 21.3 20.6 19.6 20.6 20.6 20.5 19.8
Less than 6 years
old
32.5 30.5 26.2 24.4 24.6 25.2 25.5 25.1 21.3
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ing too, which is further exacerbated by the failure to use their job
market potential. Society is aware of the problems of the majority of
the Roma and encourages the introduction of new strategies and
programs, allocating substantial funds for their implementation. How-
ever, the results of these programs and strategies fail to meet expec-
tations, and exclusion of Roma communities from society creates
enormous losses for Slovakia (lost opportunities), including higher
welfare costs, education, healthcare and policing. An important loss
is non-produced (and unconsumed) national product. All these losses
have a strong regional character, lowering the economic potential of
municipalities and counties and lowering the value of property of their
inhabitants. According to Marcinčin and Marcinčinová (2010), about
two-thirds of Roma resigned from seeking employment between
2006 and 2010, resulting in a very low Roma employment rate of
about 10% compared to 60% for the non-Roma population. In turn
the Roma suffer from a very high unemployment rate of about 46%
compared to 10% for non-Roma.20 We can observe substantially
higher unemployment rates in counties with higher concentrations of
the Roma population. 
The economic cost of non-inclusion of the Roma population is
staggering. According to estimates, inclusion of Roma in Slovak so-
ciety would increase annual GDP from 7 to 11%.21 This justiﬁes sub-
stantial public investment in education system reform and
Roma-oriented social projects. The main recommendations of this
study are: 
• prepare collection of ethnic-based data and a system of monitor-
ing and evaluation of Roma-oriented programs; 
• eliminate language barriers in education; 
• cancel special needs schools and place Roma children in regular
elementary schools; 
20 There is also a very high long-term unemployment rate, when up to 60% of the unemployed
have been without a job for longer than a year and 44% have been unemployed for over two
years. 
21 The main reason this number is so high is not the potential savings on social beneﬁts, but
the potential increase of the employed workforce in the Slovak Republic and a related boost
in GDP.
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• adjust labour market policies to the cultural and social speciﬁcs of
Roma minority; 
• evaluate experience with current Roma-oriented programs and
projects. 
Public finances
The Slovak Republic has made progress in the consolidation of its
public ﬁnances as was conﬁrmed by the European Commission.22
Deﬁcit correction measures brought its level under the threshold of
3% of GDP. With regard to the long-term sustainability of public ﬁ-
nances, it is important to make progress in health care reform espe-
cially. This area lags behind the pension reform which is already in
progress. The European Commission further acknowledges progress
in limiting the scope for tax fraud and tax evasion (with particular
focus on VAT) and the recommendation to broaden the tax base and
make greater use of taxes that are less detrimental to growth, for ex-
ample property taxation or environmental taxes.23
SR adopted pension reforms in 2012 to enhance long-term sus-
tainability of public ﬁnances. However, the long-term sustainability
gap remains well above the EU average. It largely reﬂects the impact
of an ageing population with a growing deﬁcit in regard to pension
expenditure (1.5 pps of GDP) and health care spending (2.0 pps of
GDP). With pension reform already underway, the main challenge will
be to reform the health-care system in order to place public ﬁnances
on a suitable footing. There should be measures taken for improving
cost effectiveness in the health care system. Anticipated challenges
in the medium and long term centre on proper planning in the health
workforce, as current trends are leading to an insufﬁcient number of
nurses and too small a proportion of general practitioners. The cost
effectiveness of health care could be improved by the standardisa-
tion of recommended clinical procedures.
22 European Commission (2012)
23 European Commission (2012)
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Figure 11. Selected indicators of general
government expenditures (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
A lower share of social protection expenditures as a portion of GDP
indicates lower engagement of government in this regard, hence con-
ﬁrming the need for more efﬁcient and targeted programs for social
protection. The rising share of health care expenditures corresponds
with the long-term trend of an ageing population and highlights the
need for efﬁciency measures to be taken with regard to over-capac-
ities and standardisation of procedures.
Social beneﬁts consists of transfers, in cash or in kind, by social
protection schemes to households and individuals, which are struc-
tured to relieve them of the burden of a deﬁned set of risks and
needs.
In the ﬁgure above the trend toward higher social beneﬁts by func-
tion biased toward old age and unemployment is clearly depicted,
highlighting the biggest challenges the Slovak Republic has to face
in this regard. It is therefore important to foster reforms in the edu-
cation system, active labour market policies, health care system and
services for older people.
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Figure 12. Structure of social beneﬁts by function
(% of total selected beneﬁts)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Conclusions
A stagnating trend in the productive population group and ageing
highlight the need for comprehensive reform in the social system, es-
pecially with regard to the pension and health care systems. Even
though pension reform was undertaken, we can still feel pressures
on public ﬁnances, which persist in the area of health care system
as well, which is still waiting for comprehensive reform. The Slovak
Republic will witness a dramatic shift and reach the highest depend-
ency rate and ratio in the EU. Hence, the urgency to be prepared in
this regard is very important. Interestingly, in contrast to the work-
ing-age population, the income situation of pensioners has relatively
improved during the crisis, suggesting that current provisions (and
the pay-as-you-go system) for the old age population have not suf-
fered from negative effects of the crisis to the extent of earnings from
work (and possibly beneﬁts from private pensions systems).
The social situation of households is complicated with persistent
high unemployment, strongly inﬂuenced by different labour market
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conditions in various regions of the Slovak Republic. These regional
differences are manifested in the polarisation of income as well, and
underline the need for strategies of regional development ﬁt for par-
ticular patterns of the regions or social groups. Differences between
the regions of the Slovak Republic are greater, hence indicating that
regions in SR have to tackle more diverse negative externalities than
before the crisis. They must strive to respond to a possible worsening
of the situation of social inclusion.
Besides the ageing population (a global trend in advanced
economies) probably the most signiﬁcant challenge SR has to face
is unemployment. Even though this problem has persisted for a
rather long time, the Slovak Republic was unable to improve this in-
dicator and stabilise the rate at least on the EU average level. The
European Commission recommendation reform to active labour poli-
cies, and this was recognised by the government, which claimed it
is ready to take further steps in this regard, particularly recognising
the need for additional targeted measures for the most disadvan-
taged jobseekers from marginalised groups of the population, young
unemployed persons and older people.
The transformation of health care system highlighted labour market
inadequacies, manifesting themselves in workforce shortages as a
result of several factors, especially the poor demographic structure
of health care workforce, low numbers of educated professionals and
workforce turnover in the system. Another challenge for the future,
besides low numbers in some occupations, is age structure and the
fact that the health-care workforce is getting older.
Looking at the situation in the education system, the biggest chal-
lenge is the inadequate outcome of the children from marginalised
communities and the high youth unemployment rate, indicating lim-
itations in the labour market adequacy of the education system and
shortcomings with regard to individually tailored learning processes.
It is therefore important to improve the quality and labour market rel-
evance of education. 
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THE LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL
SITUATION IN HUNGARY IN THE LAST
DECADE
Annamária Artner1
Introduction
The success of a country can be measured in many ways. The most
frequent indicators are level and growth of GDP and GDP per capita,
domestic spending on research and development (GERD) as a per-
centage of GDP and also foreign direct capital inﬂow and stock. Fur-
ther, the growth of export and its share to GDP, the state of the
equilibrium (balance of the government budget and the current ac-
count) and the rate of inﬂation are also used frequently.
However, as good as these indicators may be, economic success
means nothing if it doesn’t go hand in hand with the improvement of
the population’s standard of living. For describing the latter the char-
acteristics of the labour market and social conditions are the most
adequate tools. Some other aspects (e.g., education and health) are
helpful in gaining a deeper insight into the living standard of the pop-
ulation and the perspectives for its future. In the following I examine
the state and changes in unemployment, consumption, real wages,
income distribution, poverty, social protection expenditures of the
government and the structure thereof in Hungary in the last decade,
i.e., since 2004. Further attention will be given to education, demog-
raphy, migration and public opinion about the EU. The examination
of health indicators would be important too, but I will not deal with it
1 Senior researcher, Institute of World Economics – Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
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in detail, as the state of health of the population and the efﬁciency of
the system of health care are special problems for which a separate
study should be devoted. 
I am aware that even these indicators are not sufﬁcient to describe
the quality of life of a population perfectly and completely. I still think
that they by and large reﬂect the social and political situation of a
country from the viewpoint of the interests of the majority of people
living on salaries, wages and unemployment beneﬁts. 
Labour market
Unemployment – ILO definition
Eurostat works with the internationally accepted concept of unem-
ployment that was created by the International Labour Organization
(ILO). According to the ILO deﬁnition the unemployed are those peo-
ple who haven’t had even a one-hour paid job in the week prior to
the date of survey, actively sought work in the previous month and
are available to start work within the next two weeks. They also used
to be called the “active unemployed”. First we examine the Hungar-
ian labour market by using this indicator. 
Unemployment in Hungary as deﬁned above has grown consider-
ably after accession to the EU. In 2013 there were 449,000 unem-
ployed in Hungary, compared to 252,000 in 2004. The balk of this
growth derived from the crisis beginning in 2008. Between 2004 and
2007 the number of unemployed people swelled by 60,000, while be-
tween 2007 and 2010 it grew by 163,000. Following 2010 the level
remained high until 2012 when it began to decrease thanks to the ef-
forts of the government through launching workfare programs.2 The
number of unemployed persons who have taken part in these pro-
grams has grown considerably in the last year and a half (I will return
to this later). 
Even with these results the number of unemployed did not de-
crease much between 2010 and 2013. In 2013 the number of unem-
ployed people in Hungary was 26,000 or 5.5% less than in 2010.
Comparing this number with the 2004 data, unemployment has
2 They are so-called “fostered workers”.
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grown by 197,000 persons and the unemployment rate rose from 6.1
to 10.2% by 2013. Within this time period the peak of the number of
unemployed was 476,000 in 2012.
The situation of young people in the labour market has also dete-
riorated during the years of membership. The number of young un-
employed under 25 years of age was 56,000 in 2004 and 84,000 in
2013. However, their share in total unemployment had been decreas-
ing until 2011 more or less continuously. Then it began to rise and
reach the pre-crisis level (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Unemployment and youth unemployment
in Hungary (2004-2013)
Source: Eurostat
From the second half of 2013 the labour market situation has im-
proved considerably inasmuch as the number and rate of both young
and elder “active” unemployed decreased substantially. 
In May 2014 the number of unemployed persons decreased to
355,000, which equals an unemployment rate of 7.9%. The number
of unemployed youth (under 25 years of age) reached 65,000
(19.9%). The share of long-term unemployed (people who are unem-
ployed for longer than 12 months) in total unemployment was 49.5%
in the ﬁrst quarter of 2014. This rate is higher than the corresponding
EU average. Even with these beneﬁcial developments in the last one
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and a half years the numbers of both young and elder “active” un-
employed were higher in the ﬁrst quarter of 2014 than before the cri-
sis (2008). 
Unemployment – Registered unemployed
In the previous section I used Eurostat data that follows the unem-
ployment deﬁnition of the International Labour Organization. There
is, however, another indicator, prepared by the Hungarian National
Employment Service (NES) that refers to the number of people who
registered themselves as jobseekers. They are also unemployed but
may have occasional work and as such they are not unemployed ac-
cording to the ILO deﬁnition. This means that quite a number of this
category of jobseeker is not recorded in the statistics prepared by
Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce (HCSO).
On the other hand, the number of registered unemployed people
depends on some speciﬁc factors. Those jobseekers who think they
can ﬁnd a job quite rapidly are not likely to register because it re-
quires time and poses other bureaucratic burdens. People with better
qualiﬁcations, young people or those who are living in a region where
more jobs are offered (e.g., in Budapest) are less likely to apply at
the National Labour Ofﬁce for registration as jobseekers. Besides,
the advantages, which can be enjoyed by being registered unem-
ployed, inﬂuence jobseekers’ inclination for registration too. If the un-
employment beneﬁt is meaningful, it is worth making the effort,
otherwise not. In Hungary the unemployment beneﬁt was cut by the
government in 2010, which had a discouraging effect on jobseekers’
registration.
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned processes, we can assume
that the number of registered jobseekers at the NES is smaller than
the number of those who are actually looking for stable or at least
relatively stable employment. Despite this, the number of jobseek-
ers at the National Employment Service is much higher than that of
the unemployed on the basis of the ILO definition. In May 2014
there were 355,000 unemployed persons according to the ILO def-
inition while there were 514,000 jobseekers according to the data
of the NES. As mentioned above, the labour market situation
seemed to improve in the first half of 2014, thanks mainly to a de-
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crease in the number of jobseekers at NES in June 2014. As a re-
sult, the official unemployment rate (ILO-definition) was 8% in the
first six months of 2014 on average. This rate matches the pre-crisis
level. The situation is not so promising, however, if we examine how
the data on jobseekers for June of every year changed in the past
decade.
In June 2014 there were 439,000 people in Hungary who looked
for employment, according to the data of the NES. This number is
107.000 less than in June 2010 but with 23,000 more than in June
2008, i.e., before the outbreak of the crisis. Further, it is important to
know that in June 2014, 291,000 jobseekers, i.e., 57% of all jobseek-
ers received no unemployment or social beneﬁts. Their number rose
by 11.000 in two years (since June 2012) and by 68,000 in four years
(since June 2010). Relative to June 2004 the number of jobseekers
grew by 2% in June 2014. In the same period the number of unem-
ployed persons receiving no beneﬁts has more than doubled and the
number of those who receive unemployment allowances or social aid
decreased by 15% (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Number of jobseekers with or without unemployment
or social beneﬁt in Hungary in June of every year (2004-2014)
Source. Hungarian National Employment Service, Monthly detailed reports.
http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_havi_resz-letes_adatok
_2014
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Fostered workers
Since 2005 Hungary has been following the guidelines of the employ-
ment policy (“guidelines”) of the EU and has created an institutional
structure to suits it. The crisis activated those labour market institu-
tions and measures, for example the unemployment beneﬁt, which
helped to mitigate the socially disadvantageous effects of the crisis
on people. However, the decrease in the number of unemployed was
not possible until the new government restructured unemployment
policy by taking a turn toward the workfare program. Participation in
this program is compulsory for the unemployed, and those who par-
ticipate in it are called “fostered workers”. Since 2012, according to
the modiﬁed labour law, all jobs that the labour ofﬁces offer to the
unemployed persons are to be accepted by them even if the job has
much lower qualiﬁcation than the unemployed person has. Those
who do not accept the job lose the social beneﬁt that amount to ap-
proximately 76 euro per month in 2014. Three years ago this beneﬁt
was higher, but in order to motivate unemployed people to work the
conservative government decreased it by 20% from 2012 on. 
The workfare program has involved more and more unemployed
people since 2010, reaching 129.100 people on average in 2013 and
178,700 people on average in the ﬁrst half of 2014.3 This is an ex-
ceptionally high number since the program has been launched and
this is the reason why the ofﬁcial unemployment was considerably
lower in May and June 2014 (see Table 1).
In Hungary the minimum wage is approximately 330 euro per
month, and the average gross monthly earnings of workfare workers
is 75-80% of that. This means a net monthly income of approximately
170 euro, which is less than 60% of the minimum subsistence for a
single person that is given by the HCSO.4 The workfare program of-
fers cheap labour to the government and to those private sector em-
ployers who take part in the program. The unemployed, especially in
disadvantaged regions where regular and formal employment can
hardly be found, are usually thankful for the possibility of secure em-
ployment in the program and they hope it will continue. 
3 HCSO (2014a)
4 HCSO online database Table 2.2.12. (Minimum subsistence since 1990, HUF/month)
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_zhc011.html
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Table 1. Labour data of fostered workers in Hungary 
(2010 – May 2014)
Source: HCSO. KSH Gyorstájékoztatók, Keresetek
http://www.ksh.hu/keresetek_tn
The labour market policy of the government
The above-outlined developments reﬂect the socio-economic con-
cept of the new government (since 2010) that is built on the principle
of the so-called “work-based society”. As such, so-called “passive”
labour market policy (LMP) measures – unemployment beneﬁts, early
retirement – have been scaled back and the structure of so-called
“active” measures – that aim at employability and job creation – has
been changed. 
Regarding labour market policy expenditures of the new govern-
ment since 2010, the absolute level of expenditures has been re-
duced with the exception of direct job creation (i.e. workfare) and
employment incentives (allowances given to employers). The gov-
ernment spent more than the half of the total LMP expenditures on
the latter two types of actions in 2012. In 2013 the budget of the
workfare program was further raised to more than 180 billion HUF
(approximately 600 million euro). 
On the other hand, the role of training and education of the unem-
ployed within labour market policy has signiﬁcantly weakened in the
last couple of years. In 2008-2009 54-55 thousand unemployed took
part in some kind of training and education programs each year. This
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2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 Jan-May
monthly average
Number of employees (thousands) 87.4 60.9 90.8 129.1 178.7
Of which: Number 
of full-time employees
67.9 20.3 72.4 111.5 176.0
Number of part-time employees 19.5 40.6 18.4 17.6 2.7
Average gross monthly earnings
of full time employees (HUF) 
75,427 78,369 73,151 76,846 78,051
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number shrank to 36-47 thousand in 2011-2012.5 Between 2004 and
2010 the previous governments spent an average of 50 million euros
a year on labour market training. In the following years this amount
fell radically, equalling only 3.4 million euros in 2012.6
Cutbacks of the passive measures in labour market policy have
also been radical after 2010. The maximum amount of the unemploy-
ment beneﬁt was cut from 120% of the minimum wage to 100%. The
time span for receiving unemployment beneﬁts has been reduced by
two-thirds, from 270 to 90 days. The result, as I have already stated
above, is that fewer people get less unemployment beneﬁt for a
shorter period of time, with the share and number of unemployed
getting no unemployment or social beneﬁt having increased (see Fig-
ure 2). On the other hand, the number of those who are involved in
the workfare program and receiving very low wages has risen (see
Table 1). As a result, it seems that in the slogan of the government’s
“work-based society” the word “work” is used instead of “cheap
wage-labour”. This is also reﬂected in the decreasing real wages in
the public sector and increasing wage differentials within the labour
market.
Social conditions
Consumption, real wages and income
First of all, it is worth casting a glance at Figure 3. This shows how
the growth of real wages, real income and consumption has slowed
down after 2003. They even turned into a decreasing trend following
2006 when the government was forced to apply an austerity policy
because of a huge budget deﬁcit. Here I should note that the year
2006 was an exceptional one, as in that year the government deﬁcit
grew extremely high, reaching 9.6% of the GDP. For this reason a
quick and strong adjustment was necessary; it was carried out at the
expense of the population. However, in the years following until 2010
government policies more or less paid attention to the interests of
5 Tajti (2009, 2012)
6 Eurostat Online, Statistics by theme, Labour market, Labour market policy, Public expendi-
ture on labour market policy (LMP) interventions.
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the most helpless strata of society. Even this was not enough to sat-
isfy the needs of the population. The shock of the crisis in 2008 and
the following austerity policy resulted in a change in government at
the 2010 elections. However, social conditions haven’t improved
since the inauguration of the new government.
In 2012 consumption and real income of the Hungarian population
were below 2004 levels and real wages in 2013 were only by 6.6%
higher than they were ten years earlier.
Figure 3. Real wages, real income and consumption in Hungary 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from the Hungarian Central
Statistical Ofﬁce, http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_hosszu/h_
zhc001.html KSH STADAT rendszer: 3.2. A háztartások jövedelme és fo-
gyasztása (háztartási szektor makroszintű mutatói). (1960–)
Figure 3 shows an upward trend in all three indicators between
1996 and 2007. This, however, hides the differences between various
strata of society. The increase of the general level of real wages, in-
come and consumption doesn’t mean that these indicators grew for
all citizens. Differences have increased quickly in recent years. 
This will be discussed in the following chapters.
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Growing wage differences 
within the group of employees
The real value of net labour incomes increased in the ﬁrst years after
accession to the EU and since 2006 has been more or less the same.
However, the differences within the group of employees have
widened. 
First, since 2006 the average private sector wage grew faster than
that of the public sector. In the year of accession (2004) state em-
ployees earned 16.2% more than private sector employees. In 2009
the wages of these two sectors were essentially equal, and since then
public sector wages have been gradually lagging behind the wages
of the private sector and equalled 88.2% of the private sector aver-
age in 2013. What is more, by correcting this data with consumer
price inﬂation we ﬁnd that the real wages of the public sector have
been decreasing since 2006 and in 2013 were under their 2004 level
by 11%. In the same period of time, i.e., between 2004 and 2013,
the real wages of the private sector grew by 17.6 %.
Second, the ﬂat income tax rate that was introduced in 2011 by the
new government favoured the highest wage earner groups dispro-
portionally in every sector of the economy and caused increasing in-
come inequality in society as a whole. I will discuss in more detail
below. Third, between 2004 and 2013 the average gross compensa-
tion of all employees (public and private together) grew by 63% in
nominal terms while consumer prices went up by 60.8%. This means
that the real value of labour compensation on average has strength-
ened only by 1.3%, and in some branches has even decreased. The
latter, as I have mentioned above, is characteristic of the public sec-
tor. Those who are employed as medical staff or social workers lost
more in real terms. Employees in trade and construction industries
enjoyed the highest real increase of their wages.7
Fourth, the gap between the wages of blue and white collar workers
has widened in all sectors. Blue collar employees in the public sector
have suffered the largest deterioration both in their absolute and rel-
ative position (Table 2).
7 HCSO: 2.1.40. Azalkalmazásbanállókrendszereshavibruttóátlagkereseténekalakulása a nem-
zetgazdaságban (2004–) http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_qli022.html
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Table 2. Net earnings of blue and white colour
workers in Hungary by main sectors 2008–2012
Source: HCSO online statistics, STADAT. „Munkaerőpiac. Idősoros éves
adatok.”(Labour market. Annual data.) Table 2.1.45.and 2.1.46. http://www.ksh.
hu/stadat_eves_2_1
Finally, the gender pay gap was over 20% in the 1990s. Until 2006
this gap had narrowed considerably, reaching 14.4% in 2006. Fol-
lowing that year the gap began to rise again and reached 20.1 in
2013, which was the fourth highest rate within the Central and East-
ern European member states of the EU after Estonia, the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia, and the sixth highest in the EU28.8
Divergence of wage-groups is not the only problem. It is accom-
panied by growing poverty, social exclusion and income differences. 
Poverty, social exclusion and income distribution
The labour market situation is always in signiﬁcant connection with
the state of poverty. These two social factors also reﬂect the class
content of the policy of a government. In Hungary, as we have seen
above, the unemployment decreased in the last few years, but the
support that the government has been offering for the unemployed
people in the form of unemployment and social beneﬁts has dimin-
ished even more. This situation leaves many people without help and
8 Eurostat Online, Statistics by theme, Labour market, Earnings, Gender pay gap in unadjusted
form.
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Rate of net earnings,
percent
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2008-2012 change in
percentage point
Blue-collar/white-collar,
total economy
57.6 58.2 57.5 54.8 52.7 -4.9
Blue-collar/white-collar,
private economy
53.7 53.3 53.0 47.8 46.8 -7.0
Blue-collar/white-collar,
government
62.9 62.3 59.4 64.1 54.6 -8.3
Government/private
economy, white-collars
85.1 79.5 79.2 69.4 67.4 -17.8
Government/private
economy, blue-collars 
99.7 92.9 88.8 93.2 78.6 -21.1
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hope although the head of government that gained a two-third sup-
port on the last two elections (2010 and 2014) promised that “we
leave nobody behind”9. To be honest, he said it in connection with
the families that are indebted in foreign currency and there are not
many such families among the poorest ones.
Table 3. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion
between 2005 and 2013 (percent of the population)
Source: Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income, social inclusion and living
conditions
In 2013 more than one third (33.5%) of the Hungarian population
was at risk of poverty or social exclusion, which is among the highest
rates in the EU and it is also higher than the average rate of the new
member states (NMS12). Besides, this rate is bigger than it was in
2005 in Hungary (earlier data are not available in Eurostat) when it
stood at 32.1%. Within the period of 2005-2013 the number of the
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion was the lowest in 2008
with 2,794 thousand. Since then the number has been continuously
9 The Prime Minister’s video massage: https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=10150
311565624836
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total population
EU28 .. .. .. .. .. 23.7 24.3 24.8 ..
EU27 25.7 25.3 24.4 23.7 23.2 23.7 24.3 24.8 ..
NMS12 41.0 38.0 35.0 31.7 30.6 30.8 30.6 30.7 ..
Hungary 32.1 31.4 29.4 28.2 29.6 29.9 31.0 32.4 33.5
Less than 6 years old
EU28 .. .. .. .. .. 25.6 25.4 25.9 ..
EU27 26.6 25.7 24.5 24.6 24.6 25.6 25.4 25.9 ..
NMS12 42.4 39.4 35.7 31.7 31.3 31.4 31.3 30.7 ..
Hungary 36.9 37.7 33.8 31.7 37.0 37.1 36.8 39.1 42.4
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growing and reached 3,285 thousand in 2013 which is one hundred
thousand more than eight years ago and with 491 thousand more
than in 2008. Children under 6 years of age are even more affected.
For them the above mentioned rate of risk was 42.4% in 2013, the
highest since 2005 in Hungary and the third highest rate in the EU
after Bulgaria and Romania. In 2013 there were 24 thousand more
children at risk of poverty and social exclusion than eight years earlier
(Table 3.).
Another important indicator concerning children and thus referring
to the state of living standard of the population is the infant mortality
rate. This decreased almost continuously in the 2000s, with the ex-
ception of 2007 when it increased a little (by one percent only) and
then has fallen again. This favourable long trend broke in 2011. Be-
tween 2011 and 2013 the infant mortality grew by 21,000 or 4.8 %.10
Material poverty is measured by the share of persons with an in-
come below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the
national median equivalised disposable income. This is the so-called
at risk-of-poverty rate. This is measured both before and after receiv-
ing social transfers. The good news is that in Hungary the share of
the population that lives under this threshold before receiving social
transfers has been decreasing (Table 4). However, the picture alters
signiﬁcantly if we take a look at the rate of those who live under the
poverty threshold after social transfers. Surprisingly, this rate has
been growing in recent years. In 2013 after social transfers 1.4 million
people were below the risk-of-poverty threshold. This is the highest
number since 2005 with the exception of 2006 (Table 4). With these
two rates it is possible to calculate the rate of those whom the social
protection system frees from poverty. This is also presented in Table
4. This rate increased from 2005 until 2008. Since that year it has
been declining and its decline has been accelerating since 2010. The
rate of the population whom the social policy lifts out of material
poverty was the lowest in 2013 (since 2005).
10 HCSO online database, Table 6.1.4.http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_
wdsd006.html
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Table 4. At risk of poverty rate before and after
social transfers in Hungary (2005-2013, percent)
Source: Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income and living conditions, Mone-
tary poverty.
Similar tendencies are to be found when examining the number of
severely materially deprived people, i.e., those whose living condi-
tions are severely constrained by the lack of resources.11 Their num-
ber decreased from 2.3 million (22.9% of the population) in 2005 to
1.8 million in 2008. After that year, however, the number of people
within this group began to rise and reached more than 2.6 million in
2013 (26.8% of the population).12
The Gini coefﬁcient is the generally accepted measure of income
inequality. In the case of Hungary this coefﬁcient was unusually high
(33.3%) in the exceptional year of 2006 but then had eased down to
24.1% in 2010. Since then inequality has been on rise again, reaching
28% in 2013.13 The distribution of income by income deciles presents
the “perverse redistribution” after 2010 even more clearly. Between
11 Those people, who – according to the Eurostat deﬁnition – “experience at least 4 out of 9
following deprivations items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately
warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, ﬁsh or a protein equivalent every second
day, v) a week holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or
ix) a telephone.” See Eurostat Europe 2020 indicators explanatory notes. http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/headline_indicators
12 Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income and living conditions, Material deprivation.
13 Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income and living conditions, Income distribution and mone-
tary poverty.
GEO/TIME 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
At risk of poverty
rate before so-
cial transfers (A)
29.4 29.6 29.3 30.4 28.9 28.4 28.9 27.1 26.3
At risk of poverty
rate after social
transfers (B)
13.5 15.9 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3 13.8 14 14.3
Rate of those
whom the social
sytem help (A-B)
15.9 13.7 17.0 18.0 16.5 16.1 15.1 13.1 12.0
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2005 and 2010 the share of the bottom nine income deciles in the
national income grew and the share of the tenth decile, i.e., the rich-
est 10% of the population, lessened. After 2010 the trend reversed.
Between 2010 and 2013 only the ninth and tenth deciles saw their
positions improve and the upper 10% of the population has gained
the most. All the other deciles lost and the ﬁrst decile, the poorest
ten percent of the population, lost the most (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Distribution of the national income by income deciles in
Hungary 2005-2013 (changes in percentage point)
Source: Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income and living conditions, Distri-
bution of income, Distribution of income by quantiles.
As a consequence, the ratio of the tenth decile to the ﬁrst one in-
creased from 4.8 to 6.5 between 2010 and 2013. Before 2010 the
trend line was the opposite, even despite the unhappy year of 2006
when for the above-mentioned reasons income distribution deterio-
rated signiﬁcantly but was quickly corrected afterward. 
The social policy of the government
How is the government dealing with the impoverishment of the lower
strata of society? In the last few years the government did very little
to prevent this compared with the efforts to push the public deﬁcit
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under three percent, which it did successfully. Besides, the govern-
ment aims to reduce national debt and retrieve a substantial part of
the economy from foreign owners and into Hungarian private and
public hands. Regarding these goals the principles of “who doesn’t
work shall not eat” and the “work-based society” are coupled with
the eventuality of dismantling the social protection system.
According to Eurostat data14 the social protection expenditures of
the Hungarian state were equal to 17.1% of the GDP in 2012. That
rate is the lowest since 2006 and is substantially lower than the av-
erage of the EU28 (19.9% in 2012). In 2012 the level of social pro-
tection expenditures was only 0.5% higher than in 2009, meaning a
decrease in real terms (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Structural change* in government expenditure
in Hungary: government expenditure as a share of GDP
(change in percentage point)
* Note: 1. Recreation, culture and religion; 2. Economic affairs; 3. Health; 4. Environment
protection; 5. Public order and safety; 6. Defence; 7. Housing and community amenities; 8.
Education; 9; General public services; 10. Social protection.
Source: Eurostat Statistics by theme, Government statistics, General gov-
ernment expenditure by function
14 Eurostat Statistics by theme, Government statistics, General government expenditure by
function.
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Since 2004 the structure of the social protection expenditures has
changed at the expense of the poorest people. The most disadvan-
tageous developments in this respect happened after 2009. Between
2009 and 2012, within the social protection expenditures, only old
age pensions and beneﬁts to survivors gained bigger shares and
sums, whereas the amount of money devoted to sickness, disability,
family and children, housing, unemployment, social protection and
exclusion (not speciﬁed elsewhere) decreased. The government
saved close to 400 billion HUF (1.3 billion euro) on these latter items
in 2010, 2011 and 2012 together (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Structural change in social protection expenditures
of the government in Hungary 2004-2009 and 2009-2012
(change in million HUF)
* Note: 1. Old age; 2. Sickness and disability; 3. Family and children; 4. Survivors; 5. Unem-
ployment; 6. R&D Social protection; 7. Housing; 8. Social protection and social exclusion
n.e.c.
Source: Eurostat Statistics by theme, Government statistics, General gov-
ernment expenditure by function
Education
In the last two decades the participation rate in education for the 15-
24 years of age cohort has been growing faster in Hungary than in
the EU on average. Before 2004 the Hungarian participation rate was
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lower than the average of the EU27. In 2004 the rates were equal,
and then the Hungarian rate continued to rise. In 2012 66.6% of the
Hungarian population aged 15-24 years participated in formal edu-
cation compared with 62% in the EU28. The Hungarian rate was the
ninth-highest in the Union. This is partly thanks to the extension of
the private education sector in Hungary that originated in the reform
processes of the 1990s, when the establishment of private schools
on all levels of education became possible. Further, persistent un-
employment has also inspired young people to learn more and for
longer as participation in post-secondary and tertiary education
(ISCED 4-6) is an advantage in ﬁnding better-paid jobs after ﬁnishing
school and also serves as a means of avoiding unemployment for
some time. 
In the ﬁrst years of EU-membership (between 2004 and 2007) and
in 2010 government spending on education relative to the GDP was
higher than the EU27average. In 2012 the Hungarian rate decreased
to 4.8%,which is considerably lower than the average of the EU and
one percentage point lower than at the time of accession to the EU.
Again, similarly to other disadvantageous social developments, most
of the decrease happened in 2011 and 2012, when the conservative
government that was elected by a two-thirds majority withdrew 789
million euros from education. As a result, the money devoted to ed-
ucation in 2012 is the lowest since accession to the EU and 85 million
Euros (or 1.8%) less than in 2004. With this Hungary is one of the
two member states that spent less money on education in 2012 than
in 2004. The other country is Portugal where the decrease was 7.2%
in the same period. The EU as a whole (without Croatia) increased
education budgets by 24.1% between 2004 and 2012, although the
absolute level of expenditures stagnated in 2011 and 2012.15
Between 2004 and 2008 the ratio of students to teachers at the
ISCED 1-3 level decreased: after that it increased and became higher
in 2012 than in 2004. The rate of early school leavers from education
and training aged 18 to 24 years who ﬁnished the level ISCED 3 less-
ened considerably until 2010 and then began to grow. This means
15 Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Government statistics, General government expenditure by
function.
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that in the last three years Hungary has rolled away from the Europe
2020 target on education according to which the rate of early school
leaving is to be reduced to below 10% (Table 5).
Table 5. Some indicators of education in Hungary 2004-2013
Source: Eurostat online, Statistics by them, education and training, Educa-
tion indicators - non-ﬁnance
According to PISA assessments between 2000 and 2009 the per-
formance of the Hungarian 15-year old pupils improved in reading
literacy and did not change significantly in mathematics and sci-
ence.16 In 2009 the scores of Hungary in all fields were around the
16 Halász (2011)
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Participation rates
in education,
ISCED 1-6, aged
15-24 years (%)
59.7 61.6 62.6 63.7 64.5 64.6 65.6 66.3 66.6 n. a.
Ratio of students
to teachers,
ISCED 1-3
11.0 11.0 10.9 10.8 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.3 11.3 n. a.
Early leavers from
education and
training, from 18
to 24 years (%)
12.6 12.5 12.6 11.4 11.7 11.2 10.5 11.2 11.5 11.8
Entrants at theo-
retical starting
age in ISCED
level 5 as % of all
persons of the
corresponding
age group
12.3 12.7 11.8 11.8 11.2 9.3 9.1 8.0 6.9 n. a.
Entrants at the
theoretical start-
ing age in ISCED
level 5 as % of all
entrants in ISCED
level 5
15.2 15.3 14.2 14.9 15.4 13.7 12.5 10.8 9.3 n. a.
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OECD average.17 The results of the assessment in 2012 showed
considerable deterioration.18 On the basis of this data and indicators
of the social conditions in Hungary, the balance of the last decade
shows a negative result at the end of the period.
Demographics, migration
and the judgement of the EU
Similar to the general trend in Europe, Hungary’s population has been
decreasing for decades, by approximately 35-40 thousand persons
per year. The number of marriages per thousand inhabitants has
been decreasing and more than half of marriages end with divorce.
While the birth rate is low and decreasing, more and more children
are born outside marriage. Although these trends are naturally results
of socio-economic development in general, they reﬂect not only pos-
itive developments. 
Contrary to more developed countries, where net immigration fre-
quently outnumbers the natural decrease of the population, Hungary
doesn’t attract enough foreigners. What is more, in the last years the
number of emigrants has risen as a consequence of growing unem-
ployment (due to the crisis) on one hand and the opening of the Ger-
man and Austrian labour markets on the other. There is no reliable
data on emigration. Politicians and newspapers speak of about 300-
500 thousand or even more, while the Central Statistical Ofﬁce puts
this number at 95.000 in the ﬁrst quarter of 2014. The HCSO also
stated that emigration showed an upward trend between 2011 and
2013 but now seems to have halted: emigration in the ﬁrst 3 months
of 2014 was not higher than a year ago.19
The general feeling among people, however, is that many Hungar-
ians under 40 years of age are leaving or at least planning to take
their chances in some Western-European country to ﬁnd a better-
17 Reading: Hungary 494, OECD 493. Mathematics: Hungary 490, OECD 496. Science: Hun-
gary 503, OECD 501.https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AoBYy67Qwoevd-
HIyc2Rha2VYamZ0LUl0Xy1TdUszRkE&usp=sharing#gid=2
18 Reading: Hungary 488, OECD 496. Mathematics: Hungary 477, OECD 494. Science: Hun-
gary 494, OECD 501.https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AoBYy67Qwoevd-
HIyc2Rha2VYamZ0LUl0Xy1TdUszRkE&usp=sharing#gid=0
19 HCSO (2014b), p. 2.
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paid job. The amount of the money in euro that Hungarians can earn
in more developed member states of the EU inspire them, as well as
other Eastern Europeans, to work in them at least for a while. 
The above is especially true for young people in general and par-
ticularly for those students who have had the possibility to get ac-
quainted with life abroad thanks to the EU student exchange program
(Erasmus). According to the last Eurobarometer results, Hungarians
appreciate the Erasmus program of the EU quite a lot. 30% of those
surveyed stated that the Erasmus program is the most positive result
of the EU against 23% on average in the EU28.20
The opportunity to work and study in other EU countries likely
played a role in the growing popularity of the EU in Hungary in recent
years. Optimism concerning the future of the European Union has
grown and became the majority view in Hungary (53% in spring 2014
vs. 44% in autumn 2013). A growing proportion of Hungarians (59%
in spring 2014) feels that they are citizens of the EU too. Optimism
regarding the crisis on the job market has also been increasing, and
Hungary was among the four most optimistic EU member states in
spring 2014 in this aspect. 61% of respondents thought that the cri-
sis in the job market had already reached its peak.21 Still, 46% of re-
spondents felt they could fall into poverty, which is the ﬁfth-highest
rate in the EU28.
Changing governments – changing concepts
Although the crisis has played a crucial role in the changes in the
labour market and in the social conditions of the majority of em-
ployed and unemployed people, the effect of the policies of Hungar-
ian governments cannot be neglected in these processes. As I have
presented above, the most disadvantageous developments for the
most vulnerable strata of the society happened after 2010, when the
bulk of the negative effects of the crisis had already passed. Since
2010 new legislations have come into force. Their essence shows a
clear preference for the upper-middle and – even more so – the top
20 EC (2014a), p. 4.
21 EC (2014b), pp. 11., 22., 27., 29.
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income strata. The negligence of education disadvantageously af-
fects foremost the lower-income segments of the population.
The governments ruling before the crisis were convinced that the
best direction of the country’s development and its successful inte-
gration into the world economy was to make Hungary a place where
globalized capital ﬁnds it worth producing and investing in. This re-
sulted in a neoliberal policy where the largest companies could ex-
ploit the incentives of the government most successfully and where
either the manufacturing and service industries or ﬁnancial institu-
tions could gain substantial proﬁts from their operation. This strategy
was justiﬁed by the increasing stock of foreign direct investments
(FDI) in the country and also with the relatively high rate of GDP
growth. In the 2000s the stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP in Hun-
gary had been among the highest of the new member states of the
EU, being surpassed by Bulgaria and Estonia only. After accession
to the EU the annual growth of the Hungarian economy was around
4% until 2007. 
EU membership has supported these processes and the strategy
of these governments seemed to be on track in terms of increasing
real incomes, salaries and consumption. This was, however, a short
period of time, and was fuelled by the ﬁnancial (credit) bubble that
the same governments allowed to take place, rather irresponsibly.
First, the immense budget deﬁcit in 2006, then the subsequent col-
lapse of economic growth in 2007 and ﬁnally the outbreak of the cri-
sis in 2008 questioned the validity of the neoliberal model, especially
because the growth of the economy that was led by external factors
had gone hand in hand with the indebtedness of private households.
These factors made the failure of the neoliberal economic policy in-
evitable. 
Still, as the data above has illustrated, the neoliberal governments
paid attention to the problems of the most vulnerable strata of the
society and did their best in the frame of the global capitalism to re-
distribute incomes in favour of lower income groups. In this sense
the governments before 2010 can be called “left-neoliberal”. What
they did, however, was far from satisfactory for people living on
wages, salaries or social beneﬁts and carrying the burden of the cri-
sis. The reason for this is that in the meantime the Hungarian econ-
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omy has become “empty”. National capital has been forced back by
the market processes and/or has not been able to grow out from the
small and medium-sized enterprise sector because of the stronger
competitiveness of the much larger foreign companies. Thus, the
Hungarian economy with its national capital has become strongly de-
pendent on globalized “foreign” capital. This model of development
is a natural and frequently repeated mode of integration into the
world economy by less developed countries. It is also true for bigger
countries, for example Brazil. Larger countries, especially if they are
well-endowed with natural resources, seem to have a larger playing
ﬁeld and more possibilities to stand on their own feet. However, even
they need partners in order to catch up, as the cooperation between
the large and dynamic BRICS countries proves.
Returning to Hungary, the new conservative (or “right-neoliberal”)
government was able to win the last two elections on the wave of
general social dissatisfaction that was caused by the weakness of
the national economy and the lack of perspective for a stable future
for those who can make a living from selling their labour only.
Since 2010 the new government has changed the strategy of na-
tional development, but not completely. The government endeavours
to turn, at least partly, the supportive power of the state towards na-
tional capital instead of the foreign capital. This does not mean giving
up neoliberal principles. First, the new government has been sup-
porting foreign investments in the manufacturing sector. Second, it
has been creating an environment that offers good proﬁt opportuni-
ties to both national and foreign capital by creating a low wage envi-
ronment and a weakly protected labour market. 
From the viewpoint of the labour market, however, these two di-
rections have the same consequences: the share of the labour in
added value inevitably decreases, as this stimulates competitiveness. 
Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to assess the state of the Hungarian labour
market and social conditions since accession to the EU on the basis
of statistical data available in Eurostat and Hungarian Central Statis-
tical Ofﬁce databases. The majority of the indicators show an inverse
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U-turn from the viewpoint of the majority of the population. This
means that most of the indicators improved in the ﬁrst half but dete-
riorated in the second half of the examined period. The most recent
values of the examined indicators in most of the cases are worse
than those at the beginning of the examined decade. 
In some cases, for example the number of unemployed people, the
turning point is the year of the crisis and the concomitant austerity
policy of the government. However, the ﬁrst three years of the crisis
don’t explain the recent state of labour market properly. For most is-
sues deterioration happened or worsened after 2010, when the new
government with its new socio-economic concept came to power. 
The concept of the new government is to build the economy of
Hungary on stronger national capital with the help of more and
cheaper labour. This policy does not contradict the rules of the mar-
ket. What’s more, it is rather liberal in the sense that it favours the in-
terest of company owners. The core of competitiveness is unit labour
cost. With increasing productivity, i.e., strong investments in tech-
nological innovations, ULC can be cut back so that in the meantime
the level of the compensation of employees and hence their standard
of living increase or at least do not decrease. However, in the ab-
sence of or insufﬁcient level of technological progress the growth of
productivity cannot substitute for the absolute decrease of wages.
To increase productivity, however, a substantial amount of capital is
needed: an amount that weaker companies don’t have. 
To help smaller, technologically less developed, less competitive
ﬁrms, like the national capital of a small country usually is, a govern-
ment has to decrease the unit labour cost by pushing down the ab-
solute level of wages. Domestic companies are technologically and
ﬁnancially less developed than the large, globalized foreign compa-
nies used to be. This means that competitiveness of national capital
can be developed by decreasing the unit labour cost through the ab-
solute decrease of the labour costs. 
The result of this “national capital-minded” economic policy is re-
ﬂected in the labour market and social situation of Hungary and in
the unequal redistribution of national income in favour of the better-
off strata of society. As a consequence, the ratio of the compensation
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of employees as a share of GDP decreased from 46.8% in 2007 to
45.5% in 2013. Those who produce the added value receive less and
less of it. This strategy is however beneﬁcial for foreign capital too,
at least in the short run. In 2012 the inﬂow of FDI to Hungary hit an
all-time record high level and Hungary attracted the most foreign
capital after Poland within the Central and Eastern European EU
member states in the four years between 2010 and 2013.22
In the longer run, increasing inequalities, the growing number of
poor people within the society and the worsening conditions in edu-
cation and healthcare will backﬁre by creating a morally, intellectually
and physically ill society in which less proﬁt can be generated both
for foreign and national capital.
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PROSPECTS OF THE VISEGRAD
COOPERATION IN CHANGING
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
CONDITIONS – IDENTIFYING CONVERGING
AND DIVERGING FACTORS
Judit Kiss1
Visegrad cooperation as an instrument
of the articulation of common interests
In the last two decades, the Visegrad cooperation proved its grounds.
In 2011, when the agreement celebrated its 20th anniversary, against
all sceptic voices the cooperation among Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary was in good shape. In spite of the weak
institutionalisation – until now the International Visegrad Fund is the
only joint institution – Visegrad cooperation exists and is visible,
meaning we can talk about a successful agreement that was estab-
lished in 1991.2 It is an important political interface to elaborate
strategies based on common interests or to discuss about bilateral
problems without any constraints. 
Due to the fact that cooperation is done among independent and
sovereign countries, a number of different and similar interests can
be articulated, so there are issues that weaken and others that
strengthen the agreement. The interrelations of the four countries
1 Research professor, senior advisor, Institute of World Economics – Centre for Economic and
Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
2 Szilágyiné Bátorﬁ, E., Conference address at: A visegrádi együttműködés 20 éve - Értéke-
lések, értelmezések. Budapest:Magyar Külügyi Intézet. 2011. február 17.
3 Hamberger (2010)
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have a historical determination to weaken the integration.3 Disagree-
ment was tangible during the history of the cooperation, because of
different political strategies in the member states; thus there were
successful and less successful periods.4 It also works against the co-
operation that most of the current issues of the Visegrad Group are
not being discussed systematically but are dealt with on an ad hoc
basis.5 Nonetheless, the cooperation had to face new and formerly
non-existing challenges during its recent history, that put the agree-
ment to the test, but cohesive forces seem to prevail among the V4
in the long term. In spite of some historically rooted conﬂicts, the
similar history and the geographical location6 connect these states
on several points. The perspective of the alliance can be seen as
determined by the necessity of closer cooperation in the social and
cultural ﬁelds, as well as of the articulation of common interests on
internal and external issues.7
2004 was a turning point for the V4, as the strategic goals of these
countries have been achieved, namely successfully joining NATO and
the European Union. Soon it seemed that the cooperation would lose
its relevance (by becoming a multilateral forum without any special
target). It seemed that the agreement was to become empty and
powerless, and many thought that the V4’s continued existence was
obsolete.8 Despite the political will to inject new aims into the coop-
eration, there was a diverging force that Poland, the largest member
of the agreement, because of its’ size played a more signiﬁcant role
in the European Union than its Central European partners.9 It was
perceptible at the Ukrainian orange revolution in 2004 and the east
Ukrainian conﬂict in 2014, when Poland had a leading role within the
Visegrad countries (V4). But after a few years of EU membership –
partly due to some disillusionment and realisation that being a mem-
ber means a never ending compliance procedure – representation of
national and common regional interests came to the fore. Further en-
4 Šoth (2010); Strážay (2013); Walsch (2014)
5 Marek (2011)
6 Zelenická (2009); Brazova et al. (2013)
7 see more: Hamberger (2010); Walsh (2014)
8 Hamberger (2010)
9 Marek (2011)
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largement, new initiatives within the EU and the reform of the Union’s
common policies/structures gave new impetus to the V4 countries
to cooperate. 
Despite political turbulences, the agreement fulﬁlled its role: it was
the main forum for political dialogue and bilateral relations between
its member states. Similar or even better perspectives may await
the cooperation if its members recognise the beneﬁts of joint ac-
tions. There are two dimensions of the Visegrad cooperation after
EU accession.10 On the one hand, the internal dimension means joint
internal programs (economic, infrastructure, trade, energy, invest-
ment, cultural and educational programs) and on the other hand, the
articulating of common interests in the EU decision-making mecha-
nisms as well as towards third countries. Concerning the latter as-
pect, it was a signiﬁcant progress after 2004, that the V4 engaged
in transferring membership experiences to the Western Balkan
countries. Regarding the EU issues, at the debate of the 2014-2020
budget, Visegrad countries were successful in establishing a large
and thus inﬂuential “friends of cohesion” group11 successful in pre-
serving most of the acquis and ﬁnancial background of cohesion
policy. However, a weak point of the cooperation is the lack of reg-
ular pre-discussion of national positions prior to Council negotia-
tions, as these countries prefer to enter ad hoc coalitions within the
Union.12 An example of this behaviour was the reform of the com-
mon agriculture policy where the Visegrad countries were not able
to agree on a united approach.13
All in all, the balance of the Visegrad cooperation is on the one side
a success story, on the other side – because of the weak institution-
alisation – it has its limits. However, lack of institutions means more
ﬂexibility to respond to internal and external challenges.14 Therefore
this regional alliance has a unique opportunity – via coordination of
national politics – to create a more visible and more competitive Cen-
tral European region in the international context. Based on the history
10 Walsh (2014)
11 Vida (2012); Walsh (2014)
12 Köles (2011); Marek (2011); Vida (2012)
13 Šoth (2010)
14 Strážay (2013)
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of the Visegrad cooperation we can see that the operation and
prospects of this agreement should be examined in the context of
the regional and international issues. This research attempted to
analyse the effects of the changing internal and external environment
and to identify the main threats, challenges and possibilities regard-
ing V4 cooperation.
Aims of the research
The signiﬁcance of the Visegrad cooperation has led to countless in-
terpretations (both academic papers and other articles) which are
mainly preoccupied by the opportunities it provides. Merely the bib-
liography that was published at the 20th anniversary of the coopera-
tion, contains approximately 1400 selected articles, books and
academic papers between 1991 and 2011 about the Visegrad. 
For researchers the following questions can be articulated in this
framework. How successful is the agreement in the context of chang-
ing economic circumstances with special regard to the anti-crisis
strategies and the post-crisis period? What are the main challenges
and tasks of the decision-makers? How can the political changes in-
side the EU and the V4 inﬂuence the future prospects of the agree-
ment? How can the V4 cooperation be inﬂuenced by such ideas as
a two speed Europe with a federal core area, and a confederal outer
band (non-euro countries)? What are the major challenges for the re-
gion in terms of social circumstances or trends? How do these trends
inﬂuence the competitiveness and sustainable catching up process
including productivity, human and physical infrastructure in these
countries? 
The main assumption is that dynamics and scope of the Visegrad
cooperation have been determined by the political, economic and
social development not only of the individual countries but of the EU
as the main anchor, as well as the changing global political and eco-
nomic environment. Our goal was next to draw up the main chal-
lenges facing the V4 countries and to ﬁnd similarities and differences
regarding the economic, political and social issues. We did it because
in the last two decades the history of the Visegrad cooperation
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proved that it was driven by identiﬁed common interests.15 Therefore
the main aim of this research was to reveal in this frame of ref-
erence those cohesive (or centripetal) forces which drive to-
wards more cohesion and lead to deeper cooperation. At the
same time, we also attempted to uncover those diverging (or cen-
trifugal) forces which might weaken or halt cooperation. During the
research we kept in mind the practical use of our results therefore
we put forward recommendations for enhancing cooperation and
overcoming difﬁculties, solving arising problems. 
The research has three angles built on our basic concept. The ﬁrst
angle of the project focuses on economic issues. The questions to
be answered are as follows:
– How can Visegrad countries reach a sustainable development, and
increase their competitiveness given the current external circum-
stances? 
– Is there a change as regards the basis for further economic devel-
opment in the post-crisis period? 
– Have public ﬁnances been stabilised in a sustainable manner or
will further pressures come to the surface?
The second research angle tries to catch the crucial political ﬁelds
for the future cooperation among V4 countries. 
– How can the V4 represent and enforce its interests vis-à-vis the
general developments of the European Union (e.g. two-speed Eu-
rope, common EU budget, etc.)? 
– What is the potential for the Visegrad group to represent national
and common regional interests in the EU’s decision-making
processes?
The third issue deals with the social challenges facing the V4. Sufﬁ-
cient quantity and quality of labour, and ageing society are among
the major challenges for the whole Europe. Adequate social devel-
opment is one of the key prerequisites of sustainable economic de-
velopment and public ﬁnances (taxes, social insurance etc.). 
15 See among others: Pastwa (2014); Rácz (2014)
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– How can sustainable social structures be built up and enhance
overall competitiveness in the Visegrad countries? 
First we summarise the main results of the country studies high-
lighting the main similarities and differences in order to show the pos-
sible cooperation linkages between the V4 countries. For all pillars
we completed a SWOT analysis based on the main internal and ex-
ternal trends. Finally, we draw up the prospective future direction of
the cooperation and formulate recommendations to the decision-
makers.
Economic pillar
Convergence and sustainable
catching up process – partially successful
In today's global economy the emergence of the countries depends
even more on the opportunities from their external economic rela-
tions as well as on their internal adaptability to respond to external
challenges. In this context, regarding the economic ties, the changing
global environment provides the framework. In the case of the Viseg-
rad region this phenomenon is even more important, because the
three smaller countries are highly open economies (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia) with 75-95% of exports to GDP ratio, reﬂect-
ing a greater vulnerability to external market developments. Poland
with its big domestic market has less than 50% export to GDP ratio,
which plays a key role in the differences among the V4 countries. The
V4 have been showing signiﬁcant development in their foreign trade:
while between 1990 and 2012 the volume of world trade has tripled,
the external trade turnover of the Visegrad countries was ten times
bigger.
While the V4 countries are far (by 15-20 percentage points) more
integrated into the EU market than the EU average (61.8% in 2013)16,
some geographical reorientation of exports has been taken place
in the V4, too, especially since the crisis (mainly in the direction of
Russia, Ukraine, China and Turkey).
16 Vida (2015b)
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According to the statistical data, the economic development of the
Visegrad countries in the last ten years was mainly determined by the
impact of EU accession, the effect of the ﬁnancial and economic cri-
sis, and the outcome of crisis management. In analysing the economic
situation of the V4, three stages of development could be identiﬁed:
the post-accession and pre-crisis years (2004-2008) of diverging but
mostly improving macroeconomic trends, especially in Poland, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia; the crisis years (2009-2013) of reces-
sion, stagnation or low growth, and ﬁnally the post-crisis years (2014
and beyond) marked by harmonious converging trends. As regards
GDP ﬁgures, in spite of diverging growth rates right after accession
and in the years of the crisis, by 2014 the growth rates of V4 have
converged to around 2-3%. Though in the coming years the high pre-
crisis dynamism will not return to the region, a continuation of catching
up to the EU could be envisaged due to the above-EU-average ex-
pected growth rates (2.2-3.8% vs. 1.3-1.9% until 2019).17 The main
drivers of growth will be (remain) domestic demand (especially invest-
ment, and public and private consumption to a certain degree), net
exports (especially in the smaller countries) and EU funds equalling
135 billion euro in the 2014-2020 period. As the Visegrad countries’
economy highly depends on the EU, especially in the ﬁeld of foreign
trade and ﬁnancial resources (FDI, funds, remittances), their future
economic trends cannot be separated that of the EU.
Catching up at regional level shows a similar picture to national
performances: the most spectacular development took place in
NUTS-2 regions of Slovakia and Poland, while the Czech and espe-
cially the Hungarian regions did not experience a similar closing up.
However, in all countries there is a huge discrepancy in development
levels between the central regions (reaching well above 100% of EU
average) and the rest being below 75%.18 This problem is the gravest
in the smallest but the most dynamically catching up country (Slova-
kia), conﬁrming the trade-off theory of convergence. 
As regards the convergence of living standards measured by per
capita GDP, both the beta and sigma convergence theories were val-
17 Vida (2015b)
18 Vida (2015b)
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idated by our research results: poorer countries (like Slovakia) man-
aged to reach higher growth rates, consequently the gap narrowed
among the Visegrad countries as well as between the V4 and the EU
average. As a consequence of wage convergence, by 2012 the net
annual earnings of the V4 average (6,350 euro) reached one third of
the EU average instead of one fourth in the year of accession.19 How-
ever, price convergence happened signiﬁcantly faster. 
All in all, the V4 countries did converge to each other and to the
EU, mainly due to the very quick catching up of the less developed
countries, namely Slovakia and Poland. While at the accession the
Slovak GDP per capita in PPS stood at 57% of the EU average, by
2013 it reached 75%. The same ﬁgures for Poland were 48% and
67%, respectively. In contrast to the 18-19 percentage point con-
vergence of the two less developed countries, the two more devel-
oped countries' convergence was only 3 percentage point in the
case of the Czech Republic and 4 percentage point in the case of
Hungary, that is these countries performed below their potential. The
convergence within the Visegrad group is proved by the fact that
while at accession the difference between the most and the least
developed country in term of GDP per capita in PPS was around 30
percentage point, by 2013 this difference has halved.20 As a conse-
quence of the above convergence, the ranking of the countries
changed: though the Czech Republic managed to keep its leading
position, Slovakia and even Poland overtook Hungary due to the di-
verse economic structures and the different impact of the economic
crisis. It looks like that divergence within the V4 will slow down, how-
ever it will be a long way to bring all countries and all regions at least
to the 75% of the EU. 
Apart from quantitative changes, remarkable qualitative i.e. struc-
tural changes could be revealed: while in the 1990s Visegrad coun-
tries were mainly competitive in labour intensive industries and had
disadvantages in technology-driven industries, during the last
decade the share of high-technology products in total exports has
increased signiﬁcantly, showing a catching-up to the developed
19 Vida (2015b)
20 Bartovic (2015)
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countries. The Czech Republic and Hungary are in a leading position
with 15.0 and 16.1% shares (2013), respectively, while Slovakia and
Poland are lagging behind with 9.6% and 6.7% shares.21 As in the
case of Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic high technology
exports grew more dynamically than total exports, in Hungary high-
tech export growth was below the overall export dynamics due to
multinational-network reorganisations, signalling that corporate de-
cisions affect the external performance of the countries. The increas-
ing share of the V4 in the global value chain means that in the 21st
century national competitiveness cannot be separated from the com-
petitiveness of transnational ﬁrms.
Cleaning up public finances
– consolidation without real structural changes
Public ﬁnances in the post-crisis period are being successfully sta-
bilised, however consolidation was not accompanied by thorough
structural reform of the national budgets. Sound public ﬁnances are
not only an obligation under the Maastricht criteria but also building
blocks of a country's competitiveness.22 The Visegrad countries en-
tered the EU with differing levels of budget deficit. While the improv-
ing trends of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland were
disrupted by the crisis, Hungary was hit by it in the middle of ﬁscal
policy ‘repair’. Thus Hungary was the ﬁrst to leave the excessive
deﬁcit procedure in 2013 (after ten years of being under EDP), fol-
lowed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Regarding Poland, as
neither the 2012 nor the 2014 deadline were kept, a new deadline
was set up for 2015.23 The promising consolidation processes in all
four countries seem to keep budget deﬁcits under 3% also in the
medium run, while the public debt ratios remained below 60% in
three of them, and the high Hungarian rate has been converging to-
wards the Maastricht threshold in the recent years. 
While the V4 countries have been focusing on decreasing their
deﬁcits, no major structural reforms were adopted. This is especially
21 Túry (2014)
22 Vida (2015b)
23 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014), pp. 7-8.
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true in the case of Hungary and Slovakia where public revenues in-
creased, and expenditures were not cut back. 
Table 1. Total general government revenues and expenditures
as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
Source: Eurostat
Looking at the monetary developments since accession, after di-
vergences in the pre-crisis years, very promising converging trends
can be detected in the post-crisis period. There is recently a clear
convergence of both inﬂation rates (forecasted to be around 1-3%
in the medium run) and of long-term interest rates (thanks to system-
atic base rate cuts in Poland and Hungary) Stabilising public ﬁ-
nances, keeping the rules on ﬁscal discipline, approaching to and
sustaining nominal and real convergence plus implementing some
structural reforms (e.g. in the ﬁeld of the labour market, business en-
vironment, transport infrastructure, innovation etc.) may result in the
introduction of the euro at the beginning of the next decade in the
case of the three bigger Visegrad countries. A common joining would
be desirable, however, the societies should be prepared for the
change, also public and political support should be strengthened.
Revenues
2004 2010 2004-2013 in pp.
European Union (27 countries) 43.8 44.1 2.0
Czech Republic 40.4 39.1 0.5
Hungary 42.6 45.6 5.1
Poland 37.2 37.5 0.3
Slovakia 35.3 32.3 0.6
Expenditures
2004 2010 2004-2013 in pp.
European Union (27 countries) 46.7 50.6 2.4
Czech Republic 43.3 43.7 -1.0
Hungary 49.1 50.0 0.9
Poland 42.6 45.4 -0.7
Slovakia 37.7 39.8 1.0
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The SWOT analysis based on the main macroeconomic trends in
the Visegrad countries for the time horizon of 202224 shows that the
common strengths of the V4 countries are: growth, low inﬂation, in-
terest rate convergence, consolidated public ﬁnances, strong attrac-
tion of FDI, good trade performance and current account balance.
Future opportunities are provided by continued convergence to EU
averages, harmonious development at V4 level, rising domestic de-
mand, attraction of FDI, good manufacturing and export potential,
diversiﬁcation of export markets and use of EU funds. The main
weaknesses are in the ﬁeld of investment, productivity, innovation
and regional development. Potential threats are partly external, such
as low growth of main export partners, and partly internal such as
the exchange rate vulnerability with the exception of Slovakia, or the
net income outﬂows.
Political pillar
Western linkages – the European environment
Governance issues have always been on the agenda of European
integration, just like the permanent struggle between the federalists
and the intergovernmentalists. From the early 1990s onwards – start-
ing with the Maastricht treaty, through the Amsterdam and Nice
treaties – up until the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, gov-
ernance modes became increasingly complex and less transparent. A
great challenge was the historical enlargement and the fact that not
all member states were willing and/or able to participate in all projects
of European integration. As a response, innovative ideas on a two-tier
EU and the re-emergence of federalism came into the fore. 
Governance issues became recently intertwined with the tackling
of the global crisis. In 2009 the most serious ﬁnancial and economic
crisis ever hit the European Union. The crisis has actually been exer-
cising two parallel impacts on the integration: a centripetal one, push-
ing for deeper cooperation and a centrifugal one, working in the other
direction i.e. ﬁnding other types of breaking points to ensure eco-
nomic growth. In practice, the EU applied mixed methods and instru-
24 Vida (2015b)
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ments to tackle the crisis and there has been a boom of new institu-
tions, legislation and ﬁnancial tools proposed/created. The cen-
tripetal and centrifugal forces became visible. On the one hand, all
the member states were united to manage the crisis and work to-
gether (e.g. European Semester, Europe 2020 Strategy, Six-pack,
Two-pack, Deposit Guarantee Scheme), while on the other hand,
there were initiatives not supported by all member states (Euro Plus
Pact, Fiscal Compact) and not involving everybody (European Sta-
bility Mechanism Treaty, Single Surveillance Mechanism). 
The measures are an obvious mixture and patchwork of the Com-
munity and the so-called Union methods leading to less transparency
and accountability, and making the economic and ﬁscal policy gov-
ernance extremely complex and bureaucratic. Based on the intro-
duced measures and advocated proposals, and taking into account
the actual political and economic situation and citizens’ perception,
Vida (2015a) distinguishes four possible scenarios for EU governance.
A federation of states with clearer delimitation of competences and
more subsidiarity. The two-tier EU for the euro area would be further
institutionalised within the EU institutions and also within the ﬁnancing
system. The third scenario could be streamlined and ﬂexible EU; in
some areas the way competences are exercised would be revised.
The last scenario is the preserving of the current status quo. 
Visegrads’ different positions 
In several ﬁelds the Visegrad countries have a shared position (e.g.
in cohesion policy ﬁnancing, interconnection of transport and energy
networks, Eastern partnership, increasing competitiveness, fostering
economic growth, energy security etc.), however in other areas they
have different attitudes determined by their economic and political
situation.
Poland – which weathered the crisis well thanks to responsive do-
mestic economic policy – has been supportive for all anti-crisis meas-
ures taken by the EU (like European Semester, Euro plus Pact, the
Stability and Growth Pact (Six-pack), Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)),
while favouring a strengthened economic governance and deeper in-
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tegration. As the country's main endeavour is to avoid any “second-
class” membership, to accede to the inner circle of EU decision-mak-
ing and to become a big player, Poland acceded to all new
institutions and instruments.
Poland signed the Euro plus Pact in order to prevent the further
deepening of a two-speed European integration, to be part of the
changes and to cooperate with eurozone members. Concerning the
Six-pack – which was adopted under Polish presidency in November
2011 – Poland supported SGP reform, however, it opted for “more
ﬂexible” way to achieve the SGP requirements and strongly opposed
the Commission's proposal of ﬁnes for non-euro members breaching
SGP rules in the form of withholding EU funds.25
Poland position is that there is a need to deepen integration, to
make European institutions stronger and to complete the EMU via
steps towards a full banking, economic, ﬁscal and political union.
However, there is a fear that the different EU actions might result in
fragmentation of the EU or in several speeds of the EU.26
In the Czech Republic there was a nation-wide consensus on full
political support to becoming a member of the European Union. Sup-
port for EU membership was the highest during the Czech presidency
in 2009, then it started to drop quickly as a consequence of crisis in
the EU and the euro area. Nowadays the Czech Republic is consid-
ered to be a eurosceptic country and an unpredictable and irrespon-
sible partner (see the example of the long delay in ratifying the Lisbon
Treaty), ﬁnding itself in the position of an outsider.27 Regarding the EU
relations of the Czech Republic – pro or against deepening integration
– we can observe a clear correlation with different political directions,
at the level of both, ruling parties and the president of the country.
The Czech Republic has been sceptical about the EU’s new crisis
management methods and the further deepening of the integration
process, especially under the centre-right government. This passive
wait and see strategy, accompanied by the outright eurosceptic view
25 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014)
26 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014)
27 Bartovic (2014)
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of the former president, Mr. Vaclav Klaus, marginalised the Czech Re-
public in the EU and resulted in the country's abstention from both
the Euro Plus Pact in 2011 and the Fiscal Compact in 2012. The new
coalition government appointed in January 2014 declared a pro-EU
policy and adopted a new EU strategy with an aim to become a ﬁxed
part of the EU. The current Czech president, Miloš Zeman considers
himself a “European federalist”, he pledges for quick introduction of
the euro and for the country's participation in core Europe. As a sign
of change, the new government signed the Fiscal Compact and sent
it to the parliament for ratiﬁcation. 
The Czech position towards changes in the EU governance means
“a gradual acceptance of the multi-speed or even multi-level model
of EU integration on the condition of relative openness of the euro-
zone towards other EU member states”.28
Slovakia, as a euro-member since 2009, does not have any choice
but to join all new structures and instrument of the Economic and
Monetary Union. The Fiscal Compact came into force in January 2013
and the newly established Council for Budget Responsibility is dealing
with overall ﬁscal health, including the issue of budget deﬁcit and pub-
lic debt. In order to comply with the Fiscal Compact, Slovakia contin-
ues ﬁscal consolidation and makes efforts to ﬁght against tax evasion,
improve VAT collection and broaden the tax base. The primary focus
of the Euro Plus Pact, namely competitiveness, employment, sustain-
ability of public ﬁnances, ﬁnancial stability and coordination of tax
policies, are particularly important for Slovakia.
Concerning the ﬁscal union, Slovakia emphasises its clear objec-
tions. Lack of coordination and political will are weakening the legit-
imacy of the agreement. The ﬁscal union is almost solely driven by
the expenditure side of public ﬁnances, the revenue side (like taxes)
is underrepresented. Slovakia is for a gradual tax harmonisation, as
recently the differing tax rates and separate levies at national levels
are functioning as an element of “ﬁscal competition”.29 Finally Slova-
kia ﬁnds that there are institutional problems with enforcement of
28 Bartovic (2014), p. 18.
29 Hošoff (2014a)
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rules, and the collective guarantees for debts have many risks. All in
all, Slovakia strives to maintain the country’s place in the mainstream
of the EU.
Hungary has so far had a mixed approach. The country is fully in
favour of the Six-pack and Two-pack, and has always been commit-
ted to all the reforms taken in the framework of the existing treaties
and institutions. At the same time, Hungary is more cautious about
any new measures outside the Treaty framework. Hungary did not
sign the Euro Plus Pact (along with the Czech Republic, Great Britain
and Sweden) because of its references to tax harmonisation, while
Budapest is willing to join the coordination on the other aspects of
the Pact. This step however was in line with the government’s slogan
of national independence and emphasis on national sovereignty.
However, in order to avoid a reinforced outsider position and to show
commitment to sound public ﬁnances, Hungary actually signed the
Fiscal Compact (but most of its provisions will be binding only upon
its accession to the eurozone). 
It can be concluded that the attitudes of the Visegrad countries
in connection with the key anti-crisis instruments are different and
non-homogenous. While the Europe 2020 Strategy, the European
Semester, the Six-pack, the Two-pack, and the EU wide institutions
for monitoring ﬁnancial markets (e.g. the European Banking Authority)
were accepted by all V4 countries, the Fiscal Compact was signed
only by Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The Euro Plus Pact was ac-
cepted by Poland and Slovakia, while the European Stability Mech-
anism was signed by Slovakia only, as a member of the eurozone.30
Eastern linkages – Russian relations
The Central European countries can be deﬁned geopolitically by their
relations to Western Europe and by Eastern Europe’s (i.e. Russia’s)
interests towards them.31 Therefore the future cooperation of the
Visegrad countries depends not only on their position in the Euro-
pean Union but on their relation with Russia and its interests. It makes
30 For details see Vida (2015a)
31 Huntington (1996)
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the situation complex that the relations of Central Europe and Russia
have a quite turbulent past.32 Nowadays, the strategic leverages of
Russia over the whole region are smaller than they were in the Soviet
times. With the Soviet Union falling apart, Central Europe has no
common border with Russia, the Red Army was withdrawn, the War-
saw Pact ceased to exist, the Visegrad countries have joined and in-
tegrated into the NATO and the EU, the pro-Moscow elites were
ousted from power and there are no signiﬁcant ethnic Russian mi-
norities living in Central Europe. In the post-1989 period Central Eu-
rope needed to be concerned only of the soft power potential of
Russia (used in the case of energy business), but not of any direct
hard security threat. This period came to a quick end by the Russian
occupation of the Crimea in March 2014. 
Though the Visegrad countries share a common interest related to
Ukraine as a neighbouring country, they are very much divided on
Russia. Both normative and policy differences are discernible. Speak-
ing about the normative differences, Poland has a traditionally very
strong Trans-Atlantic commitment, taking hard stance on Russia. The
very Russia-critical position of the Czech Republic is based on its
focus on human rights. Slovakia and Hungary are much more prag-
matic. Besides, Hungary under the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is
continuing its eurosceptic, more East-oriented policy track.
In military terms, though the Russian troops are ﬁghting a war in
Ukraine, there is no any direct military threat to the Visegrad region,
which is protected by the NATO membership. Regarding energy se-
curity, all countries are highly dependent on Russian gas supply to
varying degrees. The Czech Republic is the least dependent with a
66% share in all gas imports. Hungary and Poland receive 81% and
83% of their gas imports from Russia, while the ratio for Slovakia is
93%. Both Poland and Slovakia are key transit countries, and the
Czech Republic also plays a transit role. Hence, these countries are
protected by their transit position, while Hungary is perhaps the most
vulnerable country. Visegrad countries are jointly pursuing a number
32 Rácz (2014)
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of energy projects. As none of them are completed, they could not
provide an umbrella against unwanted supply breaks or punitive
measures of Russia. In economic terms Poland has the most to lose
if Russia reacts with economic counter-measures to EU sanctions.
However, the other three Visegrad countries are engaged in a number
of large politically-driven projects which might be at stake. 
As a result of the above mentioned differences, the Visegrad group
has been unable to adopt a common position on Russia. The V4 is
very much divided about how to react to Russia’s actions in Ukraine
(take the example of EU sanctions). However, one should not forget
that increasing intra-Visegrad tensions belongs to the tactics of the
Russian foreign and security policy aimed at weakening the EU and
NATO.33 According to one of the possible scenarios, if the Visegrad
countries could be able to form a common position on Ukraine and
Russia, their visibility and prestige would be boosted. A common
Visegrad voice could be better heard in the EU, as the four countries
have the same 58 votes in the Council like Germany and France have
together. Moreover, a coherent Visegrad position on Russia could
turn the V4 into a more valuable and reliable partner of the USA.
However, differences between the V4 are far deeper than occasional,
hence it is unlikely that a common Visegrad position could be formed.
Another theoretical – though unlikely – option is that due to the
deepening lack of trust between the countries, the cooperation gets
halted or suspended. The most likely scenario is that the V4 will re-
main unable to form a common position about Russia, however, co-
operation will continue due to the “art of disagreeing” rule, meaning
that if consensus cannot be reached on a certain issue, then the
problem is put aside and cooperation continues on those areas
where a joint position can be agreed on. The existence and the ac-
tivity of the International Visegrad Fund as the primary foreign policy
arm of the V4 cooperation might be a guarantee for not suspending
cooperation. 
33 “A small Central European country can never be more for Russia than a useful weak point
inside the EU and NATO, and also in the Visegrad co-operation.” Rácz (2014) p. 15.
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Social pillar
Social changes occur at a slower pace than economic changes.
However, they provide a basis for the competitiveness of each econ-
omy and its ability to develop. Therefore it is vital to give a clear pic-
ture about the present situation, to identify possible risks and
challenges in order to prepare appropriate responses and policy-ori-
ented actions.
Europe 2020, the European Union strategy for growth and employ-
ment, was adopted in 2010. It emphasizes smart, sustainable and in-
clusive growth with special regard to social inclusion aiming at
fostering job creation and poverty reduction. Apart from these two
measures the social situation and living standards of the V4 countries
are determined by demographic trends, real wages, income distri-
bution, education, health care, pensions, social protection, migration
etc. To meet the overall EU targets, member states have set up their
own national targets in their national reform programmes. Therefore
the structure of the country reports focuses on this development
strategy.
Demographic trends
The demographic trends of the Visegrad countries are quite similar
to those of the EU countries. The V4are also characterized by declin-
ing and/or negative population growth rates caused by decreasing
fertility rates and changing reproductive behaviours. If trends continue
the population of the Visegrad countries will actually decrease, unless
large-scale immigration is not considered (envisaged). Because of
population decrease migration trends have a signiﬁcant role in the
Visegrad countries. In the case of Poland and Hungary migration is
dominated by an increasing trend motivated mostly by economic rea-
sons.  The result of emigration is the inﬂow of remittances and com-
pensations which can improve the current account balance of the
countries; however, emigration might cause labour shortages in cer-
tain occupations. In contrast to this, the migration trend in the Czech
Republic is dominated by immigration, resulting in a positive migration
balance. The V4 countries are not destinations for each other with the
exception of the Czech Republic for the highly educated segment of
the Slovak workforce. In the future there will be an increasing need in
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all the Visegrad countries to promote immigration for counterbal-
ancing natural population decline and the ageing of the society. 
Life expectancy is increasing due to decreasing mortality rates,
higher living standards, better nutrition and easier access to health
services. The consequences are: progressive ageing, decreasing
working-age population and an increasing dependency ratio. The
main associated challenge is the sustainability of the pension and
health care systems.
The 38 million-strong Polish population is also slowly declining and
is expected to be 32 million in 2050 if current trends do not change.
The negative population growth rate is due to a low birth rate – caused
by a low fertility rate – and continued emigration of young people. Em-
igration from Poland has increased signiﬁcantly since accession: from
1 million to above 2.1 million in 2012. Around 78% of emigrants
stayed abroad 12 months or longer. Large number of emigrants have
also had a positive effect on the current account balance of the coun-
try, because Poland is the third biggest EU country in terms of work-
ers’ remittance inﬂows. However, one should not forget the negative
impact of emigration, namely wage pressure and labour shortage in
speciﬁc ﬁelds, i.e., construction, health care and retail trade.34
Life expectancy is continuously increasing: nonetheless there is a
vast gap in life expectancy between Poland and western EU coun-
tries. The Polish population is aging fast: by 2060 34.5% of Poles will
be aged 65 or more. This means that a decreasing number of workers
will have to care for an increasing number of pensioners, with a detri-
mental effect on the pension system. As a solution, Poland would
have to have an inﬂow of at least 5 million immigrants by 2050, though
the country is not ready to become a non-homogenous society.35
In 2014 the Czech Republic had a population of 10.5 million, the
highest number since the country’s independence in 1993, largely due
to the positive migration balance. Between 2002 and 2013 net migration
amounted to 353 thousand, which is 3.4% of the total population. The
strong inﬂux of immigrants was mostly the result of the country’s ac-
cession to the EU, entry to the Schengen zone and strong economic
347
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growth causing labour force shortages. Despite the positive ﬁgures, ac-
cording to projections36 a signiﬁcant population decrease is expected
until 2100, resulting in a population between 6.1 and 9.1 million.  The
negative population trends can be counterbalanced by the country’s
positive migration balance. According to projections, the proportion of
the working age population will fall until the end of the century. In the
meantime there will be progressive ageing as the share of persons aged
65 and above will increase from today’s one-sixth to one-third of the
population. The dependency ratio will reach 100 per cent in mid-cen-
tury: this means that the number of those in the productive population
(20-64 years) will equal the sum of the number of people under 20 and
above 65.Increasingthe retirement age would affect this trend. 
The Slovak population size is around 5.4 million and is moving lightly
upwards due to an increasing birth rate and a stagnating death rate.
However, the size of the population is projected to decrease below 4
million by 2070 should sizeable immigration and/or a strong pro-family
policy not occur. Slovakia is the only country from the V4 where mi-
gration did not play a signiﬁcant role: it affects only some ten thousand
persons. Slovakia is the only Visegrad country where immigration has
always exceeded emigration, which was curbed by the crisis in the
EU. However, the health sector suffers from the emigration of profes-
sionals. Between 2004 and 2009 2.800 doctors moved abroad, which
is 15% of the total staff. While emigration is not currently an issue in
Slovakia, in the future the country could rely more on immigrants as a
substitute for the decreasing domestic labour supply. 
Increasing life expectancy leads to an ageing society and an in-
creasing dependency ratio. Recently Slovakia had the lowest de-
pendency ratio in the whole EU (below 20%). However, there will a
dramatic shift in the coming decades resulting in the highest depend-
ency ratio (almost 70%) by 2080.
The Hungarian population has been decreasing for decades by
35-40 thousand persons per year due mainly to the decreasing birth
rate and declining number of marriages. In 2014 the Hungarian pop-
ulation dropped below 10 million and is expected to be 7.33 million
in 2060. Hungary does not attract enough foreigners to counterbal-
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ance population decrease. Emigration outnumbers immigration,
though there is no reliable data on the former. According to ofﬁcial
statistics for the ﬁrst quarter of 2014 only 95 thousand persons left
the country, though unofﬁcial sources speak of between 300 and 500
thousand. In accordance with the general migration trend, mainly
young educated people leave the country, hence leading to labour
shortages in certain professions, especially in the heath care sector. 
Labour market trends 
Though the labour market situation has improved in the V4 coun-
tries since the crisis, unemployment – with special regard to youth
and long term unemployment – is still a challenge for all the countries
with the exception of the Czech Republic. A special common prob-
lem is the high unemployment of the unskilled labour force and un-
employment in less developed regions. Another general problem for
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is the low employment and activity
rate (63.2%, 64.9% and 65.0%, respectively in 2013), especially in
the case of women. In order to handle the above problems, active
labour market measures should be adopted and the adjustment of
the educational systems to labour market demands is required.
One of the indicators for inclusive growth is the employment rate.
According to Europe 202037 the headline target for the whole EU was
set at 75% of the population aged 20-64. The Polish target is 71%,
while the actual ﬁgure for 2013 was around 65%, compared to the
EU average of 68.5%. In the Czech Republic the employment rate
(73.5% in 2014) is the highest among the Visegrad countries and is
well above the EU average: the 2020 target is 75%. The Slovak tar-
get is 72%, which is very ambitious as the current ﬁgure is around
65%. Hungary has the lowest ﬁgures among the V4 countries with
its 62.5%: the 2020 target number is 75%.
As regards employment figures between accession and the crisis
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, employment went up
and unemployment fell to historically low levels, while the Hungarian
ﬁgures went into the opposite direction due to mismanagement of
the economy. Though the crisis broke the positive trends in the three
37 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/18_employment_target.pdf
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former countries, labour market recovery has already started and un-
employment rates show a converging trend. By 2016 only Slovakia
is expected to have a two-digit unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate in Poland was 10.3% at the end of 2013,
which is very close to the EU average. The long term unemployment
rate decreased substantially between 2004 and 2012 (from 10.3% to
4.1%) compared to the EU average of around 10%.38 In the beginning
of 2015 the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic was 5.5%,
which is the third lowest in the EU after Germany and Austria. Con-
sequently, unemployment does not mean a burden for the Czech
economy: it is mainly a regional problem and affects primarily non-
qualiﬁed workers and certain disadvantaged groups of society.
In Slovakia unemployment is one of the most signiﬁcant challenges,
requiring reform of active labour market policies. The employment sit-
uation is strongly inﬂuenced by the level of attained education. Be-
tween 2000 and 2013 the highest unemployment rate (between
40-50%) was prevalent in the case of people with primary or less than
primary education, and the Roma population. The employability of
people with upper-secondary and post-secondary education im-
proved, especially after accession, while the unemployment rate for
people with higher education increased, like in Poland and Hungary,
entailing a mismatch between education and employability. Though
long-term unemployment rates decreased after accession, in 2013 it
was around 10%, the same as the EU average, with signiﬁcant regional
differences caused by uneven development among regions. 
In Hungary the number of active unemployed increased consider-
ably after accession (from 252 thousand to 449 thousand by 2013)
and the unemployment rate stood at 10.2% in 2013 as opposed to
6.1% in 2004. The number of young (under 25 years of age) unem-
ployed reached 84 thousand in 2013 while it was 56 thousand in
2004. In May 2014 the labour market situation signiﬁcantly improved:
the unemployment rate dropped to 7.9% (355 thousand) and the
number of unemployed youth was 65 thousand. At the same time the
share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment was 49.5%,
which is higher than the EU average. 
38 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
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Education
The smart growth objective of the Europe 2020 strategy is closely re-
lated to education, which is one of the most important investments
individuals and societies can make in the future. To assess the state
of education four quantitative indicators were used.39 The most im-
portant concerns keeping students in the educational system, there-
fore the ﬁrst goal is to reduce the rate of early school leaving.
Increasing the number/ratio of students in secondary education and
tertiary education is also a target. Increasing the number of the stu-
dents and giving them competitive knowledge entails investigating
input into the education system in the form of public expenditure on
education. On the output side PISA test scores were taken for qual-
itative assessment.
The performance of the V4 countries in the ﬁeld of education
varies. The share of early school leavers is below the EU average in
the Czech Republic (5.4%), Poland (5.6%) and Slovakia (6.4%). Early
school leaving is of particular importance as this phenomenon nega-
tively affects productivity and competitiveness and contributes to
poverty and social exclusion. 
In the case of secondary education, the percentage of the popu-
lation that has attained at least upper-secondary education was
higher than the EU average in all V4 countries.40 Slovakia is above
90% and Poland and the Czech Republic are around 90% while Hun-
gary has the lowest ﬁgures (83.5%)
The proportion of population aged 30-34 with tertiary education is
highest in Poland (40.5%) and lowest in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia. As regards tertiary education in 2010, in the EU-27 19.8 million
students, that is 62.7% of all persons aged 20-24, are enrolled in
higher education. According to the Europe 2020 strategy by 2020 the
share of 30-34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment should
be at least 40% in the EU compared to 35.8% in 2012. In Poland this
indicator was 39.1% in 2012, while the national target is 45%. Slovakia
39 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-_edu-
cation
40 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Upper_secondary_or_terti-
ary_educational_attainment_and_early_leavers_from_education_and_training,_2007_and_2012
_%281%29_%28%25%29_YB14_I.png
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is among the worst performers with around a 20% share. In Poland in
2010 more than 2 million students were registered, which is one of the
highest ﬁgures in the EU. The overall Polish and Czech achievements
are generally better and above the EU average. In the ﬁeld of educa-
tion, achievements by Poland are in general better than the EU-27 av-
erage, especially in the case of early school leavers and tertiary
educational attainment.41 While Slovakia is catching up, the Hungarian
situation is deteriorating. In all countries there is an urgent need for re-
thinking the proﬁle of higher education in order to better meet the
labour market demands and to boost lifelong learning. Regarding ex-
penditure on education42 Slovakia has the worst ﬁgures. With the
spending of the 4.06% of the GDP in 2011 is the weakest position
among the V4 and the far away from the EU ﬁgures (5.25%). Poland
earmarks 4.94%, followed by Hungary at 4.71% and the Czech Re-
public at 4.51%. Regarding trends of government spending on edu-
cation, Hungary is considerably lower than the EU average and more
than 1.0 percentage point lower than at the time of accession. Hungary
is one of the two member states (the other country is Portugal) which
spent less money on education in 2012 than in 2004.
Income distribution and poverty
Income distribution does not show a uniform picture in the V4. The
most egalitarian countries are Slovakia and the Czech Republic,
Poland occupies a middle position with an improving tendency, while
the Hungarian situation is deteriorating.
In Poland income distribution, as measured by the Gini index, is
relatively equal and shows a decreasing tendency (from 35.6 in 2005
to 30.9 in 2012) due to the fast growth of the lowest salaries and the
fact that the richest citizens earn more but pay more taxes. Poland
occupies a middle position among the EU countries.43 In the Czech
Republic income distribution is very even in comparison with other
EU countries. The Gini coefﬁcient was 24.6 in 2013, which is the third
lowest in the EU after Slovenia and Slovakia. The Slovak Republic
41 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
42 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ_ﬁgdp&lang=en
43 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
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has the lowest dispersion of national income among the Visegrad
countries and the declining Gini coefﬁcient is lower than the EU av-
erage (below 25% in 2013). Income differences are closely related to
attained level of education (the higher the level of education, the
higher the income) and the location of the workplace reﬂects increas-
ing regional differences. In Hungary the Gini coefﬁcient reached 28
in 2013, entailing an unequal distribution.44 Between 2010 and 2013
the upper 10% of the population had gained the most: income distri-
bution became more unequal.
The risk of poverty and social exclusion decreased in all V4
countries with the exception of Hungary, where it increased since the
crisis. The most signiﬁcant decline occurred in Poland, while the Slo-
vak and especially the Czech rates are below the EU average and
among the lowest in the EU. However, even in these well-performing
countries certain strata of society, i.e., uneducated and unemployed
inhabitants, Roma population, children and single persons are still
vulnerable. Altogether in the V4 in 2013 15.6 million people, that is
12.7% of the EU28 population were at risk of poverty.
Regarding the trends of the social marginalization, the situation in
Poland has been improving uninterruptedly (even in the years of cri-
sis) along all indicators; consequently the social exclusion rate de-
creased substantially. With a rate of 26.7% in 2012 it is still a bit
above the EU average and concerns around 10 million people.
Women and young people experience a greater risk of poverty. The
goal for Poland is to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty
by 1.5 million compared to 2008. As regards monetary poverty,
Poland was one the worst performing EU countries in 2012 with a
rate of 17.1%, in contrast to the Czech Republic where the relevant
rate was 9.8%. The high monetary poverty rate is due to the fact that
a relatively small part (9%) of gross public transfers paid to house-
holds goes to the poorest citizens. Despite a signiﬁcant decrease, in
2012 5.1 million people, 13.5% of the Polish population was still se-
verely materially deprived and almost 7% were living in households
with very low work intensity.45
353
44 Artner (2014)
45 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
Judit Kiss354
In the Czech Republic the percentage of population at the risk of
poverty and social exclusion decreased to 14.6 per cent by 2013,
which is the lowest ﬁgure in the EU. However, people with lower ed-
ucation, without jobs and family, let alone the Roma-populated com-
munities have higher risks of poverty. The poverty rate is signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by social transfers. In 2011 the Czech government
adopted the Social Inclusion Strategy 2014-2020 with a main aim of
ﬁghting against poverty.  
In Slovakia the social exclusion rate decreased signiﬁcantly, from
32% in 2005 to 19.8% in 2013, which is below the EU average of
24.7%. The situation is not so bright in the case of children below the
age of 6 years and the Roma population (8% of Slovak population).
Monetary poverty improved after accession and then worsened as a
consequence of the crisis, though with a 13% rate it is still a bit better
than in Poland. In Hungary in 2013 one-third of the population, that
is 3.285 million people were at risk of poverty, which is amongst the
highest rates in the EU and higher than it was in 2005. Children under
6 years of age are even more affected: the rate in 2013 was 42.4%,
the highest since 2005 and the third highest rate in the EU after Bul-
garia and Romania. As regards material poverty, while the risk of
poverty rate before social transfers decreased from 29.4% to 26.3%
between 2005 and 2013, the poverty rate after social transfers in-
creased from 13.5% to 14.3%. Consequently, the share of the pop-
ulation whom social policy lifts out of material poverty in 2013 was
the lowest since 2005. The number of severely materially deprived
people increased from 2.3 million in 2005 to 2.6 million in 2013. 
Social welfare – social protection and social spending
A common issue for all V4 countries is how to eradicate poverty, to
support socially excluded strata and to ﬁnance social systems with
special regard to pensions and health care.  In all the V4 countries so-
cial expenditures as a percentage of GDP are below the EU average of
around 20%, the lowest being in Slovakia (12%) and the Czech Repub-
lic (13.8%). The main dilemma is how to increase social expenditures
while keeping public deﬁcit under the threshold of 3% of the GDP.
Though retirement age is gradually increasing in all countries, further
steps are required to ensure the sustainability of the pension systems.
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In Poland expenditure on social protection increased during the
crisis and in 2011 it stood at 19.2% of GDP and almost 36.7% of
total government expenditure compared to the 29% and 40% aver-
ages of the EU27. The main sources of funding of social protection
at the EU27 level were social contributions (57.5%) and general gov-
ernment contributions (38.2%). The same ﬁgures for Poland were
42.8% and 34.6%, respectively.
In the Czech Republic budgetary expenditures on social protection
were 13.8% of the GDP in 2012 compared to the EU average of
19.9%. It is the second-lowest share in the Visegrad group. However,
if the calculation is made based on purchasing power standards, the
Czech Republic is in ﬁrst place, providing the highest old age pension
among the Visegrad countries: in 2012 it was 1.649 euro (PPS)
monthly, while the EU average was 2.532 (PPS). 
In Slovakia a decreasing share of GDP is spent on social protection
(12% in 2012), indicating the lower engagement of the government
and providing an impetus for more efﬁcient and targeted social pro-
tection programmes. Rising health care expenditures (6% of GDP in
2012) correspond to the long-term trend of an ageing population. The
number of health care facilities (hospitals, out-patient care units, etc.)
increased since accession. By contrast the number of beds available
decreased along with the number of patients, consequently the beds
per patient ratio increased a bit. The health care system is struggling
with a shortage of professionals, a deteriorating age structure due to
demographic reasons, lack of graduates and immigration to the Czech
Republic for higher salaries and better working conditions. 
In Hungary social protection expenditures were equal to 17.1% of
the GDP in 2012, which is the lowest since 2006 and substantially
lower than the EU27 average of 19.9% in 2012. Since 2004 the struc-
ture of social protection expenditures has changed at the expense of
the poorest people. While expenditures on pensions increased, the
amount devoted to sickness, disability, family and children, housing,
unemployment and social protection decreased.
As regards the healthcare system in Poland, citizens are granted
free access to publicly ﬁnanced health facilities. In 2011 6.39% of
the GDP was spent on health, which is one of the lowest shares in
the EU. 70% of expenditures was ﬁnanced by the public sector and
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30% by the private sector. As regards the number of practicing
physicians and nurses per 100,000 inhabitants, Poland was the only
EU country with a negative growth rate for doctors and very low ﬁg-
ures compared to the EU average due to emigration, which causes
shortages of health care professionals. The situation with the number
of hospital beds is better.46
The Czech Republic is among those countries with lowest health-
care expenditure in the EU and it is in third place after Hungary and
Slovakia in the Visegrad group. Expenditures on health care have in-
creased gradually and reached 7.55% of the GDP. Public insurance
is compulsory for everybody with permanent residence, while private
spending on health care is increasing. However, the Czech Republic
is among those countries (even in the Visegrad group) with the lowest
rate of private spending. Despite the fact that expenditure on health-
care is among the lowest in the EU, people assess the quality of
healthcare positively. In some indicators (like doctors and beds per
inhabitants) the country exceeds the average EU level.
The biggest challenge for Slovakia is how to ﬁnance health care
and pension systems amidst the consolidation of its public ﬁnances
and keeping the public deﬁcit under the threshold of 3% of GDP.
There is a pressing need for a comprehensive reform of the social
systems with special regard to pensions and health care. The rising
share of health care expenditures corresponds with the long-term
trend of an ageing population in Slovakia and highlights the need for
efﬁciency measures to be taken with regard to over-capacities and
standardisation of procedures.47
Because of the ageing society the biggest challenge for the V4
countries is how to ﬁnance their pension systems. In Poland 58%
(in the EU27 46%) of total social beneﬁts (that is 11.6% of GDP) is
spent on pensions while the proportion of older people grows, all
while the number of persons of working age decreases. Recently
Poland introduced several reforms for mitigating long-term problems
and increasing ﬁnancial stability. It was decided to gradually increase
statutory retirement age as of January 1, 2013 and to introduce a uni-
46 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
47 Hošoff (2014b)
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form retirement age of 67 years. This decision is expected to increase
the labour supply and improve the balance of the public pension
fund. Other decisions were the radical change of the private pension
fund sector and the increase of the length of service for cases of early
retirement.
One of the biggest challenges for the future in the Czech Republic
is the sustainability of the pension system. The capital pension pillar
is voluntary and the state is not doing enough to motivate people to
use it extensively for securing their pensions. The on-going pension
system is already in deﬁcit, whereby its revenues are lower than ex-
penditures. Sustainability of the pension system is also a problem in
the case of Slovakia. It has a need for comprehensive reform of the
pension system, because the Slovak Republic will became the
fastest ageing country in the EU. These trends signal a rather short
life for Slovak pensioners after retirement in comparison to other Eu-
ropean countries, highlighting the urgent need for proper develop-
ment and funding for health-care and social care for elderly systems.48
Unfavourable tendency, that because of the cutting government
expenditures in Hungary – which is a result of government expendi-
ture cuts – has seen expenditure on old age pensions decrease. Re-
nationalisation of the assets of the private pension funds provided
short-term sustainability to the system, but in the long term it has
caused unsustainability of the current level of the monthly allowances.
The cohesive and diverging forces of
the Visegrad cooperation – main
conclusion and recommendations
After EU accession – as one of the strategic goals of the V4 was ful-
ﬁlled – the need for Visegrad cooperation was questioned. The im-
pact of the 2008 ﬁnancial and economic crisis – what has its effects
until now – brought to the surface the formerly existing structural
problems in the V4 countries. These issues and the debate on the
future of European integration give us the question what are the per-
spectives of this regional cooperation.
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The main objective of our research was to analyse the main politi-
cal, economic and social trends in order to attempt to reveal those
cohesive forces that lead to deeper cooperation and to uncover
those diverging forces that might weaken cooperation. Due to the
complexity of the problem it was not an easy task. Based on the his-
tory of the cooperation it can be stated that the shared problems or
tasks (EU and NATO accession, energy policy, infrastructure devel-
opment) strengthen the cohesive forces and push the V4 to deepen
the cooperation. On the other side, lack of ﬁnancial funding, joint pro-
grams and week institutionalisation can only result in articulating
some common interests (e.g. North-South infrastructure corridor).
There are three “levels” of the cooperation. The most visible is the
political side because common statements are always high on the
agenda. However, the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis brought
such opportunities and problems to the surface that bring a new di-
mension into the cooperation. The most robust centrifugal forces
have derived from the crisis, the national and EU-level crisis
management. In order to overcome the crisis, Poland continued and
the other three Visegrad countries started to follow an inward look-
ing economic policy which works against enhanced cooperation. It
became obvious that because of its large internal market, Poland has
more possibilities to sustain and create economic development. The
other three V4 countries are highly dependent on external markets,
mainly on the demand of the EU countries – despite the fact that
through the global value chain their exports are being re-exported to
the global markets – therefore the recession in the whole EU has
forced them to ﬁnd individual ways to sell their products. 
This reorientation of their external relations (towards e.g. Russia,
Ukraine, China and Turkey) beyond the boundaries of the EU loos-
ened their internal trade relations. Also, the economic crisis led to
decreasing demand, and competition for the shrinking markets be-
came keener within the EU and among the V4 countries; strengthen-
ing the centrifugal forces among the V4 countries. Furthermore, there
is a competition for foreign direct investment that had a declining
trend during the crisis, triggering a strong competition in this ﬁeld
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among the resource-poor V4 countries. On the political side, the dif-
ferences are more visible and detectable than on the economic side.
Not only currently, but in the long term too, the debate about the fu-
ture of the EU and the relations with Russia could weaken the cohe-
sion among the V4 countries. The differing position of the V4 is
determined by their economic and political situation along with their
national, regional and EU-level aspirations. First of all, as regards the
EU level, the Union has initiated a great number of crisis manage-
ment methods and instruments which were not supported by all the
V4 countries and/or not all the V4 countries were involved. One can
see that the four countries had different attitudes towards these
steps, consequently there was not much cooperation among them
when formulating their position. The same is true in connection with
the future of the EU too, with due regard to economic governance
and deepening the integration. While Poland is for strengthening eco-
nomic governance and for full economic, monetary and political
union, the Czech Republic and Hungary are rather (euro)
sceptical/critical, whereas Slovakia as a eurozone member is already
deeper integrated. Also, there is no consensus among the three non-
eurozone Visegrad countries about the introduction of the euro either,
even though coordinated preparations and joint introduction of the
single currency would be clearly beneﬁcial for the regional economic
and trade relations. 
Due to their different development levels and challenges, the V4
countries pursue different development strategies. That could be
seen in the debate about the future of the cohesion policy and agri-
cultural subsidies (even if they were united in the ‘friends of cohesion’
group). Regarding the decision-making on different EU issues and
policies, the V4 countries make alliances not by their geographical
position – i.e. Central European countries – but according to shared
interests in given topics with any EU member states concerned. This
can also be perceived as a factor weakening the agreement. Regard-
ing global issues, increasing Russian interests could redraw the bal-
ance of power in the former socialist block countries as well as in the
V4. Recently, the V4 countries are mostly divided by their foreign pol-
icy vis-à-vis Russia with special regard to the present conﬂict in
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Ukraine: Poland has a strong Trans-Atlantic commitment, the Czech
Republic is very critical, while Hungary and Slovakia have a prag-
matic approach. No common position on Russia is expected due to
the V4 countries’ differing history, interests and energy supply vul-
nerability.
Table 3. Factors that strengthen and weaken the V4 cooperation
It seems that the social situation and trends are the least visible in
the case of the regional cooperation. However, in the 21st century,
social conﬂicts do not stay within the state borders (see the illegal
immigration trend into the EU). Social welfare is also a key to a sus-
tainable and competitive socio-economic development. Just to men-
tion the most challenging ones: declining population and ageing
society, long-term sustainability of the social and welfare systems
(pension, health care and other social care) or the lack of workforce
in maintaining the economic development. Organised immigration
may be a key factor for all V4 countries. Other competitiveness fac-
tors such as activity rate and educational systems are also important
for a successful catching-up. This issue drew our attention to another
Converging (strengthening) factors Diverging (weakening) factors
Harmonious post-crisis growth trends
Narrowing of the development
gap among V4
Non-adherence to the euro 
area by PL, CZ, HU
Public ﬁnance stabilisation, convergence 
of monetary indicators
Different approaches/attitudes 
vis-à-vis EU governance changes
Post-crisis improvement of several 
macroeconomic indicators
Different interests/attitudes 
vis-à-vis Russia
Openness of the four economies
Different levels of exposure 
to external markets
Deepening integration into
global value chains
Insufﬁcient interconnectedness 
of infrastructure networks 
Representation of some common
interests at the EU level 
(e.g. cohesion policy, energy issues)
Lack of mechanisms for harmonising
positions on key EU issues
Potential to coordinate parts of the
135 billion euro EU assistance ﬂowing 
into the region between 2014-2020
Lack of platforms for regularly exchanging
best practices on public ﬁnance consolida-
tion or EU funds absorption, etc.
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important problem, namely that without a redesigned social welfare
system the region will lag behind. Furthermore, the V4 countries have
to tackle the gaps in regional unemployment and focus efforts on re-
gions struggling with high joblessness. In connection to this, the cur-
rent situation of the Roma minority anticipates increasing social
tensions and migration problems as well.
While the above summarised centrifugal forces do deteriorate V4
cooperation, some emerging centripetal forces might work in the
other direction. It is obvious from the list, that the factors pushing for
a stronger cooperation are shorter than the diverging factors. The
ground for further cooperation is provided by the Visegrad countries’
continued convergence to the EU based on which they should be
able to articulate and represent common interests more systemati-
cally. Good examples of shared positions in some EU policies in-
clude the already mentioned cohesion policy, interconnection of
transport and energy networks, Eastern partnership, increasing com-
petitiveness, job creation, fostering economic growth, energy secu-
rity, or the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
At this point we have to ask, do we want more from the Visegrad
cooperation besides strengthening the political and cultural cohe-
sion? Without any joint instrument (except for the International Viseg-
rad Fund), an independent and supranational organisation, and
without any common budget all economic cooperation will be only
under the umbrella of the funds of the European Union. Therefore the
future of Visegrad cooperation will be shaped by – beside the in-
terplay of the above mentioned centripetal and centrifugal forces –
the institutionalisation of the agreement. A ﬁrm ground for coopera-
tion is provided by the continued convergence to EU averages, re-
covering from the crisis and harmonious development at V4 level. In
order to enhance cooperation, national interests should be har-
monised with regional, V4 level ones with due regard to the de-
velopments of the EU. Our recommendations regarding the main
ﬁelds of enhanced cooperation should be the following:
a) In relation to the EU, the V4 should be able to formulate at least
the principal common guidelines vis-à-vis the future governance
structures. A basis for V4 cooperation in shaping the future of Eu-
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ropean integration should be the closing of the EU’s legitimacy
gap via strengthening both input and output legitimacy. Reinforc-
ing input legitimacy means the strengthening of the democratic
aspects and fostering the emergence of a European demos via
bringing the EU closer to its citizens. Strengthening output legiti-
macy entails the reinforced use of subsidiarity, that is, the EU
should focus on policy areas which really matter for citizens
(mostly issues of a cross-border dimension). It could be a good
strategy for the V4 countries to push for more input and output le-
gitimacy before any treaty change is put in the agenda..
b) In relation to high politics, the Visegrad platform should be used
for exchanging ideas and coordinating their positions in some in-
ternational problems (such as migration, conﬂict in Ukraine).
c) The three bigger countries should harmonise their strategies to
joining together the euro area. They should use the Visegrad plat-
form for exchanging best practices as regards both nominal and
real convergence. 
d) The V4 should coordinate investment projects and public procure-
ments linked to EU funds, in order to expand the possible (cross-
border) cooperation. To this end, some harmonisation of major
objectives of their national development programmes might be
useful. 
e) Finding solutions to common economic and social problems and
exchanging best practices thereof would also be important. Here
the issues to be covered could include increasing competitiveness
and productivity, ﬁnancing innovation, decreasing regional differ-
ences, accelerating EU funds' absorption, curbing corruption,
combating tax evasion, attempting at some tax harmonisation,
whitening black and grey economies, increasing youth employ-
ment, promoting labour force mobility, reforming pension and
health care systems while keeping public deﬁcit under the 3%
threshold, stopping population decline primarily via pro-family
policies, strengthening social inclusion.
f) In a policy-based approach, major ﬁelds of substantive coopera-
tion could be: energy security (e.g. building transmission infra-
structure), transport and infrastructure (building international rail
freight corridors and road infrastructure within the Trans-European
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Transport Network, construction of joined waterways), environ-
ment, food safety, innovation (establishment of a “V4 innovation
centre”), cross-border cooperation and migration. 
Even if all the obstacles to enhanced cooperation are eliminated
and all possibilities are utilised, the V4 will still remain only a supple-
ment to the EU as the main anchor of development. However, if the
cooperation is used to its full potential, it can contribute to the suc-
cessful EU membership of the countries concerned. 
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